===================================================================================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

February 20, 2024, Vol.17, No.1 (Issue 101)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/

===================================================================================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/mailmagazine/#e_letter

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.151: Why Has Sanctioning Russia Been Ineffective? An Examination of How to Improve the Sanctions Against Russia

By SUGITA Hiroki
Columnist, Kyodo News/Specially Appointed Professor, Meiji University

February 24, 2024 marks the third year of the Russo-Ukrainian War that started with the Russian full invasion of Ukraine. As the war reached a stalemate, the return of the territory taken from Ukraine seemed increasingly difficult. The Ukrainian counteroffensive stalled due to delays in military aid from the Western powers and the lack of weakening in Russia’s military might. Although US President Joe Biden’s announcement of “unprecedented sanctions” with great fanfare, sanctions against Russia, designed to freeze its ability to fund the war, have not produced decisive results. This paper overviews the sanctions that have been in place against Russia for the last two years, examines the reasons for their ineffectiveness, and discusses how to improve them.

For the full texts of this article, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/4280/

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.150 China’s Growing Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Unveiling Opportunities for Island Nations
by SEGAWA Noriyuki, Professor, Kindai University
(December 01, 2023)

No.149 How to Manage Economic Coercion: Neutralizing Its Impact through Diversification of Sales Channels and Procurement Sources
by KUNO Arata, Professor, Asia University
(October 12, 2023)

No.148 “LGBT Understanding Bill”
by FUNADA Hajime, House of Representatives member
(August 10, 2023)

No.147 “Climate Security and Japan”
by SEKIYAMA Takashi, Associate Professor, Kyoto University
(June 2, 2023)

No.146 “Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?
by NAGAO Satoru, Specially-appointed Research Fellow, JFIR Fellow(Non-Resident), Hudson Institute
(April 17, 2023)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR UPDATES

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–
ANNOUNCEMENT
—————– – – – —————–

Latest Commentary from JFIR Research Project

JFIR has launched a new three-year research project “The Future of the China-Russian Sphere of Influence Concept and Japan’s Response” in 2023.

China-Russia competition over the “sphere of influence” can greatly affect the Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Oceania region. These regions have kept up a “heart-cold, economy-boosting” relationship with China and Russia. Originally, the concept of “spheres of influence” is based on historically controlled areas and entangles states, international law, and current international relations. It should be properly investigated in accordance with the times and be applied to foreign policy.

This study group not merely analyzes these regional trends, but reevaluates both the risks and opportunities, mainly in politics, economics, military and culture, posed by the Sino-Russian proximity, including potential ones. Then, based on these current conditions, we examine Japan’s strengths and weaknesses, and seek challenges and prospects for securing Japan’s resilient comprehensive power. The study group is led by the following members to achieve the above goals.

Here, we introduce the latest commentary submitted by project member ENDO Mitsugi, Professor, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, The University of Tokyo.

Weakening Hegemony and Increasing Polarization in Africa

The global Indo-Pacific region has been characterized by a thin hegemony and a thin liberal order. These terms refer to “a hierarchical international system with heterogeneous and relatively autonomous constituent parts that interact intensely and often consensually but whose normative preferences need not converge, nor do they mirror those of the dominant power which loosely structures (some of) the system and provides some public goods” (Verhoeven, 2021). These concepts can also be applied when considering the current geopolitical landscape in Africa…

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/studygroup_article/4274/

==================================================================
Please send your comments and/or questions to:

Contact Us

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:

PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: ITO Wakako
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

===================================================================================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

December 20, 2023, Vol.16, No.6 (Issue 100)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/

===================================================================================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically
bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s
foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International
Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in
Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/mailmagazine/#e_letter

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.150: China’s Growing Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Unveiling Opportunities for Island Nations

By SEGAWA Noriyuki
Professor, Kindai University

China’s influence in the Pacific Islands has been growing steadily in recent years, extending beyond economic aspects to encompass security concerns. This has naturally elicited a response from Western democratic powers, who are undertaking various initiatives to preserve and expand their presence in the region. Consequently, the Pacific Islands have become a focal point of friction between these Western democratic powers and China. Amidst these geopolitical circumstances, the Pacific Island countries have adopted a stance of neutrality that is encapsulated in the principle of “friend to all, enemy to none,” thereby pursuing a strategy of balanced diplomacy.

How does the growing influence of China in the region and the resulting friction between Western democratic powers and China affect the Pacific Island nations? …

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

China’s Growing Engagement in the Pacific Islands: Unveiling Opportunities for Island Nations

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.149 How to Manage Economic Coercion: Neutralizing Its Impact through Diversification of Sales Channels and Procurement Sources
By KUNO Arata, House of Representatives member
(October 12, 2023)

No.148 “LGBT Understanding Bill”
By FUNADA Hajime, House of Representatives member
(August 10, 2023)

No.147 “Climate Security and Japan”
by SEKIYAMA Takashi, Associate Professor, Kyoto University
(June 2,2023)

No.146 “Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?
by NAGAO Satoru, Specially-appointed Research Fellow, JFIR Fellow(Non-Resident), Hudson Institute
(April 17, 2023)

No.145 “Does the Ukraine war poses a final threat to multilateralism?
by WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR
(February 14, 2023)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR UPDATES

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–
ANNOUNCEMENT
—————– – – – —————–

Latest Commentary from JFIR Research Project

JFIR has launched a new three-year research project “The Future of the China-Russian Sphere of Influence Concept and Japan’s Response” in 2023.

China-Russia competition over the “sphere of influence” can greatly affect the Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Oceania region. These regions have kept up a “heart-cold, economy-boosting” relationship with China and Russia. Originally, the concept of “spheres of influence” is based on historically controlled areas and entangles states, international law, and current international relations. It should be properly investigated in accordance with the times and be applied to foreign policy.

This study group not merely analyzes these regional trends, but reevaluates both the risks and opportunities, mainly in politics, economics, military and culture, posed by the Sino-Russian proximity, including potential ones. Then, based on these current conditions, we examine Japan’s strengths and weaknesses, and seek challenges and prospects for securing Japan’s resilient comprehensive power. The study group is led by the following members to achieve the above goals.

Here, we introduce the latest commentary submitted by project member OGASHIWA Yoko, Professor at Hiroshima University.

Transformation of Regional Order in Oceania and the “Internal Logic” of the Pacific Island Countries

Oceania has attracted much attention in recent years as a battleground where Western nations scramble to deter the rise of China, with both sides vying to win over the island countries in the Pacific region. However, China’s rise is not the only factor that has brought about change to the regional order of in Oceania, although it is certainly a major one. This article focuses on the “internal logic”, or interests, of the Pacific Island Countries, and clarifies how regional order has been transformed from the perspective of the Pacific Island Countries themselves…

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/studygroup_article/4268/

==================================================================
Please send your comments and/or questions to:

Contact Us

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:

PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: ITO Wakako
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

==================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

October 20, 2023, Vol.16, No.5 (Issue 99)

HOME

==================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically
bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s
foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International
Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in
Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:

PR and Enlightenment

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.149: How to Manage Economic Coercion: Neutralizing Its Impact through Diversification of Sales Channels and Procurement Sources

By KUNO Arata
Professor, Asia University

A landmark joint declaration, concentrating specifically on the domain of economic security, was issued at the G7 Summit that was convened in May. This was a pioneering move in the history of the summit. The declaration underscored the necessity of bolstering collaborative efforts to anticipate and counteract economic coercion, a topic that has garnered substantial attention.

Economic coercion refers to the attempt to interfere with the legitimate decisions of a foreign government by imposing economic costs (harm) or using threats thereof. It is a means to an end, and its ultimate strategic objectives may include coercing a target nation to extract policy concessions, attempting the international isolation or governmental destabilization of the target country, or demonstrating a strong diplomatic stance to gain political support from its citizens…

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/4250/

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.148 “LGBT Understanding Bill”
by FUNADA Hajime, House of Representatives member
(August 10, 2023)

No.147 “Climate Security and Japan”
by SEKIYAMA Takashi, Associate Professor, Kyoto University
(June 2,2023)

No.146 “Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?
by NAGAO Satoru, Specially-appointed Research Fellow, JFIR Fellow(Non-Resident), Hudson Institute
(April 17, 2023)

No.145 “Does the Ukraine war poses a final threat to multilateralism?
by WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR
(February 14, 2023)

No.144 “Pro-American yet Autonomous” in a multipolar era
by WATANABE Hirotaka,Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Teikyo University
(October 20, 2022)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR UPDATES

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

－－－－ ——－－－－
ANNOUNCEMENT
－－－－ —— －－－－

Latest Commentary from JFIR Research Project Released

JFIR has launched a new three-year research project “The Future of the China-Russian Sphere of Influence Concept and Japan’s Response”( https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/studygroup/sg2023a/ ) in 2023.

China-Russia competition over the “sphere of influence” can greatly affect the Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Oceania region. These regions have kept up a “heart-cold, economy-boosting” relationship with China and Russia. Originally, the concept of “spheres of influence” is based on historically controlled areas and entangles states, international law, and current international relations. It should be properly investigated in accordance with the times and be applied to foreign policy.

This study group not merely analyzes these regional trends, but reevaluates both the risks and opportunities, mainly in politics, economics, military and culture, posed by the Sino-Russian proximity, including potential ones. Then, based on these current conditions, we examine Japan’s strengths and weaknesses, and seek challenges and prospects for securing Japan’s resilient comprehensive power. The study group is led by the following members to achieve the above goals.

Here, we introduce the latest commentary submitted by project leader HIROSE Yoko, Professor at Keio University and Distinguished Research Fellow at JFIR.

“Emerging Developments in Nagorno-Karabakh (Updates Following Recent Report)”
By HIROSE Yoko

On September 1, I presented a report at the research meeting hosted by the Japan Forum on International Relations, centering on “The Future of the China-Russian Sphere of Influence Concept and Japan’s Response.” The report primarily emphasized the recent developments in Nagorno-Karabakh, with a particular emphasis on the peace initiatives in the first half of 2023. I highlighted the notable increase in the pro-peace observed during May to June, coinciding with high-level diplomatic negotiations primarily in Europe and the United States…

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/studygroup_article/4247/

==================================================================
Please send your comments and/or questions to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/contact/

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:

PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: ITO Wakako
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

==================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

August 20, 2023, Vol.16, No.4 (Issue 98)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/

==================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically
bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s
foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International
Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in
Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/mailmagazine/#e_letter

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.148: LGBT Understanding Bill

By FUNADA Hajime
House of Representatives member

The Bill for the Promotion of Understanding of LGBT People, formerly known as the Bill for the Promotion of Public Understanding of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, is to be passed in this Diet session. The original LGBT legislation, drafted by cross-party lawmakers in 2021, was primarily aimed at prohibiting discrimination; however, stiff opposition from the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) prevented the submission of the bill to the Parliament.

The revised version of the 2021 draft bill was proposed and endorsed by the LDP, Komeito, Japan Restoration Association, and the People’s Democratic Party. The bill underlines the premise of understanding the existence of LGBT people as well as eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. On the contrary, the opposition party’s proposal is similar to the former anti-discrimination law. The Bill for the Promotion of Understanding of LGBT People was revised within the LDP in the course of negotiations with other parties even after it was submitted to the Diet. The original title used the term “gender identification” (“seijinin” in Japanese) but was later replaced by “gender identity” (“seidouitsusei” in Japanese). Seijinin depends on the subjective decisions undertaken by the persons concerned, while seidouitsusei allows for third-party involvement, even if it is limited to an extent. The initial draft strongly stipulated that “discrimination should not be tolerated” but was later moderated to “there should be no unfair discrimination.”

“Seidouitsusei” (gender identity) was substituted with “jendaa aidenthithi” (katakana expression for gender identity) in the final form in order to gain the support of more political parties. Seidouitsusei can be interpreted as gender identity or gender identification. I am a little dissatisfied with the Diet’s signature iridescent resolution that carries ambiguous meaning. Traditionalist conservatives have harshly criticized the bill, claiming that it will destroy Japan’s good old traditions, culture, and family system. However, most developed countries have some kind of anti-discrimination institution for sexual minorities, and it is no exaggeration to say that this is a global trend. Same-sex partnerships are also spreading rapidly in many municipalities. Therefore, I intend to support this bill.

Nevertheless, it is undeniable that the legislation is yet to address some practical concerns. If “jendaa aidenthithi” is interpreted as gender identification, there is a risk of serious trouble: Males declaring themselves as “females” may enter women’s restrooms, locker rooms, and bathrooms. Without appropriate ways to deal with or forestall these problems, the law would lose its credibility and effectiveness and would be unable to promote the understanding of LGBT people. Robust preventive measures must be developed.

(This is the English translation of an article written by FUNADA Hajime, House of Representatives member, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on June 14, 2023.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.147 “Climate Security and Japan”
by SEKIYAMA Takashi, Associate Professor, Kyoto University
(June 2,2023)

No.146 “Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?
by NAGAO Satoru, Specially-appointed Research Fellow, JFIR Fellow(Non-Resident), Hudson Institute
(April 17, 2023)

No.145 “Does the Ukraine war poses a final threat to multilateralism?
by WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR
(February 14, 2023)

No.144 “Pro-American yet Autonomous” in a multipolar era
by WATANABE Hirotaka,Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Teikyo University
(October 20, 2022)

No.143 “Japan’s Choice for‘Eurasian Diplomacy'”
by TAKAHATA Yohei,Distinguished Research Fellow/ Director of Strategy and Policy, The Japan Forum on International Relations
(August 15, 2022)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR UPDATES

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
EVENT
————- – – – ————-

The 354th meeting of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” Held

The 354th meeting of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” was held on July 12, 2023 on the topic of ” Revelations of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine: Current Theories of War.” The guest speaker was SUMI Shigeki, Former Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Ukraine.

Outline of his speech is as follows:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/2023/07/12/4223/

==================================================================
Please send your comments and/or questions to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/contact/

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:

PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: ITO Wakako
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

June 20, 2023, Vol.16, No.3 (Issue 97)

HOME

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically
bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s
foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International
Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in
Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:

PR and Enlightenment

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

—————– – – – —————–
Announcement
—————– – – – —————–

FREE INVITATION to the JFIR Webinar “Xi Jinping’s China and its Future”

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) will convene the webinar “Xi Jinping’s China and its Future” to the following effect:

Date: June 30, 2023
Time: 16:00 to 17:30 JST
Form of a meeting: Online via Zoom
Language: English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation
Agenda:
Moderator: KAMO Tomoki, Professor, Keio University/
Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR
Presenters:
Andrew Walder, Professor, Stanford University
(https://www.jfir.or.jp/23public/0630AG_Walder_prof.pdf)
Jean Chun Oi, Professor, Stanford University
(https://www.jfir.or.jp/23public/0630JeanOi_prof.pdf)
Commentator: IIDA Masafumi, Head of the America, Europe, and Russia Division,
Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies

For the registration, click on the link below and fill in the required information no later than June 29, 2023.

Registration Form [Japanese]
https://forms.gle/A1kR9wzkyzHUC6pS7

We will send the Zoom URL and other details by email before the meeting.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s
foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein
is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.147: Climate Security and Japan

By SEKIYAMA Takashi
Associate Professor, Kyoto University

The G7 Hiroshima Summit Session 7 “Common Endeavor for a Resilient and Sustainable Planet” addressed the importance of understanding energy security, climate crisis, and geopolitical risks in an integrated manner.

The National Security Strategy of Japan, revised in December 2022, also recognizes that “climate change is a security issue that concerns the very existence of humankind.”

Such geopolitical risks and security implications of climate change have been discussed by the international community for more than a decade.

For example, since 2007, the United Nations Security Council has discussed the security implications of issues, such as climate change, resource and energy scarcity, water depletion, and ecosystem changes. The European Union, in its Common Foreign and Security Policy, also recognized that climate change, natural disasters, and environmental degradation have far-reaching effects on the resilience of communities and ecosystems on which life depends, and that these issues have led to numerous conflicts worldwide.

Government agencies and academic institutions, such as the University of Toronto in Canada, Stanford University in the US, Oslo International Peace Research Institute in Norway, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden, and Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, have been actively pursuing climate security research.

In this regard, climate security was rarely discussed in Japan until the 2020s (1). For example, the National Defense White Paper first addressed the impact of climate change on the security environment and defense in 2021.

Thus, the geopolitical risks of climate change are highly important and cannot be neglected by Japan.

As described in recent peer-reviewed papers, climate change-induced environmental impacts, such as extreme weather events, natural disasters, and sea level rise, or countermeasures, such as decarbonization, energy transition, and geoengineering, are likely to lead to anti-government riots, ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and even inter-state clashes through a complex causal process (2, 3).

Particularly, countries that are highly dependent on agriculture, underdeveloped, or have poor governance are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, and the risks of conflict and riots are correspondingly high.

However, Japan has a relatively high adaptive capacity to climate change and is free of conflict hotbeds, such as violent ethnic conflicts, within the country. Therefore, climate change-induced civil wars or large-scale anti-governmental riots in Japan are not generally anticipated.

Nevertheless, Japan may face climate security risks as mentioned below (4):

1) Intensifying conflicts over territorial rights and exclusive economic zones in the surrounding seas
2) Increased climate migration from Asia-Pacific countries
3) Economic stagnation due to damaged supply chains and local markets in climate-vulnerable Asian neighboring countries

These climate security risks will emerge in the future, along with the increasing impact of climate change. Unfortunately, climate change has become a reality recently. According to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which summarizes the latest scientific findings on climate change, global average temperatures have already risen by approximately 1.1 °C since the late 19th century; additionally, annual rainfall is increasing and the mean sea level rise is accelerating. Abnormal weather events, such as droughts, heat waves, and torrential rains, which have become increasingly severe worldwide in recent years, have also been reported to be related to climate change.

The effects of climate change are expected to become increasingly evident in the future. The world is striving to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050. Even if this goal is achieved, the IPCC report states that the global average temperature in mid-century (2041-2060) will be 1.2- 2.0 °C higher than in the late 19th century. If carbon neutrality is not achieved and greenhouse gas growth continues at current levels until mid-century, average temperatures are expected to rise in the range of 1.6-2.5 °C.

An increase in the average temperature of only 2 °C would increase the probability of an extreme heat wave by 13.9 times, which has occurred only once every 50 years in the late 19th century before climate change. Similarly, severe droughts, which occurred only once every 10 years in the 19th century, are expected to be 2.4 times more likely to occur when the average global temperatures would have increased by 2 °C .

Moreover, climate security risks become more realistic with the impacts of climate change. It is not a matter of today or tomorrow, but climate change can threaten social peace and stability in an amplified manner as a “threat multiplier.” When the wheels are in motion, they may become irreversible.

Thus, the key to risk management is preparing for the worst-case scenarios. Moreover, every individual company and government should be aware of the climate security risks to which they would be exposed to, and take the necessary steps to avoid them.

[References]

1. Odeyemi C, Sekiyama T. A Review of Climate Security Discussions in Japan. International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health. 2022; 19(14):8253. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph19148253.
2. Sekiyama T. Climate Security and Its Implications for East Asia. Climate. 2022; 10(7):104. https://doi.org/10.3390/cli10070104.
3. Nagano T, Sekiyama T. Review of Vulnerability Factors Linking Climate Change and Conflict. Climate. 2023; 11(5):104. https://doi.org/10.3390/cli11050104.
4. Sekiyama T. Climate Security in East Asia and Potentials for Sino-Japanese Cooperation. Journal of the International Security Studies. 2022; 14:126-148.

(This is the English translation of an article written by SEKIYAMA Takashi, Associate Professor, Kyoto University, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on May 29, 2023.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/
No.146 “Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?
by NAGAO Satoru, Specially-appointed Research Fellow, JFIR Fellow(Non-Resident), Hudson Institute
(April 17, 2023)

No.145 “Does the Ukraine war poses a final threat to multilateralism?
by WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR
(February 14, 2023)

No.144 “Pro-American yet Autonomous” in a multipolar era
by WATANABE Hirotaka,Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Teikyo University
(October 20, 2022)

No.143 “Japan’s Choice for‘Eurasian Diplomacy'”
by TAKAHATA Yohei,Distinguished Research Fellow/ Director of Strategy and Policy, The Japan Forum on International Relations
(August 15, 2022)

No.142 “Learn from the Determination of the Ukrainians”
by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
(June 15, 2022)

==================================================================
Please send your comments and/or questions to:

Contact Us

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PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: ITO Wakako
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

April 20, 2023, Vol.16, No.1 (Issue 96)

HOME

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically
bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s
foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International
Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in
Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:

PR and Enlightenment

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

—————– – – – —————–
Announcement
—————– – – – —————–

FREE INVITATION to the Symposium “Public and Private Governance of Cybersecurity: Challenges and Potential”

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) , Nagoya University,and British Institute of International and Comparative Law (BIICL) will convene the Symposium “Public and Private Governance of Cybersecurity: Challenges and Potential” to the following effect:

Date: Friday, May 26, 2023
Time: 13:30 to 17:30 JST (UTC +9)
Form of a meeting: Hybrid (in-person in Tokyo and online)
Language: English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation
Venue: Lecture Hall, International House of Japan (https://www.i-house.or.jp/eng/access.html)
Agenda:
　　13:30 Opening remarks: Mayu Watanabe (President, JFIR)
　　13:40 Keynote speech: Jun Murai (Professor, Keio University, ‘the father of the Internet in Japan’)
　　　　　　introduction by Tomoko Ishikawa (in Japanese)
　　14:00-15:30 Session 1
　　　Moderator: Kiichi Fujiwara (Professor Emeritus, the University of Tokyo)
　　　Panelists:
　　　　-Paul Nadeau (Adjunct Professor, Temple University/Asia Pacific Initiative): Cybergovernance in the Post-Liberal Order
　　　　-Wakako Ito (Director of Research, JFIR): The State-oriented Model of Internet Regulation: The Case of China
　　　　-Ian Tennant / Summer Walker (Heads, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime): Cybercrime, the United Nations, Prospects and Challenges for International Cooperation*
　　　　-Mahesh Uttamchandani / Bertram Boie (Practice Manager/ Senior Economist, World Bank): Cyber capacity-building*
　　15:30-15:45 Break
　　15:45-17:15 Session 2
　　　Moderator: Dai Yokomizo (Professor, Nagoya University)
　　　Panelists:
　　　　-Jens Hillebrand Pohl (Lecturer, Maastricht University): International Data Transfers and Cybersecurity (online presentation)*
　　　　-Aleksander Kalisz (Research associate, King’s College London): Public-Private Partnerships on Cybersecurity and International Law
　　　　-Tomoko Ishikawa (Professor, Nagoya University): Cyber Threats, Human Rights and FDI Restrictions
　　　　-Yarik Kryvoi (Senior Fellow, British Institute of International and Comparative Law): The Geopolitical Divide, Norm Conflict and Public-Private Partnership in Cybersecurity Governance
　　17:15-17:30 Closing remarks: Yarik Kryvoi (in English)
　　*:Online Presentation

JFIR would like to invite the readers of this E-letter to the Symposium.
For the registration, should you please click on the link below and fill in the required information no later than May 24, 2023.
https://forms.gle/sVPykJyo8Ex6sYwN8
Please note that “in-person” participation registration will be closed when we reach capacity.

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s
foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein
is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.146:Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?

By NAGAO Satoru
Specially-appointed Research Fellow, JFIR
Fellow(Non-Resident), Hudson Institute

Introduction

1. Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?

Japan – India relations are seeing lively development in the year 2023. In January, Indian fighter jets visited Japan for the “Veer Guardian” joint exercise. In February, the Indian Army visited Japan for the “Dharma Guardian” joint exercise. In March, Japanese and Indian transport airplanes took part in the “Shinyuu Maitri” joint exercise, and in the same month, the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) also conducted the “La Perouse” joint exercise in the Indian Ocean with the participation of Japan, the US, Australia, India, France, the UK, and Canada. The JMSDF has also conducted small-scale joint exercises with the Indian Navy…..

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Why Is India Important to Japan, the US, and Australia?

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.145 “Does the Ukraine war poses a final threat to multilateralism?
by WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR
(February 14, 2023)

No.144 “Pro-American yet Autonomous” in a multipolar era
by WATANABE Hirotaka,Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Teikyo University
(October 20, 2022)

No.143 “Japan’s Choice for‘Eurasian Diplomacy'”
by TAKAHATA Yohei,Distinguished Research Fellow/ Director of Strategy and Policy, The Japan Forum on International Relations
(August 15, 2022)

No.142 “Learn from the Determination of the Ukrainians”
by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
(June 15, 2022)

No.141 “Protect the Rules-Based Order against Russian Aggression”
by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
(June 14, 2022)

==================================================================
Please send your comments and/or questions to:

Contact Us

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:

PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: ITO Wakako
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

===================================================================================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

February 20, 2023, Vol.15, No.7 (Issue 95)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/

===================================================================================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically
bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s
foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International
Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in
Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:

PR and Enlightenment

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s
foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein
is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.145:Does the Ukraine war poses a final threat to multilateralism?

By WATANABE Mayu
President, JFIR

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has destroyed the free and open international order based on multilateralism and
the fundamental values of liberal democracies, human rights and the rule of law, which brought peace, stability
and prosperity to the world following the Cold War, and it has delivered a blow that will draw a line in global
history. Despite the invasion being a clear violation of international law – by encroaching on national sovereignty
and territorial integrity through inhumane use of military force, and threatening with nuclear weapons – we are
faced with the reality that it is not possible to halt this war using international law or international systems.
In other words, multilateralism is encountering an unprecedented test.

In response to this, the G7, EU, NATO and others have been united in criticizing Russia and have been implementing
high-level economic sanctions, while accepting the backlash on their own citizens (in the form of economic pain).
Additionally, the United Nations (UN), which both symbolizes multilateralism and represents international public opinion,
is also facing the dilemma of being unable to halt military action by a permanent member of its Security Council.
The UN has nevertheless fulfilled a role to an extent, with 141 member countries having voted in favor of condemning
Russia at an emergency special session of the UN General Assembly, an overwhelming majority.

On the other hand, what must be closely noted here is the reality that 40 countries opposed or abstained from this vote.
The 35 countries that abstained included G20 members China, India and South Africa. The vote exposed discrepancies in
countries’ stances toward Russia, and highlighted the presence of emerging and developing countries that do not agree
with the current order.

That is to say, even before the tragedy of the war, the voices of forces prioritizing “each country’s individual interests”
over “the world’s common interests” were making it difficult to reach multilateral consensuses. There are even grounds
to call this “a stalemate of multilateralism.” This is a challenge that multilateralism has been shouldering for some time,
via the withdrawals from multilateral frameworks that arose from President Trump’s policy of putting his own country first,
and Brexit.

What is furthermore serious is the threat that this is exposing the current order to, as economic powerhouse China threads
its way into these tremors in multilateralism and advocates “true multilateralism” while winning over emerging and developing
nations, and thus accelerating “‘China’s characteristic’ multilateralism” (Kunio Takahashi) (Note 1). China has declared
that it seeks to amend the international order that is seated on the UN’s international system, with “true multilateralism.”
The fact is that Chinese nationals who hold important posts at international organizations are a conspicuous presence. Additionally,
“‘China’s characteristic’ multilateralism” will grow with the “Shanghai Cooperation Organization,” the “Belt and Road
Initiative,” the “Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)” and other China initiatives. Moreover, in order to complement
the Belt and Road Initiative, which was viewed as problematic for posing a “debt trap,” China has also come out with the
appealing concept of the “Global Development Initiative (GDI),” whereby it partners with the UN to implement development
cooperation toward achieving the SDGs in developing countries.

These challenges by China and Russia are aggravating so-called “contested multilateralism,” and are exposing free and open
multilateralism based on fundamental values to a crisis of division.

Forming a backdrop to this accelerating division is a battle for supremacy between the U.S. and China, which surrounds the
standardization and connectivity of high tech resulting from the advent of a fourth industrial society. Even the deepening of
mutually dependent economic relationships that followed the Cold War has become a “weapon.” Geographical space has expanded to
space and cyberspace,and the sphere of security has also expanded to the economy, climate change and other areas. We are literally
in a transitional phase toward a new era of multilateralism. More than anything else, what is needed is wisdom that does not
create divisions in free and open multilateralism based on fundamental values. The key to that is an approach that nestles close
to all the countries in the Global South,including emerging and developing countries, so that they elect to endorse multilateralism.

（This is the partial English translation of an article written by WATANABE Mayu,President of the Japan Forum
on International Relations, which initially appeared on the JFIR website of the study group on “Strengthening
Japan’s Overall Diplomatic Capability” as of February 1, 2023.）

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.144 “Pro-American yet Autonomous” in a multipolar era
by WATANABE Hirotaka,Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Teikyo University
(October 20, 2022)

No.143 “Japan’s Choice for‘Eurasian Diplomacy'”
by TAKAHATA Yohei,Distinguished Research Fellow/ Director of Strategy and Policy, The Japan Forum on International Relations
(August 15, 2022)

No.142 “Learn from the Determination of the Ukrainians”
by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
(June 15, 2022)

No.141 “Protect the Rules-Based Order against Russian Aggression”
by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
(June 14, 2022)

No.140 “Russian Actions in Ukraine”
by ITO Kenichi, former president of the Japan Forum on International Relations
(April 20, 2022)

No.139 “The importance of the G7 and Japan’s role in a multipolar era”
by WATANABE Mayu, President, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(February 16, 2022)

==================================================================
Please send your comments and/or questions to:

Contact Us

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:

PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: OKUZUMI Rina
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

===================================================================================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

December 20, 2022, Vol.15, No.6 (Issue 94)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/

===================================================================================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:

PR and Enlightenment

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.144:”Pro-American yet Autonomous” in a multipolar era
By WATANABE Hirotaka
Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Teikyo University

Introduction

This article offers an independent examination of the global power changing relations within Eurasia and Japan’s position because of China’s rise, considering the Japan-United States (US) alliance and Japan’s relationships with the major Eurasian powers. Further, hopefully, it will be possible to position Japanese diplomacy toward Eurasia as a catalyst for pro-US yet autonomous Japanese diplomacy. Although the significance of “autonomous” is relative, it means that Japanese diplomacy must adopt a more flexible and multifaceted mindset than today, given the number of unforeseeable factors. Compared to the US, Japan is a nation with a different geopolitical position, national strengths, and national characteristics….

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

“Pro-American yet Autonomous” in a multipolar era

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.143 “Japan’s Choice for‘Eurasian Diplomacy'”
by TAKAHATA Yohei,Distinguished Research Fellow/ Director of Strategy and Policy, The Japan Forum on International Relations
(August 15, 2022)

No.142 “Learn from the Determination of the Ukrainians”
by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
(June 15, 2022)

No.141 “Protect the Rules-Based Order against Russian Aggression”
by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
(June 14, 2022)

No.140 “Russian Actions in Ukraine”
by ITO Kenichi, former president of the Japan Forum on International Relations
(April 20, 2022)

No.139 “The importance of the G7 and Japan’s role in a multipolar era”
by WATANABE Mayu, President, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(February 16, 2022)

==================================================================
Please send your comments and/or questions to:

Contact Us

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:

PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: OKUZUMI Rina
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

===================================================================================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

October 20, 2022, Vol.15, No.5 (Issue 93)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/

===================================================================================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/mailmagazine/#e_letter

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR UPDATES”

+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

—————-—————- – – – —————-—————- – – – —————-—————
PUBLICATION
—————-—————- – – – —————-—————- – – – —————-—————

“Urgent Recommendations: Proposed Basic Principles of a U.S.-Japan Strategy for China (revised and expanded version)” Released

The Japan Forum on International Relations, in collaboration with the American Enterprise Institute, has been conducting a joint U.S. – Japan research project, titled “China Risk and China Opportunity in the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Era,'” to seek policy coordination between the United States and Japan to confront and respond to the risks and opportunities that an increasingly assertive and rising China poses to the international community.

In July 2021, seizing the opportunity of the start of new diplomatic and security structure in the United States and Japan with the completion of the Biden administration’s review of U.S. policy toward China in the United States and the personnel shakeup of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Security Secretariat in Japan, this project issued “Urgent Recommendations: Proposed Basic Principles of a U.S.-Japan Strategy for China,” prepared by KAMIYA Matake (project Leader and Japan team leader), James SCHOFF (then U.S. team leader), KAWASHIMA Shin (vice-leader of Japan team) and HOSOYA Yuichi (vice leader of Japan team).

Since then, the project has conducted three joint U.S.-Japan workshops on democracy and human rights, economic security, and Taiwan, based on this urgent proposal, and has prepared an expanded and revised version based on the results of the discussions held there, also taking into consideration the recent developments surrounding Russia and Ukraine.

This revised and expanded version was prepared by members of the project from both the U.S. and Japan team, co-chaired by the above four leaders and Zack Cooper, who has become the U.S. team leader since April 2022, when the U.S. implementing organization was changed from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to the American Enterprise Institute.

The authors believe that this revised and expanded version, which updates the comprehensive and multifaceted guidelines on what strategies the United States and Japan should adopt toward China in light of the latest international developments, provides further important input for both U.S. and Japanese governments in formulating their policies toward China.

For the full text of the Urgent Recommendations, please refer
to:https://www.jfir.or.jp/wp/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/220901_pre.pdf

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PR and Enlightenment

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JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

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The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

August 20, 2022, Vol.15, No.4 (Issue 92)

HOME

==================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:

PR and Enlightenment

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.143: “Japan’s Choice for ‘Eurasian Diplomacy'”
By TAKAHATA Yohei
Distinguished Research Fellow/ Director of Strategy and Policy, The Japan Forum on International Relations

Introduction

On July 24, 1997, then-Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto delivered the following speech at a roundtable meeting of the Keizai Doyukai (the Japan Association of Corporate Executives).

“I believe that amid the sweeping changes in international relations resulting from the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy of our nation has come to an important period in which we must significantly push to enlarge the horizon of our foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region as we forge a new diplomatic perspective. I prefer to call this perspective Eurasian diplomacy.”…

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Japan’s Choice for “Eurasian Diplomacy”

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.142 “Learn from the Determination of the Ukrainians”
by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
(June 15, 2022)

No.141 “Protect the Rules-Based Order against Russian Aggression”
by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
(June 14, 2022)

No.140 “Russian Actions in Ukraine”
by ITO Kenichi, former president of the Japan Forum on International Relations
(April 20, 2022)

No.139 “The importance of the G7 and Japan’s role in a multipolar era”
by WATANABE Mayu, President, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(February 16, 2022)

No.138 “Discussions on strategic stability among the U.S., China, and Russia”
by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University
(December 16, 2021)

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The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

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The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

June 20, 2022, Vol.15, No.3 (Issue 91)

HOME

==================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:

PR and Enlightenment

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR COMMENTARY

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

*This issue contains two commentaries on Russia’s aggression against Ukraine written by the same author.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 141: “Protect the Rules-Based Order against Russian Aggression”

By KAMIYA Matake
Vice President, The Japan Forum on International Relations

Witness to a war of aggression

We are now witnessing a Russian war of aggression for which there is no excuse. If the international community tacitly approves of this kind of action by a major power against a smaller nation through silence, this will damage the very foundation of the rules-based international order that has served as the basis of global peace for the past several decades.

If this were to happen, the world runs the risk of returning to a situation akin to the 19th-century style power struggles in which power is the only tool available to counter that of other countries and protect one’s own country. We need to recognize how undesirable this would be and must confront Russia’s outrageous action in order to preserve the rules-based international order.

What is the international order that is based upon rules? The international community lacks a central government. Under these circumstances, a powerful actor could do almost anything they want, especially to a weaker actor. Within a country, even powerful individuals and groups are not allowed to engage in actions that violate laws and rules. This is because governments and government agencies such as the police, the military, the courts, and others would restrain and punish such actors in accordance with the law.

However, the international community does not have such enforcement mechanisms in place. This is why international law has little coercive force, allowing powerful actors to remain unchallenged when they violate rules.

In the post-war era, this situation has been greatly mitigated under the international order that was created and maintained primarily by the liberal democracies of the world (including Japan), with the United States at its helm. This constitutes the rules-based international order.

Under this order, major powers including the United States, which is the most powerful country in the world, as well as smaller powers have in principle respected international rules, and refrained from taking actions that depend upon force. Naturally, there has not been a complete absence of tyranny by the major powers. However, taking the United States as an example, even in the period during which its power overwhelmed that of all other countries, the United States endeavored to act in ways that were, relatively speaking, in accordance with international laws and rules. As a result, this order enabled us to remain relatively oblivious to the fact that the international community is an arena of power struggles where military might ultimately have the final say.

Tyranny by force must not be allowed

However, Russia’s recent actions are based on the belief that powerful countries are free to disregard international rules and do whatever they want. If we allow such behavior to continue, the only option to counter tyranny would be to use force, reverting the world to a time of confrontation based on military power. As a result, countries around the world would be forced to strengthen their militaries. Japan would be no exception if this occurred.

Since the invasion of Ukraine began, Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated that Russia is the world’s most powerful nuclear power, and on February 27, he put the country’s nuclear forces on “special alert.” Thus, there is concern that he is considering the use of tactical nuclear weapons in order to end the war in Ukraine.

If this occurs, it would signal the end of the era of non-use of nuclear weapons that has been in place for 77 years since the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The world would realize that nuclear weapons could be used. In such a situation, the number of countries which would pursue obtaining nukes might increase. Once this transpires, it would be uncertain whether Japan could remain the exception to the rule.

China shares the same idea as Russia

If we do not wish to witness the emergence of such a world, the international community, including Japan, must be prepared to resolutely protect the rules-based international order against Russian aggression. In this sense, the exclusion of Russia from the international payment network known as the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT) was the right decision; as such, it was only natural that Japan immediately announced that it would participate in this sanction. Although some are concerned that this would have a negative effect on the global economy, this is no time to be worried about such things.

It is of concern that China, the number two major power in the world, has not criticized the Russian invasion of Ukraine. China, which values cooperation with Russia in the face of the confrontation with the United States, has not wavered in its pro-Russian stance despite the situation in Ukraine. According to reports, President Xi Jinping has expressed support for Russia in the face of global economic sanctions. On February 24, immediately after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Consul General of the P.R.C. in Osaka Xue Jian posted a tweet under the title “A major lesson that should be learned from the Ukrainian problem” in which he stated, “the weak should absolutely never be stupid enough to pick fights with the strong!” The idea that weak nations should “absolutely never” defy powerful nations is diametrically opposed to the spirit of the rules-based international order.

The danger that we may revert to a situation in which international politics is reduced to power struggles and international rules are rendered meaningless is not a problem that Japan is insulated from. If we believe that such a world is undesirable, we must be willing to acknowledge the criticality of the present moment.

(This is the English translation of an article written by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan. The article was first published on the “Seiron” Column in Sankei Shimbun on March 3, 2022. It was also reprinted on the JFIR Website on the same date and posted on “JFIR Commentary” on June 14, 2022.)

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No. 142: “Learn from the Determination of the Ukrainians”

By KAMIYA Matake
Vice President, The Japan Forum on International Relations

I’m on the blacklist too

Some readers might have noticed that my name was included in the Russian blacklist banning 63 Japanese citizens from entering the country. Nothing would make me happier as an opinion leader if my criticism of Russia, as in my contribution to this column titled “Protect the Rules-based Order against Russian Aggression” on March 3, has caught Moscow’s eye. I am renewing my determination to speak courageously and not be afraid of anything.

Speaking of determination, this war has revealed the importance of determination in security matters. On May 9, coinciding with the Victory Day celebrations in Moscow, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy released a video in which he said, “The road […] is difficult, but we have no doubt that we will win” and “we will not give anyone a single piece of our land.” Russian President Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, was unable to present any concrete war results to the public in his speech at the celebrations. His speech suggested that Russia was focusing on the conquest of the Donbass region in eastern Ukraine, but according to a senior Pentagon official, Russian troops were recently seeing “very little progress” in the area due to resistance from the Ukrainian military.

Little Ukraine fighting impressively and giant Russia struggling: At the moment, we seem to accept this description as a matter of course. In recent times, there have even been speculations that Ukraine is about to go on the offensive and may even be considering retaking Crimea. Yet we should not forget that the mood around the world was quite different when this war started. Many thought that the capital Kyiv would only last a few days, with the United States and Europe even discussing how to support a government-in-exile outside Ukraine.

At the start of the war, President Putin must have thought that if the great power Russia struck hard, the Ukrainians would immediately surrender for fear of their lives, the comedian-turned-president Zelenskyy fleeing in terror. Chinese President Xi Jinping was likely of the same opinion. It is easy to find fault with this, but the truth is that we had no doubts of this prospect either.

Fighting of their own volition

The international community is in a state of anarchy, lacking a central government. Within a country, the expectation is that any unjustified “change of the status quo by force” by a strong actor will be undone by the government. But that is not the case in the international community. A status quo changed forcefully by a strong state is often accepted by the international community, especially when the use of force is limited and human casualties are low.

In the case of Ukraine, the Crimean situation before the war was close to that. In this war, if the Ukrainians had surrendered to Russia to prioritize the saving of lives over independence, a puppet government would have been established and the new situation would have been de facto accepted by the rest of the world, albeit reluctantly.

What prevented this from happening was the determination of the Ukrainian people to defend their country. In Japan, there were those who said that President Zelenskyy should give up on resisting in order to reduce civilian casualties, flee the country, and try to make a comeback at a later time. But this call is decisively mistaken because it fails to take into account the fact that the Ukrainians are fighting of their own volition.

From a Russian perspective, this war is “Putin’s war.” The Russians did not want this war. They are being made to contribute to a war that was initiated on Putin’s orders.

The question posed to the Japanese people

By contrast, the Ukrainians are not fighting “Zelenskyy’s War.” They rose up of their own volition to defend “the aggregation of various institutions, customs, values, and ideals that make Ukraine Ukraine and that make Ukrainians Ukrainians.” They believe that “to surrender is tantamount to becoming Russians” (Andrey Kurkov, one of Ukraine’s most renowned authors) and are determined to risk even their lives in opposition to that.

It is only because of the strength of their determination that Ukraine remains steadfast in its resistance against the aggression of the great power Russia. Being in an international community that lacks a central government, one must ultimately defend oneself with one’s own hands. Seeing the determination of the Ukrainians to do so, many countries around the world, including the United States, European countries, and Japan, are also strengthening their resolve to support Ukraine even if it means confronting Russia.

To protect oneself with one’s own hands in the state of anarchy, one needs the power required to do so. Yet what should not be overlooked is that, along with that power, it is also necessary to possess the determination to stand up to aggression.

Witnessing the ongoing situation in Ukraine, it appears that the security awareness of the Japanese people is rapidly becoming more realistic. It is favorable that there is a growing momentum for discussions about building defense capabilities without taboos. Yet another question posed to the Japanese is whether we have the determination to defend our country. It is not simply a matter of making brave statements. The Japanese ought to look at the behavior of the Ukrainians right now and think long and hard about what determination to defend one’s country really means.

(This is the English translation of an article written by KAMIYA Matake, Vice President, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan. The article was first published on the “Seiron” Column in Sankei Shimbun on May 16, 2022. It was also reprinted on the JFIR Website on the same date and posted on “JFIR Commentary” on June 15, 2022.)

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For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.140 “Russian Actions in Ukraine”
by ITO Kenichi, former president of the Japan Forum on International Relations
(April 20, 2022)

No.139 “The importance of the G7 and Japan’s role in a multipolar era”
by WATANABE Mayu, President, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(February 16, 2022)

No.138 “Discussions on strategic stability among the U.S., China, and Russia”
by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University
(December 16, 2021)

No.137 “Discussion of the Situation in Afghanistan”
by SUGITA Hiroki, Columnist, Kyodo News Agency
(October 19,2021)

No.136 “What is Putin’s Strategy on Japan? Vigilance needed on Russia’s ‘Peace Treaty’ Proposal”
by TOKIWA Shin, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Deputy Foreign Editor, Tokyo Shimbun
(August 2, 2021)

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Please send your comments and/or questions to:

Contact Us

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PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

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The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

April 20, 2022, Vol.15, No.2 (Issue 90)

HOME

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Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:

PR and Enlightenment

WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

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JFIR UPDATES

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“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

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ANNOUNCEMENT
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In Memory of Late Chairman ITO Kenichi

ITO Kenichi, Chairman of The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), passed away on March 14 from aspiration pneumonia at the age of 84.

The Japan Forum on International Relations, which was founded with Ito playing the leading role, marked its 35th anniversary in March. As a private, independent foreign affairs think tank, we have been conducting research, hosting exchanges, and proposing a path for Japan as a member of the international community. Ito’s argument for “Positive Pacifism” has become a major guiding principle for Japan’s diplomacy.

Ito devoted his working life to providing acute insights into Russia and made a persuasive case for his position. Russia is currently invading Ukraine, disrupting the status quo by force right before our eyes. Russia’s action, along with the rise of China, is an indication that the world must now fundamentally rethink its postwar international order. Thus, the significance of The Japan Forum on International Relations has never been greater. We will fulfill our mission as an institution with a public mandate and pass on Ito’s aspiration to the next generation. We pray that he rests in peace.

March 2022
President of the Japan Forum on International Relations
WATANABE Mayu

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ANNOUNCEMENT
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The Commentaries of JFIR Research Project Released

JFIR has established the three-year research project “Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of ‘Multilayer Globalism'” in 2020.
The basis of the existing international order, what can be defined as ‘liberal globalism,’ has been challenged by non-liberal globalism promoted by the emerging powers including China, while ‘techno-globalism’ in which the humanity has never experienced are drastically transforming the society through AI and cyberspace.
Thus, it can be regarded that the 21st Century world has entered ‘the age of multilayer globalism.’
The project aims to guide Japan’s Diplomacy in light of this trend.
It consists of the 7 research branches listed.

Branch 1: China Risk and China Opportunity in the “Era of Free and Open Indo-Pacific”
Branch 2: Japan’s Diplomacy in Eurasian Dynamism
Branch 3: US-China Hegemonic Competition and Indo-Pacific Geoeconomics
Branch 4: Multi-faceted Approach to Reinforcing a Maritime Order in East Asia: Shaping and Rallying Maritime “Public Opinion”
Branch 5: Domestic Factors in China’s Foreign Behavior and Japan’s Response
Branch 6: Russia’s Logic and Japan’s Strategy toward Russia
Branch 7: Strengthening Japan’s Overall Diplomatic Capability: Possibility of Japan as a “Hybrid Power”

As the products for the second year, each branch released commentaries. Here we introduce the commentaries submitted from the above five branches. (Note: Titles/positions of the authors are as of the release.)

The following three articles (out of ten in total) were released by the research branch 1, “China Risk and China Opportunity in the ‘Era of Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.”

“Japan’s Risk Awareness and Policy Response Concerning the Taiwan Strait”
By SAHASHI Ryo
Associate Professor, Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, the University of Tokyo

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Japan’s Risk Awareness and Policy Response Concerning the Taiwan Strait

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“Xi Jinping’s ‘Integrated Development’ Strategy across the Taiwan Strait, and the U.S. and Japan’s Response”
By FUKUDA Madoka
Professor, Hosei University

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Xi Jinping’s “Integrated Development” Strategy across the Taiwan Strait, and the U.S. and Japan’s Response

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“Managing Technological Competition with China: Challenges for Japan and the United States”
By MORI Satoru
Professor, Hosei University

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Managing Technological Competition with China:

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The following three articles (out of ten in total) were released by the research branch 4, “Multi-faceted Approach to Reinforcing a Maritime Order in East Asia: Shaping and Rallying Maritime ‘Public Opinion'”.

“The Use of the Northern Sea Route by a ‘Japanese Shipping Company'”
By GODA Hiroyuki
Professor, Marine Studies Frontier Education Center, School of Marine Science and Technology, Tokai University

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

The Use of the Northern Sea Route by a “Japanese Shipping Company”

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“Challenges in the Large-Scale Introduction of Offshore Wind Power Generation and the Potential for Japan’s International Contributions through the Use of Marine Energy (Bringing Soft Sharp Power to Asia)”
By KINOSHITA Takeshi
Professor Emeritus, University of Tokyo

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Challenges in the Large-Scale Introduction of Offshore Wind Power Generation and the Potential for Japan’s International Contributions through the Use of Marine Energy

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“Searching for the Objectives of China’s Revised Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China”
By SAKAMOTO Shigeki
Professor Emeritus, Kobe University

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Searching for the Objectives of China’s Revised Maritime Traffic Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China

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The following two articles (out of ten in total) were released by the research branch 5, “Domestic Factors in China’s Foreign Behavior and Japan’s Response”.

“Xi Jinping’s Movements on his ‘United Front'”
By SUWA Kazuyuki
Professor, Faculty of International Relations, University of Shizuoka

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Xi Jinping’s Movements on his “United Front”

For the full texts of this article in Chinese, please refer to:

习近平的统一战线工作

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“Transformation of Historical Awareness under the Xi Jinping Administration —-Regarding Negative History, Political Style, and Foreign Policy—-”
By SHIROYAMA Hidemi
Professor, Research Faculty of Media and Communication, Hokkaido University

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Transformation of Historical Awareness under the Xi Jinping Administration

For the full texts of this article in Chinese, please refer to:

习近平主政下“历史认识”之变化

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The following one article (out of ten in total) were released by the research branch 6, “Russia’s Logic and Japan’s Strategy toward Russia”.

“There was no promise of NATO non-expansion: Myth made by Putin”
By HAKAMADA Shigeki
Trustee, JFIR / Chairman of The Council on National Security Problems / Professor Emeritus, Aoyama Gakuin University

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

There was no promise of NATO non-expansion: Myth made by Putin

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The following one article (out of ten in total) were released by the research branch 7, “Strengthening Japan’s Overall Diplomatic Capability: Possibility of Japan as a ‘Hybrid Power'”.

“Japan’s Soft Power in the Struggle over International Order”
By KAWASAKI Tsuyoshi
Professor, Simon Fraser University

For the full texts of this article, please refer to:

Japan’s Soft Power in the Struggle over International Order

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We plan to update the website contents frequently, so please check the below link to see what’s new.

Japan and the World in the Age of ‘Multilayer Globalism’ 2020 to 2023

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JFIR COMMENTARY

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“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

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No. 140: “Russian Actions in Ukraine”
By ITO Kenichi

There are some who insist that the reason Russia annexed Crimea was either because of “NATO’s eastward expansion, which made it necessary for Russia to act to defend its sphere of influence,” or that “the responsibility lies with the international community, which has not determined which basic principle takes precedence, that of national self-determination or that of non-intervention in another country’s domestic affairs.” I, however, believe that both of these explanations are exercises in sophistry, and that the essential significance of “Russian actions in Ukraine” lies elsewhere.

NATO’s eastward expansion was not of its own volition, but rather, it happened on the request of the central and eastern European nations that had suffered under Russian oppression in the past. Romania’s former defense minister Ioan Pascu -who worked to get Romania NATO membership- once confided in me his relief over getting it thus: “With this, Romania has, for the first time in its history, attained true security.” The issue of which countries the central and eastern European nations will ally themselves with is their sovereign decision and not something that Russia should dictate.

While the issue of whether national self-determination or non-interference in another country’s domestic affairs takes priority is indeed something that remains unresolved in international law and, thus, is a source of instability in international politics, it can by no means be used by Russia to justify its actions in this case. This is because the essential significance of “Russian actions in Ukraine” does not lie in this area.

Thus, what needs to be addressed now is what the essential significance of “Russian actions in Ukraine” is. This is fundamentally connected to “Russian actions in Georgia” in August 2008. Russia, having faced no sanctions by the international community for its actions in Georgia and, essentially, achieving territorial expansion as a result, has acquired a taste for such behavior, doing largely the same thing in Crimea. This view is the one that best demonstrates the essence of Russian actions. I believe that “governance by force” has been at the core of the Russian state from its imperial days through the era of the Soviet Union. Thus, I have since long sensed the Putin government’s dangerous tendency to revert to this ideology.

I visited Russia in August 2000, shortly after Putin became President, and in the report I wrote after returning to Japan (published in the December edition of the magazine Shokun!), I predicted the following: “President Putin will spend the next ten or twenty years leading the construction of a regenerated Russia and will thus occupy a place in Russian history as an ‘architect’ comparable to Peter the Great and Stalin.” This prediction later proved to be accurate. The basis for my prediction was my judgment that Putin was establishing his authority based on “violence,” and that this was in accordance with the system of “Rikichi (rule by violence) ” that is part of Russia’s traditional political culture. Let me explain what I mean by “Rikichi” here.

Those practicing “Rikichi” were, at the time, commonly known as “machine.” Later, it became a system of authority linked to the KGB (Russian secret police) and came to be known as silovik (the faction of force). Before long, they arrested the businessman Mikhail Khodorkovsky, who represented the anti-Putin forces in the business world, and disbanded the oil company Yukos, which symbolized the oil and gas interests at the time. Indeed, “Rikichi” by the secret police, who wielded unlimited and absolute power, has been the traditional internal structure of Russia, with origins in the Oprichnina policy of Ivan the Terrible and later leading to Stalin’s Great Purge. The Putin administration inherited this and projected it outward, thus making it the “genetic makeup” of Russian foreign policy. This was, and continues to be, my theory on Russia.

Recent Russian actions include sending members of the Russian army to Crimea in disguise (as members of a militia) and claiming that the results of a referendum on whether Russia should annex Crimea “reflected the will of the people,” based on which Russia unilaterally annexed Crimea. This was a typical “Rikichi” action, while at the same time, it was a highly conspiratorial act based on a meticulously prepared strategic plan. The Georgian regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia were seized in the same manner. This is reminiscent of the Manchurian Incident, in which the Imperial Japanese Army itself blew up the Manchurian Railway line and then blamed it on China, subsequently moving to establish control over the entirety of Manchuria. The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia were similar actions. This indeed is where we need to look for the essential significance of “Russian actions in Ukraine.”

What, then, is the new problem currently facing the international community? We could express it as follows: How should we deal with “rogue states” that threaten post-Cold War security when they are major powers such as Russia? Our handling of such states needs to proceed with an abundance of caution, but fortunately, we have our successful experience of the Cold War. Did Russia -a state ruled by violence- learn nothing from its defeat in the Cold War? The international community maintained as its basic stance, throughout the Cold War, the idea that “the use of violence to change the status quo is unacceptable.” If we are to take the “Putin doctrine” announced at the annexation of Crimea on March 18 as an expression of his actual thoughts, then the international community needs to prepare itself to respond with an understanding of the essential significance of “Russian actions in Ukraine.”

(This essay is the English translation of a Japanese-language essay dated June 18, 2014 in which ITO Kenichi analyzed Russia. It has been published in memoriam of the author, then president of the Japan Forum on International Relations, who passed away on March 14, 2022.)

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For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.139 “The importance of the G7 and Japan’s role in a multipolar era”
by WATANABE Mayu, President, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(February 16, 2022)

No.138 “Discussions on strategic stability among the U.S., China, and Russia”
by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University
(December 16, 2021)

No.137 “Discussion of the Situation in Afghanistan”
by SUGITA Hiroki, Columnist, Kyodo News Agency
(October 19,2021)

No.136 “What is Putin’s Strategy on Japan? Vigilance needed on Russia’s ‘Peace Treaty’ Proposal”
by TOKIWA Shin, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Deputy Foreign Editor, Tokyo Shimbun
(August 2, 2021)

No.135 “Time To Have a Strong Interest in Digital Society Policy”
by ITO Yo, Professor Emeritus at the University of Yamanashi
(June 7, 2021)

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Please send your comments and/or questions to:

Contact Us

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:

PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

This e-mail is being sent to those subscribing “JFIR E-Letter.”

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　 FREE INVITATION
The International Symposium “Japan-Pacific Cooperation for Building a Free and Open Maritime Order”

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The Pacific Ocean, including the South Pacific island countries, known as the paradise of the earth, has recently become an area of major international political controversy due to environmental issues and the aggressive expansion of some countries. Against this backdrop, the stability and development of this region is essential for the realization of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” that Japan is promoting. Japan needs to further enhance cooperation with Pacific nations that share the sea.

Based on the above awareness of the issues, the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) will convene the International Symposium “Japan-Pacific Cooperation for Building a Free and Open Maritime Order,” to the following effect:

Date: Wednesday, 16 March, 2022
Time: 14:00 to 16:00
Form of a meeting: Virtual Webinar via Zoom
Language: English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation
Program: https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/220316_infoe/

Register: https://forms.gle/VV7q1Vn7SUk3cqNm9

This symposium will feature such eminent panelists as follows:
Joanne MCMILLAN, Second Secretary (Political), Australian Embassy, Tokyo
John FRITZ, Ambassador, Federated States of Micronesia to Japan
Joji DUMUKURO, Manager, National Security and Policing, Ministry of Defence, National Security & Policing, Republic of Fiji
LI Shui-Hui, President, Taiwan Japan Academy

KOBAYASHI Izumi, Professor, Osaka Gakuin University
ISHIKAWA Satoshi, Professor, School of Marine Science and Technology, Tokai University
GODA Hiroyuki, Professor, Marine Frontier Education Center, Tokai University
YAMADA Yoshihiko, Professor, Tokai University

※Moderator ITO Go, Professor, Meiji University / Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR

This symposium is part of the research project “Multi-faceted Approach to Reinforcing a Maritime Order in East Asia: Shaping and Rallying Maritime Public Opinion ( https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/ ), which JFIR has been conducting since 2020 under the supervision of ITO Go, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR, by bringing together Japanese ocean researchers in a wide range of fields. ( https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/studygroup/sg0/ ).

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CONTACT INFORMATION
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Officer in Charge: KIKUCHI
The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo,
107-0052, JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2193
Mail: jfir@jfir.or.jp

This is sent to all readers of the “JFIR newsletter.”

Secretariat of the JFIR

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JFIR Japan-U.S. Joint Symposium
“Rising China Risks to Taiwan amid the War in Ukraine: What Strategy is Necessary for the U.S.-Japan Alliance?”

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has cast a shadow over the Taiwan issue. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated on March 7 that Taiwan has always been part of China and emphasized that the Taiwan issue differs from the Ukraine issue because it is an internal affair of China. He warned Japan not to let its words and actions on the Taiwan issue cause serious damage to Japan-China relations. While Japan, the U.S., and Europe have united to impose sanctions against Russia, China has maintained a cooperative stance toward Russia. China however also says that it is ready to act as mediator between Ukraine and Russia. How will the war in Ukraine affect cross-strait relations and what changes will it bring about in the Japanese and U.S. attitudes toward Taiwan and the U.S.-Japan alliance strategy?

Based on the above recognition, the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) will convene the Japan-U.S. joint Symposium on “Rising China Risks to Taiwan amid the War in Ukraine: What Strategy is Necessary for the U.S.-Japan Alliance?” under the co-sponsorship with the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), to the following effect:

*Date and Time:
Monday, 21 March, 2022
US West Coast | 5:00 pm-7:00 pm
US East Coast | 8:00 pm-10:00pm
Tuesday, 22 March, 2022
Tokyo / Seoul | 9:00 am-11:00am
Manila/ Singapore | 8:00 am-10:00am

*Form of a meeting: Virtual Webinar via Zoom
*Program: https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/220322_programme/
*Charge: Free
*Language: English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation

The symposium will be divided into Session 1 “The Alliance Response to China Risks for Taiwan”, and Session 2 “Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on China-Taiwan Relations”, with experts from Japan and the U.S. presenting their perspectives on the topics.
The “Symposium” will feature such eminent panelists as follows:

Japanese side:
KAMIYA Matake, Project Leader/ Vice President, JFIR/ Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
SAHASHI Ryo, Associate Professor, The University of Tokyo
FUKUDA Madoka, Professor, Hosei University
OBA Mie, Professor, Kanagawa University
KOTANI Tetsuo, Professor, Meikai University
KAWASHIMA Shin, Vice Leader, Japanese Research Team/ Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, The University of Tokyo
HOSOYA Yuichi, Vice Leader, Japanese Research Team/ Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Keio University

U.S. side:
Patricia KIM, David M. Rubenstein Fellow, John L. Thornton China Center and the Center for East Asia Policy Studies, the Brookings Institution
Nick SZECHENYI, Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Japan Chair, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Zack COOPER, Senior Fellow, American Enterprise Institute (AEI)/ Co-Director, Alliance for Securing Democracy
James SCHOFF, Leader, U.S. Research Team/ Senior Director, Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA
(Order of Appearance)

This symposium is part of the U.S.-Japan joint research group on “China Risk and China Opportunity in the ‘Era of Free and Open Indo-Pacific’.”
JFIR has been conducting this joint research since 2020 in collaboration with Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) under the leadership of Project Leader KAMIYA Matake. (The U.S. counterpart of this joint research group will be changed to the American Enterprise Institute [AEI] beginning in the new fiscal year.)

For the registration, should you please click on the link below and fill in the required information no later than March 19, 2022.

https://forms.gle/y8QXNhKmkoeFevkb8

You will receive an email with the Zoom participation URL and password by the day before the meeting.
Please note that this event will close when it reaches its full capacity.

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Contact information for this Symposium
Secretariat of the JFIR (Contact Person: ITO Wakako / SATO)
(2-17-12-1301 Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo TEL: 03-3584-2190)

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The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

February 20, 2022, Vol.15, No.1 (Issue 89)

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Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:

PR and Enlightenment

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

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JFIR COMMENTARY

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“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

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No. 139: “The importance of the G7 and Japan’s role in a multipolar era”
By WATANABE Mayu
President, the Japan Forum on International Relations

Nearly half a century has passed since the inaugural Group of Seven (G7) Summit took place at the Chateau de Rambouillet on the outskirts of Paris. On the inaugural agenda of the Summit, which traces its origins to a 1973 meeting between the finance ministers of the US, West Germany, France, and the UK, was the response to the economic crisis in the US. However, the Summit’s role and significance have changed over the last fifty years, as the international community has become more polarized and complex. The year 2008 saw the emergence of a multilateral framework called the G20, while the G7 would go on to become highly institutionalized. With the dynamics of a world led by Japan, the US, and Europe undergoing a significant transformation in recent years due to the rise of emerging nations such as China and India, the questions of how to define international rules and how to form a new international order have naturally come to the forefront.

Looking at the events of the past several years, one can sense the nascent development of a configuration among the current G7 members that might rightly be called “the G7 vs. China.” Of course, the G7 does display some degree of a cooperative stance with China in spheres where the interests of the two nations overlap, but it is nevertheless the case, that at last year’s Summit, the US President Joe Biden framed US–China relations in antagonistic terms, and the UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson sought to expand the camp of democracies under the “D11” banner.

In addition, last year’s Leaders’ Statement arguably made this configuration all the more clear, not least by explicitly mentioning Taiwan for the first time. The G7 also expanded their foreign ministers’ meeting in the UK in December to include foreign ministers from the ASEAN region, a decision that was likely to have been taken with China in mind. Conversely, depending on how one looks at these events, they may send the message that the G7 cannot stand up to China unless it bands together; hence, caution must be exercised. This is especially true, since the stance toward China among the G7 countries are varied, with Japan, the US, and the UK sharing a strong sense of crisis that contrasts with the more cautious approach taken by Germany and France, which have deep economic ties with China.

Within this context, what is the role expected of Japan in the G7? Japan has been a member since the inaugural summit as a leader of liberal democracies, working towards the formation of a stable international order. Amid circumstances that see the G7 uniting in an anti-China context, would it not be best for Japan to sharpen its ability to coordinate with other countries and adopt more imaginative diplomatic policies that focus on global interests going beyond its own?

What is important here, first and foremost, is to spread an accurate perception of Asia. While China is currently expanding both militarily and economically, each country differs in how it perceives China. This is due to differences in physical distance, cultural distance, or the strength of the country’s political and economic ties with China. In addition to being the only Asian member of the G7, Japan is also China’s neighbor. In that sense, the G7 still has great expectations of Japan as its window into Asia. Japan should meet these expectations by disseminating an accurate perception of Asia, and making the most of its uncommonly deft negotiation skills to settle disputes among the G7 members. It is also imperative that Japan actively develops policies from a wider perspective, encompassing Asia and the Indian Ocean.

In light of this, JFIR launched a study group called “Strengthening Japan’s Overall Diplomatic Capability: Possibility of Japan as a ‘Hybrid Power'” in 2020. This study group, in which I serve as the Vice-Chair, uses both quantitative and non-quantitative international indices as a basis for discussions to explore the kinds of “hybrid power” Japan could exercise to strengthen its national brand. We conduct research using the global think tank network we have at our disposal in the hope of supporting Japanese diplomacy from a Track II perspective. Aside from devoting all our efforts to what we can do, we would now like to focus on future developments in Kishida Diplomacy.

(This is the English translation of an article written by WATANABE Mayu, President, the Japan Forum on International Relations, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on December 20, 2021 and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on February 16,2022.)

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For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/en/commentary/

No.138 “Discussions on strategic stability among the U.S., China, and Russia”
by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University
(December 16, 2021)

No.137 “Discussion of the Situation in Afghanistan”
by SUGITA Hiroki, Columnist, Kyodo News Agency
(October 19,2021)

No.136 “What is Putin’s Strategy on Japan? Vigilance needed on Russia’s ‘Peace Treaty’ Proposal”
by TOKIWA Shin, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Deputy Foreign Editor, Tokyo Shimbun
(August 2, 2021)

No.135 “Time To Have a Strong Interest in Digital Society Policy”
by ITO Yo, Professor Emeritus at the University of Yamanashi
(June 7, 2021)

No.134 “What Japan Should Do for the Tokyo Olympics: Now is the Time for Japan’s “Insight Diplomacy””
by WATANABE Hirotaka, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Teikyo University
(April 7, 2021)

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JFIR UPDATES

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“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

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EVENT
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The U.S.-Japan Joint Workshop on Human Rights and Democracy Held

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), together with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), organized the first U.S.-Japan small-group joint workshop on human rights and democracy, as part of our research project “China Risk and China Opportunity in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Era” online via Zoom video conference with 35 participants on November 3, 2021.

The workshop participants actively engaged with each other and the scholars during a facilitated group discussion to exchange their views on the topics.

For the summary of the discussion, please refer to:

Summary of “China Risk and China Opportunity in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Era” First Workshop on Human Rights and Democracy

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Please send your comments and/or questions to:

Contact Us

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PR and Enlightenment

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

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The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

October 20, 2021, Vol.14, No.5 (Issue 87)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/

==================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

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JFIR UPDATES

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“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

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ANNOUNCEMENT
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FREE INVITATION to the JFIR Webinar “The European Union’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Future of Japan-EU Relations”

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) will convene the Webinar “The European Union’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and the Future of Japan-EU Relations” to the following effect:

Date: Friday, 5 November, 2021
Time: 18:00 to 20:00 JST (UTC +9)
Form of a meeting: Virtual Webinar via Zoom
Language: English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation

Agenda:
18:00-18:05 Opening Remarks
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR
18:05-18:40 Keynote Session “The EU’s Indo-Pacific Strategy”
Gabriele VISENTIN, Special Envoy for the Indo-Pacific, EEAS
18:40-19:55 Expert’s Panel
YOSHITAKE Shogo
Director, European Policy Division, European Affairs Bureau
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan
Luis SIMON
Director, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS)
Brussels School of Governance, VUB
Eva PEJSOVA
Senior Fellow, Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS)
Brussels School of Governance, VUB
HOSOYA Yuichi
Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR
Professor, Keio University
19:55-20:00 Closing Remarks
HOSOYA Yuichi
Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR
Professor, Keio University

Moderator:
TSURUOKA Michito, Associate Professor, Keio University

JFIR would like to invite the readers of this E-letter to the Webinar. For the registration, should you please click on the link below and fill in the required information no later than November 2, 2021.

https://forms.gle/CJNMWXPHuBiYhZVC8

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JFIR COMMENTARY

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“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

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No. 137: “Discussion of the Situation in Afghanistan”

By SUGITA Hiroki
Columnist, Kyodo News Agency

1. US foreign policy toward Afghanistan

After the withdrawal of US troops, the American policy toward Afghanistan can be summarized in three points: (1) rapid evacuation of American citizens remaining in Afghanistan, and Afghans who cooperated with US military operations and US companies; (2) containment of the activities of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K), operating from remote areas; and (3) realization of moderate governance by the Taliban regime, assuring that policies include a recognition of the rights of women and a cessation of reprisals against former officials of the now-defunct Afghan government. The geopolitical objective of preventing China and Russia from expanding their influence in Afghanistan has been abandoned, acting as a point of recognition that US diplomacy with Eurasia has turned a corner.

All three points require reaching out to the Taliban, forcing the US to avoid confrontation with the Taliban. Since 2018, the US has been negotiating with the Taliban regarding the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan and maintaining stability thereafter, and in February 2020 the two sides reached an agreement on withdrawal in May 2021. While avoiding confrontation and fostering cooperation with the Taliban is based on these cumulative negotiations, the outlook is not optimistic, and the US government is pinning its hopes on the phasecooperation with the Taliban with no other options available. The US government is also stepping up its efforts through Qatar, which has influence over the Taliban, and there is still the possibility of cooperation with China and Russia.

Abdul Gani Baradar, the leader of the Taliban’s political arm, was released from custody in Pakistan in 2018 after the US designated him a negotiation partner, and the US maintains high hopes for collaboration with him. On August 23, after the fall of Kabul, CIA Director Bill Burns reportedly entered Kabul and conveyed the above three requests, including cooperation in evacuating Americans.

The leverage the US has over the Taliban will be the Afghan assets frozen in the US and recognition of the Taliban regime.

The former Afghan regime is believed to have $7 billion in government accounts on deposit at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, $700 million in the Bank for International Settlements, $340 million in special withdrawal rights at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and $2.4 billion in World Bank investment programs for developing countries. These assets are currently frozen by the US Treasury, which allows the transfer of personal funds alone to Afghanistan. The Taliban regime is seeking to utilize its assets in the US to run the country.

However, the US does not recognize the regime as legitimate because it was established through a military coup of the former government, which was formed through democratic elections, and because of its demonstrated disregard for human rights. For this regime to be recognized internationally, the aforementioned three requests must be fulfilled to some extent.

The new government, which assumed control on September 7, has been dominated by the Taliban and is not the “inclusive government” that the US sought – one that would include a variety of ethnic groups and women. In addition, the US opposes the appointment of senior members of the Haqqani Group, which is believed to have carried out large-scale terrorist attacks on US facilities and is designated an international terrorist organization, to key posts such as Minister of the Interior, and there is virtually no likelihood that the government will gain recognition. There is also significant potential that the militants will become more anti-American and allow various terrorist organizations to operate in the country. If the Taliban is unable to utilize its assets held in the US, it will have to rely on support from China and other countries and Afghanistan’s domestic economy to cover its expenses – not to mention relying on poppy cultivation.

In the US, while the withdrawal itself is believed to be the correct course of action, there is growing criticism of President Biden, the US military, and the intelligence community for the hasty and confusing way in which the withdrawal was executed, and Biden’s approval rating is at its lowest since his administration took office. It is believed that Biden plans to regain public support by focusing on domestic policy, which is relatively highly regarded, such as measures against the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and post-pandemic economic recovery. However, in the run-up to next year’s midterm elections and the 2024 presidential election, the Republican Party is repeatedly questioning Biden’s qualifications for the presidency by pointing to this debacle, especially to images of crowds swarming around a transport plane at Kabul International Airport.

The Republicans have positioned the remaining Americans and collaborators in Afghanistan as being held as “hostages” by the Taliban, and have drawn up a campaign strategy that equates it with the 1979 hostage crisis at the embassy in Tehran, which was a major factor in President Carter’s failed reelection. If the evacuation of these people does not proceed, Biden will find himself in further difficulties.

The Taliban has already demanded that Afghans who worked for the former regime’s technocrats and Western companies be prohibited from leaving the country, citing the need to rebuild the nation. The US is basking in the sense of liberation that the “longest war in US history” is over, and it is certain that Americans’ interest in Afghanistan will wane in the future, but it is unlikely that the US will be able to “get out of the way” easily, as it is expected that the Taliban will fail to govern the country, terrorist organizations will overrun it, the region will again be destabilized, and the US may suffer another terrorist attack.

2. Future outlook for Afghanistan

The Taliban seized control of the entire country of Afghanistan far earlier than anticipated due to the general public’s opposition to the graft, corruption, and deteriorating security of the former regime. For this reason, it is believed that there is considerable support for the Taliban in Afghanistan today. However, as was the case in the 1990s, “eradicating corruption” alone are not enough to govern a nation.

The Taliban’s centripetal force is the realization of a society based on Islamic Sharia law, and the conservative Afghan public has embraced the Taliban for this reason. Therefore, it can be assumed that if governance, including economic management, comes to a standstill, the Taliban will rely on the conservative segment of the population by further denying the advancement of women, etc., and strengthening its fundamentalist rhetoric. If this happens, it will be difficult for the international community to recognize the regime, it will not have access to assets held in the US, and there are concerns that it will deepen its ties with terrorist organizations and increase its financial dependence on the production of illicit narcotics.

If governance does not succeed, there is a strong possibility that the country will revert to civil war, as conflicts within the Taliban, non-Taliban Islamist militant groups, moderates, and ethnic groups other than the Pashtuns (mainstream Taliban) will erupt in discontent. There is no question that the fighting will be far more intense than the Taliban’s current advance.

3. Policy recommendations for Japan

Since hosting the International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance in 2002, Japan has been second only to the US in providing a massive amount of reconstruction assistance, amounting to 750 billion yen, and since 2003 has been leading the “disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration” (DDR) program for warlords and former national army soldiers, which was implemented until 2006 with positive results. Ideally, Japan, which is not regarded as an “enemy” by the Taliban, should provide various humanitarian and civilian assistance and also act as a bridge between Japan and the West. However, government-to-government assistance is difficult in the absence of state relations. Initially, humanitarian and civilian assistance will be on a small scale if the Japanese government does not recognize the Taliban regime. Japan also should not recognize the Taliban regime, since it has regressed in such areas as women’s rights.

In addition, Afghanistan is not of life-or-death importance to Japan’s national interests in various aspects, such as energy, alliance with the US, cooperation with Europe, strategy against China, anti-terrorism, and non-proliferation. Now that the US has withdrawn from the region, and “acting in coalition with the US” is no longer necessary, Japan will almost certainly find no further reason to devote resources to the country.

The US government has asked the Japanese government to help support the refugees who have been flooding into neighboring countries since the US military withdrawal began in earnest early this summer. The US is not requesting that Japan accept refugees within its borders. There have already been droves of Afghans who have fled to Pakistan, Iran, Central Asian countries, Turkey, and other countries as refugees following the Taliban’s coup. There is a clear need for support for these refugees through the UNHCR and local governments.

The fact that the Taliban is accepted by many Afghans as a force to fight corruption and bring stability should not be overlooked, and must be recognized when drawing long-term support. Although the Taliban is dismissed as “evil” by Western governments and media, Japan’s Afghanistan policy can be broadened by reaffirming that there are expectations for Islamism in the region that differ from the Western values.

In the future, China and Russia will position their support for the Taliban as a further failure of the “universal values diplomacy” envisioned by Biden, apart from the geopolitical move to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of US forces. Japan, as a free democratic democracy, should take the same position as the US, but that does not mean that the 750 billion yen in aid and DDR achievements over the past 20 years should be allowed to go to waste. Instead of being entangled in China’s and Russia’s engagement with Afghanistan, Japan should devise a strategy to restart its support ahead of the US. If the hurdles to unilateral initiatives by Japan are too high, joint projects with Pakistan and Iran may be possible.

The US is looking for ways to stabilize and moderate the Taliban regime, as the turmoil in Afghanistan will be a further blow to the Biden administration. There will be more room for Japan’s activities to complement US policy in Afghanistan, which is currently in a bottleneck.

Japan’s search for activities in Afghanistan should also be aimed at gaining a foothold in the broader Eurasian region.

What is lacking is the ability to gather and analyze information. Experts who have mastered the local languages, have local knowledge of the land, and have human networks need to be cultivated for information gathering and analysis. Efforts advancing the selection of several geopolitical and geo-economic hotspots on the Eurasian continent and the training of experts should be enhanced. The development of such experts will not only accelerate Japan’s own intelligence gathering but also deepen intelligence cooperation with the US and with the countries of Europe.

Cooperation with the US will be paramount, and an expansion of cooperation with the US intelligence community will be necessary. Strengthening Japan’s systems, including the establishment of a security clearance system, will also be required.

(This is the English translation of an article written by SUGITA Hiroki, Columnist, Kyodo News Agency, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on September 10, 2021 and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on October 19, 2021.)

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For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.136 “What is Putin’s Strategy on Japan? Vigilance needed on Russia’s ‘Peace Treaty’ Proposal”
by TOKIWA Shin, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Deputy Foreign Editor, Tokyo Shimbun
(August 2, 2021)

No.135 “Time To Have a Strong Interest in Digital Society Policy”
by ITO Yo, Professor Emeritus at the University of Yamanashi
(June 7, 2021)

No.134 “What Japan Should Do for the Tokyo Olympics: Now is the Time for Japan’s “Insight Diplomacy””
by WATANABE Hirotaka, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Teikyo University
(April 7, 2021)

No.133 “Who Knows Whether China Supports The ‘Kim Regime’ To The End?”
by ARAKI Kazuhiro, Professor, the Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University
(January 31, 2021)

No.132 “Originality, Not Succession —Policy Recommendation for PM Suga’s Diplomacy on Russia”
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, JFIR / Professor Emeritus, Aoyama Gakuin University and University of Niigata Prefecture
(November 30, 2020)

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Please send your comments and/or questions to:
jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

February 20, 2021, Vol.14, No.1 (Issue 83)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link: unsubscribe

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–
EVENT
—————– – – – —————–

The U.S.-Japan Dialogue “Managing China: Adapting U.S.-Japan Coordination Amid Political Transition” Held

JFIR, together with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) and The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), organized The U.S.-Japan Dialogue “Managing China: Adapting U.S.-Japan Coordination Amid Political Transition” in the form of an online seminar and via YouTube Live on February 3, 2021 as part of our research project “China Risk and China Opportunity in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Era.”

The panelists had an in-depth discussion on the future policy of Japan and the U.S. toward China. The following were the panelists: James SCHOFF (Senior Fellow, CEIP), Amy SEARIGHT (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense), and Patricia KIM (Senior Policy Analyst, United States Institute of Peace) from the United States; KAMIYA Matake, (Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan), KANEHARA Nobukatsu (Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / former Deputy Secretary-General of the National Security Secretariat of Japan), and TAKAHARA Akio (Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, University of Tokyo), from Japan.

For the video of the Dialogue, please refer to the following link: https://youtu.be/zUfjAmd7p1I

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 133:
“Who Knows Whether China Supports The ‘Kim Regime’ To The End?”

By ARAKI Kazuhiro
Professor, the Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University

In general, China-North Korea (DPRK) relations is thought to be close and amicable because there is no other countries these have supported North Korea like China. Both regimes, however, hate each other. Kim Il-sung spent his childhood at Chinese school and spoke fluent Chinese, and had been engaged in guerrilla activities in China. He knew the first generation of Chinese leadership, and it seems that he kept the diplomatic relation but not close.

Meanwhile, his son, Kim Jong-il was born after Kim Il-sung had escaped to Russia, which he did have neither familiarity nor China. This is same as for Kim Il-sung’s grandson, Kim Jong-un. This is one of the motives why Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un have been trying to talk to the United States in an attempt to improve its international relations.

The good example of not-so friendly China-DPRK relations was seen in the first ever inter-Korea Summit Conference between Kim Dae-jung of South Korea (ROK) and Kim Jong-il of DPRK held in June 2000. Kim Jong-il’s intention was to improve DPRK-U.S. relations by leveraging ROK’s relations with the U.S. since ROK was already under DPRK influence.

Three months later, Kim Jong-il sent his trusted subordinate, Jo Myong-rok, Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean People’s Army (KPA), as an envoy to the U.S. He received extraordinary treatments from the U.S. of meeting President Clinton and State Secretary Madeleine Albright, which eventually led to Ms. Albright’s official visit to DPRK in the following month.

While Ms. Albright’s three-day stay, Kim Jong-il extended his special hospitality by escorting her every day. Chinese Minister of National Defense, Chi Haotian was actually in Pyongyang earlier than Secretary Albright, though Kim Jong-il only met him on the day she left. Although Kim Jong-il’s confidence deepened through the event, further progress was not achieved, since Bush won the presidential election in November of the same year.

This apparently made China lose its face. It was beyond China’s understanding that DPRK welcomed U.S. Secretary of State, the common enemy whom they fought together a half century ago, while having such alliance delegation waited.

The end of Democratic administration in the U.S. which Kim miscalculated as he thought it was worth a try, even if it would upset China, to develop its relations with the U.S. and be more independence from China. As a result, North Korea has been more isolated from international community.

Then, the U.S. Republican administration’s policy towards DPRK has got much stricter particularly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In this context, the deadlock of Kim Jong-il’s foreign policy became obviously President Bush’s word of “axis of evils”.

Since Pyongyang felt the pressure of being bombarded any time by the U.S. military, Kim Jong-il shifted to appease Japan including the major compromise on the abduction issue. There were many other complex factors which Kim Jong-il’s fear of the U.S. would make him to take further to admit the abduction issue.

The lesson for Japan was, as Dr. Kim Dong-Cheol notes in “The Message for the Japanese Government,” that requires “sensitivity to deal with North Korea.” That is to say, a strong message is more effective rather than to keep calmness and talks which will not be affected to North Korea.

Meanwhile, China has deepened its distrust against DPRK’s foreign policy since Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un have been trying to proactively approaching the U.S. and kept distance with China. Although KPA is said to have close ties with China, People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) influence has been seen in the recent midnight military parade of DPRK which may imply something to consider the background.

If there is a perception gap between the Kim family, there may be strong orientation toward the U.S., and the KPA, which has a strong affinity for the PLA, there is a big question whether China can be said to support the “Kim Jong-un regime” to the end or not. China-DPRK relations has long been considered static, but in the current international situation, that may be needed more flexible interpretation to be interpreted more flexibly.

(This is the English translation of an article written by ARAKI Kazuhiro, Professor, the Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on November 25, 2020 and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on January 31, 2021.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

bucknumber

No.132    Originality, Not Succession —Policy Recommendation for PM Suga’s Diplomacy on Russia
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, JFIR / Professor Emeritus, Aoyama Gakuin University and University of Niigata Prefecture
(November 30, 2020)

No.131    A Strategic Vision Required for Suga Diplomacy
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 23, 2020)

No.130    Convicting the Historic Figures Is A Movement Gone Too Far
by FURUMURA Haruhiko, Visiting Research Fellow, the Aichi University Institute of International Affairs
(July 17, 2020)

No.129    Geoeconomic Observation on COVID-19
by KAWAI Masahiro, Distinguished Research Fellow of the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo
(June 3, 2020)

No.128    Japan’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century
by KANEHARA Nobukatsu, Distinguished Research Fellow, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(April 13, 2020)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: e-letter

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

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The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

December 20, 2020, Vol.13, No.6 (Issue 82)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link: unsubscribe

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 132:
“Originality, Not Succession —Policy Recommendation for PM Suga’s Diplomacy on Russia”

By HAKAMADA Shigeki
Trustee, JFIR / Professor Emeritus, Aoyama Gakuin University and University of Niigata Prefecture

In this article, the author would like to explore new Prime Minister Suga’s diplomacy on Russia, who said to be basically succeeding the predecessor PM Abe’s policy. The author entirely values PM Abe’s diplomatic achievements highly, including how passionate he was on the policy towards Russia, compared to any other predecessors, and expresses his respect for that.

However, the Northern Territories issue, of which PM Abe aimed to conclude by signing the peace treaty with Russia based on the friendship with President Putin during both leaders’ term, was not even got closer to the goal but rather, in the author’s perspective, fell back further. That is to say, Pres. Putin got much tougher on the issue. PM Abe voiced how regretful his administration was not able to solve the issue, but did not say how it happened. Without examining how it was not, succession of Abe diplomacy would only to be led to repeat the failure. In this article, therefore, the author will examine the issues caused in PM Abe’s diplomacy on Russia, and indicate lessons for the successor, PM Suga.

The following is the summary of what did not go well in PM Abe’s diplomacy on Russia: (1) The Abe administration did not see Russian counterpart’s very cynical, realist way of thinking or mentality. They believed the fundamental good of humanity and expected Russia’s goodwill reaction when Japan shows goodwill, which was naive. (2) Pres. Putin sees the outer Russia is enemies, and does not see Japan as an independent state due to its dependence on the United States. (3) Pres. Putin understands the international laws or treaties are to be utilized as much as possible when necessary, including the loopholes, as political wisdom.

At the United Nations, for example, Russia did not care the General Assembly’s resolution on opposing Crimea annexation at all, but makes use of its veto at the Security Council. At the Northern Territories negotiation, too, Russia always brings up the UN Enemy State Clause, the Article 107 of the UN Charter, to emphasize that the loser of the World War II cannot refuse the decision of the winner, which was decided and supposed to be removed from the Charter at the General Assembly in 1995.

For PM Suga to not repeat the abovementioned diplomatic failures, the author would like to clarify there were no true trust or recognition shared between PM Abe and Pres. Putin, with specific cases of Japan having single-handedly rushed on its wishful thinking as listed below, so those parts will not be succeeded.

On September 4, 2016, PM Abe made a speech at the Eastern Economic Forum held in Vladivostok, and passionately called on to President Putin with his first name to be friendly, “We stand here today shouldering our respective viewpoints on history … Putting an end to the unnatural state of affairs that has continued these 70 years, shall we not together carve out a new era for Japan and Russia going forward? Vladimir, in order to carve out towards the future bilateral relations overflowing with unlimited potential, I am resolved to putting forth all my strength to advance the relationship between Japan and Russia, together with you.” President Putin talked about this with insulting tone in his press conference in Hangzhou where he was visiting on the following day, though this was not reported in Japanese media as far as the author knows, probably due to the occasion was held only for the Russian media. “He is an outstanding and remarkable speaker.”

What he was great about in the speech at the Vladivostok summit meeting, however, was not the territorial issue part, but what he said about the 8 cooperation proposals (in economy and other areas that PM Abe proposed in Sochi meeting in May, 2016) and their prospects. Pres. Putin gave a cold shoulder about the territorial issue and the signing of peace treaty that PM Abe passionately talked about, while only bought the part of economic cooperation which would be practically beneficial to Russia —Pres. Putin was somewhat honest.

On November 14, 2018, the Summit meeting between PM Abe and Pres. Putin was held in Singapore. Afterwards, PM Abe said to the media that he is “willing to solve the territorial issue based on the trust being built, to sign the peace treaty. Pres. Putin and I are in a complete sync of strong willingness to conclude the issue by our own hands, of which left for over 70 years since the end of WWII to be not inherited to the future generations.” PM Abe often has stated that he and Pres. Putin were in a complete sync of their strong willingness to conclude the territorial issue and sign the peace treaty.

About a year in prior, however, Pres. Putin had said another comment that PM Abe loses his face, at the press conference in Da Nang, Vietnam on Nov. 11, 2017, that “Whoever the leader of Russia or Japan at the time of signing the peace treaty between the two countries, would not be important.” Frankly, what he meant would be that he was not willing to sign the peace treaty while he is in power. This comment was not reported in Japanese media either.

What went through then was exactly what Pres. Putin had said. PM Abe was spreading the fantasy with his Russia approach, which of course was very convenient for Pres. Putin. The Russian leadership is, therefore, welcoming PM Suga’s attitude that he is basically succeeding PM Abe’s diplomacy on Russia. As soon as Mr. Suga was elected as the new prime minister, Pres. Putin stated that he “expects PM Suga consults with Mr. Abe on his diplomacy on Russia, just like Mr. Abe consulted with (designated as an envoy to Moscow) former PM Mori,” according to a report on Sept. 14.

While succeeding the basic policies of Abe diplomacy, PM Suga also said he is taking its own stance. A Russian Japan expert, V. Kistanov, is paying close attention to what PM Suga said about “willing to build a solid foothold of own diplomatic stance.” (“Nezavisimaya Gazeta,” Sept. 21). After the Summit meeting with Pres. Putin in Singapore, PM Abe said “It was decided to accelerate the negotiation of peace treaty based on the Joint Declaration of 1956,” which means it is willing to make a deal with 2 smaller islands solution. On the contrary, on the following day of the Summit meeting, Mr. Suga clearly stated at the press conference that “It has been Japan’s consistent attitude to solve the attribution of the four islands of Northern Territories, to sign the peace treaty.

There has been no change made on that” as then-Chief Cabinet Secretary. On Sept. 14, too, Mr. Suga had stated it was not just the two islands stated on the Joint Declaration of ’56, but to “clarify the attribution of the four islands to sign the peace treaty.” Dr. Kistanov says what Mr. Suga said are noteworthy in “giving a new nuance to Mr. Abe’s stance that avoided to include all four islands.” “Conclusion of a peace treaty through the solution of [the] issue [of where Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai Islands belong]” is the exact sentence of the Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations agreed in 1993, which Pres.

Putin had recognized in 2001 and 2003. The expression though does not clarify where the islands would belong to, and it is different from how some hardliners interpret it as ‘returning of four islands at once’ solution. The agreement made in Singapore summit states to ‘accelerate the negotiation’ in Japanese version, but in Russian one it is to ‘activate the negotiation’ which is nuanced no hurry.

In sum, the following is the author’s recommendations for PM Suga: (1) Grasp the Russian leadership’s way of thinking and mentality accurately. (2) Do build his original diplomatic stance on Russia, even if it would be harder than succeeding PM Abe’s policy without a criticism. (3) Do not rush to earn achievements, be patient when odds seem to be against, and deal with the issue as it would be in the decades to come.

(This is the English translation of an article written by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, JFIR / Professor Emeritus, Aoyama Gakuin University and University of Niigata Prefecture, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on October 20, 2020 and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on November 30, 2020.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

bucknumber

No.131    A Strategic Vision Required for Suga Diplomacy
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 23, 2020)

No.130    Convicting the Historic Figures Is A Movement Gone Too Far
by FURUMURA Haruhiko, Visiting Research Fellow, the Aichi University Institute of International Affairs
(July 17, 2020)

No.129    Geoeconomic Observation on COVID-19
by KAWAI Masahiro, Distinguished Research Fellow of the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo
(June 3, 2020)

No.128    Japan’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century
by KANEHARA Nobukatsu, Distinguished Research Fellow, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(April 13, 2020)

No.127    Thoughts at Guryongpo Sunset
by ARAKI Kazuhiro, Professor, Takushoku University
(January 21, 2020)

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–
ANNOUNCEMENT
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“Trilateral Cooperation during and after COVID-19 Pandemic” Published

Since June 2020, JFIR has conducted a research project “Trilateral Cooperation during and after COVID-19 Pandemic” as part of the “Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of ‘Multilayer Globalism.'” This project examined the possibilities of further enhancing the network of trilateral cooperation among Japan, China and Korea during and after the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic for the betterment of not only for the three countries but also for the region and the world. The report of the project was published on September 4, 2020.

For the report of this project, please refer to the following link: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/regular_research/201218.html

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: e-letter

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

October 20, 2020, Vol.13, No.5 (Issue 81)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link: unsubscribe

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 131:
“A Strategic Vision Required for Suga Diplomacy”

By NABESHIMA Keizo
Critic

Mr. SUGA Yoshihide, Chief Cabinet Secretary, was elected as the new President of the Liberal Democratic Party by winning over 70% of the support at the party election held on September 14. He is going to be nominated as the 99th Prime Minister at the extraordinary session of the National Diet on the 16th. It was fortunate that the incoming cabinet would be established, without a political vacuum, after only 19 days since the announcement of PM ABE Shinzo’s resignation due to recurrence of his health condition. In the party presidency campaign, Mr. SUGA pledged “the succession and moving forward” based on PM ABE’s policy as his commitment if elected.

While PM ABE, the longest serving leader of the country, left big achievements in the last 7 year and 8 months, there are some major political issues like revision of the constitution still remained. Such issues require the wide national support, as well as firm will and capacity to make a bold action to move them forward. Having been the longest serving Chief Cabinet Secretary himself, Mr. Suga seems confident of his diplomatic policy as he says that he took part and played a key role in all the major policy decisions during the Abe cabinet. His diplomatic capacity as Prime Minister, however, is yet to be known.

Soon after turning to the 21st century, after 9/11 attacks in 2001, the world surrounding Japan has entered the age of uncertainty. China’s economic and military rise has led its relations with the United States at the level of the “cold war,” instability in Asia, Iran’s nuclear development and trembling Middle East, the dividing West —the world is at the historic turning point. The liberal international order established in the post-World War II period is concerned to be collapsing due to relative decline of the US and the increase of emerging countries’ voices, including of China. Unpredictable outbreaks such as the novel coronavirus will occur, and the chances of the collapse of the power balance in the current world is not zero. It is inevitable for Japan to have a strong plan to resiliently counteract, and to safely protect its nationals and territories in order to survive any emergency cases occur in the world.

How the “post-Abe” administration of Japan would like the world to be, and what would be Japan’s role to help realize that? The first and major assignment of the Suga administration is to lay out its strategic vision of the policy that covers diplomacy, defense, security and economy. The biggest unavoidable agenda in Japan’s external relation is that of the US & China, and its stance towards both sides. The US-China frictions are intensifying in the security field —missile defense, maritime and homeland security—- as well as in the international economy such as at the reform talk of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

The intensity keeps getting harder as the US presidential election in November is in near sight, between Xi Jinping’s China leveraging its Belt and Road Initiative in an attempt to establish new international order of their liking, versus Trump’s US administration concluding that the previous administrations’ China engagement policy was a failure. How Japan prefer the international order to be, and how and what way could it be achieved? Japan’s diplomatic efforts will be further needed to enhance its international influence to gain the worldwide support on its vision, and a specific roadmap to achieve it.

Mr. Suga said in the debate program on NHK that, based on his recognition the improvement of the US-China relations will bring the stability in the world, a strategic diplomacy is needed, rather than straight choice of “with US or with China.” The rest of the world is struggling to take balance in their relations with the US and China. For Japan, the US is a security ally, while China remains to be a close economic partner on one hand, does not relax its repeated, strong anti-Japan campaign —violating territorial waters of Senkaku Islands, or export embargo on rare earth materials, for example— depending on the timings on the other. Historically proven whoever they are against, China shows no mercy to weaker opponent, and will not offend the stronger. Armor peeks out from their ‘smile diplomacy.’

That characteristics have been clear throughout the history of China’s policy on the negotiations of the normalization of the diplomatic relations with Japan, and with the US, since Deng Xiaoping. Even under Abe administration, pro-China lawmakers in the ruling LDP and Komei Party apparently had influence over the government’s policy towards China and restricted its security policy. Needless to say, Japan-China relations will be sought based on the stronger deterrence by the Japan-US alliance. Mr. Suga shall be reminded that the immediate issue for Japan is nothing but to strengthen its own defense capacity against the violation of its sovereignty, including the ‘gray zone crisis’ that Senkaku Islands are exposed.

(This is the English translation of an article written by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on September 15, 2020 and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on September 23, 2020.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

bucknumber

No.130    Convicting the Historic Figures Is A Movement Gone Too Far
by FURUMURA Haruhiko, Visiting Research Fellow, the Aichi University Institute of International Affairs
(July 17, 2020)

No.129    Geoeconomic Observation on COVID-19
by KAWAI Masahiro, Distinguished Research Fellow of the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo
(June 3, 2020)

No.128    Japan’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century
by KANEHARA Nobukatsu, Distinguished Research Fellow, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(April 13, 2020)

No.127    Thoughts at Guryongpo Sunset
by ARAKI Kazuhiro, Professor, Takushoku University
(January 21, 2020)

No.126    Yemen Situation Will Be the Key to the US-Iran Relations Breakthrough
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(November 26, 2019)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: e-letter

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

August 20, 2020, Vol.13, No.4 (Issue 80)

https://www.jfir.or.jp

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link: unsubscribe

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 130:
“Convicting the Historic Figures Is A Movement Gone Too Far”

By FURUMURA Haruhiko
Visiting Research Fellow, the Aichi University Institute of International Affairs

The current anti-racism movement that was triggered by the killing of Mr. George Floyd has been escalating. Some people involved in the movement are taking down the statues of Confederates’ generals of the Civil War, that divided the United States between North and South. The streaming of the movie “Gone With the Wind” was suspended due to its depictions of African Americans.

These are consequences beyond the appropriate purpose, because what is done will blind the nation from the historical events. In San Francisco, the statues of President Ulysses S. Grant, and of Francis Scott Key, a poet and the writer of The Star-Spangled Banner’s lyrics, were taken down.

Although President Grant was formerly known as a great leader of the North during the Civil War, today he is targeted for the criticism for having owned slaves until right before the War began, and that he would have allowed the continuation of slavery as long as it would not be a divisive issue for the United States.

President Abraham Lincoln is regarded as the most respected US president of all times, as the giant statue of him sits in Washington DC. We learn in Japan that President Lincoln was a great leader who abolished the slavery, and assume that is why giant statue of him was built in their capital city.

Dr. KOMURO Naoki pointed out this, too, however, that it was not the main reason. What President Lincoln did greatly, hence his statue was built, was that he avoided the nation to split into two separate countries. Therefore, his biggest achievement was that he resumed the states to be united as one. The ending of the slavery was something that came along with it. As a matter of fact, the Civil Rights Act was established in 1964, about a century later.

No matter how one is progressive or at the cutting edge in their thinking in their time, needless to say it is no sooner than “behind the time” if seen from the people in the future. So, people today or in the future could criticize what happened in the past, but convicting the people then seems beyond their cause.

There might be some anti-fascists, or ‘antifa,’ among the protesters in San Francisco. For them, Francis Scott Key who wrote the national anthem was one of those who were guilty. Then, why don’t they exhaustively criticize him as much as they want, by exercising their freedom of expression, rather than destroying public properties?

If what they do is something like taking down his statue, their voice would not be appealing to many in the country, or worse, they are to be blamed then. The more the protests get escalated, the more convincing President Trump’s call for “law and order” gets.

The protesters may be are taking part in the movement to have President Trump not reelected, but they should be aware that their own deeds could be working against their will and cause.

(This is the English version of an article written by FURUMURA Haruhiko, Visiting Research Fellow, the Aichi University Institute of International Affairs, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on June 29, 2020.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

bucknumber

No.129    Geoeconomic Observation on COVID-19
by KAWAI Masahiro, Distinguished Research Fellow of the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo
(June 3, 2020)

No.128    Japan’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century
by KANEHARA Nobukatsu, Distinguished Research Fellow, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(April 13, 2020)

No.127    Thoughts at Guryongpo Sunset
by ARAKI Kazuhiro, Professor, Takushoku University
(January 21, 2020)

No.126    Yemen Situation Will Be the Key to the US-Iran Relations Breakthrough
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(November 26, 2019)

No.125    Japan Needs Its Own Diplomacy Towards Iran
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives
(September 30, 2019)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: e-letter

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

June 20, 2020, Vol.13, No.3 (Issue 79)

https://www.jfir.or.jp

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link: unsubscribe

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 129:
“Geoeconomic Observation on COVID-19”

By KAWAI Masahiro
Distinguished Research Fellow, the Japan Forum on International Relations
/ Professor Emeritus, the University of Tokyo

The free and open international economic order which has flourished in the post WWII era has been stumbling lately due to the relative decline of the United States’ economy and the Trump administration’s negligence on multilateralism and international cooperation as well as China’s rapid rise and its challenge to the existing international order. The hegemonic competition between the US and China, which intensified from 2017, has widened from trade and economic areas to technological and security domains, and now it can be regarded as a systemic competition between the free and open, democratic and market-based economy and authoritarian and despotic, socialistic state capitalism. The global pandemic of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) fueled this US-China confrontation with ‘geoeconomic’ impact, and has been raising further issues to the future of the international economic order.

The outbreak of COVID-19 has caused substantial economic contraction not only in China but also in Japan, the US, Europe and elsewhere. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasts world economic growth in 2020 to be negative 3.0 per cent due to the COVID-19 pandemic, and Ms. Kristalina Georgieva, Managing Director of the IMF, warned the world would face “the worst economic fallout since the Great Depression (of 1929).” China, the epicenter of the outbreak, marked a 33.8% decline in its real GDP in the first quarter of 2020, in comparison to the previous quarter at an annualized rate, the first negative growth ever since 1992 when the quarterly GDP growth record began.

In the same quarter, Japan, the US and Europe also marked a decline in their GDP growth too (Japan -3.4%, US -4.8%, and the Euro Area -14.4%), and the biggest economic shrinkage will likely come in the second quarter of 2020. China most likely hit the bottom of its economic downfall in the first quarter, while Japan, the US and Europe will likely do the same in the second quarter. The IMF forecasts the growth rates of the US and China for 2020 and 2021 to be -5.9% and 4.7% for the US and 1.2% and 9.2% for China, suggesting that China will likely recover earlier and faster than the US (and Japan and Europe).

During the global financial crisis following the Lehman Shock, the Group of Seven (G7) and the Group of Twenty (G20) promoted international policy coordination with US’ leadership, while this time the US is not assuming global leadership reflecting its ‘America First’ policy and as a result the drive for international cooperation to get out of the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic and economic crisis is weak. In addition to the pre-pandemic concern of US-China economic decoupling, there are signs that globalization could be reversed as countries have tightened their border control to contain the spread of COVID-19 and secure their own medical supplies and equipments and are considering to alter the trade structure that is excessively dependent on China-centered supply chains.

In Europe, each country responded unilaterally particularly at the beginning of the cross-border spread of COVID-19, rather than in unity as the European Union (EU) member states. The framework of issuing the EU’s joint bonds to assist hard-hit southern European countries such as Italy and Spain has not been approved due to the opposition by the “frugal four” including Austria and the Netherlands despite Germany’s change in mind in the affirmative direction.

The US-China confrontations have intensified over the naming of and the origin of the virus, as well as the role played by the World Health Organization (WHO). The Trump administration is in consideration to suspend its financial contribution to, and even withdraw its membership from, WHO as it views Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus as being too close to China and having made inappropriate decisions and advice at the initial phase of the global pandemic. Even if WHO had problems, it must continue to function as the central institution coordinating global fight against the pandemic at the moment, so additional funding is urgently needed to prevent further spread in developing countries. Its member countries should evaluate the performance of WHO after the current COVID-19 crisis is over.

China has been actively engaged in ‘mask diplomacy’ to assist European countries and many developing countries in Africa and other regions, but the US and advanced European countries have regarded this as an attempt to expand its sphere of influence at the time of crisis. China is advised to focus more on providing its assistance through multilateral frameworks such as WHO.

In terms of systemic competition, the question is which system would be more effective in containing COVID-19, authoritarian, despotic one like China’s or democratic one that values transparency and human rights. China strictly censored virus-related information when the spread began in Wuhan, Hubei Province, which as a result did not help stop the spread nationwide and worldwide. After that, however, China seems to have been successful in containing COVID-19 by enforcing heavy-handed lockdown of the city of Wuhan and others in Hubei Province, and strengthening the monitoring of the infected individuals. Based on these successful measures, China has moved to restart its economic activity and embark on ‘mask diplomacy’.

On the other hand, in the democratic world, the numbers of infected patients and deaths have risen enormously, to more than 150 thousand infections each in the US (1,811k), the UK, Spain, Italy, Germany and France and more than 27 thousand deaths each except Germany (with an astonishing 105k in the US while less than 9k in Germany). The explosive pandemic in the US and Europe is admittedly caused by the underestimation of, and inadequate response to, COVID-19 at the initial stage.

The democracies have responded to the pandemic by applying less severe behavioral restrictions on individuals than China, expanding virus tests, isolating infected persons and focusing on the treatment of severely infected patients, while protecting their human rights and privacy under information transparency and respect for scientific findings. Japan, the US and Europe have been trying to demonstrate to the rest of the world that the pandemic can be controlled through transparency and the protection of human rights and privacy, not through authoritarian censorship nor strict surveillance of its nationals. Its success would help restart their economic activity.

Meanwhile, China has not loosened its grip over the effective control of the South China Sea, when Southeast Asian countries and the US are occupied to combat COVID-19 domestically. In April this year, China made an announcement of establishing new administrative districts —Nansha and Xisha— in Sansha City, Hainan Province, over their disputed, militalized artificial islands. China had drawn the ‘nine dash line’ over the entire South China Sea since 1953, and established the administrative city of Sansha in July 2012, to oversee 3 islets of Nansha (Spratly Islands), Xisha (Paracel Islands) and Zhongsha (Macclesfield Bank).

In July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that China had no claims to historic rights with respect to the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea (beyond the territorial sea, exclusive economic zone [EEZ], and continental shelf to which it was entitled by the Law of Sea) and had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in its EEZ, backing a case brought by the Philippines. Despite this ruling China has not stopped operations in, or militarization of, the Spratly and Paracel Islands. China’s announcement this time of the establishment of the new administrative districts, is clearly an attempt to change the status-quo of the South China Sea by force and confirm de-facto control over the area.

The international community must appeal to China that the forceful change to the status-quo and an attempt to strengthen de facto control clearly violates the international law so that it should be withdrawn. For that matter, it is absolutely important for the US to exercise its leadership, organize international cooperation with like-minded countries and regions of Japan, Australia, the EU, ASEAN and others, and put pressure on China in unity so that it acts more responsibly in the South China Sea.

(This is the English version of an article written by KAWAI Masahiro, Distinguished Research Fellow of the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on April 21, 2020.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

bucknumber

No.128    Japan’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century
by KANEHARA Nobukatsu, Distinguished Research Fellow, the Japan Forum on International Relations
(April 13, 2020)

No.127    Thoughts at Guryongpo Sunset
by ARAKI Kazuhiro, Professor, Takushoku University
(January 21, 2020)

No.126    Yemen Situation Will Be the Key to the US-Iran Relations Breakthrough
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(November 26, 2019)

No.125    Japan Needs Its Own Diplomacy Towards Iran
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives
(September 30, 2019)

No.124    ASEAN Seek Opportunities In ‘Indo-Pacific’
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(July 10, 2019)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: e-letter

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

April 20, 2020, Vol.13, No.2 (Issue 78)

https://www.jfir.or.jp

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link: unsubscribe

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 128:
“Japan’s Grand Strategy in the 21st Century”

By KANEHARA Nobukatsu
former Deputy Secretary General, National Security Secretariat of Japan
/ Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR

1. International Order in Transition and the End of U.S.-led Uni-polarity

Today, the international order is undergoing a fundamental change. Having escaped any severe damage throughout the two World Wars, the United States has long enjoyed its status as global superpower since the end of the World War II. However, with the rapid rise of emerging countries including China, the international standing of the U.S. is no longer an absolutely outstanding one, and its uni-polar hegemonic grip of the world affairs has gradually been lost. Under the circumstances, the U.S. has turned its attention to the question of how to deal with the emerging new super-powers. Yet, only, the U.S., with its liberal ideological stance, has natural aversion to Machtpolitik type of opportunism conducive to an agreement over dividing spheres of influence with countries with conflicting political regimes.

2. “New era of Great-Power Competition” and Strategic Interests of the U.S.

Graham Allison said in a recent volume of Foreign Affairs magazine that the world is entering into “a new era of great-power competition.” Immediately after the World War II, when expectation for the advent of ‘American era’ was growing high within the U.S., George Kennan called for a persistent strategy to contain USSR with the recognition that Eastern Europe should better be relegated to the sphere of influence of USSR. The US-China relationship today is quite similar to US-USSR relationship then. As the US-China tension escalates, we need to make sure to what extent the US is seriously committed to defend its own sphere of influence. The strategic interest of the U.S. can be described as ‘The Three Eyes’: Middle East, Europe and Northeast Asia. The US can commit to two prioritized regions simultaneously but would be too busy to deal with the third one. The priority changes based on the surrounding circumstances. Asia today is becoming America’s top priority region. I understand that the islets of Japan, Korean Peninsula and Taiwan are subject to US’ security interest, but how far it is willing to commit its military forces to the islands in South China Sea is unclear. Japan needs to be ready to defend Senkaku Islands by itself in the first place.

3. International Order in Asia and the Role of Japan

International security is the world of kinetic vision: only things in motion can be captured. However powerful Japan may be, Japan would not be visible if it is not in motion. In reality, Japan holds the second biggest conventional military capability within the G7 members, after the United States. Even so, it is not possible for Japan to defend itself alone from the nuclear-bearing military powers like China or Russia. Japan should think thoroughly the relationship with the US again, while making effort to maintain the current liberal international order by strengthening the coordination also with the other like-minded countries like Australia and others. Having said that, the US is fundamentally a country of European origin, and its understanding of and interest in Asia would not be unlimited. Japan, therefore, needs to lead the effort to bring the US committed in Asia for the sake of regional stability. The economic incentive is as important as that of security. So, Japan needs to promote making more direct investment to the US, as well as to make its own market more appealing. By doing so, there may be a need for Japanese society to be reformed for the better. For example, wider acceptance of foreign workers to deal with the steep decrease of domestic working population; or inventing a global business model by utilizing the platforms services provided by so-called GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon) are some ideas to be taken into account.

4. Difference between Japan and China in Approach to Infrastructure-Building

In economic field, Japan has made some significant achievements in the area of mega Free Trade Agreements (FTA) in recent years, namely the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and Japan-European Union Economic Partnership Agreement (Japan-EU EPA). China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) takes different approach from Japan’s infrastructure export. The Chinese model is based upon bilateral agreements, by expanding the infrastructure and trade networks to the close or remote surrounding nations by setting itself in the center, which is similar with how Russia manages the pipeline networks. Meanwhile, Japan’s infrastructure export strategy aims to improve the connectivity with 360 degree directions to promote the regional economic integration, so that the market mechanism would be functioning smoothly. With this strategy, Japan is pushing the concept of ‘high-quality infrastructure,’ and that is the difference from China’s BRI policy. And the BRI also has, aside from its commercial aspect, a strategic aspect: China’s behavior regarding the Hanbantota Port in Sri Lanka (99 years lease from July 2017 on to Chinese state-owned enterprise, China Merchants Port Holdings) and the Port of Duqm in Oman have raised concerns over China. Yet some developing countries still welcome China’s infrastructure investment. How the West deals with rising China in the next two decades will have a decisive impact on how the world would be like in the future. It has been some time since Chinese economy has started to slow down, but it is still growing and will continue for a while. That the growth rate of China did not reach 7% last year does not mean it is not growing at all, and the growth generated by the industrialization will not stop until the urbanization completes, the de-population and demography turns to aging society.

5. High-Tech U.S.-China Rivalry

In recent years, while China is flexing its economic statecraft (the use of economic instruments in pursuit of national interests), the US has been considering its counteraction. The protection of sensitive technologies of US from China is a big issue in this connection. The aspect of modern war has drastically changed from the old ones, the keys now are quick detection of the enemy, and integration of intelligence, which require the research developments of cyberspace and Artificial Intelligence (AI) to be utilized. Drones and other unmanned weapons, or bioweapon that is genetically engineered for designated persons or people are expected to be used in the real field. The US government is very much alarmed by the progress and the scale of civil technologies, that could completely change the current security conditions. Consequently, they additionally designated 14 emerging technologies as subject to export control under Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), and some offices have policy that they do not employ a researcher who has a history of working for China, even if they are an American citizen. Meanwhile China, conversely, is trying hard to find foreign researchers to work with. In any case, Japan must consider seriously how to face the era of escalating US-China competition.

(This is the English translation of an outline of the lecture delivered by KANEHARA Nobukatsu, former Deputy Secretary General, National Security Secretariat of Japan/ Distinguished Research Fellow at JFIR at the 320th meeting of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” by JFIR held on February 19, 2020)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

bucknumber

No.127    Thoughts at Guryongpo Sunset
by ARAKI Kazuhiro, Professor, Takushoku University
(January 21, 2020)

No.126    Yemen Situation Will Be the Key to the US-Iran Relations Breakthrough
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(November 26, 2019)

No.125    Japan Needs Its Own Diplomacy Towards Iran
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives
(September 30, 2019)

No.124    ASEAN Seek Opportunities In ‘Indo-Pacific’
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(July 10, 2019)

No.123    Looking Back the Japan-Russia Peace Treaty Negotiation
by MATSUI Akira, the first Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan
(May 21, 2019)

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–
ANNOUNCEMENT
—————– – – – —————–

JFIR’s Research Project on “Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of ‘Multilayer Globalism'” Launched

JFIR has just launched a three-year research project (FY2020-2022) on “Japan’s Diplomatic Strategy in the Age of ‘Multilayer Globalism’.” In recent years, “liberal globalism,” basis of the current international order, has come to be challenged by “non-liberal globalism” pursued by China and other emerging countries. Besides, the world is increasingly interconnected by “techno-globalism” of an unprecedented scale. Under the circumstances, Japan and other advanced democracies are faced with a challenge of how to embrace effectively the economic dynamism generated by such emerging countries while maintaining the basic tenets of the current international order.

For an overview of this project, please refer to the following link: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/200420_pre.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: e-letter

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

February 20, 2020, Vol.13, No.1 (Issue 77)

https://www.jfir.or.jp

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link: unsubscribe

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 127:
“Thoughts at Guryongpo Sunset”

By ARAKI Kazuhiro
Professor, Takushoku University

I visited Korea in late November. As myself being an expert in Korean Peninsula affairs, it is a necessity to “breathe the local air” from time to time, to grasp the reality there. It is not possible to do so in North Korea, but South is closer than Okinawa. Honestly, there is definitely a gap between what is actually going on in Korea and what are reported in Japanese (or even Korean) media.

After my appointment in a city on the side of Sea of Japan, called Pohang-si, I decided to visit Guryongpo, an hour bus ride from there. Guryongpo industrially prospered with fishery under Japanese rule. Some streets were restored as they were in old times, and restaurants like “Hinode” (‘sunrise’ in Japanese) are still in business. Many tourists were there, possibly because the town is known to have been a drama location. A two-stories high Japanese style residence is now publicly open as Modern History Museum, displaying then- “inlanders'” stuffs (like charming black dial phones), and city maps, etc.

What I have realized this time by visiting Korea was that Japan is accepted wider than before. It seemed difficult for them to publicly say good thing about Japan before, but now they can. The book “Anti-Japan Tribalism” by Lee Young-hoon, et al., translated and also published in Japan, is still in the best-seller section of the bookstores in Korea. Meanwhile, anime products like “Weathering with You” and “Your Name” by Japanese director Shinkai Makoto are also widely sold.

In any case, there will be no end to the anti-Japanese campaign in Korea, and Korean Peninsula will always be there that, despite the difficulties in the region, Japan has no option but to deal with Korea for long. Just to expect they change their attitude will not solve anything, so what is important for us is that we stand ready. I believe if Japan stand strong and still, be patient during the difficult times, not only Korea but any countries will no longer look down on Japan. The abduction issue would be the most obvious case. Such thoughts tided in my mind while looking at the Guryongpo port sunset.

(This is the English translation of an article written by Professor, Takushoku University, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of December 12, 2019, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on January 21, 2020.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

bucknumber

No.126    Yemen Situation Will Be the Key to the US-Iran Relations Breakthrough
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(November 26, 2019)

No.125    Japan Needs Its Own Diplomacy Towards Iran
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives
(September 30, 2019)

No.124    ASEAN Seek Opportunities In ‘Indo-Pacific’
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(July 10, 2019)

No.123    Looking Back the Japan-Russia Peace Treaty Negotiation
by MATSUI Akira, the first Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan
(May 21, 2019)

No.122    Japanese Politics 2019: In for a Bumpy Ride
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 22, 2019)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: e-letter

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

December 20, 2019, Vol.12, No.6 (Issue 76)

https://www.jfir.or.jp

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bi-monthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR COMMENTARY” and “JFIR UPDATES.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR COMMENTARY” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 126:
“Yemen Situation Will Be the Key to the US-Iran Relations Breakthrough”

By SHINODA Hideaki
Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School

The summit meeting of Prime Minister Abe and President Rouhani was held on September 24. I believe this meeting will be a touchstone for Japanese diplomacy for overcoming its strife with Korea, whether Japan is genuinely seeking its contribution to the world peace, or only interested in a narrow minded disputes. Meanwhile, would this meeting help improve the US-Iran relations —actually, that is the question. It is hard to imagine if Japan asks “Dear Iran, would you listen to the US?” and Iran would listen. Even if they are suffering from the economic sanction, it is not a big problem for the leadership. So proposing to lift the sanction will hardly be a leverage for the negotiation.

Then, what is Iran’s critical interest? That would be the situation in Yemen. Currently, US-backed, Saudi-led united forces have been intervening in Yemen to combat anti-government Houthis, while Iran-backed Houthis is attacking Saudi Arabia. In Japan, Yemeni Houthis is only mentioned whether they were the main actor of attacking the oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, but it is too narrow-sighted. US State Secretary Mr. Pompeo blamed Iran, but Iranian Foreign Minister Dr. Zarif counterargued by showing the images of devastation in Yemen —pointing out it is nothing but a farce that US is blaming Iran of Saudi attack by Houthis while it is blind-sighting itself of situation in Yemen.

In fact, Democrats-led US Congress has passed the resolution to Trump administration not to provide arms to Saudi Arabia, due to the concern on Yemeni situation. Iran’s argument is convincing since Trump administration vetoed the resolution and continuing its support to Saudi Arabia. Iran, of course, is not assisting Yemen only because of the humanitarian reason. Houthis, having grown undefeatable in Yemen, has already proposed a de facto truce to Saudi Arabia. “Recognition of Houthis will help the security of the Gulf region including of Saudi Arabia, pressuring Iran will not help anything” —such message is a strong implication for the related countries. Recognition of Houthis in the international community will be a big leverage against Iran.

Saudi-led intervention in Yemen, headed by H.R.H. Prince Mohammad bin Salman, as a matter of fact, will not end instantly. It is hard to imagine, however, that Crown Prince believes they can defeat Houthis completely. Japan is likely not able to convince Prince Salman, but it does not mean Japan cannot do anything for Iranian issues. The Japanese government better be aware of its advantageous position as neutral in the current Yemen situation. For PM Abe to make a breakthrough, only way is to organize an international conference on peace in Yemen, so US and Iran can cooperate. It is hard to imagine the US, that supports Saudi Arabia, negotiates with Iran and achieve an agreement, despite the situation in Yemen, to begin with. If Japan can be a mediator for the improvement of the US-Iran relations, Japan’s seriousness on its contribution to the world peace will be recognized.

(This is the English translation of an article written by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of June 28, 2019, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on November 26, 2019.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.125    Japan Needs Its Own Diplomacy Towards Iran
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives
(September 30, 2019)

No.124    ASEAN Seek Opportunities In ‘Indo-Pacific’
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(July 10, 2019)

No.123    Looking Back the Japan-Russia Peace Treaty Negotiation
by MATSUI Akira, the first Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan
(May 21, 2019)

No.122    Japanese Politics 2019: In for a Bumpy Ride
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 22, 2019)

No.121    The End of US Engagement Policy for China
by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University
(January 29, 2019)

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–
EVENT
—————– – – – —————–

Japan-India-ROK Trilateral Dialogue
on “Future Prospects for Japan-India-ROK Trilateral Cooperation in the Age of Indo-Pacific” Held

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), together with the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) and Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), organized the Japan-India-ROK Trilateral Dialogue on “Prospects for Japan-India-ROK Trilateral Cooperation in the Age of Indo-Pacific” at the Conference Room of JFIR in Tokyo on November 28, 2019.

This Dialogue was intended as an occasion for a frank exchange of views among the Japanese delegation of 10 experts headed by WATANABE Mayu, President of JFIR, the Indian delegation of 3 experts headed by Samir SARAN, President of Observer Research Foundation, and the ROK delegation of 7 experts headed by KIM Joon-Hyung, Chancellor of KNDA, on such topics as “Changing Strategic Landscape in Indo-Pacific and the Trilateral Cooperation” and “Socio-Economic Changes in Indo-Pacific and the Trilateral Cooperation,” etc.

For the outline of the discussion, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/exchanges/pdf/191128_roe.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

he Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

[SPECIAL NEWS REPORT]
Alliance Policy Coordination Briefs on “China Risk and China Opportunity for the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Published

October 20, 2019, Vol.12, No.5 (Issue 75)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bi-monthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR UPDATES” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–
PUBLICATION
—————– – – – —————–

SPECIAL NEWS REPORT:
Alliance Policy Coordination Briefs on “China Risk and China Opportunity for the U.S.-Japan Alliance” Published

Since April 2017, JFIR and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) have conducted a joint study project on “China Risk and China Opportunity for the U.S.-Japan Alliance,” co-headed by KAMIYA Matake, Distinguished Research Fellow of JFIR / Professor of the National Defense Academy of Japan, and James L. Schoff, Senior Fellow of CEIP. As part of this project, CEIP has just published the Alliance Policy Coordination Briefs “China Risk and China Opportunity for the U.S.-Japan Alliance.” This series of Briefs seeks to provide accurate depiction of China, throwing into relief its risks and opportunities for the U.S.-Japan alliance in the areas of regional and international order, trade and technology, security, and foreign relations. Taking into account the similarities and differences in the perspectives of both the U.S. and Japan, these Briefs are expected to leave significant marks on the thinking of the topic in both countries.

For the full texts of the “Briefs,” please visit JFIR’s website ( https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/ ) and click on the banner at the top of the page, or refer directly to the following link of the CEIP official website: https://carnegieendowment.org/specialprojects/USJapanAlliance/ChinaRiskOpportunity

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 125:
“Japan Needs Its Own Diplomacy Towards Iran”

By FUNADA Hajime
Member of the House of Representatives

Iran is a major power in Middle East, the center of the Ancient Orient, and home to many world heritage sites that are well known to Japanese people. After the Persian Empire, it was ruled by dynasties all we have heard of from the world history class: Achaemenids, Seljuqs, Timurid, Safavids, etc. In Middle East, Japan has maintained a long-time friendly relations with Iran, along with Turkey.

Under the observation that Iran is secretly developing and trying to possess nuclear capability, the US and allies had reached to the agreement with Iran on Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The Trump administration, however, withdrew from the JCPOA, under the suspicion that Iran knows the loopholes of the　agreement, and is continuing the nuclear development.

The US now does not have to rely on Middle East as much as it used to, in terms of energy imports, due to the increase in domestic shale gas production. This trend became apparent with the Trump administration, as its hardliner approach to the region is seen such as recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. In such political context, Prime Minister ABE Shinzo flew to and tried to communicate with Iran, based on the historically friendly relationship of the two countries. Although Supreme Leader Ali KHAMENEI and President Hassan ROUHANI voiced that Iran does not wish for war, the mood was chilled when a Japanese tanker ship was attacked during PM ABE’s stay, by suspectedly Iranian militia.

Regardless of various opinions about PM ABE’s Iran visit, there was no remarkable achievement made, mainly due to the fact that the US itself is not seriously willing to improve the relations with Iran, and Japan is too close to the US. This was a lesson for Japan to reaffirm the difficulty of the situation in Middle East. Meanwhile, the energy condition of Japan is not easy since the Great East Japan that caused nuclear power plant incidents, hence Japan cannot help but continuing to rely on the Middle Eastern oils.

The Strait of Hormuz, where the Japanese tanker was attacked, and oil imports to Japan are passing through, is indeed vital for Japan. Therefore, Japan needs to continue its own persistent negotiation with Iran, which faces the Strait of Hormuz, even if that would set aside the alliance with the US.

(This is the English translation of an article written by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of July 3, 2019, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on September 30, 2019.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.124    ASEAN Seek Opportunities In ‘Indo-Pacific’
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(July 10, 2019)

No.123    Looking Back the Japan-Russia Peace Treaty Negotiation
by MATSUI Akira, the first Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan
(May 21, 2019)

No.122    Japanese Politics 2019: In for a Bumpy Ride
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 22, 2019)

No.121    The End of US Engagement Policy for China
by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University
(January 29, 2019)

No.120    The Caspian Summit and Japan’s International Awareness in Question
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, the University of Niigata Prefecture
(November 29, 2018)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

August 20, 2019, Vol.12, No.4 (Issue 74)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bi-monthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–
Announcement
—————– – – – —————–

INVITATION to the 17th NEAT Annual Conference on “Sustainable Development and the Environment” to be Convened in Tokyo on August 23, 2019.

The Japan Forum on International Relations will convene the 17th NEAT Annual Conference on “Sustainable Development and the Environment” to the following effect:

Date: Friday, August 23, 2019
Time: 13:30 to 16:00
Venue: Lecture Hall (“Kodo”), International House of Japan (IHJ) / Address: 5-11-16, Roppongi, Minato-ku, Tokyo
Working Language: English

The Network of East Asian Think-tanks (NEAT) is a Track 2 regional framework of leading think tanks of ASEAN+3 (APT) countries established in 2003 upon request of the APT Summit. JFIR is designated as “Country Coordinator” of Japan in NEAT activities. The Annual Conferences of NEAT is participated by leading experts dispatched by each of member think tanks of NEAT to discuss policy issues in East Asia region from various aspects, the result of which will be compiled as a set policy recommendation to be submitted to the APT Summit meeting each year.
JFIR is hosting the Annual Conference this year under the general theme of “Sustainable Development and the Environment” in which experts from APT countries as listed below will discuss in two sessions “International Cooperation on Combating the Ocean Plastic Pollution” and “Environmental Education.”For more details, please refer to the “Program” of the Conference at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/exchange/pdf/190823_program.pdf

[Overseas Side]
DING Yu, Associate Research Fellow, Foreign Environmental Cooperation Center, Ministry of Ecology and Environment (China)
Shofwan Al Banna CHOIRUZZAD Executive Secretary, ASEAN Study Center, Universitas Indonesia (Indonesia)
To Minh THU, Director, Center for Security and Development, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Vietnam)
Sonny N. DOMINGO, Research Fellow II, Philippine Institute for Development Studies(Philippines)
Jiwei QIAN, Senior Research Fellow, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore (Singapore)
Somkiat KAMOLPUN, Director, Education Hub Promotion Unit, Office of the Higher Education Commission (Thailand)
Kyaw Myaing, Member, Myanmar Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Myanmar)
KIM keeseok, Professor, Kangwon National University (Korea)
Inthasone THIRAKUL, Deputy Director General, Institute of Foreign Affaire, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Laos)
Juita MOHAMADO, Research Fellow at Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia)
Angvichet CHUM, Deputy Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Cambodia (Cambodia)

[Japanese Side]
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR
ITO Go, Director and Director of Research, JFIR / Professor, Meiji University
ISHIKAWA Satoshi, Professor, Tokai University

(In order of appearance in the program)

Then, JFIR wishes to invite readers of this E-Letter to this Conference.

For registration, please REPLY to this E-Letter (to JFIR Secretariat: jfir@jfir.or.jp Officers in charge: Mr. Kikuchi and Mr. Takeda) by stating your (1) name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, and (5) e-mail address.

Your registration is also acceptable via registration form at the following link (in Japanese only):
https://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/exchange/pdf/190823_info.pdf

The registration will be accepted on a first-come, first-served basis, and will be closed as soon as it reaches the capacity of the venue.

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

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No. 124:
“ASEAN Seek Opportunities In ‘Indo-Pacific'”

By NABESHIMA Keizo
Critic

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) held its Summit Meeting in Bangkok, Thailand on June 23. The Meeting adopted, on its own accord, “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.” It was for the first time for ASEAN to unveil such strategic outlook encompassing a broad geographical area stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, a way beyond South China Sea where they have disputes with China. In the Outlook, it acknowledges that the “Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions are amongst the most dynamic in the world as well as centers of economic growth for decades. As a result, these regions continue to experience geopolitical and geostrategic shifts.” Based on such outlook, ASEAN declares that it needs to “continue to maintain its central role in the evolving regional architecture in Southeast Asia and its surrounding regions” as well as to “continue being an honest broker within the strategic environment of competing interests.”

What is behind of this is the US-China discord in Asia-Pacific, escalating competition of hegemony in the region particularly through trade strife. For ASEAN, both US and China are close economic partners, so taking either side is not an option. ASEAN needs to maintain some distance from US and China, while also maintaining the unity as an institution for the regional integration. Issues in the South China Sea have been prolonging due to the threats posed by China’s militarization of islets and violation of fishery zone. ASEAN member states vary geographically —for example, maritime states like Philippines and Indonesia, and continental states like Myanmar and those share border with China on Indochinese Peninsula, so they have different interests. The divide within ASEAN was deepening as 4 member states with disputes with China in South China Sea, like Vietnam and Philippines, and the China supporters, the continental members such as Cambodia and Laos, were not able to reach an agreement on the joint statement, despite some repeated attempts. But now, ASEAN is required to unite stronger as the US-China confrontation is escalating.

On July 12, 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Hague ruled out China’s argument of its sovereignty in South China Sea, while China denounced the ruling as “nothing more than a piece of wastepaper” and decided to ignore it. China kept building artificial islands by reclaiming reefs, of which they militarized and started to effectively control over by constructing a runway, a hangar, radar facility, etc. ‘Indo-Pacific Initiative’ was initiated by Prime Minister ABE Shinzo, and US President Trump followed, then not only the regional countries like India and Australia, but also those in Europe with historical ties to the region, United Kingdom and France are joining. As President Trump’s administration is enforcing the Freedom of Navigation operation in South China Sea, military tension with China is rising, along with the trade strife. It is understandable that ASEAN, the main actor of the region, concerned that it would be lost amidst of the US-China confrontation in regional security and economic cooperation. So, the Indo-Pacific Initiative gave ASEAN a step to regain its raison d’être.

The Chair’s statement of the ASEAN Summit stated that they “took note of some concerns on the land reclamations and activities in the area, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region.” This part was not in the original draft prepared by Thailand, the chair, but it seems Vietnam and Singapore claimed that part to be inserted. The statement also stated to “pursue peaceful resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, including the 1982 UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea]” and “exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities and avoid actions that may further complicate the situation and pursue peaceful resolution of disputes.” “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” self-claims that it “provides a guide for ASEAN’s engagement in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions” including South China Sea. Mr. Kavi Chongkittavorn, a well-known journalist of Bangkok Post, noted “a stronger ASEAN will prevent the rise of a hegemonic power in the region.” That is right. To realize that, however, ASEAN is facing a challenge whether the organization could be strongly united to exert its powerful leadership so it will not vacillate if concern to China be noted on the joint statement or not, every year the chair state changes.

(This is the English translation of an article written by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of June 28, 2019, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on July 10, 2019.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.123    Looking Back the Japan-Russia Peace Treaty Negotiation
by MATSUI Akira, the first Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan
(May 21, 2019)

No.122    Japanese Politics 2019: In for a Bumpy Ride
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 22, 2019)

No.121    The End of US Engagement Policy for China
by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University
(January 29, 2019)

No.120    The Caspian Summit and Japan’s International Awareness in Question
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, the University of Niigata Prefecture
(November 29, 2018)

No.119    Discussion regarding the Death Penalty and Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(September 28, 2018)

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Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

June 20, 2019, Vol.12, No.3 (Issue 73)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
WATANABE Mayu, President, JFIR

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

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Announcement
—————– – – – —————–

JFIR’s New Leadership Inaugurated Under Chairman ITO Kenichi & President WATANABE Mayu

With regard to the office of President of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), which has been vacant and vicariously executed by the Chairman of JFIR since August 29, 2017, JFIR is pleased to announce that the Board of Trustees and Board of Directors meetings held on June 3, 2019, have elected Ms. WATANABE Mayu, former Vice President of JFIR, as President of JFIR effective immediately. The term of her office shall be two years, until June 2021.

For the greeting of President WATANABE, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/about_us/greeting_watanabe.htm

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

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No. 123:
“Looking Back the Japan-Russia Peace Treaty Negotiation”

By MATSUI Akira
the first Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan

In this article, I would like to review the negotiation process of the Japan-Russia peace treaty so far and point out some prospect from now. In spite of the agreement made between Prime Minister Abe and President Putin at the ‘Lodge Meeting’ in Yamaguchi prefecture in December, 2016, on moving forward practically the Japan-Russia negotiation , as well as to promote the economic development of the Far East Russia and the four Northern Islands within the special framework that would not violate the legal condition of both countries, yet little progress has been achieved.

President Putin publicly proposed to “begin the peace treaty negotiation without any preconditions” at The 4th Eastern Economic Forum in September, 2018, and later on November 14, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit Meeting, the both leaders agreed to ‘activate’ (author’s note: in Russian, it did not say ‘accelerate’ as reported in Japanese) the negotiation process based on the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration of 1956. Thus, after six decades of back and forth the negotiation was turned back where it started. On March 14, 2019 at a Russian business meeting, it was reported that President Putin said the negotiation should not be broken off but it needs “a break”. It was followed by the speech on March 27 by Mr. Mikhail Y. Galuzin, Russian Ambassador to Japan, saying that Russia and Japan shall conclude the peace treaty based on the Joint Declaration of 1956, and Japan should accept the result of the World War II. He requested Japan to ease the security concern originating from the Japan-U.S. alliance, and further protested that the Northern Islands are described as Japan’s inherent territories in Japanese textbooks.

Because Russia is tightly busy dealing with various challenges that needs to be handled without delay such as; toughening US on issues of missiles, space or military affairs; loosening unity of EU; wobbling NATO; the presidential election in Ukraine; Middle East issues like Syria, Israel and Palestine; intervention to Venezuela; rapidly rising China; unstable Korean Peninsula; weakening domestic economy; declining support for President Putin, etc.— the priority for concluding the peace treaty with Japan is significantly low. Cool-headed President Putin honestly may want to take a break. That would explain why Russia now complains about the Japanese textbooks claiming the Northern Territories as its own, proposes dissolving the Japan-US Alliance which obviously Japan can not accept.

While Russia tries to buy time and blame Japan for delaying progress, not willing to negotiate seriously and expects Japan to compromise before Russia do anything, Japan would only end up tying its own hands even it make an effort to talk or to set the time for concluding the negotiation. Personal amicable relations and national interest in international politics are two different things. Good-will or kindness will not always be reciprocated. A sign of willingness to compromise for negotiation progress could trigger even harder response.

Despite having the “abnormal state” with the absence of peace treaty for 73 years after the war, Japan and Russia have maintained the normal bilateral relations economically and diplomatically. The Northern Territories will not disappear, and the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration will remain to be a valid diplomatic document between the two sovereign states. What Japan should not do at this stage is to compromise willy-nilly to sign a peace treaty and leave source of problems in the long future. Japan needs to take a delicate balance on the surrounding three big powers US, China and Russia. As the international system today is undergoing a structural change of an unprecedented scale in which the balance of power among states is in disarray, the Northern Territories issue should not be solved in a hurry. Japan’s national interest needs to be examined through a long-term perspective based on a broader basis.

What is now required for Japan is a change of mind setting. Japan had cooperated with Soviet Russia in the developments of oil, forestry, ports, etc. in Siberia and Far East during the 1970s. Japan can separate the economic/trade relations from the peace treaty negotiation so that Japan would proactively promote economically beneficial dealings for its own. If economic win-win cooperation be promoted between the two countries President Putin would take it positively to promote economic development in Siberia and Far East to cope with rapidly rising China. Meanwhile, Japan should not forget to remind Russia of the territory issue, as ‘old wound’, from time to time in appropriate chances.

(This is the English translation of an article written by MATSUI Akira, the first Japanese Ambassador to Kazakhstan, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of April 7, 2019, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on May 21, 2019.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.112    Japanese Politics 2019: In for a Bumpy Ride
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 22, 2019)

No.121    The End of US Engagement Policy for China
by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University
(January 29, 2019)

No.120    The Caspian Summit and Japan’s International Awareness in Question
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, the University of Niigata Prefecture
(November 29, 2018)

No.119    Discussion regarding the Death Penalty and Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(September 28, 2018)

No.118    Japanese Diplomacy in post US-North Korea Summit
by NAGASHIMA Akihisa, Member of House of Representatives / former State Minister of Defense
(July 10, 2018)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

April 20, 2019, Vol. 12, No.2 (Issue 72)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 122:
“Japanese Politics 2019: In for a Bumpy Ride”

By SUGIURA Masaaki
Political Commentator

Ups and downs await Japanese politics this year. Be it breakthrough of the Northern Territories issues or realization of the constitutional amendment, both pursued by Prime Minister Shinzo, fleshing out the details, for sure, would divide the nation. The administration should not risk itself on that, as it is facing a crucial test of upcoming elections of local governments, and of the House of the Councillors. While the oppositions would go for broke, Abe administration would strike back by introducing “a double election,” holding the election of both Houses on the same day if necessary. It is no doubt that this year will be a political watershed.

In a wide perspective, the opposition party stand no chance of taking over the current Liberal Democratic Party’s rule. Because the past 6 years of the Abe/LDP administration has been a prosperous 6 years for Japan, none of the other administration since the end of the World War II ever realized the practically zero percent unemployment. Just like it was the Battle of Red Cliff for PM Abe, he had natural advantage, or of geography, time, and people, and it will echo positively more or less for the rest of his remaining 3- year tenure. I think most of the people will choose to keep the status quo by looking back his achievements in the past 6 years.

Yukio Edano, Leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, said in the new year that they will prepare themselves for the election, assuming there would be the double. PM Abe, however, would not try to hold the double election unless there would be a very good reason to do so. The very good reason is a significant progress in the Northern Territories Issue. There is zero possibility for tricky President Putin to return the four islands which gives the US military an advantage in the Far East. Possibly two islands would be returned, but four is unlikely, despite some expectations, thus ending the negotiation with two would be a likely and realistic scenario.

It is highly rare in the world history for a country to fully regain the territory lost in the war, without fighting again. Then if the election kicks off with the question whether two islands option is enough, it will be an easy target for the oppositions and mass media, or it is even uncertain what the far right wing will do. It will be impossible to maintain the current two thirds of the pro-Constitutional amendment Members. The Northern Territories Issue seems be going brightly, while in reality the circumstance is in a dark uncertainty. So the priority for the diplomacy with Russia can be deprioritized for now.

Important events of this year are already listed: ordinary session of the Diet is called on this month, the summit meeting with Russia is scheduled later. In April, there will be so-called the unified local government elections, and the Emperor’s abdication on the 30th. New Emperor will enthrone on May 1, changing the era name. Group of 20 summit meeting will be held in Osaka on June 28 and 29, of which Chinese Premier Xi Jinping is due to visit Japan. The House of the Councillors’ election will be held in June or July, and the consumption tax will be raised to 10% on October 1. The biggest obstacle in this year’s political forecast is this tax raise. Because having the election right after raising the tax guarantees the administration a defeat in the election, so the chance of holding the general election will only be way before the tax raise day, or after the later 2020 when the nation has calmed down from the tax raise anger.

The pro-Constitutional amendment parties —LDP, Komei, and Osaka Restoration Association (currently renamed as Japan Innovation Party)— won sufficiently in the previous House of Councillors’ election in 2016, securing two thirds of the seats. The seats of LDP, Komei, and JIP that are subject for the election this year is 90 or so, and that is how many they must secure to maintain two thirds in the Diet no matter what. Though it is very difficult for them to avoid the loss, because they won too well last time to begin with.

Rumor has it, the double election will be happening to control the expected damage. It is kind of a gamble, but PM Abe would do it because he has guts. While PM Abe has completely denied the possibility of the double election by voicing “I have no plan for it at all, and no such idea exists in my head,” it has been a tradition for Prime Ministers to be allowed to lie when it comes to the cases of dissolution of the House of Representatives to hold election, and of the official bank rate policy. Yoshihiko Noda, former Prime Minister, has said “When I became Prime Minister, many senior colleagues had been telling me that I now can lie about when to dissolve the House of Representatives, and about the official bank rate. But I did not think it was ok to be allowed to lie on a thing for some specific area. So when I announced ‘dissolving the House soon’ (in 2012), I struggled.

I am not sure what PM Abe might feel about this tradition, but everyone has different feeling.” Besides the dissolution is actually happening or not, we can guess there would be a possibility when PM Abe says he is not thinking of the dissolution. If Prime Minister is allowed to lie about the dissolution, media is allowed to spread its own guesses of the timing. However, there used to be a ‘boy who cried dissolution’ who were a TV reporter and crying out loud “dissolution, dissolution” for any political occasions. The guess for the dissolution requires political reporter’s accumulated decisions and insights, and the dissolution boy is the last person needed. Nevertheless, we should be aware that anything could happen in the political arena after the summer.

(This is the English translation of an article written by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of January 7, 2019, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on March 22, 2019.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.121    The End of US Engagement Policy for China
by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University
(January 29, 2019)

No.120    The Caspian Summit and Japan’s International Awareness in Question
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, the University of Niigata Prefecture
(November 29, 2018)

No.119    Discussion regarding the Death Penalty and Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(September 28, 2018)

No.118    Japanese Diplomacy in post US-North Korea Summit
by NAGASHIMA Akihisa, Member of House of Representatives / former State Minister of Defense
(July 10, 2018)

No.117    Participation in The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia 2025
by MIFUNE Emi, Professor, Komazawa University
(May 15, 2018)

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Event
————- – – – ————-

The 310th meeting of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” on “Economic Outlook of Japan and the World 2019” Held

JFIR and its two sister organizations, the Global Forum of Japan and the Council on East Asian Community monthly organizes a “Foreign Policy Luncheon” meeting to provide an occasion for members of the three organizations to meet in an informal and confidential manner with senior officials of the Japanese Government and/or other experts and specialists in fields related to international relations. The 310th meeting of “Foreign Policy Luncheon” on the topic of “Economic Outlook of Japan and the World 2019” was Held on February 28, 2019. The guest speaker was YOSHIZAKI Tatsuhiko, Chief Economist of Sojitz Research Institute.

Outline of his speech can be viewed at the following link: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/roundtables/310_190218.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

February 20, 2019, Vol. 12, No.1 (Issue 71)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 121:
“The End of US Engagement Policy for China”

By SASAJIMA Masahiko
Professor, Atomi University

The Summit Meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping was held on December 1, 2018, in Buenos Aires. The much-anticipated result was a ‘truce’ which postponed the further confrontation of the two countries for 90 days by suspending increase in tariff by the US on Chinese products scheduled in January 2019. This, however, does not change the forecast of the prolonging US-China tensions, as the bilateral disputes are spread not only within the trade deficit negotiation, but also among wider, various areas including politics and security, that all are moving towards head-on confrontation. It would be misleading if this US-China tension was recognized as ‘trade war’ based only on the superficial phenomena which started by President Trump with imposing the multiple tariff. It is highly questionable if President Trump accurately understands the seriousness of the US-China confrontation, judging from his speeches at the UN General Assembly in September, or at the US-China Summit this time. Perhaps, President Trump is trying to earn a significant result from the leadership of China in a short-term diplomatic deal, so that he can appeal that to his supporters for the next presidential election for 2020.

Meanwhile, there is a consistency in tough perception against China seen among Trump administration, from the National Security Strategy (NSS) published in December 2017, and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) published in January 2018, which stated China and Russia as ‘strategic competitors,’ to Vice President Mike Pence’s speech at Hudson Institute on October 4. Their tougher stance show that the US’ China policy has made a major shift from the post-Cold War ‘engagement’ to ‘strategic competition.’ This change comes from the disappointment no matter how much the US had waited, China was not politically liberated nor democratized after the end of Cold War. Marking its 40th anniversary in 2018 since Deng Xiaoping’s “Reform and Opening,” Xi Jinping government established much authoritative control internally, and trying to expand its interests in the South China Sea regardless of the international law and order, making China an extraordinary power. Domestically, they’re campaigning for a tight anti-corruption measures, tightening the party control and kicking out the rivals, but completing the campaign seems unlikely under the one party system that relies on itself from the head to toe.

The disappointment and sense of urgency against China are shared among the security team of Trump administration, as well as the bipartisan members of the Congress, business community, and major think-tanks. The administration’s economic team are categorized based on the comments regarding the tariff measures against China; Larry Kudlow, Director of National Economic Council (NEC) and Steven Mnuchin, Secretary of the Treasury, are seen as “doves,” and Peter Navarro, Director of the Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, as well as Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer are seen as “hawks,” but the real, comprehensive China policy appears in NSS.

A notable example of bipartisan counter-China attitude is observed on “The China Reckoning,” a paper written by two of the former Obama administration’s diplomatic/security staff, Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, which appeared on March/April 2018 issue of the Foreign Affairs Magazine. In that paper, the two argue that “the gap between the US’ expectation and the reality China is posing is expanding,” by pointing out how China has been declining the foreign interference in cases of its domestic human rights conditions, in order to protect its one party control, or having shown little care of international order in the South China Sea, thus the authors evaluate highly of Trump administration’s efforts that their “first National Security Strategy took a step in the right direction.” This hints the hard-line bipartisan China policy will continue even if Democratic Party takes over the administration.

The US’ China policy was positioned in 1972 by Nixon & Kissinger’s diplomacy during Cold War era, as the shift from the bipolar world to the multipolar one, which was inherited to Ford, Carter, then to Reagan administrations. During George H. W. Bush’s administration, who recently passed away, the relations with China had strained due to Tianmen Square protests in 1989 at the timing right before the Cold War was coming to an end. At the later half of the first Clinton administration that followed, the ‘engagement policy’ was installed, demonstrating its willingness to engage China into the international community ever since. China joined the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1991, and Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1992. Meanwhile, Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security signed in 1996 underlined the ‘engagement policy’ as a common China policy of Japan and the US, which aimed China to be included in the international community, with the mixture of cooperation and hedging, so that it would be transformed to acquire wider political liberty and democracy within the country. As a part of such strategy, Clinton administration supported China to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), and it earned the membership during the following George W. Bush administration in 2001.

The ‘engagement policy’ has dramatically shifted to the ‘strategic competition’ today. Although NSS defines both China and Russia as ‘strategic competitors,’ Russia is “China’s junior partner” according to Professor Stephen Walt of Harvard University. Russia is a ‘fake rival’ and it seems that the main target remains to be China. The concept of ‘strategic competition,’ however, has not been clarified, and it leaves many questions. First, there is no clear definition of its goal. Is it the democratization of China? Nonetheless, foreign power cannot enforce China to democratize its polity, because that is what China should decide. And how much does the world expect China to improve their human rights conditions and religious freedom (oppression against underground Christian churches, Islamic Uyghurs, Tibetan Buddhists, etc.)?

Second, it is yet to be clear whether the negotiation will be on a new rules on what kind, or what would be the common framework. The violation of intellectual properties, forcible acquirement or request of handing over advanced technology, cyber-attacks by China are common concern of the world, but how the rules will be constructed is unclear.

It is uncertain how sincerely Trump administration will be accountable for such concerns that the US allies have. The ‘strategic competition’ will be transformed from the narrow-sighted trade deficit dispute to the competition over the liberty and democracy. Which would be appealing to the emerging or developing countries, liberal and democratic order, or Chinese one-party dictatorship? The competition seems easy at a glance, but it would be difficult for the US, under President Trump, to maintain its lead without the cooperation from the likeminded Western allies. The key to win over this competition is for the US to restore the alliance. For Japan, it is necessary to carefully handle the improving Japan-China relations while balancing with the US’ ‘strategic competition.’

(This is the English translation of an article written by SASAJIMA Masahiko, Professor, Atomi University, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of December 10, 2018, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on January 29, 2019.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.120    The Caspian Summit and Japan’s International Awareness in Question
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, the University of Niigata Prefecture
(November 29, 2018)

No.119    Discussion regarding the Death Penalty and Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(September 28, 2018)

No.118    Japanese Diplomacy in post US-North Korea Summit
by NAGASHIMA Akihisa, Member of House of Representatives / former State Minister of Defense
(July 10, 2018)

No.117    Participation in The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia 2025
by MIFUNE Emi, Professor, Komazawa University
(May 15, 2018)

No.116    Kim Jong Un Will Never Let the “National Treasure” Nuclear Missile Taken Away
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 28, 2018)

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Publication
————- – – – ————-

Second Volume of “JFIR WORLD REVIEW” on “What is Geoeconomics?” Published

As previously announced, the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) launched in June 2018 a new publication entitled “JFIR WORLD REVIEW,” a biannual periodical (in Japanese) on diplomatic and international affairs. And its second volume was published on December 15, 2018.

The second volume features the topic of “What is Geoeconomics?” in collaboration with one of JFIR’s current research projects, “Japan’s Economic Diplomacy in the Era of Geoeconomics” (Project Leader: KAWAI Masahiro, Distinguished Research Fellow of JFIR).

Opening with Prof. KAWAI’s lead-off article on “The 21st Century World as Seen through Geoeconomics,” this volume features a special contribution by Amb. Robert Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy of the Council on Foreign Relations on the topic of “Indo-Pacific Strategy in an Era of Geoeconomics,” and a series of special interviews titled “What Europe Expects for Japan in an Era of Geoeconomics,” with such eminent experts as Francois Godement, Senior Policy Fellow of European Council on Foreign Relations, etc., thereby illustrating cutting-edge understandings of geoeconomics from the viewpoints of Japan, the United States, and Europe, respectively.

The second volume of “JFIR WORLD REVIEW” (in Japanese) is available at the following link: https://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/reseach/pdf/181227.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

December 20, 2018, Vol. 11, No.6 (Issue 70)

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 120:
“The Caspian Summit and Japan’s International Awareness in Question”

By HAKAMADA Shigeki
Trustee, the Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, the University of Niigata Prefecture

On August 12, 2018, in the Kazakh port city of Aktau, the Fifth Caspian Summit meeting was convened with participation of 5 Caspian littoral states of Russia, Kazakhstan, Iran, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. The meeting was held for the first time since 1996, and the leaders agreed upon and signed the “Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea.” The Convention contains the following three agreements, which, however, are riddled with problems: First, Caspian Sea has officially been recognized as an inland water with special legal status given. This has put to an end the long dispute as to whether the Caspian Sea is a sea or a lake. Second, presence of foreign military other than the Caspian five countries has been banned in the Caspian Sea. This means that the military presence of the US and/or NATO, long cause of anxiety for Russia, has been ruled out. And third, while the demarcation lines have been established on/in the water, the clause regarding demarcation at the bottom of the Sea has been removed. This leaves the dispute unanswered on the ownership of the resources there, which will be subject to bilateral negotiations among the parties concerned.

Although it is not widely known in Japan, the issues with Caspian Sea are deeply related to, not only with the energy or fishing issues among the Caspian states like Russia, Central Asian and Caucasus countries, but further extended to the strategic matters and energy issues worldwide, including the regions of Europe, United States, Near and Middle East, China, Pakistan and India. There are misinformation that give an impression as if the Caspian region will be stable and peaceful by the establishment of the Convention, settling the territorial issues and the economic disputes. In fact, the deep rooted issue of the region was not settled, and Japanese media are not aware of the seriousness of the issue.

The Caspian Sea area was so peaceful under the Soviet Union rule. Such environment changed drastically when the Soviet collapsed. The five countries acted egoistically based on their resource and fishery interests, severing the disputes among each other, and some were militarily crashed. Therefore, they tried to restrain each other by strengthening their ‘navy’ forces and conducted military exercises in a serious manner. As such, once peaceful Caspian Sea is now called a ‘sea of dispute’ (море раздора). Each one of the five countries attended the Summit this time had conducted a military exercise in Caspian Sea right before the Summit was held, and the president of Turkmenistan even headed to the Summit venue directly from the exercise location, trying to restrain other participating leaders. In October, 2015, the following year of Russia militarily ‘annexed’ the Crimea, Russia launched brand new 26 cruise missiles from also brand new 4 vessels in operation on Caspian Sea, striking 11 targets under the control of the anti-governmental groups in Syria. The missile flew 1500 km by crossing airspaces of Iran and Iraq. The domestic supporting rate of President Vladimir Putin reached a record high 89.9% in October, 2015, after the Russian air force’s operations in Syria and the missile attack from the Caspian Sea.

According to TASS, a Russian news agency, President Putin and the Government of Russia, with their strong victim’s mentality from the outer world, see the most notable achievement of the Convention was the agreement on denying the presence of the foreign militaries in Caspian Sea. President Putin noted the following according to the Kremlin’s website article: It was important to guarantee that the participants of the Summit decide the principles of military and political mutual cooperation, use Caspian Sea only for the peaceful purposes, and not allow the existence of foreign forces in the region. More important issue is the cooperation on the protection of the environment and biological resources among the Caspian states. A strict inspection is required in the light of the protection of the environment when the construction of infrastructure would threat the safety of the Sea.

The hottest topic at the moment is the Turkmenistan-Azerbaijan underwater gas pipeline plan. It is critical for Turkmenistan to have an energy export route to Europe via Azerbaijan, bypassing Russia. Because Turkmenistan does not have an energy export route to Europe, Russia used to import Turkmen gas then exported to Europe, but the trade was stopped due to the confrontation of the two countries. Now Turkmenistan, despite their willingness to be a neutral state, needs to export the major part of its rich resources to China, ending up deepening its dependency on China. So this underwater pipeline will be meaningful not just economically, but rather largely strategically and geopolitically, to liberate Caspian countries from depending on Russia or China, and it would limit Russia influence on Near and Middle East region. This is why Western countries supported the building of the pipeline enthusiastically.

Russia, on the other hand, strongly opposed the plan of such pipeline project, by arguing the agreement of all five countries around Caspian Sea is needed. This is because Russia is trying to secure its geopolitical influence through the energy issues not only on Caspian neighbors, but also on Near and Middle East, Pakistan and India. The issues in Caspian Sea means so much to the strategy and the geopolitics of the world. So, what happened with this issue on the Convention signed on August 12? The Convention states that the countries possess the rights to set new pipelines or cables based on the bilateral agreement. To do so, however, the agreement of five countries concerning the environmental protection is required. Just like Russia had intervened with the environmental reason in the case of Sakhalin II project, they can intervene in the pipeline project with the environmental reasons again. This is admitted by Russian newspapers as follows:

– Russia can stop the construction of the underwater pipeline with the environmental excuse. Also, Russia can intervene in the major projects of other countries that are working in Caspian Sea for gas, oil, and other things, by using the excuse of the environmental issues. (Expert, August 20, 2018)
– “The quarter century old dispute, will go on.” (Kommersant, August 13, 2018)
– The Convention states the pipeline building in a vague expression. This was because it was the result of the compromise among the all parties. (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, August 14, 2018)

The Convention states that the jurisdiction of the underground resource will be decided through the negotiation of the parties. As you may know, the statement is not only a matter among the Caspian nations, but also it is a matter closely connected to the West or Near and Middle Eastern countries with Russia or China. Although the major media in Japan briefly reported about the Caspian Summit on August 12, I have yet to encounter one that report in detail on how important the Convention and the agreement this time was in the context of the international politics. The news was not widely known, or only known as a unique event in a special region, at best. This poses a question of the international and security awareness of Japanese people.

(This is the English translation of an article written by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, The Japan Forum on International Relations / Professor, the University of Niigata Prefecture, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of September 5, 2018, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on November 29, 2018.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.119    Discussion regarding the Death Penalty and Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan
by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School
(September 28, 2018)

No.118    Japanese Diplomacy in post US-North Korea Summit
by NAGASHIMA Akihisa, Member of House of Representatives / former State Minister of Defense
(July 10, 2018)

No.117    Participation in The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia 2025
by MIFUNE Emi, Professor, Komazawa University
(May 15, 2018)

No.116    Kim Jong Un Will Never Let the “National Treasure” Nuclear Missile Taken Away
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 28, 2018)

No.115    The Changing Eurasian International Strategic Environment and Japan’s Response
by WATANABE Hirotaka, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
(January 30, 2018)

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Event
————- – – – ————-

Japan-US Roundtable Meeting on “The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Changing Balance of Power in the Asia Pacific” Held

JFIR organized the Japan-US Roundtable Meeting on “The North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Changing Balance of Power in the Asia Pacific” in Tokyo on December 11, 2018.

This Rountable was intended as an occasion for a frank exchange of views between the 5 delegation members of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy (NCAFP) headed by Ambassador Susan ELLIOTT, and 6 Japanese experts including ITO GO, Director of Research of JFIR / Professor of Meiji University, discussing such topic as the North Korean nuclear issues and the dynamics of security relations in the Asia Pacific region.

For the outline of discussion of the Roundtable, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/181211_roe.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

October 20, 2018, Vol. 11, No.5 (Issue 69)

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Announcement
————- – – – ————-

“The JAPAN-RUSSIA DIALOGUE” to be Convened on December 4 in Tokyo

JFIR, under the co-sponsorship of the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and the Far East Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (FEB RAS) will convene “The JAPAN-RUSSIA DIALOGUE: Possibility of Japan-Russia Cooperation in an Increasingly Complex Northeast Asia” to the following effect:

Date: Tuesday, December 4, 2018
Time: 13:00 to 16:30
Venue: “Lecture Hall,” The International House of Japan”
Language: Only in Japanese & Russian (Japanese-Russian simultaneous interpretation will be provided)
Admission: Free of charge

This “Dialogue” aims to provide an occasion for an exchange views between Japanese and Russian experts on the grand theme of “Possibility of Japan-Russia Cooperation in an Increasingly Complex Northeast Asia.”

The experts featured as panelists in this “Dialogue” include Valentin SERGIENKO, Vice-President of the Russian Academy of Sciences / Chairman of FEB RAS, Viktor LARIN, Director of Institute of History, Archeology and Ethnography of the Peoples of the Far East, FEB RAS from the Russian side, and HAKAMADA Shigeki, Superior Research Fellow of JFIR, MORIMOTO Satoshi, Director of JFIR, from the Japanese side.

For more information, please refer to the following link:

http://www.gfj.jp/j/dialogue/20181204_program.pdf

Then, JFIR would like to invite readers of this E-Letter to the “Dialogue.” For the registration, should you please send us (1) your name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, and (5) e-mail address via e-mail ( dialogue@gfj.jp ) no later than December 1, 2018.

PLEASE NOTE that the application will be processed on a first-come-first-served basis, and the registration will be closed when all the seats are filled.

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 119:
“Discussion regarding the Death Penalty and Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan”

By SHINODA Hideaki
Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School

On July 6, some of the leading members of the Aum Shinrikyo cult were executed, and it was widely reported by press. I remember vividly that the Tokyo subway sarin gas attack in 1995 attracted immense press coverage in Europe as I was studying in England then. So people in Europe should even now retain their memories of the attack. At the news of their execution, some EU member countries expressed their sympathies to the victims, their objection to the Japanese death penalty, and criticized the very act of execution. What I found strange about the way Japanese media covered the news was that the headline read “the largest execution in the post-war period, shocking the world / some criticizes it’s inhumane.” In fact, the ‘world’ here should be ‘European countries.’ On the other hand, on July 6, the same day we had the raining disaster and the execution of Aum Shinrikyo members, the murder suspect of Linh, a Vietnamese school girl in Japan, was sentenced to “indefinate imprisonment.” Then, Linh’s parents, Vietnamese, has launched a signature campaign in a bid to pass the death penalty on the suspect. We could not say that Europe is “the world,” while Vietnam and Japan are not.

It is true that the death penalty has been abolished in most of the countries in the world. There are also countries still have it as law, but feel to abolish it, that it has not been exercised. Despite such, it still depends on countries outside the Europe. There is no likeliness that the death penalty would be banned among Islamic countries. I support the death penalty personally, just like the average Japanese people, but this doesn’t make us we are against the ‘world.’ It is not an issue the world is easily divided in black and white. In Europe, abolishment of the death penalty is a standard. Do I dislike Europeans for that? No. I get along with them, Europe is livable, and now it is more prospered than Japan. They have power. Europe dominated the Best 8 at the FIFA World Cup. This was possible due to their generous immigration policy and liberal society they have. Sharing of the value is the origin of strength that the integrated Europe has. I am not the supporter of abolishing the death penalty, but I am a member of Amnesty International. It is idiotic to undermine Amnesty’s wonderful activities just by looking at their opinion against the death penalty. It is also idiotic if the supporter of the death penalty look down on the opinion of those who are not. There must not be an easy division of black and white on an issue that takes away somebody’s life. The abolishment of the death penalty is actually replacing it with the life imprisonment. The philosophy of what Europe means the abolishment of the death penalty is that the prisoner charged with the death penalty should be punished by the life imprisonment instead. I think, honestly, it is a difficult question to answer which is better.

The problem is that the structure of the discussion is not understood well in Japan. Has the ‘legal experts’ community’ in Japan been paying the effort to deepen the discussion? Don’t they think the ‘world’ is for abolishing the death penalty but Japan isn’t, yet themselves (‘legal experts’ community’) are with the ‘world’? Aren’t they trying to lead the discussion to the stories like Japanese constitution was established based on French Revolution, the constitution’s protectionists are with the ‘world,’ so the revisionists are the return of Nazism? There is no life imprisonment in Japan. Because of that, there are major inconsistency as widely known. The prisoner charged for indefinite imprisonment would be released on parole after 30 years or so of serving. On theory, indefinite imprisonment is sentenced with a possibility that the sentenced prisoner would be corrected, but practically as the legal custom, those who murdered one person will be sentenced to indefinite imprisonment but not death penalty. The ‘common sense’ of the ‘legal experts’ community’ in Japan differentiates the indefinite imprisonment from the death penalty only based on the number whether the murderer killed one person, or two or more. Frankly speaking, this does not seem like a good custom.

This is the same ‘common sense’ of the ‘legal experts’ community’ when it comes to the Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan. It is nothing special, people in the same circle discuss and decide the custom, punish those who does not belong or leave that by unfair treatment of job allocation, and those who are in power stay in power through such scheme by maintaining the structure in the legal or academic industry. Although in reality, there’s such custom, and it is rather difficult to abolish the death penalty in Japan. It would show a major change if life imprisonment was introduced. Not only the indefinite imprisonment, but also the death penalty will be reduced. It would practically decrease the death sentence before abolishing the death penalty. If so, why not act to introduce the life imprisonment to begin with, step by step, rather than calling for abolishing the death penalty? In fact, their attitude regarding the Art. 9 of Japanese Constitution is the same. It should, based on the ‘common sense of the public opinion,’ be administrated in accordance with the purpose of the Constitution, or revised to determine the interpretation, not abolishing it. In short, allow the use of self-defense and administrate the constitution, or determine the interpretation, in accordance with the international law that clarifies the actor is legal to do so. ‘Common sense’ of the ‘legal experts’ community,’ however, will not function in such way, and will not tolerate such flexibility. If not ‘the constitutional protectionist,’ they will immediately denounce and will not listen at all by labeling ‘recurrence of Nazis,’ ‘affinity to Hitler,’ ‘revival of pre-war era,’ ‘the path once we have been through,’ in other words calling it ‘militarist,’ ‘third-class Muneki Minoda,’ or perhaps ‘America’s servant.’ I wish the legal experts would lead and transform the society where they would say “I respectfully disagree.”

(This is the English translation of an article written by SHINODA Hideaki, Professor at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies Graduate School, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on July 12, 2018, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on September 28, 2018.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.118    Japanese Diplomacy in post US-North Korea Summit
by NAGASHIMA Akihisa, Member of House of Representatives / former State Minister of Defense
(July 10, 2018)

No.117    Participation in The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia 2025
by MIFUNE Emi, Professor, Komazawa University
(May 15, 2018)

No.116    Kim Jong Un Will Never Let the “National Treasure” Nuclear Missile Taken Away
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 28, 2018)

No.115    The Changing Eurasian International Strategic Environment and Japan’s Response
by WATANABE Hirotaka, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
(January 30, 2018)

No.114    The Challenges that the 4th Abe Administration Must Tackle
by HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
(November 24, 2017)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

August 20, 2018, Vol. 11, No.4 (Issue 68)

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 118:
“Japanese Diplomacy in post US-North Korea Summit”

By NAGASHIMA Akihisa
Member of House of Representatives / former State Minister of Defense

The United States-North Korea Summit in Singapore on June 12th, was indeed historic, though disappointment is spread among those who expected something actually fruitful. Especially it has been very much criticized by the experts. This is based on the fact that despite the big talk of President Trump before the Summit that he would convince North Korea of complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization (CVID), the joint statement only mentioned “complete denuclearization” (lacking ‘verifiable’ and ‘irreversible’!), and neither had it said the definition of denuclearization, its deadline, nor the framework of inspection. It seemed nothing but what Kim Jong-un wanted to prolong the denuclearization process as much as possible. Additionally, it was said that promising to cancel the joint military exercise with South Korea -without consultation with the ally-, which North Korea had requested for long time, was thoughtless.

As I have observed the Korean Peninsula issues since 1997 as myself having been working for a think-tank in the US then, President Trump’s way of dealing was hasty due to his ambition (motivated by the midterm election in November?), I have been worried if he could be entrapped by North Korea or its backing, China. As a matter of fact, Western experts are saying that “the real winner of the Summit was China.” China has consistently insisted the need for a peaceful solution for the Korean Peninsula. To make it realized, North Korea needs to suspend its nuclear and missile tests, and US-South Korea’s joint military exercise -as it is symbolized as unfriendly anti-North Korea policy- needs to be suspended (“Double Freeze”), China has called to the respective sides. And that’s exactly how the Summit in Singapore turned out.

Moreover, according to the joint statement, both leaders agreed on “the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The denuclearization of the entire “Korean Peninsula” has a deeper meaning than what the international community expects from the denuclearization of North Korea. It actually suggests to remove the US’ “nuclear umbrella” provided to South Korea, as there are no nuclear arms kept in the South half of the Peninsula -not in South Korea, nor by US military in the country- anymore. The only reason the US is providing the nuclear umbrella to South Korea is the US-South Korea alliance, with 30,000 members of US Forces Korea (USFK) stationed. China’s principle strategy has been consistent since the beginning of Korean War, to remove US’ influence from the Korean Peninsula -in another words, establishing its own control over the Peninsula. The direction Mr. Trump has presented this time, surprisingly matches with such China’s aim.

If that’s the case, Japan is in a trouble. Japan’s principle strategy has also been consistent since the end of World War II, to maintain and strengthen the US’ security commitment to Korea and Japan. President Trump’s negotiation attitude, not only suspending the US-Korea joint military exercise, but also referring to withdrawing of USFK (in the future), is not acceptable. The biggest issue for Japan, abduction of Japanese nationals by North Korea, was not mentioned in the joint statement, in spite of President’s claim that he had repeatedly referred to it during the Summit.Not only that, the cost related to denuclearization would be covered by Japan, Korea, and China, the President said. Additional apprehension is the possibility of dissolving of the “maximum pressure” that once it forced North Korea to sit on the negotiation table, by a US-North Korea handshake at the Summit. It is said that the China-North Korea trade has already been increased, and South Korea and Russia are positive on economic assistance for North Korea.

Nevertheless, “Alea iacta est.” Clearly President Trump’s way is extraordinary. The details and agenda are usually consulted through the diplomatic negotiations before the Summit meeting. The “Trump style” is maybe the complete opposite of that. Leaders shake hands, and the rest is given to the working level officials. Though the path is unclear, it is clear that the denuclearization process is initiated. Better yet, the ball is in North Korean side. The focal point is now whether North Korea moves on to the denuclearization process ‘promptly.’ Mr. Trump has been criticized by the experts that he made too much concessions to North Korea, but US-Korea joint military exercise can be restarted anytime depending on how North Korea behaves, and the US even can use the betrayal by North Korea of its “consciousness” if happened as an excuse to switch to the military action against them, that perhaps for him, it is not a concession.

Now, what Japan should do diplomatically from here? I believe mid- and long-term perspective is important. We ought to welcome the break out of the war has been avoided for a while, but the denuclearization process will be a long and difficult one. Meanwhile, Japan should seek an opportunity seriously for holding the Japan-North Korea Summit to solve the abduction issue, the biggest problem pending for Japan. To do so, we have to ask them the honest report regarding the abductees based on the Stockholm Agreement. It would not be difficult for one of the strictest police state such as North Korea, in which the authority monitors everyone -whether its own nationals or foreigners- to make a report on inquiries on the abductees. Upon their response, I think we could cover the international share of the denuclearization burden sincerely.

Moreover, we should not forget that our main security concern in mid- and long-term period is China. China has increased their military spending for 51 times bigger in last 30 years, their modernized nuclear missiles’ range covers our country, and acting assertively in East and South China Sea, their threat is much bigger and complex than that of North Korea. To stabilize the relations with such a country, deepening of the economic ties as well as the ‘balance of power’ are required. Hence the point is, how to maintain and strengthen the alliance with the US, led by President Trump, a man with uncommon diplomacy.Even if the threat of North Korea’s nuclear missiles was decreased, we must proceed steadily of installing the aegis shore, a land-based defense system that is a key to deterring missiles, as there still will be a threat of ballistic/cruise missiles remain. At the same time, we must pay our effort to construct the self-sustaining responsive capacities of an effective defense and intelligence gathering, so that we can “defend our nation by ourselves.”

In any case, simply improving the bilateral relations between North Korea and South Korea, US, or Japan, will not suffice to bring peace and prosperity in the Korean Peninsula. Ceaseless efforts to stabilize the multilayered security environment among Japan, US, China, Korea, and Russia, are required. For that I will remain to propose and proceed a strategic Japanese diplomacy, together with the Members of the Houses, regardless of ruling or opposition.

(This is the English translation of an article written by NAGASHIMA Akihisa, Member of House of Representatives / former State Minister of Defense, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on March 13, 2018, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on June 21, 2018.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.117    Participation in The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia 2025
by MIFUNE Emi, Professor, Komazawa University
(May 15, 2018)

No.116    Kim Jong Un Will Never Let the “National Treasure” Nuclear Missile Taken Away
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 28, 2018)

No.115    The Changing Eurasian International Strategic Environment and Japan’s Response
by WATANABE Hirotaka, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
(January 30, 2018)

No.114    The Challenges that the 4th Abe Administration Must Tackle
by HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
(November 24, 2017)

No.113    A Grand Strategy to Avoid the Sino-American War
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 29, 2017)

No.112    United States’ Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party)
(July 26, 2017)

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Event
————- – – – ————-

JFIR International Colloquium
on “Japan-China Relations in the Era of Power Transition” Held

JFIR organized “JFIR International Colloquium: Japan-China Relations in the Era of Power Transition” at the Conference Room of JFIR in Tokyo on August 1, 2018.

This Colloquium was intended as an occasion for an exchange of views between a Chinese delegation of 6 experts headed by WU Shicun, President of China’s National Institute for South China Sea Studies (NISCS), and a Japanese delegation of 9 experts headed by ITO Go, Director of Research of JFIR / Professor of Meiji University, discussing such topics as “Power Transition and Maritime Order” and “Toward a Future-Oriented Japan-China Relationship” in two sessions.

For the outline of the discussion, please refer to:

https://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/180801_roe.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: jfir@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: OHYA Minoru
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

June 20, 2018, Vol. 11, No.3 (Issue 67)

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 117:
“Participation in The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia 2025”

By MIFUNE Emi
Professor at Komazawa University

On February 28, I participated as one of the panelists in “The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia 2025,” an international symposium co-organized by the Japan Forum on International Relations, The Global Forum of Japan, and the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS). I would like to thank once again Mr. Takahata of JFIR and all staff related to the event. At the symposium I made a presentation on “what is happening in Eurasia?”.

For those who are interested in the specifics of how China has been conducting their diplomacy, please read my books, “Chugoku Gaikou Senryaku (Chinese Diplomatic Strategy)” (Kodansha Sensho Metier, 2016.), and “Bei-Chu-Ro Power Shift to Nihon (US, China, Russia’s Power Shift and Japan)” (Keiso Shobo, 2017.). In these books, I have articulated the Chinese diplomacy from the perspective of neither a “panda hugger” (pro-China), nor a “dragon slayer” (anti-China).

To answer the question “what is happening in Eurasia?,” the simply put conclusion is that China is restructuring the international order by utilizing “One Belt One Road” (OBOR), aiming to achieve Pax Sinica. Many mass media in Japan love to introduce this OBOR as an economic initiative. The economic aspect, however, is just a part of the OBOR.

Mr. Xi Jinping of China has iterated that OBOR goes from “the country-to-country community of common destiny” to “the regional community of common destiny,” and even further to “the community of common destiny for mankind,” uniting the development of China and the countries on the route. OBOR is an initiative to form a China-led international order, in another words “the community of common destiny for mankind,” therefore it pursuits the world order of Pax Sinica.

What China is promoting through OBOR are, first of all, to build “Five Cooperation Priorities” which are (1) policy coordination, (2) facilities connectivity, (3) unimpeded trade, (4) financial integrity, and (5) people-to-people bond. OBOR is an initiative of building China-led global governance through forming of the connectivity that comes with the joint construction of the economic corridor.

By expanding and developing the connectivity through OBOR, China aims to form the “community of shared interests” and the “community of shared responsibility,” then it aims to transform the world’s political and economic order to China-led global governance by forming what China calls “the community of common destiny for mankind,” or Pax Sinica.

China has iterated “to adhere to the principles of One Belt One Road – discuss, build, and share together.” By emphasizing the word “together,” China calls to “construct a new type of international relations that sets cooperation/win-win in the core” not by alliance, but by partnership.

With OBOR, China calls on to the countries along the OBOR to mutually respect each other’s sovereignty, dignity, territorial integrity, and the development style as well as the social system, emphasizes the need to respect each other’s core interest and serious concern, to build the mutually beneficial security mechanism.

Consequently, OBOR has the aspect that demands to the neighboring countries to recognize the “space claimed by the expanding China” as “China’s territory,” undermining the Western universal norms such as human rights, liberty, and the rule of law.

Subsequently, I’d like to give four major things what China is doing through OBOR. First, connecting OBOR with other country’s or region’s platforms. China is not newly establishing OBOR from the scratch. What China calls as OBOR is an initiative that is connecting strategically the already existing regional cooperation platforms.

China is trying to connect OBOR with various regional platforms of the neighboring countries, such as Kazakhstan’s “Bright Path,” Eurasian Economic Union proposed by Russia, Master Plan of ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC), Turkey’s “Middle Corridor,” Mongolia’s “Road to Development,” United Kingdom’s “Northern Powerhouse,” European Union’s “Juncker Plan,” “16 + 1 Cooperation” by Central & Eastern Europe and China, and Poland’s “Amber Road.”

Second, the development of China’s new colonialism in Indian Ocean, namely the Port of Hambantota in Sri Lanka, for example. China is expanding its interests in the Indian Ocean, including some dramatic behaviors as if trying to clean the “Qing Dynasty’s history of shame.” As Professor Hirotaka Watanabe of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, one of the panelist at “Eurasia 2025,” exactly pointed out that China, a land power, is trying to rise as a sea power.

In addition to the land and sea power attempts, it is worrisome that China is also trying to make “Space Information Corridor” through OBOR.

China aims to build the network of early warning system in the field of “maritime disaster prevention and risk management” through OBOR mechanism, and the “Space Information Corridor” stands on the integrated information network of three systems: (1) earth observation satellite “Yaogan” (remote sensing), (2) communication satellite, and (3) navigation satellite “BeiDou.” So China is trying to be a cyber power and space power in the respective areas.

Third, China is trying to develop a favorable international environment for “Made in China 2025” through OBOR. “Made in China 2025” is a three-step development plan announced by Chinese government in May, 2015.

China aims to join “the world’s manufacturing powerhouse” in the “first step” by 2025, aims to raise its manufacturing industry to the mid-level among the world’s manufacturing powerhouse in the “second step” by 2035, then in the “third step” it aims to be the top of the manufacturing powerhouse by 2045. In the fields experiencing the difficulty to see rapid innovation, China is absorbing the technology by acquiring foreign companies.

Meanwhile, China is acquiring mineral resources and markets in the developing countries through OBOR. “Friendship Chains” stated in OBOR is not only an economic means but also a political one.

“The State Council’s Notice on Announcing ‘Made in China 2025′” insists that it will “integratedly allocate the military/civilian technological resources, jointly capture the military and civilian technologies, support the effective utilization of military and civilian technologies, and promote the diversion in the basic research.”

We should be cautious that “Made in China 2025” which promotes military-and-civilian technological usages, and OBOR are inter-connected.

Fourth, by forming the OBOR partnerships, China is making its policy to be heard easier in the international community, or using it as a mean to deter the policy or behavior of the international community that China does not favor.

For example, a defense plan against merger & acquisition, minding China, drafted for European companies, was opposed by Central and Eastern European countries. Italy, France and Germany, kept appealing to the European Commission, regarding the acquisitions by Chinese companies, to tighten the regulation for the cases of strategic companies, and ones financially sponsored by government or official organization, to give the European Union the authority to block such investments.

Though such attempt was blocked by the Central and Eastern European countries which are strengthening “16 + 1” framework. In response to the move, German Foreign Minister Mr. Gabriel and some others expressed their concern that China would divide the EU’s China policy by controlling the Central and Eastern European countries.

Also, to give an example of Greece, a country deepening its relation with China in recent years, EU had to give up its collective statement at the United Nations Human Rights Council last year regarding the human rights concern in China, because it was supposed to be unanimously agreed by all 28 EU member countries to be submitted as “EU statement” but Greece opposed it.

There will be no problem with China becoming more influential if it is a peaceful rise. It’s a pleasure if a friendly neighbor emerges peacefully. But the problems are, how the “expanding China” would use its increasing influence, and how it would affect Japan. As China is busy developing the “Polar Silk Road,” it would increase its presence in Nansei Islands, as well as at Tsugaru and Soya Channels.

The security environment for Japan will likely be tougher. Japan should not consider China’s Japan diplomacy or OBOR as part of “friendship chains” like it’s done in Central Asia and Europe. Neither should it regard China’s diplomacy in Eurasia from an European perspective, where China is not as much of a direct security threat. So Japan should consider how to deal with OBOR, only after assessing where Japan is positioned in China’s policies aiming to realize Pax Sinica.

Since late last year, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress has been discussing “Heroes and Martyrs Protection Law” to uplift “the spirit of heroic martyrs and patriotism,” and it will become the new law during this year’s NPC. This law prohibits the criticism on the Chinese Communists’ “anti-Japanese partisan” that fought against Japanese military during the Sino-Japan War. Making September 30, 2014 the Martyrs’ Day, China has done some events to honor martyrs.

The list of “anti-Japanese martyrs and heroes” was published as a part of such events, though some pointed out that it included some people who did not exist. How “history overwriter China” is seeing Japan, how it’s acting in the Nansei Islands area and around Japan ？ we should consider Japan’s diplomacy in Eurasia after assessing China’s mid- and long-term goals calmly.

What is happening in Eurasia? We should not regard OBOR of China that aims to realize Pax Sinica only from the viewpoint of business opportunity.

(This is the English translation of an article written by MIFUNE Emi, Professor at Komazawa University, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on March 13, 2018, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on May 15, 2018.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.116    Kim Jong Un Will Never Let the “National Treasure” Nuclear Missile Taken Away
by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(March 28, 2018)

No.115    The Changing Eurasian International Strategic Environment and Japan’s Response
by WATANABE Hirotaka, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
(January 30, 2018)

No.114    The Challenges that the 4th Abe Administration Must Tackle
by HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
(November 24, 2017)

No.113    A Grand Strategy to Avoid the Sino-American War
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 29, 2017)

No.112    United States’ Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party)
(July 26, 2017)

No.111    Coolheaded Military Analysis is What We Need
by KATO Seiichi, former attorney-at-law
(May 15, 2017)

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Publication
————- – – – ————-

A New Periodical “JFIR WORLD REVIEW” Launched

As a private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan, The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) has been conducting various research activities on different themes and regions. In order to disseminate the outcomes of these activities, JFIR launched a new periodical entitled “JFIR WORLD REVIEW” on June 1, 2018.

Featuring a collection of policy papers on important diplomatic and international issues of the time, this periodical, though available only in Japanese at this stage, will come out biannually on a regular basis. The first volume features the topic of “What Is Happening in Eurasia Now?” in collaboration with one of JFIR’s current research projects, “Eurasian International Strategic Environment in Transition and Japan’s Diplomacy” (project leader: WATANABE Hirotaka, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR / Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies).

Starting with a general commentary entitled “International Politics from Eurasia’s Viewpoint” by Prof. WATANABE to elaborate the purpose of the featured topic, this volume contains policy papers by Japan’s front-line experts on the topic: MIFUNE Emi, Professor, Komazawa University, UYAMA Tomohiko, Professor, Hokkaido University, HIROSE Yoko, Professor, Keio University, and SUZUKI Yoshikatsu, former Editor in Chief of magazine “Diplomacy”.

In addition, a special chapter entitled “Voice of the World” contains the full text of a special speech delivered by Pascal BONIFACE, Director, The French Institute for International Strategic Affairs (IRIS) of France, a world authority on the featured topic.

While available only in Japanese at this stage, this volume helps the readers to grasp the essence of the latest situation of dramatically changing Eurasian international strategic environment as well as its implications to Japan’s diplomacy.

The full text (in Japanese) of the first volume of “JFIR WORLD REVIEW” is available at the following link.

First volume of “JFIR WORLD REVIEW” (in Japanese)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to: info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to: http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

April 20, 2018, Vol. 11, No.2 (Issue 66)

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 116:
“Kim Jong Un Will Never Let the “National Treasure” Nuclear Missile Taken Away”

By SUGIURA Masaaki
Political Commentator

The reconciliation policy of Mr. Moon Jae-in, the president of the Republic of Korea, towards North Korea will only result in a situation, frankly speaking, that North will take what they want and gives nothing back.

Kim Jong Un seems to be struggling from the United Nations’ economic sanction, so he encourages the Korean Summit Meeting between the North and the South to be held, and propagates the completion of their nukes and missiles to celebrate their 70th Anniversary of the Day of the Foundation of the Republic in September, to avoid the worsening of the economy.

President Moon is the one who’s been influenced. Meanwhile, if the United States let Mr. Moon go with his reconciliation policy, and follows to compromise with North Korea, in exchange of freezing the testing of the intercontinental ballistic missiles, Japan, of which 200 nodong missiles are aimed, will possibly be left behind. The US’ Far Eastern strategy will not work if Japan is alienated.

It seems that Kim is struggling and trying to make a strategic change by himself, though it would be the path once his father had come, he would just take the path to deceive the international community. But the US must know that. Ms. Ivanka, the daughter of President Trump, has reminded President Moon at the dinner of his appeasing stance towards North.

“We would like to reconfirm that we maintain the maximum pressure on the Korean Peninsula until it gets de-nuclearized,” she said to Mr. Moon. President Moon pledged in response that “the de-nuclearization and the South-North dialogue cannot go separately; the two must be done simultaneously.” Mr. Moon tends to make a good face to both sides, but his real aim is to realize the Korean Summit, which would only make him to be affected by the North’s influence.

North Korea’s diplomacy seems skillful at a glance, yet it always gives itself away. Sending his own sister, Kim Yo-jong as his envoy, showed their struggle that they had no one else in their diplomatic resource but family. This was because the North was urged to show their seriousness to President Moon. The author may not be the only one feeling the coldness behind Kim Yo-jong’s “smile diplomacy.”

Successfully influenced Moon, Kim Yo-jong returned and reported to Kim Jong Un, and it was seen that Kim Jong Un made a specific direction to further improve the Korean relations -one of which was the freezing of ICBM test launch. By halting the ICBM tests that fly over Japan, they are appealing to the international community, trying to get the US’ attention.

Of course, they will not abandon their missile development and can continue their program domestically. North Korea’s this pseudo-detente comes from the impact of the UN sanctions that has gradually been working.

The government of Japan has confirmed the off-shore delivering between the North Korean and Dominican registered tankers at the international waters in the East China Sea. The impact of the UN resolution on the sanction against North Korea will be clearer later this year, as North has started to work on such struggling, hole-finding deeds.

Kim, however, wants to avoid such impact no matter what. Considering the upcoming 70th Anniversary of the Day of the Foundation of the Republic, the most important day there, on September 9, the worsening of the economy is the last thing he wants in order to maintain his authority. Using the President Moon’s reconciliation policy, the North probably wants to earn the economic assistance by realizing the Korean Summit in prior to the 70th Anniversary.

Ultimately, it is needless to say that they aim to contact with the US. The Unification Ministry spokesperson of the ROK is trying to promote the direct US-North Korea talk already with no concerns, by voicing that they “hope the North Korea and the US will initiate a constructive talk at an appropriate timing.” But Japan and the US cannot afford to observe and do nothing while President Moon getting caught by the trap set by Kim Jong Un.

Historically, the negotiation with the North is a pattern -once they get economic assistance, they annul the agreement with no hesitation. The agreements such as the freezing of the testing of the long range ballistic missiles agreed between the US, suspension of the uranium enrichment at the nuclear facility in Nyeongbyeon where kept under international surveillance, were annulled long ago, and this time, too, they seem to be using the same hand as if they know what they’re doing.

The whole issue comes down to the point if the North would give up their nuclear missile development. If they don’t, the Far East will continue to face “the madman with a knife” situation. The North, however, will not abandon their nuclear missile program.

Therefore, if the US-North Korea talk happens, it’s not only expected to make compromise, but rather likely continue to break. This is because the nuclear missile is, for Kim Jong Un, a national treasure per se, that if he gives it up, the regime would not sustain. Japan and the US must work to seal the weak spot of the Japan-US-ROK cooperation, expanded by President Moon.

(This is the English translation of an article written by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on February 27, 2018, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on March 28, 2018.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.115    The Changing Eurasian International Strategic Environment and Japan’s Response
by WATANABE Hirotaka,  Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
(January 30, 2018)

No.114    The Challenges that the 4th Abe Administration Must Tackle
by HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
(November 24, 2017)

No.113    A Grand Strategy to Avoid the Sino-American War
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 29, 2017)

No.112    United States’ Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party)
(July 26, 2017)

No.111    Coolheaded Military Analysis is What We Need
by KATO Seiichi, former attorney-at-law
(May 15, 2017)

No.110    The Dangerous Nature of America First
by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher, JFIR
(March 24, 2017)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Publication
————- – – – ————-

Responses to “U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report 2018”

U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report 2018 “Stronger than Ever, but More Challenged than Ever: the U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Trump-Abe Era” published by JFIR on April 12 this year has received responses from various circles both in and outside of Japan, of which noteworthy coverage by the Japanese media can be viewed at the following link (in Japanese):
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/regular_research/180420.pdf

The full text (Japanese / English) of the Policy Report is available at the following links.

U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report 2018 (in English)
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/regular_research/180412_e.pdf

U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report 2018 (in Japanese)
http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/reseach/pdf/180412_j.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: TANAKA Shoko
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter

(Extra Edition)

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

This E-Letter (Extra Edition) provides the global audience with our news on publication of the U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report 2018 “Stronger than Ever, but More Challenged than Ever: the U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Trump-Abe Era.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

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The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

February 20, 2018, Vol. 11, No.1 (Issue 65)

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

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“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

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Announcement 1
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“The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia in 2025” to be Convened on February 28 in Tokyo

JFIR, the Global Forum of Japan and the French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs (IRIS) will convene “The Dialogue with the World: Eurasia 2025” to the following effect:

Date: Wednesday, February 28, 2018
Time: 14:00 to 18:00
Venue: “Maple Room,” Hotel Okura Tokyo, Japan
http://www.hotelokura.co.jp/tokyo/en/location/
*English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided.

This “Dialogue” aims to discuss and exchange views among Japanese and overseas experts on the prospects and solutions to the changing international order in Eurasia where geopolitical tension and danger are rising, centering on such topics as “What is happening in Eurasia?” and “Eurasia in Transition: from a Global Perspective.”

The experts featured as panelists in this “Dialogue” include WATANABE Hirotaka, Professor of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, and UYAMA Tomohiko, Professor of Hokkaido University, from the Japanese side, and Daniyar KOSNAZAROV, Researcher of Narxoz University in Kazakhstan, and Scott SEAMAN, Director of Eurasia Group, from the overseas side.

Also, this “Dialogue” features as special guest Pascal BONIFACE, Director of IRIS, a world’s leading expert on geopolitics and the author of a must-read on geopolitics, “Atlas of the Globalized World (Atlas du Monde Global).”

For more information, please refer to: http://www.gfj.jp/j/dialogue/20180228_info.pdf

JFIR would like to invite the readers of this E-letter to the “Dialogue.” For the registration, should you please send us (1) your name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, and (5) e-mail address via e-mail ( dialogue@gfj.jp ) no later than February 23, 2018.

PLEASE NOTE that the application will be processed on a first-come-first-served basis, and the registration will be closed when all the seats are filled.

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Announcement 2
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The Japan-U.S. Dialogue “China Risks and China Opportunities: Implications for the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy'” to be Convened on March 2 in Tokyo

JFIR, the Global Forum of Japan and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) will convene the Japan-U.S. Dialogue “China Risks and China Opportunities: Implications for the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy'” to the following effect:

Date: Friday, March 2, 2018
Time: 14:00 to 18:00
Venue: “Lecture Hall,” International House of Japan, Tokyo
https://www.i-house.or.jp/eng/access.html
*English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided.

This “Dialogue” aims to discuss and exchange views among Japanese and U.S. security experts on the prospects of the risks and opportunities that could be brought about by the rise of China, centering on such topics as “China’s Strategy and Policy in the Indo-Pacific Region” and “How Should Japan and the United States Respond?”

The experts featured as panelists in this “Dialogue” include KAMIYA Matake, Professor of the National Defense Academy of Japan, KAWASHIMA Shin, Professor of the University of Tokyo, and HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor of Keio University, from the Japanese side, and James SCHOFF, Senior Fellow of CEIP, Michael SWAINE, Senior Fellow of CEIP, and Evans REVERE, Senior Advisor of Albright Stonebridge Group from the U.S. side.

For more information, please refer to: http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/exchange/pdf/180302_info.pdf

JFIR would like to invite the readers of this E-letter to the “Dialogue.” For the registration, should you please send us (1) your name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, and (5) e-mail address via e-mail ( dialogue@gfj.jp ) no later than February 26, 2018.

PLEASE NOTE that the application will be processed on a first-come-first-served basis, and the registration will be closed when all the seats are filled.

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“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

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No. 115:
“The Changing Eurasian International Strategic Environment and Japan’s Response”

By WATANABE Hirotaka
Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies

Subsequent to the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, the Eurasian international strategic environment is currently in transition towards a new stage. To grasp the essence of this transition, geo-political point of view is indispensable. Today, the word “geo-politics” is often referred to as political competition for regional power. However, I would rather comprehend the term as the ways that each regional power looks at world map from their own perspectives, with themselves being in the centre of the map. With this awareness in mind, I would like to reflect on how China, Russia, Central Asia, Caucasus, and Europe look at Eurasia respectively.

Before moving on, let me stress one point. That is, the declining influence of the US in Eurasia is hugely relevant to the changing strategic environment of the region. In the 1990s, the US set military bases all across Central Asia and secured political as well as military influences within the region and beyond. However, since the 9/11 in 2001 and the outbreak of Afghan Wars in particular, the US has shifted its strategic focus solely to its operation in Afghanistan. As a result, the US’ influences in Eurasia significantly shrank, and I would like to set that as a premise for my discussion below.

First, Eurasia from the viewpoint of China. China’s international predominance has significantly expanded in recent years, and behind the expansion one can see China’s ambition to take the lead in Chinese style global governance. Indeed, the way that China gained large international voice is well depicted in “One Belt One Road Initiative (OBOR)” which Xi Jinping administration is promoting. In this respect, one should consider OBOR as strategical slogan for regional expansion, rather than economic expansion. And yet, the actuality is still abstract and not well outlined, hence it is questionable to what extent China can achieve its proposed objectives through OBOR in reality.

Meanwhile, in relative terms with “New Silk Road by Land and Sea” that China also puts forwards, China is interested in the polar route over the North Pole that has become possible to sail through throughout the year due to global warming. On the one hand, this polar route inevitably leads us to reconsider the conventional idea of geo-politics in Eurasia. On the other hand, in the midst of such new geo-political environment, China incorporates the route in part of its regional power expansion scheme in Eurasia by way of strengthening “5+1 connectivities (communication on policy making; building transportation and telecommunication network; facilitation of trade; strengthening financial intermediation and currency circulation; encouraging mutual understanding and space, cyber and sea areas).”

Moving on, Eurasia from the viewpoints of Russia, Central Asia and Caucasus. In Russia, there have been publications on geo-politics since the 1990s and they are referred to as a tool to analyse how Russia sees international affairs. Russia’s international disposition is characterised as; 1) neither like the dispositions of the West nor the East; 2) following the historical pattern of shrinking its land and regional power at the time of danger, and then recapturing them; 3) prioritising security over economy, and showing a tendency to become “major country” by means of tactical diplomacy and military power.

In light of this, Russia established diplomatic relationship with China based on the idea of realism. That suggests Russia’s relationship with China fluctuates in accordance with its relationships with the US and Europe. After the Ukrainian crisis in 2014 in particular, Russia’s relationship with the US and Europe has fallen into decay and, as a result, Russia’s views on the two have become critical. On the contrary, Russia’s view on China has turned positive. As to the relationships between Russia, Caucus and Central Asia, the Eurasia Economic Union (EEU: Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan) and Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO: the EEU states plus Tajikistan) are the two main regional agencies.

Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan do not participate in neither of them, but these two countries maintain close bilateral relationships with Russia. The countries of Central Asia are said to be pro-Russia and tend to be in good terms with China comparatively. Turning to the Caucasus region, Azerbaijan holds on to neutral and balance diplomacy, Armenia takes pro-Russian stance and Georgia shows a disposition of pro-US and pro-Europe. Nevertheless, their views on Russia are still complex even among those that are pro-US and pro-Europe. In fact, even in Ukraine and Georgia one cannot ignore positive views on Russia and shared nostalgia for the Soviet time among the peoples.

Lastly, Eurasia from the viewpoint of the EU. To begin with, the EU’s disposition to Russia has traditionally been ambivalent. That is one outcome of the EU’s strategies which aims to maintain diplomatic balance with the US and China as well as Russia. However, since the dawn of this century, the EU has shown a tendency of becoming more and more cautious about Russia which has become major energy supplier and shown aggressive diplomacy under Putin’s leadership. In particular, after the Ukrainian crisis this tendency has become evident, and the EU has strengthened measures against Russia. And yet, the EU’s disposition to Russia is still unclear as seen in that Germany’s former Chancellor Schroder holds a position in the board of Russian oil company, for instance.

As to the EU’s disposition to China, the EU has been alarmed by China’s expansion strategies over Eurasia since 2012 when Xi Jinping spoke on “Chinese dream.” Among multilateral frameworks for economic cooperation between China and Europe, there is one called “16+1 initiative.” The framework itself is thought to be China’s strategy to make the EU disintegrated, which led some to become even more alarmed at China. In light of this, the EU has been trying to further enhance its relationship with the countries of Central Asia as an extension of the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Starting from “EU-Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership” in 2007, the EU has extending its support to Central Asia in terms of democratisation, human rights, good governance, security, counter-terrorism, energy and infrastructure in the fields of transport. In short, in the midst of receding US and expanding China, we have Putin’s Russia pushing diplomatic strategies independent from those of the US and Europe, which resulted in China and Russia having closer relationship, on the one hand. On the other hand, the EU is keen on reaching the post-Soviet countries as an extension of its enlargement policy.

And that is the new direction of power balance in Eurasia at present. Although this article did not touch on India and the Middle East, these two regional powers also need careful attention. A problem at stake is, under such circumstances, how Japan should set up and implement diplomacy to Eurasia. Looking at Japan’s diplomacy to Eurasia to date, it appears that there are inconsistencies between different regions. In other words, there are some regions to which Japan is committed and the other regions where Japan has few diplomatic contacts. That testifies the need for reconsideration as to how Japan should distribute the objectives of its diplomatic strategies within Eurasia as a whole.

(This is the English translation of an article written by WATANABE Hirotaka, Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on November 20, 2017), and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on January 30, 2018.)

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.114    The Challenges that the 4th Abe Administration Must Tackle
by HIRONO Ryokichi, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University
(November 24, 2017)

No.113    A Grand Strategy to Avoid the Sino-American War
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 29, 2017)

No.112    United States’ Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party)
(July 26, 2017)

No.111    Coolheaded Military Analysis is What We Need
by KATO Seiichi, former attorney-at-law
(May 15, 2017)

No.110    The Dangerous Nature of America First
by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher, JFIR
(March 24, 2016)

No.109    Survive the Trump Administration with High Alert
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(January 20, 2017)

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Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: TANAKA Shoko
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

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The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

December 20, 2017 Vol. 10, No.6 (Issue 64)

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

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Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

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“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

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Event
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　JFIR 30th Anniversary Symposium on “Japan’s Diplomacy in an Era of Power Transition” Convened

In commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), which was established on March 12, 1987, as a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan, JFIR convened the Anniversary Symposium under the general theme of “Japan’s Diplomacy in an Era of Power Transition,” in Tokyo on November 1, 2017.

The Symposium featured as panelists the following 10 key members of JFIR. These panelists discussed a mega-trend of today’s international society, thereby drafting out a course of actions Japan’s diplomacy should take.

TANAKA Akihiko, Supreme Councilor, JFIR/ President, The National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
KAMIYA Matake, Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, National Defense Academy
WATANABE Hirotaka, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
KAWAI Masahiro, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR/ Specially Appointed Professor, The University of Tokyo
ITO Go, Trustee and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Meiji University
INOGUCHI Takashi, Councilor, JFIR/ Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo
TAKUBO Tadae, Director, JFIR/ Professor Emeritus, Kyorin University
OHYA Eiko, Trustee of JFIR/ President, Oya Soichi Library
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Director, JFIR/ Chancellor, Takushoku University
MIYAKE Kunihiko, Member, JFIR/ President, Foreign Policy Institute
(In Order of Appearance in the Program)

For the outline of the Symposium, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/171101_roe.pdf

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“JFIR Commentary”

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“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and/or friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

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No. 114:
“The Challenges that the 4th Abe Administration Must Tackle”

By HIRONO Ryokichi
Professor Emeritus, Seikei University

Following the victory in the 2013 election of the House of Councillors, the LDP-Komeito coalition won a landslide victory once again in the election of the House of Representatives on 22nd October 2017, thus assuring the House nomination of Mr. Shinzo Abe to be Japan’s Prime Minister and form his 4th Cabinet on 1st November to implement his priority policies.

As for the Opposition, both party candidates and voters themselves were caught in surprise with the election turnout where Constitutional Democratic Party made an impressive record, against the Party of Hope showing a poor performance. Both the ruling and the opposition parties, however, share the general public’s concern with innumerable difficult issues confront Japan both internally and externally. The Abe Administration has since its inception in 2012 installed soft money policy based on “the First Arrow” of Abenomics which places top priority on economic growth.

While job market has been easing, the total amount of wage earnings by the employed workforce has grown only slightly, if not remaining stagnant, due mainly to an increased hiring of temporary workers. Also, the government has so far failed to achieve its inflation target of 2%. In fact, the trend of the yen devaluation vis-a-vis the U.S. dollars resulting from the continued soft money policy has contributed to the rise of Import prices which, coupled with long periods of rainy season and unusually severe rainstorms, have raised food prices, hitting hard especially on low-income youngsters and old-age pensioners.

Also, there is a growing concern in Japanese industry dependent on the imports of raw materials and manufactured components, since the devaluation of the yen has been eroding the international competitiveness due to increasing cost of production. Most of the Japanese companies facing severe competition on the global market, have been shifting their core operation overseas rather than at home in quest of cheaper labor, land, taxes and lesser labor and environmental regulations.

Since Japan has been experiencing low birth rates and the aging of the population, such corporate investment policy is already causing a threat to the long-term growth of the Japanese economy. In the General Assembly of the United Nations in the fall of 2015, the global community adopted the post-2015 Development Agenda entitled the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2016-30 and appealed to all the U.N. member states including the developed ones to achieve those 17 goals by 2030.

Japanese Government, having made public its National Implementation Plan (NIP) last year, has now been trying to accomplish it. The UNICEF revealed this year its assessment of the SDGs achievement by country in those 9 major areas related to children’s wellbeing. According to their assessment, Japan’s ranking among the 37 countries surveyed are (1) 23rd in poverty eradication, (2) 1st in famine wipe-out, (3) 8th in hygiene and welfare, (4) 10th in the quality of education, (5) 1st in the quality of work, (6) 32nd in narrowing inequalities, (7) 33rd in sustainable urban habitat, (8) 36th in sustainable consumption and production, and finally (9) 8th in achieving peaceful and inclusive society.

There are no countries that rank 1st in all areas surveyed, but generally speaking Nordic countries such as Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Iceland occupy high ranking, along with Switzerland, Austria and Germany. Judging from the above international comparison of assessment, it is urged that Japan place a greater emphasis on achieving social development goals like environmental conservation and the quality of life rather than simply pursuing economic growth and rise in personal income and material wealth.

Japan not only must not rest easy with the survey results, but also should work harder to enhance public awareness and install such policies, legislative measures and institutional mechanisms essential to achieving the SDGs all round. As regards Japan’s fiscal policy reform which is “the Second Arrow” of the Abenomics, it is to be noted that the total amount of national fiscal deficits outstanding including local government debts now exceeds the twice as much as Japanese GDP. We economists are seriously concerned with possible infeasibility of the Abe

Administration’s fiscal reform measures, if remaining unchanged, to achieve its goal of primary balance surplus by 2020 or even by 2025 as proclaimed during the election campaigns this time as well as last time. The tax reforms including the rise of consumption tax from 8 to 10% in the fall of 2019 and the stated corporate income tax reduction generating tax revenue increases through higher economic growth rates, and further rationalization of government spending in welfare and all other areas may not lead to budget surplus, taking into account the continued low birth rates, ageing of the population and the growing threat to national security in the foreseeable future.

Also, a rapid decline of bond valuation and a consequent rise of market interest rates that could happen under huge chronic fiscal deficits, with the Bank of Japan holding of national bonds exceeding 50% of its annual bond issuance, may contribute to destabilization of the Japanese economy in the medium or longer term. We are worried that under these fiscal conditions the government may not be able to cope with possible stock market volatility induced speculatively by foreign hedge funds and investors.

Furthermore, in order to install and implement intended economic restructuring strategy effectively under “the Third Arrow” of Abenomics, it is vital to remove all those vested interests and introduce further deregulation which has been found almost next to impossible under the Japanese political and social structure. On top of these domestic difficulties confronting the Abe Administration, New Zealand is reported to follow the United States to withdraw from TPP, as Labour Party won the general election recently and asking for further TPP renegotiation.

It may be likely that TPP 11 eventually become TPP10. It is important to recall that TPP negotiations have been postponed repeatedly in the past because of strong resistance and opposition of numerous vested interest groups both in Japan and overseas especially in developing member-to-be countries. Strong political leadership is required to deal with such solid opposition lobbies. It is equally, if not more, important to raise greater awareness among the general public to advocate consumers’ interests, rather than specific industry interests, that is. Bottom-up appeals are vital to protect the public interests.

In this connection, reopening of nuclear power plants is a key concern among the Japanese people, as shown in the recent elections. The explosion of Fukushima nuclear power plant of Tokyo Electric Power Company in 2011 contaminated neighboring mountains, rives and ocean and the removal of polluted soil in plow-lands and urban areas in that region, along with appropriate processing of nuclear wastes are still unresolved and keenly watched by the entire population of Japan. The Japanese government, like many others, has yet to show its definitive policy direction to meet the demand of the global community to shift to decarbonized world through the replacement of fossil to renewable energy, as agreed under the Paris Agreement of 2015.

Globally, since the international affairs surrounding Japan are changing rapidly, the agenda of Constitutional Amendment, notably on Article 9, is one of the most important issues that Abe’s LDP appealed to the voting public during this most recent election. The government plans to submit the preliminary draft of constitutional amendment to the Constitutional Review Committee in both Houses this year or possibly next year.

This agenda is not just a domestic political issue. As Japan’s key neighbors politically, economically and security-wise China and South Korea are watching constitutional debate with a keen concern. Since the trilateral summit among these three has been suspended due to diplomatic tensions over petty island ownership and wartime history, Abe’s handling of constitutional amendment is not only a critical issue to the Japanese people, but also to Asian governments and people and also to Japan’s allies such as the United States and Australia.

The relationship with Russia over the Kuril Islands dispute is another concern. In view of these critical problems, the Abe Administration should act with an utmost care and sensitivity, despite their landslide victory in the general election. Prime Minister Abe and his team should bear in mind that their supermajority in both Houses can turn into a grave political risk, if they are reckless and overconfident.

It is the foremost imperative for the 4th Abe Administration to deal with these highly sensitive domestic and global issues properly and resolutely to earn the trust of the general public who voted in the yesterday’s election in the hope of continued political stability, economic reforms, the protection of human rights, the conservation of global environment and world peace without nuclear.

(This is the English translation of an article written by Ryokichi HIRONO, Professor Emeritus, Seikei University, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on October 23, 2017 and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on November 24, 2017)

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For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.113    A Grand Strategy to Avoid the Sino-American War
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 29, 2017)

No.112    United States’ Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party)
(July 26, 2017)

No.111    Coolheaded Military Analysis is What We Need
by KATO Seiichi, former attorney-at-law
(May 15, 2017)

No.110    The Dangerous Nature of America First
by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher, JFIR
(March 24, 2016)

No.109    Survive the Trump Administration with High Alert
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(January 20, 2017)

No.106-108   Trump’s America and Tasks for Japan
by SHIMADA Haruo, Director of JFIR
(November 21 to 23, 2016)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: TANAKA Shoko
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

October 20, 2017, Vol. 10, No.5

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Commentary”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 113: “A Grand Strategy to Avoid the Sino-American War”

By NABESHIMA Keizo
Critic

The most critical challenge to global security is how to manage “Xi’s China” in Asia and “Putin’s Russia” in Europe. Both China and Russia adhere to totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, and their behaviour is completely at odds with the liberal world order based on freedom, democracy and the rule of law, which has brought more tensions to the world. This trend is accelerated by the declining America’s power, and unless the Trump administration makes America resurge with new strategies, the world will fall into further chaos.

The Xi administration advocates the resurgence of the Chinese civilization, and they are advancing Chinese influence from the Asia Pacific to the Eurasian continent with their economic leverage “Belt and Road” tactics. As a result, our security concerns are growing day by day. That is typically seen in their unilateral aggressiveness over territorial disputes in the East China and the South China seas.

Rivalry over the hegemony between China a rising power and America the established world leader is so intense as to be called Thucydides’s trap, illustrating a great transformation of international affairs that is just as mentioned above. When Professor Graham Allison of Harvard University published “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap?” in 2017 to foresee the U.S.-Chinese relationship, he told that the war between the two nations was unlikely.

However it was extremely difficult for the two to coexist in a cooperative manner because there was a huge gap in their strategic visions. According to the authoritative 2015 RAND study “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard,” over the next five to fifteen years, “Asia will witness a progressively receding frontier of U.S. dominance.” Some economic forecast even predicts that the size of the Chinese economy will grow three times as large as the American one by 2040.

Late President Richard Nixon confided his former speech writer William Safire, “We may have created a Frankenstein” when he talked about his visit in 1972 to China to normalize bilateral diplomatic relations. He could never imagine that the Chinese monster would grow so tremendously. Regarding China’s view about the United States, Professor Allison argues, “From China’s perspective, the U.S. position in the western Pacific is waning. Chinese actions in the region have endeavored to hasten the U.S.’ retreat, most visibly in the South China Sea.”

Furthermore, Allison told that, American pundits who had talked with Chinese leaders including former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger had unanimously pointed out that the Chinese side believed American strategy was based on containment. Just as mutual deterrence of MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction prevented a nuclear war during the U.S.-Soviet Cold War, nuclear war is unlikely to happen also between the United States and China.

However, since growing economic interdependence has made America and China inseparable Siamese twins, we can only conclude that both sides have to make a compromise. Richard Haas, President of the Council on Foreign Relations which publishes renowned journal “Foreign Affairs,” also argues, “Today’s foreign policy must begin with a concerted effort to discourage major-power rivalry, competition, and above all conflict from becoming the dominant feature of the international system again” in his book “A World in Disarray” published in 2017.

For the Communist regime, a more aggressive foreign policy could create a new source of political legitimacy, but only by placing trade and investment opportunities at risk. Haas mentioned, “How China’s leaders will manage this dilemma will be truly consequential for China and the world.” China needs to behave as a responsible great power. They must abide by international law, and domestically they must respect human rights and establish the rule of law that meets the international standard.

Also, America has so many things to do. It is an urgent matter to rebuild its system of the armed forces of which vitality and morale have been inflicted by defence spending cut. This may have led to recent collision accidents of two Aegis destroyers of the 7th Fleet in a row. The Trump administration must do something to stop social divides which have started growing since their inauguration, and resolve the gloomy political dysfunction that comes from disputes with congressional leaders, in particular those of his fellow Republicans.

Most importantly, they have to make coherent strategies as the superpower. However, since the Trump administration upholds “America First,” it is unlikely that they launch a grand strategy for “The World First” to which embraces global responsibility.

(This is the English translation of an article written by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on August 28, 2017 and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on September 29, 2017.)

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For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows. Please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.112    United States’ Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party)
(July 26, 2017)

No.111    Coolheaded Military Analysis is What We Need
by KATO Seiichi, former attorney-at-law
(May 15, 2017)

No.110    The Dangerous Nature of America First
by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher, JFIR
(March 24, 2016)

No.109    Survive the Trump Administration with High Alert
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(January 20, 2017)

No.106-108   Trump’s America and Tasks for Japan
by SHIMADA Haruo, Director of JFIR
(November 21 to 23, 2016)

No.105    Japan Should Tackle the “Northern Territories” Issue from Long Term Perspectives
by KAWATO Akio, former Diplomat
(November 18, 2016)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

                ————- – – – ————-
Announcement
————- – – – ————-

 The Japan Forum on International Relations 30th Anniversary Symposium on “Japan’s Diplomacy in an Era of Power Transition” to be Convened on November 1 in Tokyo

Commemorating the 30th anniversary of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), which was established on March 12, 1987, as a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan, JFIR will convene the 30th Anniversary Symposium under the general theme of “Japan’s Diplomacy in an Era of Power Transition” to the following effect. PLEASE NOTE the language used in the Symposium is JAPANESE ONLY.

Date: Wednesday, November 1, 2017
Time: 15:00 to 17:30
Venue: “Maple Room,” Hotel Okura Tokyo, Japan
( http://www.hotelokura.co.jp/tokyo/en/location/ )

This Symposium will feature as panelists the following 10 key members of JFIR and discuss a mega-trend of today’s international society from the four different angles, i.e., “China Risk and China Opportunity,” “Changing Strategic Environment in Eurasia,” “International Economy in the Era of Geo-economics,” and “New Approach to Formation of Maritime Order” and then seek to draft out a grand design of the diplomatic strategy for Japan to pursue.

TANAKA Akihiko, Supreme Councilor, JFIR/ Professor Emiritus, The University of Tokyo
KAMIYA Matake, Director and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, National Defense Academy
WATANABE Hirotaka, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies
KAWAI Masahiro, Superior Research Fellow, JFIR/ Specially Appointed Professor, The University of Tokyo
ITO Go, Trustee and Superior Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Meiji University
INOGUCHI Takashi, Councilor, JFIR/ Professor Emiritus, The University of Tokyo
TAKUBO Tadae, Director, JFIR/ Professor Emeritus, Kyorin University
OHYA Eiko, Trustee of JFIR/ President, Oya Soichi Library
MORIMOTO Satoshi, Director, JFIR/ Chancellor, Takushoku University
MIYAKE Kunihiko, Member, JFIR/ President, Foreign Policy Institute
(In Order of Appearance in the Program)

For more information, please refer to the program of the Symposium (in Japanese):
http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/pdf/171101_program.pdf

JFIR would like to invite readers of the JFIR E-letter to the Symposium. Should you wish to attend the Symposium, please inform us of (1) your name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, and (5) e-mail address via e-mail ( jfir@jfir.jp ) no later than October 27, 2017.

PLEASE NOTE that applications will be registered on a first-come-first-served basis, and the registration will be closed when seats are filled out.

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: TANAKA Shoko
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

August 20, 2017, Vol. 10, No.4

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
HASHIMOTO Hiroshi, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Commentary”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 112: “United States’ Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement”

By FUNADA Hajime
Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party)

On June 1 (early in the morning of June 2 Japan time) the U.S. President Donald Trump declared withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement which deals with global warming prevention. He has been suggesting that the Agreement would be disadvantageous to the U.S. economy since the time of his presidential campaign. Now that the withdrawal has become reality, the international community was uniformly disappointed.

The Paris Agreement is a multilateral agreement adopted at the 21th meeting of the UN-led “Conference of the Parties on Climate Change (COP)” held in Paris two years ago. The first conference of this framework (COP1) held in Rio de Janeiro adopted “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development” and the third conference (COP3) held in Kyoto adopted “Kyoto Protocol,” both considered as epoch-maker.

In the Paris Agreement, each signatory country has agreed to set its own goal for the reduction of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, to keep the increase in the average temperature below two degrees above pre-industrial levels and to achieve net zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050.

It has now become clear that global warming may lead to a relative rise in sea levels, which causes submergence of coastlines, damages resulting from heavy rainfalls and drought, and amplification of typhoon and cyclones. Hence, global warming cannot be mitigated without joint efforts of every country.

Per annum CO2 emissions of the U.S. accounts for 16%, coming second only to China. While the immediate impact of withdrawal of such a country would not be small, taking into account the fact that the former U.S. President Barack Obama had taken the initiative in defining the Agreement, the impact would be enormous.

Besides, although the validity of the Agreement would remain intact, the withdrawal of the U.S. which originated the very idea of the Agreement may break the momentum of the collective efforts by other signatory countries. Although it is unlikely that the U.S. will reverse its decision, it would be quite meaningful if Japan, EU as well as China, the world’s largest CO2 emitter, would build a coalition against such negative posture towards global warming mitigation.

(This is the English translation of an article written by FUNADA Hajime, Member of the House of Representatives (Liberal Democratic Party), which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on June 14, 2017, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on July 26, 2017.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows. Please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.111    Coolheaded Military Analysis is What We Need
by KATO Seiichi, former attorney-at-law
(May 15, 2017)

No.110    The Dangerous Nature of America First
by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher, JFIR
(March 24, 2016)

No.109    Survive the Trump Administration with High Alert
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(January 20, 2017)

No.106-108   Trump’s America and Tasks for Japan
by SHIMADA Haruo, Director of JFIR
(November 21 to 23, 2016)

No.105    Japan Should Tackle the “Northern Territories” Issue from Long Term Perspectives
by KAWATO Akio, former Diplomat
(November 18, 2016)

No.104    Is an “ASEAN minus X” Model Possible?
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 29, 2016)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

                ————- – – – ————-
Announcement
————- – – – ————-

JFIR’s Research Project Granted three “A” Grades from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

On June 5, 2017, JFIR was granted three “A” and one “A-” grades from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) for all of its four research projects respectively sponsored by MOFA in the fiscal year 2016. MOFA sponsored 12 research projects of six Japanese think tanks in 2016.

The outline of JFIR’s four research projects are as follows:

“The Ukraine Crisis and Japan’s Diplomacy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map” (Project Leader: MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Superior Research Fellow of JFIR / Professor of Univ. of Shizuoka) aimed to grasp the essential significance of the Ukraine Crisis and its geopolitical implications in global perspective thereby providing guidelines for Japan’s foreign policy. This project received an “A.”

“The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Era of Japan as a Proactive Contributor to Peace” (Project Leader: KAMIYA Matake, Director and Superior Research Fellow of JFIR / Professor of National Defense Academy of Japan) aimed to examine an ideal form of operation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance with special reference to Japan as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” after the establishment of the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the enactment of Japan’s new security legislation. This project received an “A.”

“Maritime-Territorial Issues in East Asia and Strategy for Crisis Management” (Project Leader: ITO Go, Superior Research Fellow of JFIR / Professor of Meiji Univ.) aimed to consider maritime-territorial issues in East Asia as a composite of legal, political as well as historical nature, and to develop a strategy on how to prevent countries concerned from crossing the “red line” over the issues. This project received an “A-.”

“Global Health Governance and Japan’s Diplomay” (Project Leader: SATO Teiichi, Superior Research Fellow of JFIR / Professor Emeritus, International University of Health and Welfare) aimed to review the current status of global health governance as an indispensable agenda for sustainable development of the international community and to draft a guideline for Japan’s diplomatic strategies to contribute to global health governance with special reference to East Asia. This project received an “A.”

For more information, please refer to (in Japanese):
http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/reseach/info/170620.html

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: TANAKA Shoko
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

 June 20, 2017, Vol. 10, No.3

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
HASHIMOTO Hiroshi, President, JFIR

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

                ————- – – – ————-
Announcement
————- – – – ————-

JFIR’s New Leadership Inaugurated Under Chairman ITO Kenichi & President HASHIMOTO Hiroshi

With regard to the office of President of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), which has been vacant and vicariously executed by the Chairman of JFIR since February 28, JFIR is pleased to announce that the Board of Trustees and Board of Directors meetings have elected Mr. HASHIMOTO Hiroshi, former Ambassador of Japan to Singapore and former Auditor of JFIR, as President of JFIR, as of June 15, 2017. The term of his office shall be two years, until June 2019.

For the greeting of Chairman ITO, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/about_us/greeting_chairman.htm

For the greeting of President HASHIMOTO, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/about_us/greeting_president.htm

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 111: “Coolheaded Military Analysis is What We Need”

By KATO Seiichi
former attorney-at-law

Intimidated by the US President Donald Trump’s resolute message that he would not hesitate to resort to preemptive attack against North Korea as he had done in Syria, Song Ilho, North Korean Ambassador in charge of Diplomatic Normalization with Japan, intimidated Japan with a warning that the country would suffer the maximum damage if war breaks out.

This is North Korea’s psychological warfare to “win without fighting”, by stirring up such fears among the “peace-addicted” Japanese that they would make the Japanese government dissuade the US government from attacking North Korea. In fact, every time North Korea was exposed to an existential emergency by way of American military attack, it threatened the South Korean people by saying Seoul would be turned into sea of fire and evaded American military attacks.

This tactic has always worked up until now, and North Korea has successfully avoided US military attack while pursuing its own nuclear and missile developments. This time seems to fall into the same tactics again. However, even if war breaks out, I doubt that Japan should really be the maximum damage and Seoul should turn into sea of fire as suggested by North Korea. We must be cool-headed in military analyses.

As we all know, no North Korean fighter jets and war ships are up to date and most of them are rather outdated. Thus, their combat capability is starkly weaker than that of the high-tech armed US forces. North Korean submarines are so slow and noisy that they can hardly come close to the American carrier strike groups. Besides, since North Korea does not have the missile defense system like Japan, they cannot intercept American ballistic missiles.

Furthermore, North Korea has no Airborne Early Warning and Control system, which inevitably make the country incapable of defending themselves from ultra-low altitude flight of Tomahawk cruise missiles. The US Navy can launch about 300 Tomahawk missiles from its two nuclear powered submarines. In addition, it has not yet been confirmed whether North Korea has manufactured nuclear warheads small enough to be loaded on ballistic missiles.

Their fixed missile launchers are vulnerable to Tomahawk attacks, which erodes their second-strike capability. Meanwhile, it is assumed that the US forces can destroy North Korea’s underground military facilities with “Mother of All Bombs (MOAB)” as demonstrated in Afghanistan on April 13.

Japan and South Korea have defense mechanisms against missile attacks linked with the US’ advanced radar systems, which suggests possibilities in which the former two countries can intercept substantial North Korean ballistic missile attacks. Seen in this way, once the United States resorts to a preemptive attack, all North Korea could do is to focus on its own defense and her counterattack capability against Japan and South Korea is quite limited.

Even if North Korea uses a nuclear weapon as the last resort, America will retaliate with several or even some ten times greater nuclear attacks and North Korea will suffer from catastrophic damages. Therefore, Japan does not have to be afraid of North Korean nuclear retaliation. Rather, it would end up simply following the planned tactic by the Kim dictatorship if Japan surrenders to North Korea’s usual diplomatic practice of “intimidation”.

(This is the English translation of an article written by KATO Seiichi, former attorney-at-law, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on April 27, 2017, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on May 15, 2017.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.110    The Dangerous Nature of America First
by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher, JFIR
(March 24, 2016)

No.109    Survive the Trump Administration with High Alert
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(January 20, 2017)

No.106-108   Trump’s America and Tasks for Japan
by SHIMADA Haruo, Director of JFIR
(November 21 to 23, 2016)

No.105    Japan Should Tackle the “Northern Territories” Issue from Long Term Perspectives
by KAWATO Akio, former Diplomat
(November 18, 2016)

No.104    Is an “ASEAN minus X” Model Possible?
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 29, 2016)

No.103    Restore the Balance of Power before Nuclear Disarmament
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(July 29, 2016)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: TANAKA Shoko
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

 April 20, 2017, Vol. 10, No.2

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 110: “The Dangerous Nature of America First”

By KAWAMURA Hiroshi
Foreign Policy Watcher

Since the election campaign, President Donald Trump has been stressing the foreign policy key word of “America First” which raises critical concerns among American allies, while Russia and China are exploring more vigorously to overturn Western supremacy, and Iran and North Korea are testing the new administration in Washington. Some people believe naively that there is no problem for any nation state to give priorities to her own people and national interests.

Things are not so simple, and we should never dismiss the dangerous and caustic nature of this ideology. First of all, Trump understands US foreign policy so poorly that he falls into believing in selfish and defensive views of the world. As a Jewish immigrant from the old Soviet Union in the childhood, Max Boot criticizes Trump’s bigoted zero-sum perspectives. Notably, Trump sees that America has been so altruistic that her trade partners have exploited the working class in the Rust Belt.

To the contrary, it is universally understood that American help to reconstruct her former enemies to become friendly trade partners and allies is a successful landmark of her foreign policy. It is quite worrisome that Trump does not evaluate highly of American ideals, including human rights, and that is bitterly criticized by European allies and international NGOs. Actually, human rights advocacy has weakened American enemies such as the Soviet Union, and bolstered American power, through promoting democracy and freedom. An immigrant from the Soviet Union like Boot is well much more aware of it than Trump.

Meanwhile, far right nationalists in Europe and Japan are emotionally empathetic to Trump’s vision, though it hurts national security interests of their countries. This is because such self-assumed grassroots patriots detest globalist elites, and they want bullying Trump to defeat cosmopolitan ruling class. It is White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon, who provides the philosophical foundation for Trump’s America First.

Professor Daniel Kreiss at the University of North Carolina points out that the pillars of Bannon’s idea are economic nationalism and antipathy to corporatist global elites. In Bannon’s view, the world is inherently an arena of nation state competition. From this point of view, he believes that trade, immigration, and multilateral cooperation erodes national sovereignty and identity. Instead of universalism that modern enlightenment advocates, Bannon understands international politics in terms of the Clash of Civilization, and sees Islam inherently belligerent.

Since Trump suggested abolishing alliances with Europe and Japan, his foreign policy is commonly seen isolationism. However, Kreiss insists that Bannon’s thoughts are essentially nationalism, and that does not hesitate foreign intervention, only to maximize national interests in a ruthlessly competitive world. Unlike neoconservatives’ regime change, Trump’s intervention is not based on such a universal ideal but sporadic recognition of international affairs.

Trump is unpredictable not just because of his temperament, but because of Bannon’s ideology. Elliot Cohen and his proponents are right to denounce Trump’s swing from disengagement to belligerent adventurism in the open letter. In view of Bannon’s influence on Trump like this, so called flattery diplomacy by major power leaders notably British Prime Minister Theresa May and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is no guarantee to develop stable relations with the new administration.

Max Boot argues that such hatred against rootless cosmopolitan simulates xenophobia and anti-Semitism, which is closely associated with undemocratic nationalists like Josef Stalin and Charles Lindbergh. In resonance with the alt-right in the United States, a Russian neo-Eurasianist Alexander Dugin is exploring to seize the opportunity to work with the Trump administration to repeal the current liberal world order, while expanding Russian influence from Ukraine to the Middle East, including Turkey, Iran, and Syria. America First is the ideology of dissolving the Western democratic alliance. There is no wonder why Trump and Putin are so closely entangled, and Bannon’s anti-globalism charms nativists in Europe and Japan so much. The danger of America First is too critical to dismiss.

(This is the English translation of an article written by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on March 1, 2017, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on March 24, 2017.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.109    Survive the Trump Administration with High Alert
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(January 20, 2017)

No.106-108   Trump’s America and Tasks for Japan
by SHIMADA Haruo, Director of JFIR
(November 21 to 23, 2016)

No.105    Japan Should Tackle the “Northern Territories” Issue from Long Term Perspectives
by KAWATO Akio, former Diplomat
(November 18, 2016)

No.104    Is an “ASEAN minus X” Model Possible?
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 29, 2016)

No.103    Restore the Balance of Power before Nuclear Disarmament
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(July 29, 2016)

No.102    Japan Should Refute Every Lopsided Claim that Russia Makes
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, JFIR
(May 30, 2016)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

JFIR Updates

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Event
————- – – – ————-

International Symposium on “International Order in the Asia-Pacific and Japan-ASEAN Cooperation” held in Singapore

JFIR, under the co-sponsorship of S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of Nanyang Technological University, organized an international symposium on “International Order in the Asia-Pacific and Japan-ASEAN Cooperation” in Singapore on February 13, 2017.

This open symposium featured such panelists as TAN See Seng, Professor of RSIS, from the Singapore side and KAMIYA Matake, Professor of National Defense Academy of Japan/Superior Research Fellow of JFIR, KATO Yoichi, Senior Research Fellow of Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation, and SAKATA Yasuyo, Professor of Kanda University of International Studies, from the Japanese side, and was attended by approximately 40 participants in total including academics, diplomats, journalists, etc.

For the Outline of Discussions of the symposium, please refer to;
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/170213_roe.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: TANAKA Shoko
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

 February 20, 2017, Vol. 10, No.1

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi, Chairman, JFIR
SHIMADA Haruo, President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 109: “Survive the Trump Administration with High Alert”

By SHIKATA Tatsuo
Economist

Under the “Trump Market” stock prices are soaring and Yen is depreciating. I have concern about growing “Optimism” among some people. Particularly, depreciation of JPY15/month is an extraordinary situation, which does not reflect on the real market.

Some say “Since Trump has been in business for a long time, he must make an economically reasonable judgment”, but his real estate business is a quite speculative “zero-sum game” compared with other businesses, and he is always trying to be a sole winner and is proud of it.

Nowadays, first class business persons always seek for “win-win relationships” with highly required CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility), and the Trump style business is obsolete under the present world standard. He has already started criticizing TOYOTA who is going to invest in Mexico, and it is not in compliance with principles of the Free Market Economy that the President-elect is putting pressure on a foreign private company not to invest in another country.

One of coming concerns is the trend of the Sino-USA Relationship. Trump has repeatedly made assertive statements such as “to impose 45% import tax on products from China” and “to designate China as Foreign Exchange Manipulator”, but it remains to be seen if/when he may suddenly change his attitude. He may improve the Sino-USA Relationship as well as the Russo-USA Relationship, and may try to jointly control the world among the three countries.

Then, Japan may be left behind. Most of US companies have recognized China as a huge growing market since 1980s, and it is a symbolic event that IT executives, who rarely wear suits, wore suits to welcome Xi Jinping in autumn in 2015 when the Sino-USA relationship turned sour.

Trump seemingly receives advice from Kissinger from time to time, and it is Kissinger himself who bypassed Japan to open the Sino-USA Relationship. Even now he regards China as a “partner of USA”, while he shows cautiousness on Japan in his latest book entitled “World Order”.

The only certain thing about the Trump Administration would be “Unpredictability”. We can no longer judge the Japan-USA Relationship in line with the present common understanding. Without any presumption but with high alert we should survive the new Administration, and it is critically important that we keep appealing to Trump and ordinary US citizens how profitable the
2 Japan-USA Security Treaty and the Japan-USA Economic Relationship are in a clear and visible manner.

(This is the English translation of an article written by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on January 10, 2017, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on January 20, 2017.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.106-108    Trump’s America and Tasks for Japan
by SHIMADA Haruo, Director of JFIR
(November 21 to 23, 2016)

No.105    Japan Should Tackle the “Northern Territories” Issue from Long Term Perspectives
by KAWATO Akio, former Diplomat
(November 18, 2016)

No.104    Is an “ASEAN minus X” Model Possible?
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(September 29, 2016)

No.103    Restore the Balance of Power before Nuclear Disarmament
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(July 29, 2016)

No.102    Japan Should Refute Every Lopsided Claim that Russia Makes
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, JFIR
(May 30, 2016)

No.101    Has Abenomics Lost Its Initial Objective?
by SHIMADA Haruo, Director of JFIR
(March 17, 2016)

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JFIR Updates

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Announcement
————- – – – ————-

The Japan-U.S. Dialogue “The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?” to be Convened on March 3 in Tokyo.

The Global Forum of Japan, the Institute of National Strategic Studies, and the Japan Forum on International Relations are co-sponsoring the Japan-U.S. Dialogue “The Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Era of the Trump Administration: Crossroads or Continuity?” to the following effect.

Date: Friday, March 3, 2017
Time: 14:00 to 17:30
Venue: “Lecture Hall,” International House of Japan, Tokyo, Japan ( https://www.i-house.or.jp/eng/access.html )

At this “Dialogue,” Japanese and U.S. security experts featured as panelists will discuss “Prospects and Challenges of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the Trump Era” in Session I and “What Should the Two Allies Do?” in Session II. The panelists of this “Dialogue” are as follows:

From the Japanese side: KAMIYA Matake (Professor at the National Defense Academy of Japan / Director and Superior Research Fellow at JFIR), NAKANISHI Hiroshi (Professor at Kyoto Univ.), KATO Yoichi (Senior Research Fellow at Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation), HOSOYA Yuichi (Professor at Keio Univ.), and WATANABE Tsuneo (Senior Research Fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation).

From the U.S. side: Robert MANNING (Senior Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security, Atlantic Council), Nicholas SZECHENYI (Deputy Director and Senior Fellow at the Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS), James PRZYSTUP (Senior Research Fellow at INSS), James SCHOFF (Senior Fellow at Carnegie Endowment for International Peace), and Rust DEMING (former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State).

For more information, please refer to:
http://www.gfj.jp/j/dialogue/20170303_program.pdf

JFIR would like to invite the readers of this E-letter to the “Dialogue.” For the registration, should you please send us (1) your name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, and (5) e-mail address via e-mail ( dialogue@gfj.jp ) no later than February 28, 2017. English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided at the “Dialogue.”

PLEASE NOTE that applications will be registered on a first-come-first-served basis, and the registration will be closed when seats are filled out.

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: TANAKA Shoko
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter
(Extra Edition)

“Appointment of New Officers of JFIR”
“Greetings from New Chairman and President”

====================================================================

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

  20 December 2016, Vol. 9, No.6

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.106: Trump’s America and Tasks for Japan (1)

By SHIMADA Haruo
Director of JFIR

Worst Presidential Election Ever
On November 8, Donald Trump won the presidential election and became the 75th President of the United States. I first of all congratulate Mr. Trump for getting the seat of the president and also the United States for electing the next president for the country.

We Japanese have been gazing at the TV screen in the afternoon of November 9 (Japan time), and were surprised and shocked to see and hear the news of the final result of the election, namely, the victory of Mr. Trump. We were surprised because most of us have been hoping and believing that Ms. Hillary Clinton will win the election to become the next president of the United States. We were shocked because we have been fed up to hear and see Mr. Trump’s rude and abusive language, his discriminatory attitude against minorities and foreigners, his prejudice of looking down women, and above all his violent messages to deny globalization and internationalization. From our point of view, it was simply unthinkable and intolerable for such a great country as the United States to have him as a leader.

For more, please refer to:
(1) http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/161121.pdf
(2) http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/161122.pdf
(3) http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/161123.pdf

—————– – – – —————–

No.105:

Japan Should Tackle the “Northern Territories” Issue from Long Term Perspectives

By KAWATO Akio
former Diplomat

A strange misunderstanding over the Kuril territorial problem is prevailing now.

That is—- “The Japanese government wanted to conclude the peace treaty with the Soviet Union in October 1956, under the condition the Habomai and Shikotan (the smaller two islands out of the four islands which Japan now claims. These four islands are called the “Northern Territories” by Japan. Japan does not claim the islands, which are located in the north of the Northern Territories and are called the Kuril Islands by Russia) would be returned.

However, the negotiation was deadlocked, because the US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles intervened into the bilateral talk, and let Japan demand the Soviet Union to return Kunashir and Iturup (the larger two of the four) in addition. Now that the Cold War is over, Japan should act ‘independently’ from the United States, and reach a peace treaty with Russia by abandoning Kunashir and Iturup”—-

This assumption is self-deprecating and skewed. In the first place, when Japan and Russia reached the Shimoda treaty to start formal diplomatic relations in 1855, both countries agreed that all four islands including Kunashir and Iturup were under the Japanese sovereignty, which was recognized by the Soviet Union until the military occupation in 1945.

Therefore, these disputed four islands are integral parts of Japan, from legal and historical viewpoints. I can hardly believe that yielding such critical territories implies ‘independence’ from the United States. That is quite odd.

Another misunderstanding distorts the discussion between Japan and Russia. Russia alleges that ailing Franklin Roosevelt admitted Joseph Stalin to seize the Kuril Islands, including Kunashir and Iturup, in return for joining the war against Japan at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. But as the US government several times admitted, the disputed four islands were not included in Roosevelt’s concession.

This would mean that Japan be deprived of its own territory, and this would go against the Atlantic Charter (August 1941), the Cairo Declaration (November 1943), and the Potsdam Declaration (July 1945) that stated the objective of World War II; all of them deny territorial expansion, and stipulate Japan would be expelled only from the areas where it had seized violently and forcefully.

The principle of territorial inviolability was accepted as a key to the postwar world order, and Japan surrendered under this condition.

President Putin is coming to Japan soon, and some Japanese pundits are expecting a substantial progress in the solution of the Northern Territories issue, but as things stand now Russia is not feeling an urgent need to address the Northern Territories issue.

Japan should avoid making an excessive concession to squeeze a meager progress. Even if the Northern Territories issue be resolved, bilateral economic relations will not develop rapidly, nor will Russia cut security partnership with China to support Japan continually.

The territorial disagreement is not necessarily a hurdle to deepen economic and political cooperation with Russia. Japan imports oil, gas, and coal from Russia for no less than 10% of her total consumption. The Japan Self Defense Forces interact with the Russian armed forces, and both forces even conduct small scale joint exercises.

While there are only 6 million people in the Russian Far East, 120 million people live in the adjacent Chinese Northeast. This is a huge population imbalance. Russia needs something to check Chinese power. And if Russia becomes more friendly toward Japan, the latter will be freed from political and military pressure by China and Russia together.

This means that both countries can become good partners in the Western Pacific, even if they continue to negotiate on the Northern Territories issue. Compared with the days when the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration was announced in October 1956, current Japan is in a far more advantageous position vis-a-vis Russia. There is no reason for Japan to make a compromise with the Kremlin so hastily. Japan should negotiate with Russia resolutely, from long term perspectives.

(This is the English version of an article written by KAWATO Akio, former Diplomat, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on October 2, 2016, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” as no.105 on November 18, 2016.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.104:   Is an “ASEAN minus X” Model Possible?
by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(29 September, 2016)

No.103:   Restore the Balance of Power before Nuclear Disarmament
by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(29 July, 2016)

No.102:   Japan Should Refute Every Lopsided Claim that Russia Makes
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, JFIR
(30 May, 2016)

No.101:  Has Abenomics Lost Its Initial Objective?
by SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce
(17 March, 2016)

No.100:  How Should We Respond to the Anglo-Chinese “Golden Era”?
by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher
(22 January, 2016)

No.99:   “Haste Makes Waste” in Territorial Talks with Russia
by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, JFIR
(30 November, 2015)

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“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Event
————- – – – ————-

International Symposium “Japan-Europe Intellectual Dialogue: Seeking Japan-Europe Joint Strategy toward Peace and Prosperity of the World with Ever Increasing Uncertainty” Held

JFIR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) co-organized “The Second Japan-Europe Intellectual Dialogue: Seeking Japan-Europe Joint Strategy toward Peace and Prosperity of the World with Ever Increasing Uncertainty,” at The Ritz-Carlton Tokyo on November 15, 2016. This “Dialogue” is the second in a series, the first one having being organized last year.

This year’s “Dialogue” was attended by eight panelists from Europe, including Karel LANNOO, CEO of the Centre for European Policy Studies (EU), Gerard LYONS, Chief Economic Advisor of Policy Exchange (U.K.) and Andrzej TALAGA, Director of Strategy of Warsaw Enterprise Institute (Poland), as well as eleven panelists from Japan, including MORIMOTO Satoshi, Director of JFIR (former Minister of Defense), SHIMADA Haruo, Director of JFIR and IIDA Keisuke, Professor of the University of Tokyo.

Lively discussions were held on such topics as “Forecast of the U.S. Asia-Pacific Strategy and Europe Strategy under its new Presidency” and “What should Japan and Europe jointly encourage the U.S. to do now?” in two sessions.

For the outline of discussions of the symposium, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/161115.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

  20 October 2016, Vol. 9, No.5

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.103: Restore the Balance of Power before Nuclear Disarmament

By NABESHIMA Keizo
Critic

The communique of the Foreign Ministers Meeting of the ASESAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) on July 25 did not mention the judgement by the Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague that denied the Chinese sovereignty in the South China Sea. The Chairman’s Statement of the ASEAN Summit Meeting held in Laos on September 7 did not mention it either. In view of this, there is a growing recognition in ASEAN that the relationship with China needs to be reset.

The ASEAN is managed under the principle of unanimity (ASEAN method), but regarding the South China Sea problem, pro-Chinese Cambodia objected strongly to include the “Hague judgement” into the communique, as a result of blatant Chinese intervention.

China offered a 600 million dollar loan to Cambodia a week before the meeting, and Prime Minister Hun Sen expressed objection to the adjudication of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which gave an impression to the global community that his country had yielded to such a huge amount of Chinese aid. Remember that the ASEAN failed to announce the joint statement in 2012 when Cambodia assumed the chairmanship.

An ASEAN divided by great power intervention will have some impacts on Asia Pacific affairs. As the Sino-American rivalry for regional hegemony grows intensified, liberal democracies such as Japan, the United States, Australia, and India, need to reconsider how to get involved in the ASEAN that stands at the crossroads.

Singaporean Foreign Minister Vivian Balakrishnan told the media that the series of meetings between the ASEAN and their counterparts “gave us the opportunity to press the reset button and to set ASEAN-China relations back onto a more positive projectory.” Though Singapore and Indonesia are not involved in territorial disputes in the South China Sea, both countries are increasingly critical to unilateral reclamation and militarization of reefs by China.

Though the Philippines “won the lawsuit” of the Arbitration Court, Professor Richard Javad Heydarian at De La Salle University, commented critically, “The ASEAN’s shortcomings lie in its institutional design of consensus-based decision making, which has handed de facto veto power to each member country to create institutional paralysis” in his article to the Strait Times to represent viewpoints of his country.

As a result, ASEAN has become inclined to “disunification rather than unification” as shown in the last Foreign Ministers meeting. He is critically concerned that such a paralysis would undermine ASEAN influence in South East Asia, and therefore, he argues that ASEAN officials consider introducing a majority rule system, so called an “ASEAN minus X” system.

It is reported that ASEAN Secretary-General Le Luong Minh is exploring the way of “more effective process of reaching consensus on important issues.” One of such processes is an “ASEAN minus X” model. This method gives an option to member countries to join an ASEAN deal later, if they did not agree to it at first. It is applied to only economic relations, as typically seen in the liberalization deal of telecommunication service between Brunei and Singapore.

The ASEAN has expanded from original five members to ten members, and underdeveloped members of enlargement like Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar are heavily dependent on huge Chinese economic sphere, and they are politically vulnerable to Chinese pressure. If mutual national interests are incompatible among members, as the enlargement goes further, it will be increasingly difficult for the ASEAN to build a consensus, as it happens in the European Union (EU).

The ASEAN will celebrate the 50th anniversary in 2017, and it is a pressing problem for them to build up stable relations with major powers including China, Japan, and the United States, to restore unity and trust for their raison d’etre.

(This is the English version of an article written by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on August 1, 2016, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” as no.104 on September 29, 2016.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.103 Restore the Balance of Power before Nuclear Disarmament

by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist
(29 July, 2016)

No.102: Japan Should Refute Every Lopsided Claim that Russia Makes

by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, JFIR
(30 May, 2016)

No.101 The NYT’s ‘Condescending Eyes’ and ‘Distortion Syndrome’ Going Too Far”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(11 May, 2015)

No.100 Has Abenomics Lost Its Initial Objective?

by SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce
(17 March, 2016)

No.99 “Haste Makes Waste” in Territorial Talks with Russia

by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Councilor of JFIR
(30 November, 2015)

No.98 “Strategization” of the U.S.-Vietnam Relations Worthy of Note

by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(24 September, 2015)

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“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Announcement
————- – – – ————-

The Dialogue with the World “The International Order in Europe and Asia-Pacific after the Ukraine Crisis and Japan’s Course of Action” to be Convened on November 25 in Tokyo

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), under the co-sponsorship with the Institute of World Policy (IWP), the Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center (BSC) and the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), will convene “The Dialogue with the World” on “The International Order in Europe and Asia-Pacific after the Ukraine Crisis and Japan’s Course of Action” to the following effect.

Date: Friday, November 25, 2016
Time: 13:00 to 16:50
Venue: “Saffron”, Ivy Hall, Tokyo, Japan ( https://www.ivyhall.jp/access/ )

The “Dialogue” will feature such eminent panelists as follows:

From the foreign side: Dr. Leonid LITRA / Institute of World Policy (Ukraine), Dr. Daria KHASPEKOVA / Russian International Affairs Council (Russia), Dr. Joerg FORBRIG / German Marshall Fund (Germany), Dr. Robert NURICK / Atlantic Council’s Brent Scowcroft Center (U.S.).

From the Japanese side: Prof. MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo / Univ. of Shizuoka, Assoc. Prof. SUEZAWA Megumi / Heisei International Univ., Prof. ITO Go / Meiji Univ., Prof. HAMAMOTO Ryoichi / Akita International Univ., Prof. SAITO Motohide / Institute of Policy and Cultural Studies, Chuo Univ.

For more information, please refer to:
http://www.gfj.jp/j/dialogue/20161125_program.pdf

JFIR would like to invite readers of the JFIR E-letter to the “Dialogue.” Should you wish to attend the “Dialogue,” please inform us of (1) your name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, and (5) e-mail address via e-mail ( dialogue@gfj.jp ) no later than November 22, 2016. English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided at the “Dialogue.”

PLEASE NOTE that applications will be registered on a first-come-first-served basis, and the registration will be closed when seats are filled out.

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

  20 August 2016, Vol. 9, No.4

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No.103: Restore the Balance of Power before Nuclear Disarmament

By SHIKATA Tatsuo
Economist

Japanese people were impressed with President Barack Obama’s beautiful speech and dialogues with atomic bomb victims, when he visited Hiroshima. It was the culmination of Obama’s effort toward “The world without nuclear weapons,” ever since he appealed this in the Prague speech in 2009, but how about the real achievements in nuclear nonproliferation in his seven and half year term up to now?

China is building up nuclear armaments as typically seen in the rapid development of DF-41 MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) capable ICBM, North Korea declares their success in hydrogen bomb and SLBM tests to be recognized as a nuclear power in the global community, and they are developing nuclear bombs and missiles rapidly. Furthermore, Russia is boosting nuclear attack capability, notably, they are developing Status-6 long range nuclear torpedo.

Based on the assumption that the US-led Free World shall not take military responses, China reclaims lands and militarizes islands in the South China Sea one-sidedly and Russia annexes of Crimea, and thus, the balance of power between autocratic nations and the Free World is shifting in favor of autocracies. Nevertheless, some people in the United States argue that their country cut nuclear warheads unilaterally.

However, we understand the US-Soviet nuclear disarmament talks were initiated when both powers were in balance, and therefore, if the United States reduces nuclear weapons when autocracies are boosting their nuclear arsenals, they will see the Free World weak, and our adversaries will be emboldened.

Nuclear arms reduction should not be driven by sentimentalism, and the Free World must build up the deterrence strong enough to counter the rising adversary. Once the balance of power is restored in this way, the negotiation must start solemnly, from long term perspectives.

(This is the English translation of an article written by SHIKATA Tatsuo, Economist, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on May 31, 2016, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” as no.103 on July 29, 2016.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.102: Japan Should Refute Every Lopsided Claim that Russia Makes

by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee, JFIR
(30 May, 2016)

No.101 The NYT’s ‘Condescending Eyes’ and ‘Distortion Syndrome’ Going Too Far”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(11 May, 2015)

No.100 Has Abenomics Lost Its Initial Objective?

by SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce
(17 March, 2016)

No.99 “Haste Makes Waste” in Territorial Talks with Russia

by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Councilor of JFIR
(30 November, 2015)

No.98 “Strategization” of the U.S.-Vietnam Relations Worthy of Note

by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(24 September, 2015)

No.97 “Logical Fallacy of Blaming the Security Bill for Being Unconstitutional

by KURANISHI Masako, Political Scientist
(29 July, 2015)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Announcement
————- – – – ————-

JFIR’s Research Project Granted an “A+” Grade from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan

On June 20, 2016, JFIR was granted one “A+” and two “A” grades from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) for all of its three research projects respectively sponsored by MOFA in the fiscal year 2015. MOFA sponsored 13 research projects of six Japanese think tanks in 2015.

The outline of JFIR’s three research projects are as follows:

“The Ukraine Crisis and Japan’s Diplomacy that Takes a Panoramic Perspective of the World Map” (Project Leader: MUTSUSHIKA Shigeo, Superior Research Fellow of JFIR / Professor of Univ. of Shizuoka) aimed to grasp the essential significance of the Ukraine Crisis and its geopolitical implications in global perspective thereby providing guidelines for Japan’s foreign policy. This project received an “A+.”

“The U.S.-Japan Alliance in the Era of Japan as a Proactive Contributor to Peace” (Project Leader: KAMIYA Matake, Director and Superior Research Fellow of JFIR / Professor of National Defense Academy of Japan) aimed to examine an ideal form of operation of the U.S.-Japan Alliance with special reference to Japan as a “Proactive Contributor to Peace” after the establishment of the new Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and the enactment of Japan’s new security legislation. This project received an “A.”

“Maritime-Territorial Issues in East Asia and Strategy for Crisis Management” (Project Leader: ITO Go, Superior Research Fellow of JFIR / Professor of Meiji Univ.) aimed to consider maritime-territorial issues in East Asia as a composite of legal, political as well as historical nature, and to develop a strategy on how to prevent countries concerned from crossing the “red line” over the issues. This project received an “A.”

These three research projects of JFIR are continuously conducted in this fiscal year 2016 as well, the final products of which will respectively be summarized as sets of policy recommendations to be submitted to the Japanese government and concurrently published in March 2017, the end of the fiscal year.

For more information (in Japanese), please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/reseach/info/160627.htm
=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

  20 June 2016, Vol. 9, No.3

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 102: Japan Should Refute Every Lopsided Claim that Russia Makes

            By HAKAMADA Shigeki
Trustee, JFIR

　　　　　Japan will host the G7 Ise-Shima summit on May 26 and 27. Prior to this, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe will visit several countries in Europe and Sochi of Russia during the “Golden Week” holidays in early May, in order to meet European leaders and President Vladimir Putin.

Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov expressed his hardline views in detail to deny everything associated with bilateral negotiations with Japan since the Soviet era, regarding the Russo-Japanese peace treaty. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Abe dares to visit Russia to have a bilateral summit, despite objection and concerns among Western allies, notably the United States.

The foremost reason for it that Abe proclaims publicly is to conclude the peace treaty with Russia. If he is dedicated to the summit with Putin so much, I would suggest that the Japanese government do the following, in order to gain an understanding from the global community.

That is, to promote Japanese viewpoints on this issue both at home and abroad, in order to show how Russian arguments are clearly wrong. Up to now, the Japanese government has been too considerate of the Russian side, though their criticism to Japan dismisses past negotiations for the peace treaty. If this goes on, the global community will not understand Japan’s standpoint. Also, it would make Abe defensive at the summit, from the beginning.

These days, the Kremlin disseminates strongly anti-Japanese propagandas worldwide that deny all the processes of past Russo-Japanese talks on the Kuril Islands dispute, though these arguments are poorly reasoned. Their point is that the territorial dispute after World War II has been settled, and “the Russo-Japanese talks for the peace treaty are irrelevant to the territorial issue”.

On the Russian side, President Putin said “South Kuril (Northern Territories for Japan) belongs to Russia as a result of World War II, according to the international law” in September 2005, and even told more harshly, “The transfer of Habomai and Shikotan islands based on the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration is not territorial retrocession” in March 2012 and May 2014.

Last year, Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Morgulov dismissed the fact completely as to mention, “We have not done any negotiation with Japan regarding the territorial dispute.” Furthermore, Foreign Minister Lavrov invited 200 Russian and more than 250 foreign journalists to the press conference on January 26 this year, to denounce Japan for unfounded reasons, by referring to the UN Charter and the Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration in detail.

What Russian leaders argue consistently today, is that Japan does not recognize the reality settled as a result of World War II, in other words, Japan is too revisionist.

Lavrov’s press conference was held when Ukraine and Syria drew much attention from the global community, and he told about the Russo-Japanese peace treaty in detail on this occasion, on behalf of the Russian government. That suggests implicitly that there is a strong intension on the Russian side to promote their logic on the peace treaty with Japan throughout the world.

What I am most critically concerned is that the Japanese side does not reveal information to the Japanese public and the global community, to show how Russian logics are outrageous, while Russia launches international campaigns aggressively.

Regretfully, the Japanese government just said “Russian claims are unconstructive and not in accordance with facts and our bilateral summits agreements” to argue against Morgulov. But I am quite skeptical whether such a statement persuades anyone into understanding why Russian arguments defy facts and bilateral agreements, and why they are wrong.

Also, I am concerned with Japanese counterargument to the appalling view presented by Foreign Minister Lavrov, in the same way. The Japanese government just said “Their claims are unacceptable for us, because the centerpiece of the peace treaty is the sovereignty issue of the Northern Territories, that is, the territorial dispute,” without explaining why Russian side claims were wrong.

Moreover, the Japanese side said, “We do not consider specific actions against them, including protest.” Of course, sensitive diplomatic negotiation processes like territorial talks should be kept secret. However, the Japanese government should promote their fundamental viewpoints to the global community more proactively, in order to refute Russian distortion of the fact.

(This is the English translation of an article written by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Trustee of JFIR, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on March 10, 2016, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” as no.102 on May 30, 2016.)

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For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.101 The NYT’s ‘Condescending Eyes’ and ‘Distortion Syndrome’ Going Too Far”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(11 May, 2015)

No.100 Has Abenomics Lost Its Initial Objective?

by SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce
(17 March, 2016)

No.99 “Haste Makes Waste” in Territorial Talks with Russia

by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Councilor of JFIR
(30 November, 2015)

No.98 “Strategization” of the U.S.-Vietnam Relations Worthy of Note

by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(24 September, 2015)

No.97 “Logical Fallacy of Blaming the Security Bill for Being Unconstitutional

by KURANISHI Masako, Political Scientist
(29 July, 2015)

No.96 “Putin’s Rule and Russia’s Path to the Future”

by ITO Kenichi, President, JFIR
(27 May, 2015)

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“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Announcement
————- – – – ————-

Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue “International Order in the 21st Century and the Security of Maritime Asia” to be Convened on July 12 in Tokyo

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), under the co-sponsorship with Meiji Institute of International Policy Studies (MIIPS), Meiji Institute for Global Affairs (MIGA), and the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), will convene the “Japan-Asia Pacific Dialogue” on “International Order in the 21st Century and the Security of Maritime Asia” to the following effect.

Date: Tuesday, July 12, 2016
Time: 13:00 to 16:50
Venue: “Global Hall”, Global Front, Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan ( http://www.meiji.ac.jp/cip/english/about/campus/su_campus.html )

The “Dialogue” will feature such eminent panelists as follows:

From the Japanese side: Prof. ITO Go / JFIR, Meiji Univ., Prof. SATO Koichi / J.F. Oberlin Univ., Dr. SHOJI Tomotaka / National Institute for Defence Studies, Prof. YAMADA Yoshihiko / Tokai Univ., and Prof. ASANO Ryo / Doshisha Univ.

From the Asia-Pacific side: Dr. David WALTON / Western Sydney University (Australia), Dr. NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh / Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (Vietnam), Prof. YOU Ji / Univ. of Macau (China), Prof. Hikmahanto JUWANA / Univ. of Indonesia (Indonesia), Prof. Virginia WATSON / Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (USA & The Philippines), and Prof. Pham Quang MINH / Univ. of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National Univ.-Hanoi (Vietnam).

For more information, please refer to:
http://www.gfj.jp/j/pdf/160712_program.pdf

JFIR would like to invite readers of the JFIR E-letter to the “Dialogue.” Should you wish to attend the “Dialogue,” please inform us of (1) your name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, and (5) e-mail address via e-mail ( dialogue@gfj.jp ) no later than July 8, 2016. English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided at the “Dialogue.”

PLEASE NOTE that applications will be registered on a first-come-first-served basis, and the registration will be closed when seats are filled out.

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

  20 April 2016, Vol. 9, No.2

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

No. 101: Has Abenomics Lost Its Initial Objective?

            By SHIMADA Haruo
President, Chiba University of Commerce

　　　　　I appreciate Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s devotion to his duty as the leader of Japan. The Abe administration upholds Abenomics which is a vital policy for the Japanese economy and people’s life, and it draws worldwide attention. However, I am deeply concerned with the accomplishments of Abenomics until now and its recent directions, since I still support the Abe administration despite these worries.

The key objective of Abenomics is a departure from 20 year deflation. For this purpose, the Bank of Japan supplied a huge amount of base money to cause inflation, and carried out quantitative and qualitative monetary easing so that consumers and businesses have inflationary mindsets.

This “first arrow” of Abenomics was successful to boost corporate profits and raising stock prices by devaluing the exchange rate, but falling oil price makes it unlikely to achieve a 2% inflation rate, despite BOJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda’s dedicated effort. The quantitative and qualitative monetary easing will not accomplish the core objective.

Another reason for such a huge amount of base money supply is to expand export through currency depreciation and to stimulate economic growth, but that has neither boosted export nor contributed to economic growth. We cannot dismiss world economic downturn, notably in China, but actually, Japanese big companies that lead national export, have shifted their business bases overseas during the last era of strong yen.

From this point of view, I suspect that the Japanese government overlooked such structural changes that deterred export growth, even if the yen was devalued. The “second arrow” is flexible fiscal expenditure to support the economy, and the result of which has revealed that it is virtually impossible to keep the promise to the global community to achieve the equilibrium of the primary balance in 2020.

In view of the above changes, I would like to lay my hopes on the “third arrow” of economic growth strategy. The growth strategy has been announced three times up to now, in 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively.

The strategy in 2013 launched three action plans, but they were insufficient. The 2014 strategy was highly evaluated internationally, as it actively involved in the reform of basic nature of the Japanese economy, such as capital market reform, agricultural reform, and labor reform. But it takes ten to twenty years for a structural reform like this to work.

Meanwhile, it is quite difficult to understand the growth strategy approved by the cabinet in June 2015. Frankly, this is empty and the quality of it has become even poorer. Abenomics was heavily dependent on monetary policy, and did not tackle long term issues so much, such as social security and regional development.

However, people increasingly worry about dire prospects of long term problems like population decrease, aging, and so forth, while the administration responds to such trends with mere slogans like “regional revitalization” and “dynamic engagement of all citizens”. But it is quite unlikely that these “policies” will really revitalize the region, or promote dynamic engagement by the people.

It appears to me that these slogans are intended to boost election campaigns for the House of Councillors or possible double election with the House of Representatives in July, rather than to resolve real economic problems.

This is typically seen in distribution of subsidies to the region, increases in governmental assistance to all categories of people, particularly benefits to lower income and elderly people with the total amount of 360 billion yen, and complete acceptance of Komeito’s demand to introduce the reduced consumption tax rate system.

Still, I would like to support the Abe administration continually, and this is why I advise them to articulate their policy directions to manage increasingly unforeseeable economy. From now on, I will tackle specific issues of this big problem one by one.

(This is the English translation of an article written by SHIMADA Haruo, President, Chiba University of Commerce, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” of JFIR on February 8, 2016, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on March 17, 2016.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.100 How Should We Respond to the Anglo-Chinese “Golden Era”?

by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher
(22 January, 2016)

No.99 “Haste Makes Waste” in Territorial Talks with Russia

by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Councilor of JFIR
(30 November, 2015)

No.98 “Strategization” of the U.S.-Vietnam Relations Worthy of Note

by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(24 September, 2015)

No.97 “Logical Fallacy of Blaming the Security Bill for Being Unconstitutional

by KURANISHI Masako, Political Scientist
(29 July, 2015)

No.96 “Putin’s Rule and Russia’s Path to the Future”

by ITO Kenichi, President, JFIR
(27 May, 2015)

No.95 “The NYT’s ‘Condescending Eyes’ and ‘Distortion Syndrome’ Going Too Far”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(11 May, 2015)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Event
————- – – – ————-

Memorandum of Cooperation Concluded between the JFIR and the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat

On December 15, 2015, Secretary General YANG Houlan (China) and Deputy Secretary Generals LEE Jong-heon (South Korea) and UMEZAWA Akima (Japan) of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS), the joint consultative body among the three governments of Japan, China, and South Korea, visited the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and signed the Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) with the JFIR.

For more information, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/151215.pdf

For the news article on the MOC signing at the TCS website, please refer to:
http://tcs-asia.org/dnb/board/view.php?board_name=2_1_2_tcs_news&view_id=408

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

  20 February 2016, Vol. 9, No.1

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

How Should We Respond to the Anglo-Chinese “Golden Era”?

            By KAWAMURA Hiroshi
Foreign Policy Watcher

　　　　　Britain hosted Chinese President Xi Jinping last October to hail the dawn of the “Golden Era” between both countries. Meanwhile, human rights activists denounced Chinese oppression in Tibet, and the Royal Family treated Xi sarcastically. But from a policy perspective, the most critical concern is the security implication of nuclear plant construction in Bradwell and Hinkley Point.

Before exploring our response to the Anglo-Chinese nuclear deal, I would like to narrate the background of British foreign and domestic policy. To begin with, we have to understand Britain’s foreign policy rebalance. Currently, British media talk about “Brexit” as Prime Minister David Cameron suggests a national referendum to question EU membership.

Britain has been frustrated with immigration problems within the Union, and explores more market opportunities in the emerging economies, particularly in Asia, rather than in the Eurozone. This is nothing strange in view of Britain’s traditional ties with Commonwealth nations, and some of them are leading emerging markets, including India, Malaysia, Singapore, South Africa, and Nigeria.

While the United States talks about the “pivot” or the “rebalance” to Asia, Britain is initiating the “reprioritisation” to Asia.

This is the change of Britain today, which is typically seen in Cameron’s salesman diplomacy when he visited India in February 2013 to accompany a huge business delegation. Despite notorious handling of Muslims in the Gujarat riot in 2002 as the Chief Minister, Cameron courted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi for investment on his visit to the United Kingdom this July.

Human rights activists may blame Cameron, but his diplomacy was already “market-oriented,” before Xi’s visit to London, and a foreign policy direction like this is loyal to Britain’s historical instinct.

In order to assess the controversial business deal with China, we need to understand how Britain sees her global position, particularly between Europe and Asia.

This October, Chatham House released a policy paper, “Britain, Europe and the World: Rethinking the UK’s Circles of Influence,” and mentions three challenges to British foreign policy. The first challenge is globalization and intensified economic competition. The second one is diversified threats from geopolitical tension with Russia and China to the rise of Islamic extremism in the Middle East and around the world.

The last one is structural reform of aging multinational organization from the United Nations, international financial institutions, NATO, and the EU. In view of these challenges, this paper says that Britain must adapt to the trend of the U.S.-China power balance. Then, we need to explore how Britain is making an adjustment.

As the Cameron administration sees the Bretton Woods system needs to be revised to live up to the changes of power balance in this century, Britain advices China how to internationalize the renminbi. Quite importantly, Britain’s export to BRIC and MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Turkey) countries grow stagnantly, but only that with China surges twofold from 2011 to 2014.

Though the U.S.-Chinese clash in the East and South China seas is a security concern, Robin Niblett, Director of Chatham House, points out that Britain has different interest and capability over China from those of the United States at the event on October 19. The focal point of his argument is to keep Britain influential.

In postwar British foreign policy, the United Kingdom assumes itself a hub to connect three circles of the United States; Europe; and the rest of the world such as the Commonwealth, the Middle East, China, and Japan. However, Niblett says that Britain’s role as the transatlantic connecting bridge is fading, as America keeps more eyes on the Baltic states to contain Russia, and Britain is out of the Eurozone.

In addition, Niblett comments that erosion of international organizations like the United Nations, Bretton Woods banks, and the G7, poses critical constraints to British influence in the word as she is a key stakeholder of these organizations. Therefore, he argues that Britain needs to deepen relations with China to rebalance foreign policy priority and rebuild international organizations.

Niblett’s view is founded on sober realism, but still, Britain’s excessive engagement with China is questionable. Historically, Britain failed to embrace rising Germany. The security risk of the nuclear deal is far greater than that of controversial AIIB (Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) membership.

In view of these problems, we should appeal our views to British people who share common anxieties like the environment and security. Nuclear safety is a global problem after the Fukushima shock. British environmentalists and local residents worry whether Chinese companies abide by Western standards to preserve the ecology of the Bradwell estuary.

More critically, the bid winner called CGN (China General Nuclear) is closely tied with the People’s Liberation Army as many other Chinese companies are. Chinese engineers can steal sensitive advanced technology through hacking or traditional styled espionage.

Remember, Putin’s secret agent lurked in Russian communities in London to kill Alexander Litvinienko. Bradwell and Hinkley Point plants can become Trojan horses to accommodate Chinese spies for another Litvinienko poisoning. It is too well known that China stole F-35 information from BAE Systems. It may be a tip of the iceberg, and China could have hacked furthermore information from BAE Systems, like the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carrier and numerous missiles.

It is Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne who endorses such a close relation with China, despite security and environmental concerns, while former MI6 Director of Operations and Intelligence Nigel Inkster points out that China will take advantage if they find weakness on the British side, as they are so hard power oriented and self-interested.

Chancellor Osborne and Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond argue that Britain will exert influence on China behind the closed door, but things will not go so easily as they say.

In addition, this nuclear deal is contradictory to Britain’s recent action with the United States, NATO allies, and Japan, to persuade Turkey and South Korea not to buy HQ-9 anti-air missiles from China for fear of security information divulgence.

Also, why does the United Kingdom have to solicit China to build controversial nuclear plants? Britain is a world leader in science and technology, and the public takes pride in it even during the British disease era. As proven in the Astute class submarine, Britain has advanced nuclear industry. Why doesn’t the government sign up with home companies to employ British engineers? This is more logical to create jobs and stimulate the economy through public investment.

We have to raise these environmental and security concerns with the nuclear deal to Cameron and Osborne, in resonance with domestic opponents in the United Kingdom. Particularly, Osborne is the front runner to succeed Cameron’s premiership, and he drove Britain to turn the China policy from Cameron’s meeting with Dalai Lama in May 2012. Both the United States and Japan must send a strong reminder message to Osborne, as all Western allies did to Turkey and South Korea over the Chinese air defense system.

Though Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn denounced China for human rights violation, his party was critically damaged in the general election in May this year, to lose their traditional electoral bases in Scotland to the SNP (Scottish National Party). It is quite unlikely that they will replace Cameron. Chinese influence on Britain can grow furthermore, if we do nothing.

Therefore, we must ask Osborne to explain his vision of British and global security. Also, we need to notice French involvement behind the curtain, as EDF (Électricité de France) helps CGN (China General Nuclear) win the bid to build Bradwell and Hinkley Point nuclear plants. China’s penetration in Europe is quite deep, and PLA influence on nuclear security must be removed or minimized before it gets too serious.

Finally, I would raise a question whether Japan can replace China to represent the rest of the world, if British policymakers conceive their transatlantic position is eroding so seriously. Ultimately, it is Japan that can share security burdens with Britain, not China. In science and technology, the Anglo-Japanese partnership will bear more fruit than the Anglo-Chinese one. We should be much more alert to this dangerous nuclear deal.

(This is the English translation of an article written by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” of JFIR on November 25, 2015, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on January 22, 2016.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.99 “Haste Makes Waste” in Territorial Talks with Russia

by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Councilor of JFIR
(30 November, 2015)

No.98 “Strategization” of the U.S.-Vietnam Relations Worthy of Note

by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(24 September, 2015)

No.97 “Logical Fallacy of Blaming the Security Bill for Being Unconstitutional

by KURANISHI Masako, Political Scientist
(29 July, 2015)

No.96 “Putin’s Rule and Russia’s Path to the Future”

by ITO Kenichi, President, JFIR
(27 May, 2015)

No.95 “The NYT’s ‘Condescending Eyes’ and ‘Distortion Syndrome’ Going Too Far”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(11 May, 2015)

No.94 “Can the Japanese Turn Their Pacifism from Passive to Proactive?”

by KAMIYA Matake, Professor of National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow of JFIR
(30 March, 2015)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Announcement
————- – – – ————-

The Japan-U.S. Dialogue “Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Turbulent Time of Transition” to be Convened on March 2 in Tokyo

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), under the co-sponsorship with the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the U.S. National Defense University and the Global Forum of Japan (GFJ), will convene the “Japan-U.S. Dialogue” on “Evolving Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Turbulent Time of Transition: Sustaining the Open, Rules-Based Global Order” to the following effect.

Date: Wednesday, March 2, 2016
Time: 13:00 to 17:00
Venue: “Lecture Hall,” International House of Japan, Tokyo, Japan ( https://www.i-house.or.jp/eng/access.html )

The “Dialogue” will feature such eminent panelists as KAMIYA Matake, Professor of National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow of JFIR, HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor of Keio Univ., and NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor of Kyoto Univ., from the Japanese side, and James PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow at INSS, Rust DEMING, former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and Robert MANNING, Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, from the U.S. side.

For more information, please refer to:
http://www.gfj.jp/j/pdf/160302_program.pdf

JFIR would like to invite readers of the JFIR E-letter to the “Dialogue.” Should you wish to attend the “Dialogue,” please inform us of (1) your name, (2) affiliation, (3) title, (4) phone number, and (5) e-mail address via e-mail ( dialogue@gfj.jp ) no later than February 29, 2016. English-Japanese simultaneous interpretation will be provided at the “Dialogue.”

PLEASE NOTE that applications will be registered on a first-come-first-serve basis, and the registration will be closed when seats are filled out.

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

  20 December 2015, Vol. 8, No.6

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

“Haste Makes Waste” in Territorial Talks with Russia

            By HAKAMADA Shigeki
Councilor of JFIR

　　　　　It is a wishful thinking for Japan to assume that Russia will give us something to resolve the territorial problem, in return for our friendly attitude. From the Russian point of view, Japan’s appeasing response to their hard line demands with a naive thought of valuing “bilateral dialogues,” will simply appear “weak.” Once Russians see us like this way, they behave more coercively and intimidatingly. This is what happens now.

During the Soviet era, I argued that Russians shrugged off their friendly nations, but the Kremlin saw potential enemies with respect and awe when they provoked a feeling of tension among Russians, even if they were “unfavorable” (See my book in Japanese, “Shinso no Shakaishugi,” or “In Depth Understanding of Socialism” in 1987).

The Russian mindset like this has not changed even today. Our government and politicians strongly believe that the Japanese side cannot take tough stances as long as the Northern Territories (South Kuril) are under de facto control of Russia, but an understanding like this is considered offbeat in the common sense of diplomacy on the global stage.

If such an appalling thought in the Japanese political corridor were known throughout the world, it would invigorate China that tries to occupy and take de facto control of Senkaku, and South Korea that currently takes de facto control of Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks).

In international politics, when the sovereignty of one country is infringed, that country should protest strongly against such behavior of the adversary. Otherwise, the infringed country would not be regarded as a respectable sovereign state. This is a common sense of diplomacy.

The foremost imperative of Japanese foreign policy to Russia is that we should overturn their disrespectful attitude to see Japan a “weak power.” While Russia ignores the Japanese sovereignty and takes irrationally dominating attitude, we behave so conciliatorily simply because we believe that it is Japan’s interest to keep the door of dialogues open to resolve bilateral problems. But this will lead Russia to treat us more and more disdainfully.

From long term perspectives, it is far more important to make the Russian side treat us with respect and awe, even though they see us unfavorably for a short term, and that would be helpful to build equal and good relationship between Japan and Russia.

Of course, the Russian side would pose pressure and intimidation to Japan’s response like this, politically, economically, and so forth. The Japanese side must accept some risks associated with such behavior. The prospect of the Russo-Japanese relationship depends on whether Japan’s posture is really serious and determined or not.

If Japan avoids such risks as is always the case, the counterpart shall never take the “protest” seriously. There is no doubt that the Japanese government’s steadfast attitude over the sovereignty issue would result in a critical cost to the economy, and it is irresponsible to impose the burden on the private sector.

The government must take measures to share the burden of the “pain,” and explain the reason for this thoroughly to the public. This is a posture to show that the Japanese government will respond to national sovereignty issues without any compromise, and to send such a message both at home and abroad.

I would like to stress that the real dialogues and negotiations start when the Russian side realizes sincerity on the Japanese side, which would eventually lead to normal bilateral relations. Remember, “Haste makes waste.” Should we ask Russia for dialogues so humbly, and stick to the idea of inviting Putin to Japan by the end of the year? That is the question.

In the future, the Sino-Japanese relationship is likely to develop more troublesome than the Russo-Japanese relationship. Therefore, it is our strategic interest to found friendly, stable, and mutually respectful ties with Russia in the long run. My policy recommendation is not intended to confront Russia, but to build a truly equal and friendly bilateral relation.

(This is the English translation of an article written by HAKAMADA Shigeki, Councilor of JFIR, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” of JFIR on September 30, 2015, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on November 30, 2015.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.98 “Strategization” of the U.S.-Vietnam Relations Worthy of Note

by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(24 September, 2015)

No.97 “Logical Fallacy of Blaming the Security Bill for Being Unconstitutional

by KURANISHI Masako, Political Scientist
(29 July, 2015)

No.96 “Putin’s Rule and Russia’s Path to the Future”

by ITO Kenichi, President, JFIR
(27 May, 2015)

No.95 “The NYT’s ‘Condescending Eyes’ and ‘Distortion Syndrome’ Going Too Far”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(11 May, 2015)

No.94 “Can the Japanese Turn Their Pacifism from Passive to Proactive?”

by KAMIYA Matake, Professor of National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow of JFIR
(30 March, 2015)

No.93 “Japan Should Explore UNSC Reform rather than Permanent Membership”

by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher
(12 January, 2015)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Event
————- – – – ————-

International Symposium “Japan-Euro Intellectual Dialogue: Japan-Euro Strategic Partnership and Future of Asia and Beyond” Held

JFIR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (MOFA) co-organized an international symposium titled “The Japan-Euro Intellectual Dialogue: Japan-Euro Strategic Partnership and Future of Asia and Beyond,” at ANA Intercontinental Tokyo on November 11, 2015.

This symposium, held behind the closed doors, was attended by seven panelists from Europe, including Thomas GOMART, Director of the French Institute of International Relations and Markus KAIM, Senior Fellow of German Institute for International and Security Affairs, as well as fourteen panelists from Japan, including MORIMOTO Satoshi, Director of JFIR (former Minister of Defense) and NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor of Kyoto University.

Lively discussions were held on such topics as “Changing Power Balance in East Asia” and “International Order in the 21st Century” in two sessions.

For the outline of discussions of the symposium, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/151111.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

20 October 2015, Vol. 8, No.5

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

“Strategization” of the U.S.-Vietnam Relations Worthy of Note

            By NABESHIMA Keizo
Critic

　　　　　Skirmish over Southeast Asia among Japan, U.S. and China has grown in intensity. This is because the balance of power has been increasingly disturbed against a backdrop of the rise of China, the retreat of the U.S. and the recovery of Japan. This is symbolized by the “strategization” of the U.S.-Vietnam relations, triggered by the first visit to the U.S. by General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong of Vietnam.

Having realized a historic visit to the U.S. on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of the Vietnam War and the 20th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Vietnam, General Secretary Trong clearly stated that “what is of utmost importance is that we have been transformed from former enemies to become friends, partners – comprehensive partners” after his meeting with President Obama on July 7th.

On the confrontation against China over the issue of South China Sea, Vietnam agreed with the U.S. that they “share their views and concern” and will “promote the comprehensive relationship between the two countries in all areas, ranging from political to economic to defense and security cooperation.”

It is no wonder that President Obama gave unstinted praise to Vietnam, saying it “has proven to be a very constructive partner” as this marked a strategic shift of Vietnam, overthrowing the equidistant diplomatic stance it used to take between the U.S. and China.

It is obvious that this strategic shift of Vietnam was motivated by the rapid moves of China since 2014, including unilateral installation of oil drilling rigs within the EEZ of Vietnam in South China Sea, construction of artificial islands by reclaiming rock reef, which have been turned into military bases.

Alexander L. Vuving, a Hawaii-based security expert, analyzes that the U.S.-Vietnam relations have been spurred to a new height so that “an informal strategic alliance” would be politically possible.

Josua Kurlantzick, Senior Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), expects that the bilateral relations would be strengthened, investment from the U.S. and Japan would be promoted afresh with the participation of Vietnam in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and arms export from the U.S. would be expanded.

Given that President Obama is most likely to visit Vietnam this autumn, Mr. Kurlantzick even touches upon the possibility that the next U.S. President would consider forming a treaty-based alliance with Vietnam.

China has launched Asian infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and is trying to take in Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), using massive infrastructure investment as a bait. As a new development, Thai military regime, in protest against the U.S., a treaty-based ally of Thailand, for its pressure for democratization including suspension of military aid, has suddenly closed in on China and strengthened military cooperation with China, including the purchase of 3 submarines.

These moves of Thailand, geographically adjacent to Cambodia who is on a pro-China stance, are a golden opportunity for China to conduct pincer operation against Vietnam, to strengthen its influence on Indochina, and to venture into the Indian Ocean in terms of military strategy.

The “New Tokyo Strategy 2015 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation,” adopted at the Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting sponsored by Japan on July 4th against the backdrop of such fast-moving situation, carried a diplomatic implication of great significance.

Heads of state from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam were all present, and all of them highly praised “Japan’s path as a peace-loving nation for the past 70 years since the end of World War II.” Japan will provide assistance worth JPY 750 billion to realize “quality growth” in the Mekong region in cooperation with Asia Development Bank (ADB) over the next three years (2016-2018).

This is a strategic move of Japan taking into account “Statement by Prime Minister on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war” as well as China’s AIIB.

Regarding maritime dispute in South China Sea, it is of great significance that “full and effective implementation” of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and “the importance of early conclusion” of Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) have been reconfirmed, given that pro-China Cambodia also took part.

Japan is the biggest aid donor to Vietnam. Vietnam’s population has exceeded 90 million, the largest in the Mekong region, and it has a great potential as its economic growth rate has reached by almost 6%, while its per-capita gross domestic product (GDP) is still low as much as 2,000 U.S. dollars (IMF 2014).

Prime Minister ABE Shinzo visited Vietnam as his first official trip overseas in January 2013, and the summit-level contact has been incessant since the agreement was made on the need for “Extended Strategic Partnership” on the occasion of the visit of President Truong Tan Sang to Japan in the following year.

(During his visit in Japan, General Secretary Trong stated at his meeting with Prime Minister Abe on September 15th that Japan and Vietnam shared “serious concerns” about the situation in the South China Sea.)

The tug of war among the U.S., Japan and China across Vietnam will inevitably have an impact on the future situation of Asia.

(This is the English translation of an article written by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” of JFIR on July 13, 2015, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on September 24, 2015.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.97 “Logical Fallacy of Blaming the Security Bill for Being Unconstitutional

by KURANISHI Masako, Political Scientist
(29 July, 2015)

No.96 “Putin’s Rule and Russia’s Path to the Future”

by ITO Kenichi, President, JFIR
(27 May, 2015)

No.95 “The NYT’s ‘Condescending Eyes’ and ‘Distortion Syndrome’ Going Too Far”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(11 May, 2015)

No.94 “Can the Japanese Turn Their Pacifism from Passive to Proactive?”

by KAMIYA Matake, Professor of National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow of JFIR
(30 March, 2015)

No.93 “Japan Should Explore UNSC Reform rather than Permanent Membership”

by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher
(12 January, 2015)

No.92 “The Incheon Asian Games Have Clearly Tarnished the national Prestige of South Korea”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(28 November, 2014)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Publication
————- – – – ————-

Final Report of the Study Group on “Population Aging and Security of Japan” Published

JFIR Study Group on “Population Aging and Security of Japan: How to Face the Present Crisis,” headed by Prof. SATO Teiichi, former Vice Minister of Education, Science and Culture of Japan, released its final report (in Japanese) on July 31, 2015.

Population aging, one of the main causes of the decline of national strength, has now turned into a security issue not only in Japan but worldwide including Asia. With this awareness in mind, the Study Group provided a comprehensive view of the issue from a global perspective and, as a culmination of the study, published the Report with policy recommendations on how to effectively tackle with the issue.

The Report is composed of 2 chapters. Chapter 1 discusses population aging and its influence on the security of Japan, including the future perspective of manpower of self defense forces, police officers, and firefighters etc., while taking into account the same perspective in other Asian countries. Chapter 2 reminds the nation about the implications of the issue in economic, social, educational and technological contexts.

For the full text of the Report (in Japanese), please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/reseach/special_study/201507.1.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

20 August 2015, Vol. 8, No.4

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

Logical Fallacy of Blaming the Security Bill for Being Unconstitutiona

            By KURANISHI Masako
Political Scientist

　　　Currently, diet voting on the Security Bills in June, 2015, that has drawn nationwide attention, was postponed. This postponement seemed to be caused from the opinions of all the three scholars, who were invited to the diet testimony and stated that the bill is unconstitutional judging from their interpretation and understanding on Article 9 (See (i)) of the Constitution of Japan.

In Japan, those who understand Article 9 narrowly, so-called ‘the supporters of Article 9,’ are expressing such anxieties as these new security bills would extend the sphere of overseas activity and deployment of the Japanese Self Defense Forces. In my opinion, however, their interpretation and understanding on Article 9 is full of inconsistencies.

In the first place, they have hardly approved the Japanese right of self-defense affirmed in the Charter of the U.N., “the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense (See (ii)),” while they, ignoring the reality, have believed in the function of the collective security system of the U.N. since 1946.

In 1946 when the current constitution was enacted, there remained idealistic expectations that the collective security system of the United Nations would have kept the world peace and that neighboring countries around Japan must have been “peace-loving peoples (See (iii))” as expressed in the preamble of the constitution.

Not a small part of Japanese people had placed firm confidence in this U.N.’s world peace plan. In other words, it was optimistically supposed that the international and global community would have guaranteed Japanese security entirely.

Soon after that, however, it came to be clear that these expectations were illusion or unrealistic. So, early in the 1950s, Japan, facing with the threat of the Communist bloc, concluded a bilateral security treaty with the U.S.

Since then the government of Japan has maintained officially an interpretation of Article 9 to confirm the Japanese right of self-defense for conforming the reality and has explained to the people that the Charter of the U.N. affirms every country in the world the right of defense and that this is an axiom of natural law.

In 1981, however, the Director-General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau made a controversial explanation in the diet that Article 9 allows the government to have the right of collective self-defense but not allows it to exercise this right. As a matter of course, within the government and among the Japanese people, the 1981 interpretation has brought serious confusion and argument about the security alliance between Japan and the U.S.

Accordingly, on 1st July, 2014, the present Cabinet dared to alter the 1981 interpretation to keep step with the drastic change of the international situation, and decided new one to remove the ban on exercise of the right of collective self-defense. The new security bills are the outcome of this alteration.

Anyway, although the right of self-defense, whether collective or not, is regarded to be the second safety measures preparing for risks of the dysfunction of the collective security system of the U.N., ‘the supporters of Article 9,’ who blame the 2015’s new security bills for being unconstitutional, have demanded to get back to the 1981 interpretation persistently until now, notwithstanding the reality is getting bad to worse.

Their attitude seems to be inconsistent and to be irresponsible to the Japanese people.

In the second place, ‘the supporters of Article 9’ have denounced any participation of Japan in U.N’s activities including peacekeeping operations as ‘dreadful war which is to be renounced by Article 9,’ while they have ever thought that Japan should leave the national security to the collective security system of the United Nations and the global community as mentioned above.

In other words, they have recommend the Japanese Government to be a by-stander at the case that any other foreign country would be violated illegally, but on the other hand, they have looked forward to helping hands of the U.N. and foreign countries when Japan would be attacked by foreign armed forces. This selfish and unilateral security policy will dishonorably make Japan fall into a free rider in the international and global community.

Viewed in this light, it seems to be logical conclusions that reinforcement of the national security should be attended with overseas deployment of the Self Defense Forces under cooperation with foreign armies or organizations and that Japan should take due responsibilities to maintain peace and moral order of the international and global community as one of its members.

The 2015’s new bills will contribute not only to strengthen Japan’s security, but also to provide a crucial deterrent to other countries within the framework of international principles, laws and systems. Why are they opposing to this new security bills? Their logic is critically fraught with contradictions within itself.

Reference

(i) The Constitution of Japan, Article 9. “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”.

(ii) The Charter of the United Nations, Article 51.

(iii) The Constitution of Japan, the preamble.

(This is the English version of an article written by KURANISHI Masako, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” of JFIR on July 1, 2015, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on July 29, 2015.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.96 “Putin’s Rule and Russia’s Path to the Future”

by ITO Kenichi, President, JFIR
(27 May, 2015)

No.95 “The NYT’s ‘Condescending Eyes’ and ‘Distortion Syndrome’ Going Too Far”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(11 May, 2015)

No.94 “Can the Japanese Turn Their Pacifism from Passive to Proactive?”

by KAMIYA Matake, Professor of National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow of JFIR
(30 March, 2015)

No.93 “Japan Should Explore UNSC Reform rather than Permanent Membership”

by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher
(12 January, 2015)

No.92 “The Incheon Asian Games Have Clearly Tarnished the national Prestige of South Korea”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(28 November, 2014)

No.91 “Diet Should Summon Asahi to Question ‘Press Disaster'”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(26 September, 2014)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

————- – – – ————-
Publication
————- – – – ————-

U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report “Grand Design of the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a New Stage” Published

JFIR and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the U.S. National Defense University conducted a joint study project on “Grand Design of the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a New Stage,” co-headed by Prof. KAMIYA Matake of National Defense Academy of Japan and Dr. James PRZYSTUP of INSS, for the fiscal year 2013-2014.

As a culmination of this study project in search for an ideal way the U.S.-Japan Alliance should be under the revised U.S.-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, the U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report “Grand Design of the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a New Stage: As a Protector of a Liberal, Open, Rule-based International Order in the Era of ‘Smart Power'” was published in June, 2015 and announced at the press conference held in Tokyo on July 3rd, 2015.

Reflecting the perspectives of both the U.S. and Japan, this Joint Policy Report is expected to leave signifiant marks on the thinking of the topic in both countries.

For the full text of the U.S.-Japan Joint Policy Report “Grand Design of the U.S.-Japan Alliance at a New Stage,” please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/special_study/201506.pdf

————- – – – ————-
Event
————- – – – ————-

The Report of the Expanded Policy Council on “Statement by Prime Minister ABE Shinzo on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the War” Presented to Prime Minister ABE Shinzo

The meeting of Expanded Policy Council on “Statement by Prime Minister ABE Shinzo on the 70th Anniversary of the End of the War,” co-sponsored by JFIR’s Policy Council (Chairman: ITO Kenichi, President of JFIR) and Emergency Policy Council (Chairman: TAKUBO Tadae, Director of JFIR) was held on July 30, 2015. 24 members of the two Councils participated in the discussion.

The Report of the Expanded Policy Council (in Japanese), with full contents of the discussion including sugggestions and recommendations on how the “Statement” should be, was presented to Prime Minister ABE Shinzo on August 10, 2015.

For the full text of the Report (in Japanese), please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/activities/pr/150810.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

20 June 2015, Vol. 8, No.3

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

Putin’s Rule and Russia’s Path to the Future

            By ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

Russia held the ceremony to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the victory against Germany in Moscow on May 9 this year. The war against Germany is called the Great Patriotic War in Russia, and May 9 VE Day has been celebrated as the most important holiday since the Soviet era.

This year, it was the biggest military parade since the collapse of the Soviet Union to hyperbolize that Russian victory over Nazism and Japanese militarism saved the world from fascist rule, and to stress that it was a victory of “democracy,” but on the ceremony day, it turned out that the only leader of major powers who came to Moscow was Chinese President XI Jinping.

What is the implication of this? When people talk about history by words, it reflects subjective views of the speaker. For countries of Eastern Europe, including three Baltic states, World War II was far from the war of “liberation.” It was just a change of the oppressor, from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Red Army.

The Soviet troops invaded Hungary in 1956, and intervened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 along with four other East European allies, in order to suppress the governments in both countries as they were exploring to deviate from the Soviet bloc.

Therefore, the global community welcomed the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, as a shift of the world order “from Yalta to Malta.” It looked as if people in Eastern Europe had won real freedom and independence for the first time in history.

From the GORBACHEV to the YELTSIN era, Russia did not object to the shift of the world order “from Yalta to Malta,” but since the inauguration of Vladimir PUTIN to the president, who regards the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century,” the Kremlin has chosen a way that is completely different from those of GORBACHEV and YELTSIN.

In my eyes, PUTIN is not a communist. It seems that he has no illusion with communism. However, as a power-oriented politician who is endowed with capturing public sentiment, PUTIN is acquainted with deep-rooted desire of the Russian nation to expand the territory since the Rurik and the Romanov dynasties. He is a man who does not hesitate to make use of that for his own seizure of power.

As the President of JFIR, I invited the delegation from the Chechen Republic (In those days, Chechnya signed the Khasavyurt ceasefire accord with Russia as a semi-independent state.), led by First Deputy Prime Minister Kozh-Ahmed NOUKHAYEV, in December 1996, and he told us deep wish of Chechen people for peace and self-rule. However, when Putin took power, he made up “terrorists” of Chechens, and did not hesitate to find a reason to start the Second Chechen War immediately.

At that time, I warned that PUTIN would not be satisfied with just invading Chechnya, and he would go furthermore in the Russian neighborhood if we did not stop him, and things developed as I predicted, as seen in the Russo-Georgian War in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Moreover, PUTIN is intervening into eastern Ukraine, and such a “change of current status by force” that his Russia does was a usual practice by fascist nations that were regarded as enemies of “democracies” by the world during World War II, and therefore, there was nothing strange that leaders of major powers that fought this war did not attend the 70th anniversary ceremony of the victory against Germany.

Nevertheless, Chinese President XI Jinping came to such a ceremony, and I wonder whether it was good for China. I am quite doubtful of it.

Disclaimer: The views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not in any way represent the views of JFIR as an organization.

(This is the English translation of an article written by Prof. Dr. ITO Kenichi, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” of JFIR on May 12, 2015, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on May 27, 2015)

—————– – – – —————–

The NYT’s “Condescending Eyes” and “Distortion Syndrome” Going Too Far

            By SUGIURA Masaaki
Political Commentator

I used to believe that the New York Times (NYT) was the one of the most trustworthy newspapers in the world. But in recent years, it has come to be filled with misreports almost as if putting those tabloids in New York City to shame. I do not care if its voice leans to liberal or its editorial policy is left-biased. Nor do I care if a sharp decline in the circulation figure left the daily no choice but to seek salvation in its electronic version.

Yet, regardless of its worsening business conditions, deteriorating standards and “crudeness” of its articles today are too much to tolerate. This is epitomized by its editorial article entitled “Shinzo Abe and Japan’s History” on April 20, which was “a pile of misreports.”

First of all, the article assumed an appallingly condescending attitude. The editorial points out that “[T]he success of the visit also depends on whether and how honestly Mr. Abe confronts Japan’s wartime history,” and demanded him to face up to atrocities that the Imperial Japanese Forces committed against China and Korea, including the “comfort women” issue.

It seems to me that Western correspondents in Tokyo are liable to “educating” Japan as if it were an underdeveloped country, while shelving problems in their home country. And such attitudes are reflected in their editorials at home. However, we are no longer living in the era of the Meiji Restoration. Regardless of whether ABE faces wartime history with sincerity or not, “third-rate foreign reporters” have no business offering Japan criticism based on full of misinformation.

While apparently attempting to zero in on the “historical issues,” the NYT fails to understand the core meaning of the recent Japan-U.S. summit meeting. The essential significance of this meeting lies in a sea change in Japan’s national security policy enabling exercise of the right to collective self-defense, thereby leading the Japan-U.S. relations into a new phase of the alliance. Besides, the guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense cooperation will soon be revised.

To the U.S., now suffering a serious decline in national strength, these developments mean entrance into a new era of a most favorable kind. OBAMA therefore has every reason to welcome it, and he has no intention whatsoever to find fault with Japan regarding its historical perception of the events of 70 years ago.

The same editorial article also reads “[T]he success of the visit also depends on whether and how honestly Mr. Abe confronts Japan’s wartime history, including its decision to wage war, its brutal occupation of China and Korea, its atrocities and its enslavement of thousands of women forced to work as sex slaves or ‘comfort women’ in wartime brothels.”

In this passage, there is a fatal error of recognition of what is referred to as “brutal occupation of Korea.” The writer of this editorial article must be more ignorant of basic facts in world history than a junior high school student. In 1910, Japan “annexed” Korea without any violation of the international law, which is far from venturing an invasion.

During the Japanese rule of Korea, slavery was abolished, literacy rate rose, population grew, and sanitary conditions were improved. The annexation was approved by the United States, Britain, France, and Russia, and amongst them, the United States even issued a statement that Japan’s annexation of Korea was based on good intention, and that it was for the promotion of happiness among Koreans. They should remember such an important statement as was made by their own country.

Furthermore, the editorial article reads “South Korea and China criticized efforts by Japan’s Education Ministry to force publishers of middle-school textbooks to recast descriptions of historical events – including the ownership of disputed islands.”

This is a wild claim. It refers to insertion of descriptions about Takeshima and the Senkaku Islands in social studies textbooks in Japan as a part of governmental authorization. As almost all countries in the world do, including China and South Korea, a country conducts education about their own territory with precision. Based on this, there is no claiming that Japan is leaning to the right.

In addition, the editorial article claims that the ABE administration tried to “distort historical past,” taking as an example a request made by the Japanese government last year that a part of 1996 report by UN Commission on Human Rights recognizing comfort women as sex slaves be retracted.

The editorial article refers to the “Coomaraswamy Report,” one of the most fabricated reports of all those released by the United Nations. Apparently, this editorial article was written without knowing the fact that such incidents as “forcible taking away of comfort women” and “women’s volunteer corps (as a synonym for comfort women)” have been proved baseless as a series of false reports by the Asahi Shimbun on these incidents, on which the above UN report was based, had already been retracted.

The editorial article was written by looking at clipping from the Asahi Shimbun of almost a decade ago. This editorial article is not the only one riddled with errors. Recent misreports by NYT are going too far.

Last February, they reported that ABE denied the Rape of Nanking, and Chief Cabinet Secretary SUGA Yoshihide bitterly protested against their “significant factual error.” At the end of the last year, they wrote that Japanese rightists including the Abe administration were intensifying attacks against Asahi Shimbun on the issue of comfort women, and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary SEKO Hiroshige refuted this by saying that the ABE administration never attacked Asahi and their reporters.

The NYT’s malicious distortion, misreport, and stigmatization of the ABE administration seem unbridled. In dealing with such animosity, the Japanese government or the Japanese embassy should protest in writing to the president of NYT and request an apology from those in charge, every time a misreport is made. There is no other way.

(This is the English translation of an article written by Mr. SUGIURA Masaaki, which originally appeared on the e-Forum “Hyakka-Seiho” of JFIR on April 22, 2015, and was posted on “JFIR Commentary” on May 11, 2015)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.94 “Can the Japanese Turn Their Pacifism from Passive to Proactive?”

by KAMIYA Matake, Professor of National Defense Academy of Japan / Superior Research Fellow of JFIR
(30 March, 2015)

No.93 “Japan Should Explore UNSC Reform rather than Permanent Membership”

by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher
(12 January, 2015)

No.92 “The Incheon Asian Games Have Clearly Tarnished the national Prestige of South Korea”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(28 November, 2014)

No.91 “Diet Should Summon Asahi to Question ‘Press Disaster'”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(26 September, 2014)

No.90 “Ending East Asia’s History Wars”

by KOIKE Yuriko, Trustee, JFIR / Member of the House of Representatives
(17 September, 2014)

No.89 “The Ukrainian Issue and Japan’s Diplomacy”

by ITO Kenichi, President, JFIR
(1 July, 2014)

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

20 April 2015, Vol. 8, No.2

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

Can the Japanese Turn Their Pacifism from Passive to Proactive?

            By KAMIYA Matake
Superior Research Fellow, JFIR
Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

The Interim Report on the Revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation (hereinafter the “Guidelines”), which the Japanese and the U.S. governments published on 9 October 2014, declared that the Guidelines revision corresponds to Japan’s policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation adopted by the government headed by Prime Minister ABE Shinzo.

The report also declared that the revision reflects the substance of the cabinet decision on 1 July 2014 that includes changes in constitutional interpretations aimed at enabling the limited exercise of the right of collective defense. The author heartily agrees with this declaration as one of those who have called for switching Japan’s post-World War II pacifism from a passive one to a proactive one for a long time.

There have been two types of passiveness inherent in Japan’s post-World War II pacifism. They were the absence of the “intention to take action for peace,” and the absence of the “intention to use military power for peace.”

Japanese people have gradually regained their awareness for the need for their country to contribute personnel to, and play a part in, activities for world peace since they were shocked by the international criticism of Japan’s responses to the Gulf Crisis and the Gulf War (1990-91) as “checkbook diplomacy” by a nation that only donates money for the sake of peace.

However, the tendency to understand peace and military power as completely opposite and incompatible concepts and to reject the dual nature of military power as a tool that can destroy peace and has a capacity indispensable to defending peace has remained deeply rooted in Japanese society.

The Japanese government’s policy against the exercise of the right to collective defense has been the symbol of such a tendency. This policy has been “an impediment” to the Japan-U.S. alliance (The 3rd Armitage-Nye report: “The US-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia”). It would be highly desirable if such passiveness could be overcome.

However, I cannot be too optimistic about the current situation. The author would like to ask readers to read the following extract. When do you think this essay was written?

“Then, how will Japan’s post-World War II pacifism be evaluated…? Phrases like ‘not taking up arms,’ ‘anything but war,’ ‘not possessing nuclear weapons,’ and ‘not deploying troops overseas’ characterize Japan’s postwar pacifism. As these words demonstrate, Japan’s postwar pacifism was a principle that denies something. To borrow an expression from Professor KOSAKA Masataka, it was negative pacifism.

However, to what extent will such negative and passive pacifism adapt itself to a greater international role in a time… when Japan is about to play such a role?

Japan must continue its restraint in taking action of some kind. However, the theme for the country… is to do something…, instead of just retiring into its shell. If that is the case, there is a need to convert our pacifism from a negative and passive one to a more proactive and positive one.

I believe Japan must think of something independently and develop original schemes for approaching it in order to bear its international responsibilities more proactively while continuing to exclude military-centricism.”

Was this essay written around the time of the Gulf War? The answer is no. It is not that new. KAMIYA Fuji, my late father, who was a well-known Japanese representative in the field of international politics, wrote this essay forty-five years ago in 1969.

I was astonished when I found these paragraphs recently and knew that my own father had pointed out a quarter century earlier what I have been thinking and arguing for the last twenty odd years.

I was even more shocked by the fact that Japan has not yet sufficiently overcome the passiveness of its pacifism after nearly half a century since such arguments were first made by leading intellectuals of the time, and now those of us in Japan who specialize in diplomatic relations and security are still discussing the same issue, using words that are almost identical to those used forty-five years ago.

Without sufficient public support, Prime Minister ABE’s proactive pacifism cannot be adequately implemented, and might end up being a pie in the sky. The same is true for his policy of limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense. To what extent will the Japanese people allow their pacifism to become proactive?

Various public opinion polls conducted after the cabinet decision on July 1, 2014, have consistently demonstrated persistent reluctance of the Japanese public to accept the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense by their country. As has been often argued, insufficient explanation about the policy by the Abe administration could be one of the reasons of that.

There is, however, another more fundamental reason: One aspect of passiveness in Japan’s post-war pacifism, the reluctance to acknowledge the role of military power for peace, still remain quite strong in the Japanese society.

Can the Japanese people overcome the passiveness they have not been able to get over for the last forty-five years? Will Japan be able to implement the policy of positive pacifism? We should not be too optimistic and complacent about the current situation. More explanations by the government would be necessary. And so would be the role of opinion leaders like ourselves. Japan’s foreign and security policies will remain at a crucial stage from this point on.

Note: The sections of the above quotations denoted with “…” contained the following phrases, respectively – “in relation to problems in the 1970s,” “in the 1970s,” “in the 1970s” and “for Asia.”

(This is the English version of an article written by Prof. KAMIYA Matake, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” of JFIR on November 9, 2014. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent those of the National Defense Academy of Japan or of Japan’s Ministry of Defense.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.93 “Japan Should Explore UNSC Reform rather than Permanent Membership”

by KAWAMURA Hiroshi, Foreign Policy Watcher
(12 January, 2015)

No.92 “The Incheon Asian Games Have Clearly Tarnished the national Prestige of South Korea”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(28 November, 2014)

No.91 “Diet Should Summon Asahi to Question ‘Press Disaster'”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(26 September, 2014)

No.90 “Ending East Asia’s History Wars”

by KOIKE Yuriko, Trustee, JFIR / Member of the House of Representatives
(17 September, 2014)

No.89 “The Ukrainian Issue and Japan’s Diplomacy”

by ITO Kenichi, President, JFIR
(1 July, 2014)

No.88 “The Decline of Deterrence Power behind the Ukraine Crisis”

by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(19 May, 2014)

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“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

Vice Chairman of the Policy Council of JFIR Spoke at “Japan-Euro Dialogue Seminar” in Paris

As a follow-up to the international symposium “Japan and Europe: Creating a Better Future – Rule-based and Prosperous” held under the co-sponsorship of JFIR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan on November 21, 2014, “Japan-Euro Dialogue Seminar” was organized by IFRI (French Institute of International Relations) in Paris on March 9, 2015.

Prof. Dr. SHIMADA Haruo, Vice Chairman of the Policy Council of JFIR / President of Chiba University of Commerce, attended the Seminar and delivered a keynote speech.

For his report entitled “My Trip to Paris to Speak at Japan Euro Dialogue Seminar,” you are invited to read the full text by clicking the link below:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/article/shimada/150403.pdf

For more information on the international symposium “Japan and Europe: Creating a Better Future – Rule-based and Prosperous,” please click the link below:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/141121.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120

====================================================================

The Japan Forum on International Relations(JFIR) E-Letter

20 February 2015, Vol. 8, No.1

http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm

====================================================================

Greetings,

“The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) E-Letter” is delivered electronically bimonthly, free of charge, to readers in the world interested in Japanese thinking on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), private, non-profit, independent and non-partisan foreign policy think tank in Japan.

It will provide the global audience with our news on “JFIR Commentary” and “JFIR Updates.”

If you wish to unsubscribe, please enter your email address in the “unsubscribe” box at the following link:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter/unsubscribe.html

ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

“JFIR Commentary” presents views of members and friends of JFIR on Japan’s foreign policy and other related international affairs. The view expressed herein is the author’s own and should not be attributed to JFIR.

—————– – – – —————–

Japan Should Explore UNSC Reform rather than Permanent Membership

            By KAWAMURA Hiroshi
Foreign Policy Watcher

During the Koizumi era, Japan’s bid for the permanent membership drew much attention both at home and abroad, but that ended in failure. However, Japan has not abandoned the aspiration for this seat. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe made it clear that Japan would continue to bid for the permanent membership, in his address to the UN General Assembly on September 26, 2014. I appreciate such “Never give up” attitude, but is it a worthy quest for Japan?

The fundamental problem of the Security Council is not to restore international standing of Japan and Germany, but to correct the veto problem which precludes the Council from making decisions for collective security. Therefore, Japan should propose something fundamental to resolve malfunction of the UNSC, instead of reconfirming its position as the 6th or 7th greatest power in the global pecking order, following the established Big Five.

As a matter of fact, I was in the midst of patriotic fervor when the Koizumi administration bid for the permanent membership, which resulted in a failure. In those days, I believed so naively that Japan stepped up to a political great power, because it was already the second largest economy.

But time has passed since then, and it is necessary to reconsider whether continual bidding will be real Japanese interest or not. Outrageous lobbying will consume a considerable amount of money and energy. The Japanese government has given pork barrel aid to Asia and Africa, to placate them to vote in favor of Japan.

To win the bid, Japan asked regional powers such as Brazil and India to make a joint application for the permanent membership. That was the vital objective to found G4 that was consisted of Japan, Germany, Brazil, and India. However, it is quite doubtful whether regional powers like Brazil and India are prepared to assume global responsibility.

If regional balance is so important, then, the African Union has the right to claim its seat in the Security Council. There is no wonder why both the United States and China vetoed G4’s bid, though they were supposed to be at odds each other. Moreover, Japan’s enduring aspiration for the permanent seat has become a good target of Chinese propaganda.

Shortly after Abe’s speech, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reminded all attendants at the General assembly that it would be the 70th anniversary of Chinese victory over Japanese fascism, this year. If Japan can override the Chinese veto, it is worthy of bidding.

However, even if Japan works hard for the bid, but China blocks it every time, then, Japanese effort will be the target of Chinese negative campaign over wartime history. As Mainichi Shimbun comments critically in the editorial on September 27 last year, there is no momentum to change the UN Charter, just to accommodate Japan as a new permanent member of the Security Council.

Therefore, I argue that Japan should propose something that urges fundamental change of currently indecisive and inactive UNSC, instead of lobbying to satisfy its vanity. I am not in flat denial of benefits to be a permanent member. Prior to the Scottish referendum, former British Prime Minister John Major raised a critical concern, “We would lose our seat at the top table in the UN, if Scotland voted for independence”.

However, Japan’s position is starkly different from those of existing P5 nations, as it must consume so much energy to overcome tough hurdles to win the top seat. Above all, what can Japan do, if it were granted for the permanent membership? Does Japan dare to use veto power at the UNSC to turn the entire world against itself in the worst case? Will Japanese promotion to the honorary seat change the world? Rationally speaking, these are utterly not.

Remember Saudi Arabia stepped down the nonpermanent seat at the Security Council on October 17 in 2013, because it is so indecisive and so inactive in critical Middle East security issues, including Iran’s nuclear program and the crisis of ISIS. Saudis see current UNSC useless, helpless, and valueless.

Considering burden, benefits, and campaign effort, UNSC membership does not necessarily serve Japan’s national interest. As far as this issue is concerned, I agree to Saudi Arabia’s decision completely.

We have to keep in mind that the current status of the P5 was endowed from the beginning. Therefore, Major’s anxiety on the eve of Scotland’s vote makes sense for Britain. But the nations of the rest of the world other than the P5 need to struggle to bid for the membership in the Security Council, even if it is a nonpermanent one, and not to mention a permanent seat. Japan’s struggle will be vetoed by China in the end. There is no reason that Japan repeat such a fruitless attempt.

However, an initiative for fundamental and universal agenda can create a momentum for change. It is commonly known that the United States is more inclined to the coalition of the willing rather than UN resolutions, because it is the most annoyed with Russian and Chinese vetoes in the Security Council that have been precluding urgent actions even after the Cold War era.

This is typically illustrated in the appointment of John Bolton to the Ambassador to the United Nations by the Bush administration, even though he is a vocal critic to this organization. Whether under Democrat rule or Republican rule, such distrust to current UN decision making system is widespread among American policymakers. It is a deadlocked UNSC that really matters to the global community, rather than the pecking order of the nations.

If Japan really were to change the Security Council, it should focus on fundamental and structural problem. That will draw more support from the world. Regarding the veto problem, I would suggest a change from a single vote veto system to a two or three vote veto system by the permanent members.

Even if the permanent seat were granted, Japan cannot act alone. A single veto system will not be of much help for Tokyo. Whoever the prime minister is, Japan’s money and diplomatic labor must be spent properly for the right objective. Any action simply based on patriotic passion and vanity is useless and valueless.

(This is the text of an article by Mr. KAWAMURA Hiroshi, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho” of JFIR October 15, 2014.)

—————– – – – —————–

For more views and opinions in the back number of “JFIR Commentary,” the latest of which are as follows, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/commentary/backnumber.htm

No.92 “The Incheon Asian Games Have Clearly Tarnished the national Prestige of South Korea”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(28 November, 2014)

No.91 “Diet Should Summon Asahi to Question ‘Press Disaster'”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(26 September, 2014)

No.90 “Ending East Asia’s History Wars”

by KOIKE Yuriko, Trustee, JFIR / Member of the House of Representatives
(17 September, 2014)

No.89 “The Ukrainian Issue and Japan’s Diplomacy”

by ITO Kenichi, President, JFIR
(1 July, 2014)

No.88 “The Decline of Deterrence Power behind the Ukraine Crisis”

by NABESHIMA Keizo, Critic
(19 May, 2014)

No.87 “Revisiting the Kono Statement Carries Japan-South Korea Relations into Unknown Waters”

by SUGIURA Masaaki, Political Commentator
(31 March, 2014)

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates”

++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++

“JFIR Updates” introduces to you latest events, announcements and/or publications of JFIR.

International Symposium “Japan and Europe: Creating Together a Better Future – Rule-based and Prosperous” Held

JFIR and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan co-sponsored an international symposium titled “Japan and Europe: Creating Together a Better Future – Rule-based and Prosperous” in Tokyo on November 21, 2014. A lively discussion was held by 105 participants.

From the Japanese side: Dr. FUKUSHIMA Akiko/the Tokyo Foundation, Amb. ISHIKAWA Kaoru/the Japan Forum on International Relations, Prof. ITOH Motoshige/the University of Tokyo, Prof. KIMURA Fukunari/Keio University, Prof. MICHISHITA Narushige/National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies, Prof. NAKANISHI Hiroshi/Kyoto Univerity, Prof. SOEYA Yoshihide/Keio University, Dr. TSURUOKA Michito/the National Institute for Defense Studies, and Prof. WATANABE Hirotaka/the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies.

From the European side: Dr. Felix ARTEAGA/the Elcano Royal Institute, Spain, Dr. Fraser CAMERON/the EU-Asia Centre, Baroness Ruth HENIG/the House of Lords, Britain, Dr. Patrick KOELLNER/the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies, Associate Prof. Claude MEYER/the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, Research Prof. Luis SIMON/the Institute for European Studies of Vrije Universiteit Brussels, and Dr. Marie SODERBERG/the European Institute of Japanese Studies.

For more information, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/pdf/141121.pdf

=====================================================================

Please send your comments and/or questions to:
info@jfir.or.jp

To customize your subscription, or unsubscribe, please refer to:
http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/e-letter.htm

Officer in Charge: KATSUKAWA Teruo
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.
2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052
JAPAN
Tel: +81-3-3584-2190
Fax: +81-3-3589-5120