Strategic Competition and the role of AUKUS
Introduction: The media hype
The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral partnership is a constant fixture on the international media cycle, with each new development drawing intense scrutiny and speculation from pundits and analysts. A recent Joint Statement by AUKUS Defence Ministers revealed that all three of the USS-Virginia Class nuclear-powered submarines to be delivered to Australia under Phase 2 of the Optimal Pathway will now be “in-service” boats – as opposed to two “used” and one “new”, per the original plan. This decision, they claimed, would result in “simplifying supply chain management, operational and maintenance requirements, and maximising cost efficiencies”[1].
This immediately triggered another round of critical comment levelled at the performance and integrity of the AUKUS project, echoing the furore surrounding the Pentagon’s 2025 Review led by Eldrige Colby (Under Secretary of War for Policy)[2]
. One observer, who likened the new arrangement to being ripped off at car dealership, remarked that – “You’ve paid for a Porsche, but they give you a compact two-seater”[3]. This latest episode compounds ongoing concerns that the sluggish output of American naval building yards could lead to delays – or even the failure to deliver – the Virgina boats to Australia[4]. Other expert commentators have endorsed the government’s line that the revised plan reduces the complexity of operating the Virginia-Class boats (now that all three will be the same “Block IV” build, rather than different variants), and in no way represents some great debacle – just as Colby’s 2025 review turned out to be a “non-event”[5]. Nevertheless, renewed opposition to AUKUS within the ranks of the governing Australian Labor Party, and attendant domestic controversy, continue to keep the project in the spotlight[6].
Stepping away from the often-hyperbolic discourse surrounding each fresh development or setback in the AUKUS project, this Commentary, instead concentrates on how this deeply-entrenched and multi-faceted endeavour can be appraised from a wider angle: as a powerful tool to jointly prosecute strategic competition by the Anglosphere allies.
Strategic competition: The challenge
Strategic competition is widely seen by policymakers an analysts as the defining feature of the international system in the current era. The term is all-pervasive in speeches, policy documents and reports. For example, the UK’s 2025 Strategic Defense Review (SDR) warns of “intensifying strategic competition between states—and with non state actors—for political, military, economic, and technological power”[7]. With Sino-American rivalry at its core, strategic competition engages multiple centres of power, including US allies and partners. It is essentially a multi-dimensional contest for pre-eminence in the international order writ large and encompasses multiple sites of contestation. Most prominent among these is the quest for competitive advantage in the dimensions of (i) diplomacy/order-building (ii) military/defence (iii) economics/technology and (iv) intelligence/information.
States such as the US, UK and Australia, as well as Japan, have sought to generate strategic advantage by employing “all arms of national power” or “comprehensive national power” to address these challenges by greater mobilisation of their sovereign resources. But this alone is not sufficient to keep up with challenger states. Even the United States, powerful as it might be, cannot face-down all these challenges single-handedly. That is why the US, and its allies and partners, have sought to pool their resources to achieve their goals collectively. Outside of bilateral efforts, one of the principal formats through which this occurs is “strategic minilateralism”. Strategic minilaterals – such as the Quad and AUKUS – are small-group collectives between US allies and partners that seek to pursue a variety of competitive endeavours within an institutionalised format. These forms of strategic minilateral cooperation are distinguished from other “generic” minilaterals of lesser consequence, by their overt intent to shape the regional order, and their possession of sufficient resources and capabilities to affect the balance of power[8].
AUKUS: An Allied Response
Unveiled in September 2021, the AUKUS trilateral partnership is centred on the co-development of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) between the US, UK and Australia[9]. It is divided into two “pillars”. Pillar I’s nine working groups have carriage of the overall submarine enterprise. Guided by the “Optimal Pathway” the submarine project will proceed in three Phases. In the first Phase, Australian submariners will be trained, and US and UK SSNs rotate to Australia’s Stirling naval base near Perth (Submarine Rotational Force-West). The second Phase plans for delivery of three (possibly five) in-service US Virginia-Class SSNs to Australia (while its existing Collins-Class boats are gradually retired). In the final Phase, a new AUKUS-Class SSN will be built and deployed for the British Royal Navy, followed by the Royal Australian Navy. The accompanying Pillar II of AUKUS is focused upon Advanced Capabilities co-development, based around eight working groups aimed at developing “game changing” technologies. These include uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), Quantum computing, AI, autonomous systems, advanced cyber, hypersonics/counter-hypersonics, and electronic warfare systems.
When the collaborative activities and ambitions of both Pillars are considered, coupled with the high degree of existing security cooperation between the members, the trilateral partnership represents a potentially formidable aggregation of allied power. If effectively leveraged and deployed, this power can afford significant competitive advantages across multiple dimensions. That is, AUKUS reaches far beyond the centrepiece submarine “deal” to generate competitive strategic advantage in the following ways.
| (i) | First, in terms of its diplomatic significance, AUKUS has sent shockwaves across the regional security environment and has become firmly entrenched as a key component of the regional security architecture. It represents a clear signal of strategic resolve by the US and two of its closest allies towards upholding the regional order, based upon a balance of power. It is testament to the robust and reinvigorated strategic alignment of the Anglosphere powers. Yet, while the members also subscribe to the vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), AUKUS – unlike the Quad – is not about contributing public goods or regional governance and thus lacks any “soft power” elements of order-building. Notwithstanding – for Canberra especially – AUKUS provides the harder defence edge to its regional diplomacy to back its “integrated statecraft” approach[10]. |
| (ii) | Second, the military/defence dimension of AUKUS is a vital contribution toward prosecuting strategic competition. The acquisition of an independent SSN flotilla by Australia will represent “step change in Australia’s undersea warfare capability”[11]. It will also be a linchpin for the country’s strategy of deterrence by denial whilst making it a more potent allied partner. Importantly, this will also grow the size of the combined submarine capability available to these allies. Additionally, behind this emerging collective deterrence front, the members undertake trilateral (and bilateral) military exercises and training which serve to generate the latent ability to operate in a “coalition” in the event of a regional crisis contingency. |
| (iii) | Third, economics/technology (and economic security) have become a key vector in the strategic competition with challenger states. In this respect commentators have sought to highlight the economic (as well as strategic) “promise” of AUKUS[12]. Indeed, for the UK and Australia particularly, governments have been keen to emphasise how a revitalisation of defence-industrial capacity can serve as a “engine for growth” within the wider economy. The overall project is expected to generate domestic gains in terms of investment opportunities, jobs, public-private partnerships and commercial applications for the various technologies being developed[13]. Indeed, the collaboration on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET) under AUKUS Pillar II has “dual use” military/civil application firmly in mind. By increasing the connectivity between America’s Defense Innovation Unit, Britain’s Defence and Security Accelerator, and Australia’s Advanced Strategic Capabilities Accelerator, and working to reduce or remove barriers to international arms/technology transfer between them, AUKUS serves as force multiplier in Innovation, Science and Technology for its membership. |
| (iv) | Lastly, AUKUS stands to make a major contribution to the intelligence/information dimension of strategic competition. Though details are limited due to the classified nature of intelligence activities, the Informational Sharing working group (Pillar II) will develop new networks for the exchange of sensitive data through the creation of allied digital infrastructure, including also plans for an Electronic Warfare system. When added to the volume of intelligence sharing between the members (through Five Eyes), trilateral situational awareness and assessments will be further reinforced[14]. More specifically, Advanced Capabilities – AI, Quantum computing and cyber – all have intelligence-related applications, as do UUVs (announced as a “Signature Project” in the Joint Statement above). Relatedly, AUKUS must respond toward the information operations of adversaries, not only to protect its secrets, but to maintain its legitimacy against pressures from the outside. Examples of the latter include attempts by Beijing to discredit it in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the need to engage in an information campaign in South East Asia to reassure regional stakeholders of its intentions (transparency).[15] |
Japan and AUKUS:
Ongoing developments in the AUKUS project are naturally of interest to Japanese policymakers given that the project contains its key US ally and Australian/British Strategic Partners and the consequent impact the strategic minilateral is having on the regional security environment. This Commentary has offered a new way of thinking more cogently about its intended effects by characterising it as a multi-faceted tool of strategic competition. Japan is also engaged in a quest to achieve competitive strategic advantage. As Tokyo considers participation in elements of AUKUS Pillar II (Advanced Capabilities), and eyes the acquisition of SSN’s for the Japanese Maritime Self Defence Force, the AUKUS experience remains highly pertinent, and potentially instructive.
*Thomas Wilkins is a distinguished research fellow at JFIR and an associate professor at the University of Sydney.