The Japan Forum on International Relations

No.158
January 24,2025

“Middle Power Minilateralism”: The Australia-Japan-Korea Trilateral
Thomas WILKINS

Introduction

Meetings in a “minilateral” format between the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific are proliferating widely.[2]. At the end of 2024, the Defence Ministers of the US, Australia and Japan met in Darwin to firm up their collective regional deterrence posture (originally initiated under the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) process).[3]The US, Japan, Australia and the Philippines held a quadrilateral meeting shortly afterwards to coordinate on approaches to regional security.[4] Prior to this, in July of 2024, a vice Foreign Ministers/Deputy Secretary of State meeting took place between the US, Japan and the ROK to consolidate their trilateral cooperation as agreed under the ground-breaking Camp David Summit back in 2023.[5] Different forms of minilateral cooperation continue to expand and progress through both the convocation of government officials, and through more formalised institutional structures such as the Anglo-American-Australian AUKUS configuration.[6]

But attention has now turned to a potential new minilateral grouping between key American allies in the Indo-Pacific without the inclusion of the US: an Australia-Japan-ROK “trilateral” forum. This minilateral configuration remains at the nascent stage, but Canberra, Tokyo and Seoul appear eager to explore the possibilities. An inaugural trilateral Defence Ministers Meeting and Officials-level Indo-Pacific Dialogue was held in June 2024.[7] The same month a dedicated Track 1.5 Dialogue was hosted by the US Studies Centre think tank in Sydney to further discussion and affirm trilateral connections.[8]

A solid basis for three-way minilateral cooperation

There are several factors motivating Australia-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination. First, the three US allies are united in their appreciation of a deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, concerned about instability in the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula. In the context of accelerating Sino-US rivalry and strategic competition exploring enhanced three-way collaboration makes good strategic sense. Second, Canberra, Tokyo and Seoul are equally apprehensive over what the second Trump Presidency will mean for allies and the regional order in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, sharing assessments and creating new policy options without total reliance on the US is deemed worthy of exploration.

Third, there is good reason to build upon the strong convergence of shared values and interests between the three liberal democratic powers in itself. With each of the three partners limited in their national power resources and capabilities compared to the US and China, pooling resources and aligning policies is a way to create room for manoeuvre for “secondary” states within the contested regional landscape. Lastly, Seoul appears keen to pursue minilateral cooperation to strengthen its presence within the regional security architecture; an architecture that is increasingly becoming more defined by minilateral configurations such as the TSD, the Quad and AUKUS, none of which Korea is a party to.

A quick assessment of the compatibility of the three states reveals a strong potential partnership. Australia, Japan and Korea are the three most important US allies in the Indo-Pacific, they are all firmly established liberal democracies championing the shared values, and all crucially depend upon the maintenance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, frequently referred to as “middle powers” (though some caveats are attached to Japan under this denominator), they possess an inclination to work with multilateral organisations, play the role of “good international citizens” and build coalitions (such as the trilateral itself).[9] Moreover, possessing significant economic, diplomatic and military power individually, their influence would be further magnified if they act in concert. With robust bilateral ties between Australia and Japan through their Strategic Partnership, a deepening Australia-ROK Strategic Partnership, and a relatively positive bilateral relationship between Japan and Korea, there is a good basis upon which to pursue trilateral cooperation.

Towards a trilateral agenda

At this nascent stage trilateral cooperation could evolve in many policy directions, building on an existing web of ongoing bilateral collaborations. A brief summary of functional areas of cooperation prospectively includes the following foci.

At the sharper (and most “difficult”) end of the collaboration spectrum, the partners could concentrate on coordinating regional deterrence (as per the TSD). In particular, a degree of trilateral cooperation on maritime security – intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and maritime domain awareness (MDA) would appear compelling and feasible. More robust activities such as combined military exercises, though, are likely confined to more distant horizons. Cooperation in this area however is inhibited first by its inherent sensitivity, and second, by the necessity of US involvement (suggesting a “quadrilateral” format with the US?). Plus, trilateral threat perceptions toward the region are not entirely aligned, with the ROK understandably placing higher emphasis on the North Korean threat than Japan, and especially, Australia.[10] This limits the extent to which this activity can be pursued in this space outside of the US context, though does not preclude it, since better trilateral defence integration also serves towards reinforcing a common US-led deterrence front. As a result of the constraints just identified, such cooperation will likely be minimal and piecemeal, and probably not the primary focus of the trilateral agenda.

Nevertheless, the three partners could prospectively concentrate on the enabling factors behind an overall improvement in regional deterrence capabilities through defence-industrial-technological cooperation. Both Japan and Korea have impressive defence-industrial bases and technological advantages, whilst Australia has demand for these, as well as some niche technological specialisations it could contribute (e.g. Quantum computing). Potentially, the partners could explore joint research development and/or co-production enterprises. Other minilateral formations such as AUKUS and the UK-Japan-Italy Global Combat Aircraft Programme (GCAP) are models that could be emulated, perhaps at a lower level of the value chain, such as munitions production or other enabling systems. Meanwhile, cooperation on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET), such as AI, Quantum computing, robotics and so forth, would be easier to achieve, with such advanced technologies having commercial as well as military application.

This neatly segues into broader economic cooperation. The three countries are already mutually significant trading partners, each with comparative advantages. Free Trade Agreements (FTA) are in place across each of the partner dyads, that could be further exploited and energised trilaterally. With the need to “de-risk” trade with China being accompanied by the prospect of harsh tariff measures by President Trump, there are strong incentives to focus trilaterally, and to coordinate to mutually mitigate such hazards. This also involves an accent on “economic security”, through securing unimpeded access to supply chains, including critical minerals, and a preparedness to withstand (or deter) economic coercion. Thus, mutually assisting one another with improving national (and collective) economic resilience is a prospective area for increased cooperation. Other forms of economic-technological cooperation, such as working together to progress green energy transition might be considered. Lastly, mutual support and engagement with multilateral economic fora, such as in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CTTP), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Indo-Pacific Economic Forum (IPEF), are venues in which the three partners could make a greater impression if they coordinated their policies.

The three partners are highly committed to a rules-based regional order in both security and economic terms. This is exemplified by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, first championed by Japan, adopted by Australia, and effectively endorsed by Korea.[11] This envisions a region governed by a rules-based order, enhancing economic prosperity, and a commitment to peace and stability.[12] To expedite this, the trilateral partners can play a role in providing a measure of economic and security governance to regional states, building on their national/bilateral efforts. The provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA), investment and capacity-building to key sub-regions such as the Pacific Islands and South East Asia is something that each nation is already deeply engaged in and could be coordinated trilaterally to improve outcomes. This extends to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), something that could be facilitated trilaterally as well given the maritime capabilities of the three partner states.[13] Support for ASEAN-led regional security architecture, including connection with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, would also provide scope for reinforcing the regional order.

Next steps and challenges

The discussion above has concentrated on potential and probable areas within which trilateral coordination could be effective, building on accomplishments to date. But whether this emergent minilateral will become effective and durable may depend upon its appropriate institutionalisation. It could remain an “informal” configuration, through sporadic trilateral Minsters meetings, accompanied by Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogues and ad hoc trilateral agreements/activities. The partners would do more to harmonise their parallel national lines of effort towards common goals and view them “through a trilateral lens”.[14] This would maintain flexibility, not require extensive resource allocation, and would be unlikely to cause any internal or external issues (such as condemnation from Beijing).

Alternatively, as seen with other minilaterals such as AUKUS and the TSD, and to a lesser extent, the Quad, it could assume a more “formal” institutional guise. In this case, high-profile Ministerial or leaders meetings would become regularised, the trilateral would issue an official statement of aims and agenda (and action plan for implementation), and would create new organisational infrastructure, such as working groups and trilateral agreements to facilitate this. This would necessitate a higher degree of commitment both in terms of political/diplomatic capital and resources but would be far more impactful. The application of a recognisable denomination – e.g. “Australia-Japan-Korea” (AJK) – or other suitably eye-catching acronym would serve to better lodge it in the regional policy discourse and distinguish it from a plethora of other (easily forgettable) “trilaterals”.

Apart from this, there are other conceivable impediments to progressing the trilateral project. First, it needs a strong raison d’être through a mandate that cannot be (better) accomplished through existing channels of coordination, most saliently the US-alliance framework (particularly in the case of deterrence issues). Though an AJK trilateral will certainly further the process of “connecting the spokes” within the US-alliance network, which is a worthy aim, the value proposition of the trilateral outside of, or in addition to, this function needs to be clearly justified.[15] One unofficial purpose of the trilateral might be the creation of a space for “secondary powers”/US-allies to discuss how to deal with a more isolationist or destabilising American policy under Trump. There are also the vicissitudes of internal policy to be considered. Not only domestically, with the ROK government currently in turmoil, but between Seoul and Tokyo specifically. The bilateral relationship has typically been subject to disruption when unresolved historical or territorial issues have gained political exposure. While the current state of bilateral relations is favourable, much work remains to be done, and a positive trajectory is not a certainty.

In summary, there are compelling reasons for greater trilateral coordination, though what issues this concentrates on and what form this takes have yet to be determined. However, even if trilateral cooperation can be made to fulfil a useful purpose for these middle power states, it will remain supplementary (or complimentary) to their US-alliance relations, which cannot be effectively replaced or replicated.

*Thomas Wilkins is a distinguished research fellow at JFIR and an associate professor at the University of Sydney.

[1] ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: The author would like to thank the East Asia Institute, Seoul, for the invitation to speak at the ROK-Japan-Australia Trilateral Conference: “ROK-Japan-Australia Cooperation in Trump 2.0”’, (18 Jan 2025).
[2] Wilkins, Thomas, The “Minilateral Moment” and The Regional Security Architecture in The Indo-Pacific”, NIDS Commentary, No. 25 National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, (16 Feb 2023). http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary254e.pdf
[3] Wilkins, Thomas. “US-Japan-Australia Trilateralism: The Inner Core of Regional Order Building and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.” Asia Policy 19, no. 2 (2024): 159-185.
[4] US Department of Defense, ‘Joint Readout from Australia-Japan-Philippines-Republic of Korea-United States Defense Ministers’ Meeting’, (21 Nov 2024). https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3973807/joint-readout-from-australia-japan-philippines-republic-of-korea-united-states/
[5] US Department of Defense, ‘Japan-United States-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement’, (27 July 2024). https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852146/japan-united-states-republic-of-korea-trilateral-ministerial-joint-press-statem/
[6] Wilkins, Thomas, ‘Australia and AUKUS into the 2030s’ International Information Network Analysis, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, (14 Sept 2023), https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/thomas_08.html
[7] Australian Government: Defence, ‘Eleventh Australia-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations’ (5 Sept 2024). https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2024-09-05/eleventh-australia-japan-22-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-consultations
[8] Watterson, Christopher, ‘Seizing the moment: Outcomes of the inaugural Australia-Japan-South Korea trilateral dialogue’, (18 Sept 2024). https://www.ussc.edu.au/outcomes-of-the-inaugural-australia-japan-south-korea-trilateral-dialogue
[9] See: Struye de Swielande, Tanguy, Dorothée Vandamme, David Walton, Thomas Wilkins (eds.),
Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Theories, New Cases (London: Taylor & Francis, 2018); Abbondanza, Gabriele. “The odd axis: Germany, Italy, and Japan as awkward great powers.” Awkward powers: Escaping traditional great and middle power theory (2022): 43-71.
[10] Lee Dongkeun ‘“ROK-Australia-Japan Cooperation”: A Perspective from the ROK’, National Commentaries, (Sept 30 2024), The Asan Forum. https://theasanforum.org/a-perspective-from-the-rok/
[11] Kim, Jiye and Thomas Wilkins, ‘South Korea and America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Yes, But Not Quite’, Fulcrum, (26 Nov, 2020). https://fulcrum.sg/south-korea-and-americas-indo-pacific-strategy-yes-but-not-quite/
[12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Japan, ‘Achieving the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Vision
Japan Ministry of Defense’s Approach’, MOFA, (no date). https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/india_pacific/india_pacific-en.html
[13] Richardson, Lauren, ‘Trilateral Cooperation Between Australia, Japan and South Korea: Potential And Possibilities’, Research Paper, Griffith Asia Institute, (2022). https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/1507717/Richardson-trilateral-cooperation-web.pdf
[14] East Asia Institute, “ROK-Japan-Australia Cooperation in Trump 2.0”’, ROK-Japan-Australia Trilateral Conference, East Asia Institute, (18 Jan 2025). https://www.eai.or.kr/new/en/event/view.asp?intSeq=22834&board=eng_event
[15] Wilkins, Thomas. “A Hub-and-Spokes “Plus” Model of us Alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Towards a New “Networked” Design.” Asian Affairs 53, no. 3 (2022): 457-480.