March 31,2025

The Growing Importance of U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Non-Military Issues Under the Second Trump Administration

With the inauguration of the second Trump administration, which once again places “America First” at the forefront of its agenda, there is a growing sense that global affairs have entered a period of intensified uncertainty. The era in which the United States singlehandedly upheld the international order and exercised unchallenged leadership is undergoing a significant transformation, and the very structure of the international order itself is beginning to shift dramatically. The Crisis of Global Governance Of particular significance is the fact that global governance, which is the response to major global agendas such as the global environment, pandemics, international terrorism, refugees, and human rights that cannot be solved by the governance of a single country alone, is now facing a major crisis. Global governance means responding to major global agendas such as the global environment, pandemics, international terrorism, refugees, and human rights, and to movements in the international order that cannot be resolved by the governance of a single country alone, in an age when people, goods, money, and information move across borders. The Trump administration’s flurry of presidential authorizations include abandoning climate change measures, tariffs, dismantling USAID (United States Agency for International Development), mass layoffs of government employees in the field of international cooperation, freezing funding for international exchanges, and many other non-military global governance issues. All of these are extensions of the fight against America’s domestic “enemies within,” and the intensity of their hatred of “wokeness” makes the Trump administration appear to be distancing itself from global governance. Various issues of global governance are now being replaced by partisan rivalries in the United States. In Trump’s campaign last year, the term “illegal immigrants” was the most important keyword to solidify support among conservatives. There are “sanctuary cities” where illegal immigrants are not removed even humanely in areas and urban areas where there is a large Democratic support base, but Trump has shown signs of a thoroughgoing ban on this as well. Moreover, as Trump himself pointed out in his speech to Congress in early March, this change has only just begun. It is likely that a great purge like China’s “Cultural Revolution” will continue in the future. How to Turn a “Trump Risk” into a “Trump Opportunity” However, in Japan-U.S. cooperation, this major change in the U.S., especially in the non-military field, is not always exclusively negative. How can we turn the “Trump risk” into a “Trump opportunity”? It is up to Japan and the U.S. to further explore common issues. For example, if, as the Trump administration has variously argued, the very mechanisms that support global governance today are already dysfunctional and the U.S. is being “preyed upon” by countries around the world, then expanding opportunities to update these complaints to fit the current situation is also possible in the context of a stronger U.S.-Japan relationship. For example, if China is abusing the WTO by not adhering to the principles of free trade, it is possible to create a forum for the US and Japan to discuss together how to correct the “injustice” and ensure the full rule of law. This is much more rational than the rough-and-tumble approach of holding the US economy hostage with tariffs, which would lead to a “Trump recession.” If Europe and other countries can be brought into the discussion, the dysfunctional reform of the WTO will move forward at a rapid pace. Beyond that, a new framework that replaces the WTO reform may also be presented. Because the Trump administration is fundamentally transactional in its approach, some have viewed its use of tariffs as merely a bargaining tool in negotiations. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that these tariffs are also intended to attract direct investment from foreign companies. The underlying objective is to promote the development of American industries and to expand domestic employment. In the case of Japanese companies, however, direct investment in the United States has already progressed considerably. Any further sharp acceleration in this trend could lead to the hollowing out of Japan’s domestic industries. To reduce such negative impacts, it may be worth considering the creation of a framework for dialogue, similar to the former U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative, which would facilitate structured discussions through mutual consultation. In any case, as the international community learned in the aftermath of the Great Depression, it must be reaffirmed that there are no winners in a trade war triggered by tariff hikes. It is essential for Japan and the United States to develop mechanisms to thoroughly prevent the escalation into a trade war, not only through bilateral frameworks but also by incorporating other countries into the process. If this U.S.-Japan dialogue can serve as a model for Europe and other Asian nations, it could help prevent the destabilization of the global economy caused by the Trump administration’s tariff measures. With regard to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), from which the United States withdrew, it should be noted that no progress was made toward rejoining even under the previous Biden administration. In light of this, the likelihood of the United States returning to the agreement at this point in time appears to be extremely low. Nevertheless, Japan should continue to maintain a structure that allows for the United States to return at any time, in order to uphold its commitment to free trade. Various Possibilities for Cooperation Beyond tariffs, there are various possibilities for cooperation between Japan and the United States. For example, the Trump administration’s return to fossil fuels, embodied in the slogan “drill, baby, drill,” is scientifically problematic when considering the long-term state of the global environment. While Japan has taken steps to align with the United States in certain respects, such as through the purchase of liquefied natural gas (LNG), it must also continue to advance its own climate change mitigation efforts. One potential area for deeper cooperation between the two countries is the development of technologies that reduce the environmental impact of fossil fuel use. From the Trump administration’s perspective, the transition to electric vehicles (EVs) serves only to benefit China, and the United States should instead focus on strengthening its fossil fuel industries, where it holds a comparative advantage. It is likely that the administration will continue to promote energy extraction and position it at the core of its economic policy, alongside tariffs and tax cuts. Even if the Trump administration abandons climate change mitigation efforts, it will be Japan’s role to maintain international cooperation on this front. Alternative energy technologies inherently face a wide range of challenges that must be addressed from multiple perspectives. For example, in the case of solar panels, some of the mineral resources used in their production are reportedly sourced through forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur region of China. In order to achieve truly sustainable energy generation, it will be necessary to develop materials that are both environmentally and ethically sound. Although partisan perspectives certainly differ, the seriousness of misinformation on social media is a shared concern for both Japan and the United States, as well as a global issue. If Japan and the United States can work together to develop mechanisms that ensure information accuracy in the age of artificial intelligence, such efforts would represent a meaningful contribution to the international community. Cooperation is also possible in the area of human mobility. Japan has traditionally not been proactive in accepting refugees, and this stance has often drawn criticism from the international community. However, if the United States under the Trump administration moves to reduce immigration, Japan could consider measures such as accepting a portion of the individuals who would otherwise have been received by the United States. This would serve as a way to strengthen Japan’s engagement with the international community. At the same time, it is important to remember that the right to seek asylum is protected under international law. If Japan expands its acceptance of refugees, it could also provide a basis for advocating improvements in the U.S. approach to refugee and immigration policy. In addition, Japan should consider partially covering the costs of Japan-U.S. exchange programs such as the Fulbright Program, which the United States may suspend due to budget freezes. It is important to ensure that the cultivation of the next generation of leaders and the advancement of academic and educational exchange are not hindered by such fiscal constraints. America’s “Unprecedented Polarization and Political Stalemate”, and the Language the Administration Cannot Deny Amid an environment of “unprecedented polarization and political stalemate”, it is important to recognize that there remains substantial public opposition within American society to the Trump administration’s efforts to dismantle policies related to global governance. The outcome of last year’s presidential election was decided by a margin of only 1.48 percentage points. Contrary to widespread misconceptions in Japan, it was by no means a “landslide victory” for Trump. The notion of a “landslide” or a “popular mandate” represents nothing more than the uncritical repetition of the Trump camp’s own claims. Furthermore, while the Republican Party holds a majority in both houses of Congress, it does so by an extremely narrow margin. At the same time, Republican voters continue to strongly support the Trump administration’s policies. The various changes introduced under this administration are likely to be regarded as part of the “new normal”, and the international community, including Japan, must learn to adapt accordingly. One key area of adaptation is the strategic use of language. When promoting climate change measures, for example, it is important to recognize that the Trump administration tends to avoid and even reject terms such as “global warming” or “sustainable development.” These are not simply policy disagreements but issues of wording. In order to engage the administration effectively, it may be necessary to reframe the same climate-related initiatives using alternative language, such as policies for achieving long-term “energy independence”. In other words, it is essential to adopt terminology that the Trump administration itself cannot openly reject. By choosing language that the Trump administration cannot deny, even in the face of “unprecedented polarization and political stalemate”, it is possible to signal solidarity with segments of the American public who still support the continuation of global governance policies. This approach also represents a forward-looking strategy that anticipates potential shifts in U.S. politics and society in the lead-up to the 2026 midterm elections and the 2028 presidential and congressional elections. Japan’s Role The second Trump administration is likely to bring about even greater changes. The era in which the United States sought to assert leadership unilaterally is undergoing a major shift, and the country is increasingly distancing itself from global governance. The transformation of the United States, once the central actor in sustaining the international order, is becoming more pronounced, and it is gradually relinquishing the very international system it helped to create. Within this broader trend, Japan is expected to play a vital role in keeping the United States engaged with the international community. In this sense, Japan’s role has become all the more significant. European countries, which share common values with Japan, have high expectations for Japanese leadership and may choose to coordinate first with Japan not only on issues related to the United States but also in their approach to China. Although the return of Trump to power brings with it a number of risks, it may also present opportunities for Japan to assume greater leadership on the global stage. From this perspective, it is important to reframe our thinking and move toward a new era in the Japan-U.S. relationship. When it comes to non-military areas of cooperation between Japan and the United States, it is essential to first examine closely how these dynamics may evolve in the coming years. (This is an English translation of a commentary written by MAESHIMA Kazuhiro, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Sophia University, which originally appeared on the JFIR website in Japanese on March 23, 2025.)

MAESHIMA Kazuhiro

January 24,2025

“Middle Power Minilateralism”: The Australia-Japan-Korea Trilateral

Introduction Meetings in a “minilateral” format between the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific are proliferating widely.[2]. At the end of 2024, the Defence Ministers of the US, Australia and Japan met in Darwin to firm up their collective regional deterrence posture (originally initiated under the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) process).[3]The US, Japan, Australia and the Philippines held a quadrilateral meeting shortly afterwards to coordinate on approaches to regional security.[4] Prior to this, in July of 2024, a vice Foreign Ministers/Deputy Secretary of State meeting took place between the US, Japan and the ROK to consolidate their trilateral cooperation as agreed under the ground-breaking Camp David Summit back in 2023.[5] Different forms of minilateral cooperation continue to expand and progress through both the convocation of government officials, and through more formalised institutional structures such as the Anglo-American-Australian AUKUS configuration.[6] But attention has now turned to a potential new minilateral grouping between key American allies in the Indo-Pacific without the inclusion of the US: an Australia-Japan-ROK “trilateral” forum. This minilateral configuration remains at the nascent stage, but Canberra, Tokyo and Seoul appear eager to explore the possibilities. An inaugural trilateral Defence Ministers Meeting and Officials-level Indo-Pacific Dialogue was held in June 2024.[7] The same month a dedicated Track 1.5 Dialogue was hosted by the US Studies Centre think tank in Sydney to further discussion and affirm trilateral connections.[8] A solid basis for three-way minilateral cooperation There are several factors motivating Australia-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination. First, the three US allies are united in their appreciation of a deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, concerned about instability in the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula. In the context of accelerating Sino-US rivalry and strategic competition exploring enhanced three-way collaboration makes good strategic sense. Second, Canberra, Tokyo and Seoul are equally apprehensive over what the second Trump Presidency will mean for allies and the regional order in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, sharing assessments and creating new policy options without total reliance on the US is deemed worthy of exploration. Third, there is good reason to build upon the strong convergence of shared values and interests between the three liberal democratic powers in itself. With each of the three partners limited in their national power resources and capabilities compared to the US and China, pooling resources and aligning policies is a way to create room for manoeuvre for “secondary” states within the contested regional landscape. Lastly, Seoul appears keen to pursue minilateral cooperation to strengthen its presence within the regional security architecture; an architecture that is increasingly becoming more defined by minilateral configurations such as the TSD, the Quad and AUKUS, none of which Korea is a party to. A quick assessment of the compatibility of the three states reveals a strong potential partnership. Australia, Japan and Korea are the three most important US allies in the Indo-Pacific, they are all firmly established liberal democracies championing the shared values, and all crucially depend upon the maintenance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, frequently referred to as “middle powers” (though some caveats are attached to Japan under this denominator), they possess an inclination to work with multilateral organisations, play the role of “good international citizens” and build coalitions (such as the trilateral itself).[9] Moreover, possessing significant economic, diplomatic and military power individually, their influence would be further magnified if they act in concert. With robust bilateral ties between Australia and Japan through their Strategic Partnership, a deepening Australia-ROK Strategic Partnership, and a relatively positive bilateral relationship between Japan and Korea, there is a good basis upon which to pursue trilateral cooperation. Towards a trilateral agenda At this nascent stage trilateral cooperation could evolve in many policy directions, building on an existing web of ongoing bilateral collaborations. A brief summary of functional areas of cooperation prospectively includes the following foci. At the sharper (and most “difficult”) end of the collaboration spectrum, the partners could concentrate on coordinating regional deterrence (as per the TSD). In particular, a degree of trilateral cooperation on maritime security – intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and maritime domain awareness (MDA) would appear compelling and feasible. More robust activities such as combined military exercises, though, are likely confined to more distant horizons. Cooperation in this area however is inhibited first by its inherent sensitivity, and second, by the necessity of US involvement (suggesting a “quadrilateral” format with the US?). Plus, trilateral threat perceptions toward the region are not entirely aligned, with the ROK understandably placing higher emphasis on the North Korean threat than Japan, and especially, Australia.[10] This limits the extent to which this activity can be pursued in this space outside of the US context, though does not preclude it, since better trilateral defence integration also serves towards reinforcing a common US-led deterrence front. As a result of the constraints just identified, such cooperation will likely be minimal and piecemeal, and probably not the primary focus of the trilateral agenda. Nevertheless, the three partners could prospectively concentrate on the enabling factors behind an overall improvement in regional deterrence capabilities through defence-industrial-technological cooperation. Both Japan and Korea have impressive defence-industrial bases and technological advantages, whilst Australia has demand for these, as well as some niche technological specialisations it could contribute (e.g. Quantum computing). Potentially, the partners could explore joint research development and/or co-production enterprises. Other minilateral formations such as AUKUS and the UK-Japan-Italy Global Combat Aircraft Programme (GCAP) are models that could be emulated, perhaps at a lower level of the value chain, such as munitions production or other enabling systems. Meanwhile, cooperation on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET), such as AI, Quantum computing, robotics and so forth, would be easier to achieve, with such advanced technologies having commercial as well as military application. This neatly segues into broader economic cooperation. The three countries are already mutually significant trading partners, each with comparative advantages. Free Trade Agreements (FTA) are in place across each of the partner dyads, that could be further exploited and energised trilaterally. With the need to “de-risk” trade with China being accompanied by the prospect of harsh tariff measures by President Trump, there are strong incentives to focus trilaterally, and to coordinate to mutually mitigate such hazards. This also involves an accent on “economic security”, through securing unimpeded access to supply chains, including critical minerals, and a preparedness to withstand (or deter) economic coercion. Thus, mutually assisting one another with improving national (and collective) economic resilience is a prospective area for increased cooperation. Other forms of economic-technological cooperation, such as working together to progress green energy transition might be considered. Lastly, mutual support and engagement with multilateral economic fora, such as in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CTTP), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Indo-Pacific Economic Forum (IPEF), are venues in which the three partners could make a greater impression if they coordinated their policies. The three partners are highly committed to a rules-based regional order in both security and economic terms. This is exemplified by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, first championed by Japan, adopted by Australia, and effectively endorsed by Korea.[11] This envisions a region governed by a rules-based order, enhancing economic prosperity, and a commitment to peace and stability.[12] To expedite this, the trilateral partners can play a role in providing a measure of economic and security governance to regional states, building on their national/bilateral efforts. The provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA), investment and capacity-building to key sub-regions such as the Pacific Islands and South East Asia is something that each nation is already deeply engaged in and could be coordinated trilaterally to improve outcomes. This extends to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), something that could be facilitated trilaterally as well given the maritime capabilities of the three partner states.[13] Support for ASEAN-led regional security architecture, including connection with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, would also provide scope for reinforcing the regional order. Next steps and challenges The discussion above has concentrated on potential and probable areas within which trilateral coordination could be effective, building on accomplishments to date. But whether this emergent minilateral will become effective and durable may depend upon its appropriate institutionalisation. It could remain an “informal” configuration, through sporadic trilateral Minsters meetings, accompanied by Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogues and ad hoc trilateral agreements/activities. The partners would do more to harmonise their parallel national lines of effort towards common goals and view them “through a trilateral lens”.[14] This would maintain flexibility, not require extensive resource allocation, and would be unlikely to cause any internal or external issues (such as condemnation from Beijing). Alternatively, as seen with other minilaterals such as AUKUS and the TSD, and to a lesser extent, the Quad, it could assume a more “formal” institutional guise. In this case, high-profile Ministerial or leaders meetings would become regularised, the trilateral would issue an official statement of aims and agenda (and action plan for implementation), and would create new organisational infrastructure, such as working groups and trilateral agreements to facilitate this. This would necessitate a higher degree of commitment both in terms of political/diplomatic capital and resources but would be far more impactful. The application of a recognisable denomination – e.g. “Australia-Japan-Korea” (AJK) – or other suitably eye-catching acronym would serve to better lodge it in the regional policy discourse and distinguish it from a plethora of other (easily forgettable) “trilaterals”. Apart from this, there are other conceivable impediments to progressing the trilateral project. First, it needs a strong raison d’être through a mandate that cannot be (better) accomplished through existing channels of coordination, most saliently the US-alliance framework (particularly in the case of deterrence issues). Though an AJK trilateral will certainly further the process of “connecting the spokes” within the US-alliance network, which is a worthy aim, the value proposition of the trilateral outside of, or in addition to, this function needs to be clearly justified.[15] One unofficial purpose of the trilateral might be the creation of a space for “secondary powers”/US-allies to discuss how to deal with a more isolationist or destabilising American policy under Trump. There are also the vicissitudes of internal policy to be considered. Not only domestically, with the ROK government currently in turmoil, but between Seoul and Tokyo specifically. The bilateral relationship has typically been subject to disruption when unresolved historical or territorial issues have gained political exposure. While the current state of bilateral relations is favourable, much work remains to be done, and a positive trajectory is not a certainty. In summary, there are compelling reasons for greater trilateral coordination, though what issues this concentrates on and what form this takes have yet to be determined. However, even if trilateral cooperation can be made to fulfil a useful purpose for these middle power states, it will remain supplementary (or complimentary) to their US-alliance relations, which cannot be effectively replaced or replicated. *Thomas Wilkins is a distinguished research fellow at JFIR and an associate professor at the University of Sydney. [1] ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: The author would like to thank the East Asia Institute, Seoul, for the invitation to speak at the ROK-Japan-Australia Trilateral Conference: “ROK-Japan-Australia Cooperation in Trump 2.0”’, (18 Jan 2025). [2] Wilkins, Thomas, The “Minilateral Moment” and The Regional Security Architecture in The Indo-Pacific”, NIDS Commentary, No. 25 National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, (16 Feb 2023). http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary254e.pdf [3] Wilkins, Thomas. “US-Japan-Australia Trilateralism: The Inner Core of Regional Order Building and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.” Asia Policy 19, no. 2 (2024): 159-185. [4] US Department of Defense, ‘Joint Readout from Australia-Japan-Philippines-Republic of Korea-United States Defense Ministers’ Meeting’, (21 Nov 2024). https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3973807/joint-readout-from-australia-japan-philippines-republic-of-korea-united-states/ [5] US Department of Defense, ‘Japan-United States-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement’, (27 July 2024). https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852146/japan-united-states-republic-of-korea-trilateral-ministerial-joint-press-statem/ [6] Wilkins, Thomas, ‘Australia and AUKUS into the 2030s’ International Information Network Analysis, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, (14 Sept 2023), https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/thomas_08.html [7] Australian Government: Defence, ‘Eleventh Australia-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations’ (5 Sept 2024). https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2024-09-05/eleventh-australia-japan-22-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-consultations [8] Watterson, Christopher, ‘Seizing the moment: Outcomes of the inaugural Australia-Japan-South Korea trilateral dialogue’, (18 Sept 2024). https://www.ussc.edu.au/outcomes-of-the-inaugural-australia-japan-south-korea-trilateral-dialogue [9] See: Struye de Swielande, Tanguy, Dorothée Vandamme, David Walton, Thomas Wilkins (eds.), Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Theories, New Cases (London: Taylor & Francis, 2018); Abbondanza, Gabriele. “The odd axis: Germany, Italy, and Japan as awkward great powers.” Awkward powers: Escaping traditional great and middle power theory (2022): 43-71. [10] Lee Dongkeun ‘“ROK-Australia-Japan Cooperation”: A Perspective from the ROK’, National Commentaries, (Sept 30 2024), The Asan Forum. https://theasanforum.org/a-perspective-from-the-rok/ [11] Kim, Jiye and Thomas Wilkins, ‘South Korea and America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Yes, But Not Quite’, Fulcrum, (26 Nov, 2020). https://fulcrum.sg/south-korea-and-americas-indo-pacific-strategy-yes-but-not-quite/ [12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Japan, ‘Achieving the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Vision Japan Ministry of Defense’s Approach’, MOFA, (no date). https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/india_pacific/india_pacific-en.html [13] Richardson, Lauren, ‘Trilateral Cooperation Between Australia, Japan and South Korea: Potential And Possibilities’, Research Paper, Griffith Asia Institute, (2022). https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/1507717/Richardson-trilateral-cooperation-web.pdf [14] East Asia Institute, “ROK-Japan-Australia Cooperation in Trump 2.0”’, ROK-Japan-Australia Trilateral Conference, East Asia Institute, (18 Jan 2025). https://www.eai.or.kr/new/en/event/view.asp?intSeq=22834&board=eng_event [15] Wilkins, Thomas. “A Hub-and-Spokes “Plus” Model of us Alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Towards a New “Networked” Design.” Asian Affairs 53, no. 3 (2022): 457-480.

Thomas WILKINS

December 12,2024

China’s Aim to Build an “All-Weather China–Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era ” with Africa Reflections from the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) 2024 Beijing Summit

Introduction The summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing on September 4–6, 2024. The FOCAC includes[1] China, 53 African countries with which China has established diplomatic relations, and 55 countries and organizations from the African Union Commission (AUC)[2]. The 2024 Beijing Summit was attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping, heads of state of 51 countries, heads of government of 2 countries[3], President of the African Union Commission Musa Faki Mahamat, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and more than 3,200 other participants. The Beijing Declaration on Building an All-Weather China–Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era (hereinafter designated as the “FOCAC Beijing Declaration”) and the associated Action Plan (2025–2027) were adopted at the FOCAC Beijing Summit. By “new era,” Xi Jinping explains that it means “China has become a world power” and “China is playing an important role in the history of mankind.”[4] In the context of the “new era,” which is envisioned with China holding a leading position in the international order, what is China’s goal in aiming to build an “All-Weather Community” with Africa? How does China position Africa within this framework? Based on this awareness of these issues, this paper will discuss relations between China and African nations as seen through the eyes of a Japanese scholar specializing in contemporary Chinese diplomacy, using the following structure. Section I presents an examination of the “FOCAC Beijing Declaration” and the “Action Plan (2025–2027),” along with the argument that China’s current Africa policy, which Xi Jinping has positioned as a “new era,” has raised the stage to a more comprehensive relationship that encompasses more aspects of governance and security than ever before. Section II points out the five pillars of China’s policy toward Africa as expressed from the FOCAC Beijing Summit. Section III presents discussion of China’s expanding maritime expansion and the construction of a defense line to West Africa. Ⅰ FOCAC Beijing Summit: Advancing a More Comprehensive Relationship ◆ The goal is developing a sustainable relationship with Africa Although African countries had demanded debt forgiveness from China, China did not respond at the FOCAC Beijing Summit. However, China pledged about $50 billion in financial assistance to Africa over three years (about $40 billion was pledged at the 2021 FOCAC ministerial meeting). In monetary terms alone, this amount represented a marked reduction from the approximately $60 billion at the 2015 Johannesburg FOCAC and the 2018 Beijing FOCAC. Because of fiscal constraints from China’s economic slowdown and increased debt risk in Africa, China is on track to increase its investments in about 1,000 more small projects, which it has designated as “small and beautiful projects.” Nevertheless, the dollar amount does not reflect the scale and scope of China’s involvement in Africa directly. China has been developing “efficient engagement” in supporting economically developing countries through projects of international financial institutions and multilateral development banks. The “FOCAC Beijing Declaration” links Africa’s “Agenda 2063,” China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” and the United Nations’ “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” It advocates for the joint efforts of China and Africa for joint construction of the “Global Development Initiative (GDI),” “Global Security Initiative (GSI),” and “Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).”[5]。 Since approximately 2016, China has shifted from providing aid to a broad range of countries to particularly emphasis on support for key strategic regions in its global strategy[6]. According to the “Action Plan (2025–2027),” this shift emphasizes moving away from traditional debt-driven infrastructure investments towards strengthening cooperation in trade relations, governance models, and security and safety governance. The goal is to develop sustainable relations with Africa. In other words, although the loan amount has shrunk, in terms of their content, they are more comprehensive and applied deeper than before. China is moving decisively in the direction of expanding its influence in Africa. ◆ Africa seeks to maximize its own profits in anticipation of U.S.–China competition Nevertheless, this is not a one-sided relationship by which China can control Africa. Generally, the term “Win–Win” refers to a situation in which both parties benefit, commonly used in business. However, Western officials have joked with dark humor that the “new meaning of Win–Win” is that China wins twice[7]. Nevertheless, in the competition for spheres of influence in Africa, through which China has been expanding its presence, China has not necessarily strengthened its dominance over the West. African countries are striving to strengthen their bargaining power over China, citing the presence of support from Western countries as well. For example, in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia, where China has an overwhelming presence because of U.S.–China competition over cobalt, the West’s “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)[8]” has been working on a large-scale development initiative known as the “Lobito Corridor”. African countries are maneuvering to take advantage of the U.S.–China power bloc competition to advance their own interests. ◆ Strong awareness of the UN “Agreement for the Future” The FOCAC “Action Plan (2025–2027)” is influenced strongly by the UN’s “Pact for the Future” (Resolution A/RES/79/1), which was adopted on September 22, 2024 with the aim of transforming global governance. The “Pact for the Future” outlines 56 actions beginning with “We Will.” It is based on the vision “Our Common Agenda,” announced by Secretary-General António Guterres on September 10, 2021, reflecting the dialogue of UN member states. The draft proposal (Zero Draft) was released on January 26, 2024 with subsequent discussions, which led to the publication of the “Revised Draft (Rev.1)” on May 14, 2024[9], and to adoption on September 22. The “Pact for the Future” calls for the development of a global code of conduct to end the infodemic and the “war on science,” which are undermining the world, while seeking new modes of cooperation in achieving common interests with global solidarity. It reflects efforts to address international conflicts and environmental destruction, advocates for improvements in political representation, education, and skills training. Moreover, it emphasizes the need for an inclusive multilateral system supported by the UN, with advanced networking, including multi-stakeholder dialogue on outer space. The “Pact for the Future” is also intended to enhance the representation and voice of developing countries in agreements aimed at strengthening international frameworks for space governance and reforming the international financial architecture. Of particular interest in relation to FOCAC is the Global Digital Compact, an annex to the Pact for the Future. The document will be the first comprehensive global framework for digital cooperation and artificial intelligence (AI) governance. The Global Digital Compact, the first international commitment on data governance, puts data governance responsibility with the UN agenda and calls on countries to take concrete action by 2030. With the formulation of rules for global digital governance and data governance in mind, it is clear that China is keenly aware of building a network of friend blocs that will support the “rules it wants to create.” ◆ Xi Jinping’s “Ten Major Partnership Actions” In his keynote speech at the FOCAC Beijing Summit, Xi Jinping set forth the “Ten Major Partnership Actions” for the modernization of Africa and articulated concrete directions for China–Africa cooperation [10]. Specifically, he raised the following avenues for development. (1) “Partnership Action for Inter-Civilizational Mutual Recognition,” including the establishment of a platform for the exchange of governance experiences. (2) “Partnership Action for Trade Prosperity,” including zero tariffs for 33 least-developed countries, expanding market access for African agricultural products, and deepening cooperation in e-commerce. (3) “Partnership Action for Industrial Chain Cooperation,” including the establishment of a digital technology cooperation center and the implementation of digital demonstration projects. (4) “Partnership Action for Connectivity,” characterized by land–sea cooperation and coordinated development. (5) “Partnership Action for Development Cooperation” under the Global Development Initiative (GDI). (6) “Partnership Action for Health and Well-being,” including the establishment of the China–Africa Hospital Alliance and the joint construction of healthcare centers. (7) “Partnership Action for Agricultural Promotion and Livelihood Focus,” including the provision of 1 billion RMB in emergency food aid, the construction of 100,000 acres of agricultural standardization demonstration zones, the dispatch of 500 agricultural experts, the creation of the China–Africa Agricultural Science and Technology Innovation Alliance, the implementation of 500 public welfare projects, creating industrial added value for Africa and generating over 1 million jobs in Africa. (8) “Partnership Action for Human and Cultural Exchange,” including the joint construction of engineering technical universities and vocational schools, and the construction of 10 “魯班工房[11](Luban Workshops: China’s foreign vocational education cooperation institutions)”. (9) “Partnership Action for Green Development,” including the implementation of 30 clean energy projects, the establishment of early warning weather business platforms, disaster prevention, reduction, and relief efforts, cooperation in biodiversity conservation, the establishment of a China–Africa Forum for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology, the construction of 30 joint research institutes, along with cooperation in satellite remote sensing, lunar and deep space exploration. (10) “Partnership Action for Security Cooperation,” including the establishment of a partnership with Africa for the implementation of the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the creation of cooperative demonstration areas for GSI collaboration, the provision of 1 billion RMB in free military aid to Africa, training 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police and law enforcement officers, inviting 500 young military officers to China, conducting joint military exercises, training, and patrols, implementing the “Africa Mine Removal Assistance Operation,” and jointly maintaining personnel and project safety. Compared to the “Eight Major Action Guidelines” proposed at the 2018 Beijing Summit[12], the “Ten Major Partnership Actions” for 2024 are more in-depth than before in the areas of governance, inter-party exchange, military exchange, digital development, satellite development, and security development. ◆ Mutual Support for Regime Maintenance: China’s “Modernization Does Not Mean Westernization” The Beijing FOCAC partnership actions prioritize the “growth of exports” from Africa’s natural resources and agriculture. In recent years, China has faced criticism from Western countries related to the “debt trap” associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. Consequently, the emphasis of the program has shifted from debt-driven infrastructure investment to trade relations. Within the FOCAC framework, African countries can receive support from China without the typical conditionalities that are inherent with aid from Western countries, such as democracy, human rights, freedom, and environmental considerations: the so-called “Washington Consensus”. This relative lack of conditions allows China to solidify its position as a “partner” to African nations. For China, its relations with African nations hold significance not only for the stable acquisition of mineral resources and global South diplomacy but also as part of the broader strategy to promote a governance model distinct from that of the West[13]. This strategy of promotion is key to China’s “distinctive great power diplomacy.” The most important axis of this diplomacy is to maintain the leadership of the Communist Party of China, strengthen confidence in China’s socialist path, theory, system, and culture, and work towards increasing the number of countries and people who understand and support the social system and development path that China has chosen[14]. For China, the top priority in security is the maintenance of the one-party dictatorship and democratic centralism political system under leadership of the Communist Party of China. In the aftermath of the Beijing FOCAC, the Chinese foreign affairs magazine “World Knowledge”, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, criticized Walt Whitman Rostow’s modernization theory as a narrow perspective and argued that “modernization does not mean Westernization.” The magazine also criticized how Western neoliberalism has forced deindustrialization on Africa[15]. The neoliberal Washington Consensus is regarded by African countries as an imposition of good governance. The criticism of the Washington Consensus from authoritarian African governments resonates with China. ◆ China’s Efforts to Incorporate Africa into the Formulation of International Rules for AI and Cybersecurity Africa’s AI market size accounts for only 2.5% of the global share[16]. However, the potential demand for digitalization in Africa is immense. For example, 70% of global mobile payment transactions take place in Sub-Saharan Africa[17]. According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Africa’s share of global internet users is still about 14%, but investments in digital infrastructure, such as the expansion of submarine cables, are expected to reach $6 billion annually by 2027[18]. Africa’s appeal lies not only in its potential markets and key minerals. The “Action Plan (2025–2027)” outlines China’s vision for collaboration with Africa through initiatives such as the “Global AI Governance Initiative (GAII)” and the “Global Data Initiative (GDI).” These initiatives are aimed at establishing the Global Security Initiative (GSI) through mutual cooperation between China and Africa. A key objective of China in Africa is to work with the Global South for the joint construction of a “Digital Community of Shared Destiny” and position China’s leadership in the GDI at the core of international rule-making for digital governance. ◆ GSI and Africa’s Inclusion in SSA China’s efforts to engage Africa extend beyond merely the GAII and GDI. Establishment of a partnership with Africa for the construction of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) was emphasized repeatedly by China during the FOCAC and was included in the “Action Plan (2025–2027).” When reading President Xi Jinping’s keynote speech alongside the “Action Plan (2025–2027),” it becomes readily apparent that the “Green Development Partnership Action” and the “Security Cooperation Partnership Action” have become increasingly comprehensive compared to past years. Additionally, the plan includes local perspectives such as the protection of Chinese citizens and companies operating in Africa, and global perspectives on security cooperation in widely diverse fields including space, satellites, AI, and cybersecurity. This inclusion of cooperative projects suggests that China is seeking to integrate Africa into its Space Situational Awareness (SSA) framework. The “Green Development Partnership Action” between China and Africa includes the establishment of a meteorological early warning operation platform, the creation of a peaceful nuclear technology platform, and cooperation in areas such as satellite remote sensing, lunar exploration, and deep space exploration, which indicates that China intends to strengthen its green cooperation with Africa while also solidifying Africa’s support in the development of space governance rules, all while securing resources and rights for China. China has already expressed its intention to enhance space traffic management, including improvement of space debris monitoring systems, and to develop integrated space–climate monitoring systems linking space and the Earth’s surface. In this context, China is actively advocating for participation in the development of international rules within the UN framework. ◆ Safe Access to Resources and China’s Private Security Companies One focal point of the recent FOCAC “Action Plan (2025–2027)” is the direction in which China’s security companies in Africa are expected to strengthen their roles. China has provided “military subsidies” to African countries, invited 6,000 African military personnel and 1,000 law enforcement officers for training, and conducted joint military exercises, training, and patrols, all aimed at incorporating Africa into the Global Security Initiative (GSI) proposed by China. Furthermore, China is set to enhance its support for counterterrorism capabilities in regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, and to collaborate with 14 East African countries, Interpol, and the African Police Cooperation Organisation (AFRIPOL) to establish a “security Silk Road,” particularly addressing the establishment and enhancement of the capabilities of law enforcement agencies. The proposal for jointly building a security partnership reflects the increasing gravity of protecting Chinese citizens and businesses in Africa, a concern that has become increasingly urgent as China’s presence in Africa grows. With over 10,000 Chinese companies and more than one million Chinese citizens working across Africa, Chinese citizens and businesses are increasingly exposed to risks such as kidnappings, terrorist attacks, anti-China violence, and local coups, especially as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expands. However, despite the growing Chinese presence, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains reluctant to engage in large-scale military deployments across Africa as of October 2024. Instead, China remains in a situation of not fully trusting African security forces to protect Chinese citizens and businesses. In response, China has turned to private security companies such as Beijing DeWe Security Service[19], Huaxin Zhongan Security Service (HZSS), and China Security Technology Group (CISG), which have expanded their presence in Africa in recent years. Although these companies are officially “private enterprises,” their core personnel often come from the PLA, the People’s Armed Police, or the police forces[20]. Unlike Russian private military companies, China’s private security firms are not allowed to engage in combat operations. According to China’s “Security Services Management Regulations” (adopted in September 2009 and effective January 2010), private security personnel are only allowed limited access to firearms. The use of violence to resolve conflicts is prohibited (with exceptions for security operations in the Gulf of Aden)[21]. Instead, Chinese security companies are required to “cooperate closely” with the local military and police forces. These companies do not participate directly in African conflicts but instead hire local armed personnel and train police and other security forces behind the scenes[22]. However, incidents of human rights violations have arisen, as in cases where Chinese private military companies have lent firearms to local militias and security companies, contributing to human rights abuses in countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These events have exacerbated anti-China sentiment in the region. In terms of protecting Chinese citizens in Africa, President Xi Jinping emphasized in the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022 that “the ability to safeguard national security should be strengthened… overseas security capabilities should be built up, and the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and overseas entities should be protected.[23]” Nevertheless, the murder of nine Chinese workers in a mine in the Central African Republic in March 2023, an unresolved case, highlighted the growing risks faced by Chinese citizens working in Africa and further intensified the sense of urgency among the Chinese leadership. From the content outlined in the 2024 FOCAC “Action Plan (2025–2027)” and “Security Cooperation Partnership Action,” it seems likely that the role and scope of China’s private security companies in Africa will expand in the near future. Ⅱ The Five Pillars of China’s Africa Policy From analyses of the “FOCAC Beijing Declaration” and the “FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025–2027),” the main objectives of China’s Africa policy can be outlined as the following: (1) Support for Non-Western Governance Models and Mutual Support, (2) Expansion of the Representation and Influence of the Global South in Multilateral Rulemaking, (3) Ensuring Stable Supply Chains for Mineral Trade, Including Critical Minerals, and Securing Global Value Chains, (4) Protection of Chinese Citizens and Companies Operating in Africa, (5) Establishment of a Second Overseas Base in Africa, (6) Incorporation of Africa into SSA and the Development of International Rules for Space-Based and Ground-Integrated Space Situational Awareness at the UN. Points [4] and [6] are discussed in Section I. Point [5] is discussed in Section III. This section will specifically examine points [1]– [3]. ◆ Support for Non-Western Governance Models and Mutual Support, and Expansion of the Representation and Influence of the Global South The first goal is joint promotion of governance models that differ from Western-style democracy and collaboration with African countries in resisting Western criticism. In other words, China is advocating for the promotion of a “new type of international relations” and the formation of a “friendship circle” or network to resist the West’s decoupling and de-risking efforts against China[24]. The second goal, which is linked closely to the first, is the expansion of representation and influence in multilateral institutions. Cooperation with the Global South for China is not only about promoting South–South cooperation but also about enabling the Global South to rise as a group and play an important role in forming a power balance against the West in international society. Both China and Africa assert that “Africa is not a battleground for great power struggles but a partner in international cooperation,” as stated in the “Action Plan (2025–2027)[25].” However, in reality, the content strongly reflects the competition for spheres of influence among great powers and opposition to the United States. For instance, the plan includes opposition to the politicization of human rights issues, cooperation in the United Nations and BRICS, collaboration on discussions to integrate the “Agreement on Investment Facilitation for Development” into the WTO framework, and cooperation in the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), to be held in Spain during June 30 through July 3, 2025[26]. At the FfD4, stronger efforts will be made reform the international financial architecture, including the ways of providing development financing, grants, and technical assistance to economically developing countries by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The “Action Plan (2025–2027)” states clearly that Africa will cooperate with China to promote modernization for common development and prosperity, will respect each other’s right to choose their own political systems, and will explore modernization models based on the characteristics of each civilization and development needs. China also calls for strengthening the integration of development philosophies between China and Africa, and establishing a platform for the exchange of modern experiences and autonomous knowledge systems between the two sides[27]. Both China and Africa are committed to poverty reduction, expanding exchanges among national governments, legislatures, and local provinces and cities, to deepening experience exchanges on governance, modernization, and development, and to continuous mutual support in a quest for modernization based on agreements. Before the FOCAC Beijing Summit, the 13th “China–Africa Think Tank Forum” was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on March 8, 2024, with more than 300 participants including government officials, scholars, and entrepreneurs from China and Africa. At this forum, the “Consensus on Deepening International Development Cooperation between China and Africa Think Tanks,” also known as the “Dar es Salaam Consensus,” was announced. In this statement, China emphasized the need to achieve modernization based on each country’s national conditions and the cultural and historical aspects of its people[28]. Furthermore, China stated in the “Action Plan (2025–2027)” that it respects the political and economic choices made by African countries based on their own circumstances, that it refrains from interfering in their internal affairs, and that it does not impose conditions on aid to Africa. China also highlighted its support for African countries to play a larger role in global governance, particularly in solving global issues. China expressed support for the African Union to become a formal member of the G20 and its support for more African countries in joining the BRICS family. Additionally, China is advocating for reforms in the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, aiming at increasing African representation in protecting the legitimate interests of developing countries, and aiming at expanding the representation and influence of developing nations in global governance[29]. ◆ Critical Minerals The third key objective is the expansion of trade relations centered around “critical minerals.[30]” As the world shifts toward decarbonization, the importance of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel has increased dramatically because of the necessary production and infrastructure related to renewable energy sources such as solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles (EVs). Africa holds abundant reserves of these critical minerals. As one would expect, investment in renewable energy is also on the rise[31]. According to the International Energy Agency’s Critical Minerals Market Review 2023, released in July 2023, the demand for major energy transition minerals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements is increasing rapidly, with demand for critical minerals expected to double by 2030 because of the growth of clean energy and the expansion of power grids. Although Western companies are the main suppliers of copper and lithium, Chinese companies have a marked presence in the production of nickel (mined mainly in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia) and cobalt (mined primarily in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)[32]. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as reported in its Economic Development in Africa Report 2023, analyzed Africa’s renewable energy and supply chains. The analyses revealed that Africa holds remarkable shares of the world’s critical mineral reserves, including cobalt (48.1%), manganese (47.6%), natural graphite (21.6%), copper (5.9%), and nickel (5.6%). South Africa alone holds 640 million tons of the world’s total manganese reserves of 1.5 billion tons, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accounts for about 46% (3.5 million tons) of the world’s cobalt reserves of 7.6 million tons, which are used in devices such as smartphone batteries[33]. Moreover, Africa produces other crucially important metals and minerals for low-carbon transition such as chrome, lithium, natural graphite, niobium, rare earth metals, silver, tellurium, and titanium. In light of these natural endowments of strategically important minerals, during the FOCAC Beijing Summit, particularly noteworthy were the meetings between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the heads of state of key African nations: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. ◆ South Africa As a member of BRICS and set to chair the G20 in 2025, South Africa is gaining prominence in China’s Global South diplomacy. The South African government has highlighted the eight agreements signed during President Cyril Ramaphosa’s visit to China under FOCAC, which are expected to engender the expansion of exports to China, including those of minerals, goods, products, and agricultural products. Additionally, South Africa must regard China as a key partner in addressing its energy security challenges[34]. On September 2, 2024, President Xi Jinping and President Ramaphosa elevated the bilateral relationship to a “new era comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership,” aimed at accelerating the construction of a high-level community of shared destiny between the two countries. In their joint statement, the two leaders emphasized deepening cooperation in traditional areas such as agriculture, health, medicine, and infrastructure construction, while particularly addressing key sectors such as the digital economy, new energy, and artificial intelligence. They also agreed to expand mutual cooperation in renewable energy, energy storage, and power transmission and distribution[35]. Investment in the renewable energy sector is expanding rapidly across Africa, with considerable increases in solar panel manufacturing in countries such as South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco. These projects not only supply raw materials from South Africa to China but also contribute to product manufacturing within Africa, consequently strengthening China’s supply chains and global value chains. Amid the U.S. push for decoupling and de-risking, China is integrating Africa into the restructuring of its supply chains to mitigate risks of fragmentation. ◆ Zimbabwe Rich in mineral resources such as gold, platinum group metals, nickel, chrome, and diamonds, Zimbabwe tightly controls the export of unprocessed minerals such as lithium, which is mined by hand. However, three major Chinese mining companies (Zhejiang Huayou, Zhongtai Resources Group, and Chengxin Group) are exempt from these restrictions, making China a special partner for Zimbabwe. In the fall of 2023, the chairman of Zhongtai Resources, Wang Pingwei, emphasized China’s plans to build a lithium product industrial chain in Zimbabwe, accelerate the construction of solar power plants, and support sustainable development[36]. In countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Nigeria, where Chinese companies dominate the mining sector, the governments of these countries restrict lithium exports while allowing Chinese-built refineries to process the raw material locally. This arrangement enables China to create supply chains with added value in the region[37]. On September 3, 2024, China and Zimbabwe agreed to enhance and elevate their relationship further to a “Comprehensive and Strategic Cooperation Partnership.” President Emerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe and President Xi Jinping held discussions and agreed on the need to build a strong cooperation framework based on five pillars: politics, economics and trade, security, culture, and international cooperation. They also emphasized the importance of constructing a high-level “China–Zimbabwe Community of Shared Destiny.” The joint statement released on September 3, 2024 highlighted China’s commitment to protecting Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. It also emphasized the need to align Zimbabwe’s development strategies with China’s, expanding mutual cooperation in investment, trade, infrastructure, energy and minerals, clean energy, digital economy, agriculture (including avocados), and the building of connectivity networks. The statement also underscored the exchange of experiences in the management of rare earths and key minerals between the two countries. Furthermore, the statement included a commitment to supporting Chinese investment in Zimbabwe’s new energy value chain projects, as well as in the renovation of Zimbabwe’s railway system and various infrastructure projects under the “Digital Zimbabwe” initiative[38]. Relations between China and Zimbabwe are by no means limited to mineral trade. China supports Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, security, and development interests, and opposes “external interference” and “illegal sanctions,” particularly those imposed by Western countries. China, having pledged continued support for Zimbabwe’s governance and administrative experience exchanges, continues to provide scholarships to Zimbabwean students studying in China. On September 3, Zimbabwe expressed its appreciation for Xi Jinping’s concept of a Community of Shared Destiny for Humanity, particularly valuing the “common values” of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom proposed by Xi. Zimbabwe also expressed support for China’s vision of a multipolar world order[39]. This mutual appreciation underscores how China’s concept of a “Community of Shared Destiny” aligns with resistance against interference and sanctions from Western countries, as well as supporting non-democratic political systems. ◆ Nigeria Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, holds a leading position in West Africa. The country has strong relations not only with emerging economies but also with the G7 nations. In China’s Africa policy, Nigeria occupies a particularly important position diplomatically, geopolitically, and in terms of mineral strategy. Rich in natural resources such as crude oil, natural gas, lithium, tin, niobium-tantalum ore, gold, and iron ore, Nigeria has become a critical source of raw materials. However, with respect to lithium mining, the Nigerian government has intensified regulations by requiring foreign companies to establish lithium processing and refining plants in the country before they are allowed to mine and export lithium. Similarly to its arrangements in Zimbabwe, China has methodically established a favorable supply chain for itself in Nigeria. In this context, China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment announced on December 8, 2023, at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) in Dubai that it had agreed to an investment contract with Nigeria’s Ministry of Power for the construction of a lithium-ion battery manufacturing plant by Chinese companies. Ahead of the FOCAC summit, on September 3, 2024, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu and President Xi Jinping agreed to deepen their “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”; they released a joint statement on the construction of a “Community of Shared Destiny.[40]” China expressed support for Nigeria’s leadership role within ECOWAS and pledged military equipment and intelligence support. Nigeria, in turn, affirmed its support for the “One China” policy. The two countries agreed to support China’s initiatives such as the “Community of Shared Destiny for Humanity,” the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), while strengthening mutual cooperation within the UN, G20, and BRICS. Additionally, China and Nigeria have agreed to expand the use of the Chinese yuan through a currency swap agreement. Moreover, they welcomed the establishment of factories in Nigeria by Chinese companies in sectors such as new energy, mineral resource development, agriculture (including peanuts), infrastructure construction, artificial intelligence, digital technology, and the application of the BeiDou satellite navigation system. The two countries have signed bilateral cooperation documents, which include collaboration in nuclear power generation[41]. ◆ The Two Congos: The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo Africa has two countries named Congo. The Republic of Congo, which gained independence from France in 1960, changed its name to the People’s Republic of Congo in 1969, later reverting to the Republic of Congo in 1991. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), after gaining independence from Belgium, changed its name to the Republic of Zaire in 1971 before reverting to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997. In the Republic of Congo[42], exports of a wide scope of are closely associated with the crude oil industry. Its economy is intensively dependent on oil. By contrast, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) boasts abundant mineral resources, including cobalt (the world’s largest producer), tantalum (also leading in production), copper, and diamonds. Approximately a quarter of the DRC’s GDP and around 90% of its exports derive from oil and mineral resources, with mineral production driving its GDP growth. The DRC is necessary for China’s critical mineral strategy because it holds nearly half of the world’s reserves of cobalt[43]: a particularly vital material for smartphone batteries. In response, the U.S. and EU have taken steps to counter China’s substantial influence in the DRC. As part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), they have proposed the “Lobito Corridor” project, connecting Angola’s Lobito Port on Africa’s west coast to the “Copper Belt” region of the DRC and Zambia. This initiative counters China’s transcontinental railway, which already links Angola, the DRC, Zambia, and Tanzania, sparking a “China vs. U.S. + EU” competition for influence in the DRC. Caught in the middle of this geopolitical rivalry, the DRC seeks to avoid exclusive alignment with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and instead aims at attracting investment from both sides, and at maximizing commitments extended from both China and the West. The salient importance of the DRC to China was evident in the placement of the summit meeting between DRC President Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo and President Xi Jinping at the top of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ FOCAC summit webpage. During their meeting on September 2, 2024 in the Great Hall of the People, Xi noted the elevation of China–DRC relations to a “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership” in May 2023. The two nations agreed to expand trade and investment cooperation, enhance trade liberalization and facilitation, and encourage more Chinese companies to invest in the DRC. They also committed to deepening cooperation in infrastructure, energy, mining, forestry, civil aviation, and other sectors, aiming to strengthen global supply chains and to develop industries jointly. The partnership extends to human resource development, customs capacity building, and journalism, with numerous bilateral agreements signed to support these initiatives[45]. China’s agreements with the DRC reflect its strategy to strengthen supply chains and value chains by advancing the local processing of intermediate products in Africa, even in the challenging environment of U.S.–China “decoupling.” The mineral supply chain encompasses extraction, transportation, shipment, processing, refining, and alloying, culminating in the manufacture and sale of mineral-based products. The DRC is also known for its severe human rights issues infractions, including “conflict diamonds,” exploitation through low-wage labor, child conscription, and systematic violence against women, leading to regulation under Section 1502 of the U.S. Dodd–Frank Act. From China’s perspective, increasing local processing and manufacturing in the DRC would help reduce transportation costs for raw materials, consequently extending China’s reach in the region’s critical mineral sector. Ⅲ China’s Expansion of the “Space Information Corridor” and the Development of the “Sixth Island Chain” ◆ The First to Fifth Island Chains China is actively expanding its sphere of influence in Africa. High-ranking officials in the Biden administration, including Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, have sounded alarms, claiming that China has become increasingly aggressive and authoritarian in regions such as the Indo-Pacific. They warn that Chinese leaders are working to expand their power projection capabilities and to establish a global network of military bases[46]. Whereas the U.S. Department of Defense’s official reports primarily discuss the First and Second Island Chains, scholars, media, and practitioners are paying close attention to China’s activities extending to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Island Chains. The Fourth and Fifth Chains are not fully established yet, but through the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s efforts toward achieving them have gathered momentum. The First Island Chain is China’s minimum defensive line, stretching from the Kuril Islands through Japan, Kyushu, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo, reaching the South China Sea. The Second Island Chain runs through the Ogasawara Islands and U.S.-held Guam, ending in Papua New Guinea. Surrounding this line are countries that have entered the Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the U.S., including the Republic of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia. The Third Island Chain extends from the Aleutian Islands to Hawaii, American Samoa, Fiji, and reaches New Zealand. In recent years, China has gained an upper hand in key geopolitical locations along the Third Island Chain, such as Kiribati and the Solomon Islands[47]. The Fourth Island Chain moves southward, from Gwadar in Pakistan to Hambantota in Sri Lanka and the Maldives[48]. As China strengthens its presence in this area, India is preparing a military base in the Republic of Mauritius. In October 2024, the U.K. announced it would return the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius, but under an agreement, the U.S.–U.K. military base on Diego Garcia, the largest island, will continue to operate for the next 99 years. The Fifth Island Chain curves around Djibouti, following the coastline of East Africa, through the Mozambique Channel, and down to South Africa. China’s Doraleh base in Djibouti reflects its commitment to using economic resources, conducting anti-piracy operations, and protecting overseas Chinese citizens, marking China’s deepening involvement in Africa and the Western Indian Ocean[49]. Based on these developments, the U.S. Department of Defense has expressed concern that China might be considering establishing PLA bases or logistics facilities in Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and the Seychelles[50]. ◆ Strategic Pursuit of Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa In recent years, China has increasingly directed loans to West African countries, including the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Senegal, the Republic of Benin, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic of Cameroon, and the Republic of Ghana. This shift to the Atlantic-facing side from earlier emphases on East Africa and Southern Africa is noteworthy from a geopolitical perspective. The People’s Liberation Army’s access to ports, including availability through military cooperation, has the potential to enhance China’s power projection capabilities and to increase threats to vital maritime routes. China’s “support” for the Global South became more focused geopolitically and strategically after 2016, concentrating efforts on key countries. China has reduced government loans considerably because many infrastructure projects in Africa such as ports, hydroelectric power plants, and railways have proven to be financially unsustainable. Whereas the Chinese government encourages public-private partnerships (PPP) as a new means of investing in Africa, the private sector is cautious about projects in Africa because of the difficulties in debt repayment[51]. Despite this caution, investment in sub-Saharan Africa, which remains trapped in poverty, continues to attract attention because of the region’s geopolitical importance. ◆ China’s Pursuit of its First Permanent Military Base in the Atlantic Since China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, discussions have centered on China’s military presence, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. However, starting around 2014, China’s expanding economic footprint in Portugal’s Terceira Islands in the Atlantic caught the attention of Western media. From 2019 onward, the U.S. military has grown increasingly wary of China’s activities stretching southward from Terceira’s strategic Lajes area (notably, Praia da Vitória Port) to West Africa. China, with aspirations of becoming both a “maritime power” and a “space power,” is investing aggressively in infrastructure, space, ports, maritime, and industry along the Atlantic-facing west coast of Africa, starting from the Terceira Islands. The expanding Chinese presence in this area, along with its influence in places such as Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean, is attracting interest by U.S. government and military officials for its potential as a strategy to counterbalance American interests. In 2019, as the U.S. military’s concerns about China’s moves in West Africa grew, China began fortifying its domestic laws to facilitate overseas military base construction for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This effort included revision of the National Defense Law, undertaken by the Ministry of National Defense, with two reviews by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The amended law after adoption on December 26, 2020, came into effect on January 1, 2021. The new Article 22 of the amended law states explicitly that one of the PLA’s missions is to “protect national interests overseas” in the “new era.” Article 68 adds a mandate to “safeguard the safety of citizens, organizations, and facilities abroad.”[52] China appears to be positioning itself to establish its first permanent military base on Africa’s Atlantic side. Because this base would likely serve purposes beyond simply safeguarding Chinese citizens and businesses in Africa, it remains an emphasis of U.S. vigilance. ◆ Strategic Significance of the Equatorial Region: China’s Development of ASAT Capabilities to Target Geostationary Satellites The port of Bata, a large port in Equatorial Guinea’s mainland and its largest city, received initial funding from the China Exim Bank in 2006. It was constructed by a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company in 2014. In 2015, Huawei Marine Networks secured a contract from the Equatorial Guinean government to build a submarine cable system connecting the country to Europe. In 2021, China reached out to officials in Equatorial Guinea with the aim of establishing its first permanent military base on the Atlantic coast. This facility would potentially allow Chinese warships to rearm and conduct repairs opposite the U.S. East Coast, raising concerns in both the White House and the Department of Defense. In response, John Finer, Deputy National Security Advisor for the United States, visited Equatorial Guinea and other nations in October of the same year, meeting with President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and his son, urging them to reject China’s proposal[53]. However, the U.S.–China struggle did not end there. In March 2022, then U.S. Army General Stephen J. Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, stated that China was seeking new base locations across a range from Mauritania to Namibia, posing a challenge to U.S. national security[54]. Townsend reiterated this point at a press briefing on July 28 of that same year. China’s expanded presence in the Gulf of Guinea, and by extension around the equatorial region, entails important military implications. Satellites used for purposes such as weather monitoring and broadcasting rely on geostationary orbits, which follow a circular path approximately 36,000 km above the equator[55]. These satellites move at the same rate as the Earth’s rotation. Therefore, the satellites can observe nearly the same area on the planet continuously. Moreover, because the Earth’s rotational speed increases closer to the equator, launching rockets from near-equatorial locations is advantageous. A report on space security published by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency on April 12, 2022, highlighted that China and Russia are expanding their development of anti-satellite weapons, with the aim of deterring U.S. military intervention. The report warned that China, which has already deployed ground-based anti-satellite missiles targeting satellites in low Earth orbit (below 2,000 km), might develop missiles capable of reaching satellites in geostationary orbit (36,000 km)[56]. In October of the following year, the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress stated that China’s People’s Liberation Army is developing directed energy weapons and satellite jamming equipment, as well as ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles targeting low Earth orbit satellites. The report suggests that China intends to develop weapons capable of destroying satellites in geostationary orbit[57]. Given China’s military strategy, it is crucially important that Western countries carefully analyze the potential space strategy behind China’s satellite support for African countries around the Gulf of Guinea. ◆ “Space Information Corridor” and Africa The 11th item in Africa’s “Agenda 2063” flagship projects is the “African Outer Space Strategy,” indicating Africa’s ambitions to advance its space development. China has been the most proactive country involved in Africa’s space industry, providing funding and training, building satellites and ground stations, and collaborating on efforts in support of satellite navigation and climate monitoring to support Africa’s capacity in satellite communications and Earth observation. China’s support for Africa in this area pre-dates President Xi Jinping launching of his vision for China to become a “space power.” In Nigeria, China’s cooperation began in 2011 under a 2009 contract between China Great Wall Industry Corporation, a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), and the Nigerian Communications Satellite Ltd. In December 2011, a Long March 3B rocket launched Nigeria’s communication satellite, NigComSat-1R, from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan Province. Developed using China Academy of Space Technology’s Dong Fang Hong-4 technology, the NigComSat-1R satellite covers West Africa and Southern Africa, parts of Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. Since Xi Jinping launched his “space power” vision in 2017, China’s support has accelerated. From Algeria, CASC launched the Alcomsat-1 communication satellite in December 2017 on behalf of the Algerian Space Agency, achieving stable positioning of the device. This project included an integrated system of satellites, rockets, ground control, and application systems. In 2020, the ALCOMSAT-1 satellite and ground station exported by CASC’s Fifth Academy were featured on a 500-dinar banknote in Algeria. In November 2019, Sudan’s first satellite was launched from China. The following month, China provided Ethiopia with a multispectral remote-sensing satellite to aid in climate change research, agriculture, forestry, water resources, and disaster monitoring. In June 2023, China helped Egypt establish a satellite assembly and testing center in Cairo, followed by the successful launch of Egypt’s MisrSat-2 satellite in December. This satellite is used for agriculture, mineral exploration, surface water identification, and environmental monitoring related to climate change. Additionally, in December, China and Egypt signed a series of space agreements, including cooperation on the China-led International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). In August 2024, the Egyptian Space Agency (EGSA) announced a joint venture with Hong Kong’s USPACE Technology Group to develop space technology. South Africa joined the ILRS project in September 2023, with the South African National Space Agency (SANSA) collaborating in areas such as project demonstration, mission implementation, operations, and training. The space agencies of South Africa and China also agreed to mutual cooperation in remote sensing data exchange and satellite ground stations under the BRICS remote-sensing satellite framework. A primary motivation of China for its space initiatives in Africa is promoting the adoption of its BeiDou Satellite Navigation System as a replacement for the U.S.-led GPS, asserting a more competitive stance in the IoT era for Space Situational Awareness (SSA). On April 10, 2018, China established the first overseas facility of the BeiDou system, the China–Arab BeiDou Center, in a science and technology park north of Tunis, Tunisia. Since then, China has engaged in discussions with the AU and with African countries on the adoption of BeiDou. China expects Africa to play a “significant and favorable role” for China in shaping the rules of global governance for space activities. Moreover, it fully expects the support of China’s interests by AU and African nations. Conclusion As examined above, although the amount of Chinese financing for Africa announced at the 2024 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has been reduced, this reduction does not signify a decrease in China’s engagement with Africa. Rather, considering its content, the aid reflects a more comprehensive and assertive approach, influenced by U.S.–China competition, and suggesting that China is moving forward with expansion of its influence in Africa. Both China and Africa proclaim that they will not make Africa a battleground for major power competition. Nevertheless, Africa has increasingly become a stage for geopolitical competition, not only as a noteworthy player in global governance norm-setting but also as a focus of power struggles taking place in space and cyber domains. That said, African nations, which are gaining more agency, appear to be leveraging the U.S.–China rivalry to attract investment from both sides for their national development ambitions. Western countries, even if they are unable to outcompete China’s growing presence in Africa, must advance their diplomatic efforts to keep African nations from aligning too closely with China, with the aim of maintaining Africa’s neutral stance. [1] “Forum on China–Africa Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, April 2024. [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gjhdqzz_681964/zfhzlt_682902/jbqk_682904/] [2] The AUC represents the AU externally as its secretariat and proposes policies and legislation while also implementing decisions (Mission of Japan to the African Union [https://www.au-mission.emb-japan.go.jp/files/100674424.pdf]). [3] Mohamed Younis Menfi, Chairman of the Presidential Council of Libya, and Abdel Fattah al-Burhan Abdelrahman al-Burhan, Chairman of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan. [4] 「习近平：决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色社会主义伟大胜利——在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告」,中国政府网, October 27, 2017. [5] 「关于共筑新时代全天候中非命运共同体的北京宣言（全文）」, 中华人民共和国外交部, September 5, 2024. [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485966.shtml] [6] Regarding China’s shift in support for economically developing countries, examples such as the case of Pacific island nations are discussed in the following: Emi Mifune, “Implications of Pacific Island Nations in Sphere-of-Influence Competition and the China Risk: An Examination of Palau, Kiribati, and the Solomon Islands,” Japan Forum on International Relations, February 14, 2024. [https://www.jfir.or.jp/studygroup_article/10538/] [7] For example, the remarks of Attorney General Barr during the Trump administration can be found in the following: William Barr, “Transcript of Attorney General Barr’s Remarks on China Policy at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum,” U.S. Department of Justice, July 17, 2020. [https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/transcript-attorney-general-barr-s-remarks-china-policy-gerald-r-ford-presidential-museum] [8] The two specific major economic corridor developments that PGII has been covering are the India – Middle East – Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) and the Lobito Corridor. A discussion of IMEC and China is presented below: Emi Mifune, “The International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) to Middle East Eurasia and ‘One Belt, One Road’ in ‘China’s Distinctive Great Power Diplomacy in the New Era,’” Middle East Research Council, May 7, 2024. [https://www.meij.or.jp/research/2023/18.html] [9] https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.org/files/sotf-the-pact-for-the-future.pdf [10] “学而时习「习近平主席宣布中非“十大伙伴行动”」,” 求是网, September 6, 2024. [http://www.qstheory.cn/zhuanqu/2024-09/06/c_1130199372.htm] [11] China’s Luban Workshops are part of a strategy by the Chinese government to strengthen collaboration with Chinese enterprises abroad, fostering local technical talent who are well-versed in Chinese culture and business practices. For China, these workshops serve as a means to expand its industrial standards and technology. For African businesses and governments, they lead to improvements in technology and job creation. The Luban Workshops have become an important tool in the development of China–Africa relations. [12] (1) Implementation of industrial promotion actions. (2) Implementation of infrastructure connectivity actions. (3) Implementation of trade facilitation actions. (4) Implementation of green development actions. (5) Implementation of capacity-building actions. (6) Implementation of health and sanitation actions. (7) Implementation of people-to-people and cultural exchange actions. (8) Implementation of peace and security actions. [13] I discuss this kind of Chinese democracy being turned into diplomacy in my article（三船恵美「外交化した中国的民主」霞山会『東亜』to be published in December 2024). [14] For information on “China’s Distinctive Great Power Diplomacy,” please refer三船恵美”第15章 大国外交と日本 ―「中国の特色ある大国外交」とは何か―” in 現代中国政治, edited by 加茂具樹 and 渡邊真理子, to be published by 法律文化社 in 2025. [15] Liu Haifang, Li Wentao, Tang Xiaoyang, and Wang Jinjie, “When Chinese-style Modernization Meets African Modernization,” World Knowledge, Issue 18 (September 2024), pp. 12-25. This article features a roundtable discussion with renowned Chinese Africa researchers Liu Haifang, Director of the African Studies Center at Peking University; Li Wentao, Director of the Institute of African Studies at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations; Tang Xiaoyang, Professor and Chair of the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University; and Wang Jinjie, Deputy Secretary-General of the African Studies Center at Peking University. The journal also includes an article on the anti-U.S. protests in Niger, which took place two days after the U.S. agreed to withdraw its troops from the country at the request of the Nigerian government on April 19. On April 12 of the same month, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a memorandum with Niger for the commercialization of the Agadem oilfield project. [16] GSMA, “New GSMA report reveals huge potential for AI to support Africa’s socio-economic growth across agriculture, energy and climate,” July 16, 2024 [https://www.gsma.com/newsroom/press-release/new-gsma-report-reveals-huge-potential-for-ai-to-support-africas-socio-economic-growth-across-agriculture-energy-and-climate/]. [17] “Why is DX Advancing in Africa? The Benefits and Drawbacks of Generative AI,” JICA, February 26, 2024 [https://www.jica.go.jp/information/topics/2023/p20240226_01.html]. [18] Marcio Cruz (ed.), Digital Opportunities in African Businesses, World Bank Group, May 2024 [https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/e6f2cc1b-ad12-460f-9f17-ff95b69cb378/content]. [19] The company has local subsidiaries or branches in Guinea, Kenya, the Central African Republic, Madagascar, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and other countries. Moreover, it has opened offices in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United Arab Emirates. [20] For example, VOA reports that 99% of China’s private security contractors are former People’s Liberation Army personnel, former special forces, or former paramilitary police. Kate Bartlett, “How Chinese Private Security Companies in Africa Differ From Russia’s,” March 31, 2023, Voice of America [https://www.voanews.com/a/how-chinese-private-security-companies-in-africa-differ-from-russia-s-/7030946.html]. [21] “保安服务管理条例,” Chinese Government Website, October 19, 2009 [https://www.gov.cn › content_1443395]. [22] “Wagner Withdrawal Could Open Door for Chinese Security Companies,” Africa Defense Forum, Jul 18, 2023 [https://adf-magazine.com/2023/07/wagner-withdrawal-could-open-door-for-chinese-security-companies/]. [23] “高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜 为全面建设社会主义现代化国家而团结奋斗——在中国共产党第二十次全国代表大会上的报告(October 16, 2022),” People’s Daily, October 26, 2022. [24] The Chinese government and Chinese media have repeatedly criticized “de-risking” as essentially “decoupling,” merely a change in rhetoric. [25] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “中非合作论坛—北京行动计划（2025-2027）,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 5, 2024 [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zyxw/202409/t20240905_11485697.shtml]. [26] In FFD4, China is scheduled to serve as vice-chair alongside other Asia–Pacific countries in rotation. [27] 「中非合作论坛—北京行动计划（2025-2027）」as previously mentioned. [28] 「中非智库论坛近期发布《中非智库关于深化全球发展合作的共识》」国际合作中心, June 27, 2024, [https://www.icc.org.cn/strategicresearch/laboratory/worldpolitics/xgwz/2321.html]. [29] 「中非合作论坛—北京行动计划（2025-2027）」as mentioned earlier. [30] No clear definition exists of which resources are regarded as critical minerals: the definition apparently varies depending on the country and the circumstances of the year (Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, “Critical Minerals Essential for Decarbonization,” September 4, 2023 [https://www.mol-service.com/ja/blog/critical-minerals]). [31] International Energy Agency, Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2024,　May 17, 2024　[https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/ee01701d-1d5c-4ba8-9df6-abeeac9de99a/GlobalCriticalMineralsOutlook2024.pdf]. [32] International Energy Agency, Critical Minerals Market Review 2023, December 2023 [https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/c7716240-ab4f-4f5d-b138-291e76c6a7c7/CriticalMineralsMarketReview2023.pdf]. [33] UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2023: The Potential of Africa to Capture Technology-Intensive Global Supply Chains, August 16, 2023 [https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/aldcafrica2023_en.pdf]. [34] South African Government News Agency, “SA increases imports to China,” South African News, September 6, 2024, [https://www.sanews.gov.za/south-africa/sa-increases-imports-china]. [35] 「中华人民共和国和南非共和国关于建立新时代全方位战略合作伙伴关系的联合声明（全文）」中华人民共和国外交部, September 3, 2024. [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_678284/xgxw_678290/202409/t20240903_11483773.shtml]. [36] 「津巴布韦总统出席中资锂矿投产仪式」新华网, November 30, 2023. [http://www.news.cn/world/2023-11/30/c_1130000226.htm]. [37] 「习近平同津巴布韦总统姆南加古瓦会谈」中华人民共和国外交部, September 3, 2024. [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677824/xgxw_677830/202409/t20240903_11484419.shtml]. [38] 「中华人民共和国和津巴布韦共和国关于深化和提升全面战略合作伙伴关系、构建高水平中津命运共同体的联合声明（全文）」中华人民共和国外交部, September 4, 2024. [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677824/xgxw_677830/202409/t20240904_11484698.shtml]. [39] 前掲、「中华人民共和国和津巴布韦共和国关于深化和提升全面战略合作伙伴关系、构建高水平中津命运共同体的联合声明（全文）」。 [40] 「中华人民共和国和尼日利亚联邦共和国关于建立全面战略伙伴关系、构建高水平中尼命运共同体的联合声明（全文）」中华人民共和国外交部, September 4, 2024. [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_678356/xgxw_678362/202409/t20240904_11484700.shtml]. [41] 「习近平同尼日利亚总统提努布会谈」中华人民共和国外交部, September 3, 2024. [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_678356/xgxw_678362/202409/t20240903_11484430.shtml]. [42] At the 2024 FOCAC Beijing Summit, the joint chairman with China was President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo. On September 6, 2024, President Xi Jinping met with President Sassou Nguesso at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing. Both countries issued a joint statement on the “Deepening of the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperation Partnership and the Building of a High-Level China-Congo Community of Shared Future” (Xi Jinping Meets with President Sassou of the Republic of Congo, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, September 6, 2024 [https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn//gxh/tyb/zyxw/202409/t20240906_11486441.html]). [43] UNCTAD, Economic Development in Africa Report 2023, op.cit.. [44] 「中华人民共和国和刚果民主共和国关于建立全面战略合作伙伴关系的联合声明（全文）」中华人民共和国外交部, May 26,2023, [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677680/xgxw_677686/202305/t20230526_11084472.shtml]. [45] 「习近平会见刚果（金）总统齐塞克迪」中华人民共和国外交部, September 2, 2024, [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677680/xgxw_677686/202409/t20240902_11483165.shtml]. [46] Jim Garamone, “Austin Tells Reagan Forum How U.S. Will Take on Challenge of China,” DOD News, December 4, 2021 [https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2861926/]. [47] The power struggles along the Third Island Chain are discussed by Emi Mifune in ‘Implications of Great Power Competition in Oceania Island Nations and China Risks – A Study on Palau, Kiribati, and the Solomon Islands,’ Japan Forum on International Relations, February 14, 2024 [https://www.jfir.or.jp/studygroup_article/10538/]. [48] The power struggles along the Fourth Island Chain and in South Asia are discussed by Emi Mifune in ‘China’s ‘Great Power Diplomacy’ and South Asia,’ International Trade and Investment Research Institute, World Economic Review, May–June 2024 issue (Special Feature: ‘The Diversification of South Asian Countries: Understanding the Current Situation and Future Prospects’), April 2024, pages 62–68. Additionally, the power struggles in the Middle East, located between the Fourth and Fifth Island Chains, are discussed by Emi Mifune in ‘The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) in the Context of ‘China’s Distinctive Great Power Diplomacy in the New Era’ and the ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ in Eurasia and the Middle East,’ Middle East Research Council, MEIJ Commentary No. 6, May 7, 2024 [https://www.meij.or.jp/research/2023/18.html]. [49] Wilson Vorn Dick, “China’s Reach Has Grown: So Should the Island Chains, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, October 22, 2018 [https://amti.csis.org/chinas-reach-grown-island-chains/]. [50] US Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, DoD, October 2023, p.155. [51] Boston University Global Development Policy Center, Chinese Loans to Africa Database, September 18, 2023[https://www.bu.edu/gdp/chinese-loans-to-africa-database/]. [52] 「中华人民共和国国防法」国防部网, December 27, 2020. [http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/fgwx/flfg/4876050.html]. [53] Michael M. Phillips, “China Seeks First Military Base on Africa’s Atlantic Coast, U.S. Intelligence Finds: Alarmed officials at the White House and Pentagon urge Equatorial Guinea to rebuff Beijing’s overtures,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2021. [54] David Vergun, “General Says China Is Seeking a Naval Base in West Africa,” DOD News, March 17, 2022 [https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/2969935/general-says-china-is-seeking-a-naval-base-in-west-africa/]. [55] By contrast, in “low Earth orbit” between 200 km and 1000 km above the Earth’s surface, the orbital period is short. That orbital space is used for remote sensing, human spaceflight, data communication, and the International Space Station (ISS), among other purposes. [56] Defense Intelligence Agency, Challenges to Security in Space, DIA, April 12, 2022 [https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Documents/News/Military_Power_Publications/Challenges_Security_Space_2022.pdf] . [57] “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: A Report to Congress, Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, DoD, October 2022 [https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF]. (This is an English translation of a commentary written by MIFUNE Emi, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Komazawa University, which originally appeared on the JFIR website in Japanese on November 4, 2024.)

MIFUNE Emi

October 18,2024

Business Risks Posed by Climate Change: From a Japanese Perspective

Have you recently felt that extreme weather events such as heavy rain and intense heat occur more frequently? In fact, the number of severe weather-related disasters, including floods, storms, droughts, and heat waves, has nearly quintupled over the 50 years between the 1970s and the 2010s. The economic damage caused by these events has expanded approximately eightfold over the same period (WMO, 2021). One factor related to the occurrence of extreme weather is climate change driven by global warming. As you may know, global warming refers to the rise in the Earth’s average temperature. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Sixth Assessment Report, the Earth’s average temperature by the 2010s (the average from 2011 to 2020) had increased by 1.1°C compared with the 19th century, and global warming is now approaching nearly 1.5°C (IPCCa, 2022). This represents a temperature change that humanity has not experienced in at least the last 2,000 years. The rise in temperature is due to the massive combustion of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) since industrialization in the 20th century, which has rapidly increased the concentration of greenhouse gases, such as carbon dioxide, in the atmosphere. These increased levels of carbon dioxide act like a film around a greenhouse, trapping more of the sun’s heat energy on the Earth’s surface, leading to a rise in temperature. However, a mere increase of 1.1°C or 1.5°C in temperature may not sound like much to many people. Nevertheless, even this small increase in average temperature has triggered various changes on Earth, such as altering wind and ocean currents, increasing the amount of water vapor in the atmosphere, raising sea temperatures and levels, and melting ice in the Arctic and Antarctic. These changes interact with one another and have a significant impact on the global climate. Currently, countries around the world are working toward achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, with the aim of reducing net carbon dioxide emissions to zero. However, even with these efforts, global warming is unlikely to halt. According to the latest predictions compiled by the IPCC, even if carbon neutrality is achieved by 2050, it is highly likely that global warming will exceed 1.5°C by 2040. Moreover, even if the current reduction targets set by various countries are steadily implemented, carbon neutrality by 2050 is unlikely. In fact, the reality suggests that global warming could reach 2°C by around 2050 (IPCC, 2023). How, then, could this seemingly small rise in global temperatures of 1.5°C or 2°C lead to severe disasters in society? How might this impact business? In this study, we examine the risks on Japanese business posed by climate change-induced weather disasters and social disruptions, focusing on specific issues, such as damage from heavy rainfall and flooding, reduced labor productivity due to heatwaves, and the effects of drought and water shortages on agriculture and related sectors. 1. Damages Caused by Heavy Rainfall and Flooding (1) Risks for Heavy Rainfall and Flooding First, global warming increases the risk for heavy rainfall and flooding. This is because, as the temperature increases, the amount of vapor contained in the atmosphere increases (for every 1°C rise in temperature, the saturated water vapor amount increases by approximately 7%), leading to higher volumes of rainfall. According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, extreme rainfall events that would have occurred once every 10 years without human-induced climate change are predicted to increase by 1.7 times with 2°C of warming (IPCCa, 2022). In Japan, the Japan Meteorological Agency predicts that with 2°C of warming, the frequency of heavy rainfall events with daily precipitation of over 100 millimeters will increase by approximately 1.2 times, and those with over 200 millimeters will increase by approximately 1.5 times compared with the late 20th century average (1980–1999) (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology and Japan Meteorological Agency, 2020). Heavy rainfall and short-term intense rainfall also increase the risk for flooding. This is because rivers may swell rapidly, causing them to overflow their banks (fluvial flooding), or rainwater may accumulate in one area, leading to local flooding (pluvial flooding). (2) Impact on Business The specific impacts of heavy rainfall and flooding on businesses vary greatly depending on the industry, business model, location of facilities, and position within the supply chain, making it difficult to generalize. However, one notable example is the 2011 flooding of the Chao Phraya River basin in Thailand, which had significant repercussions for the Japanese economy. This flood inundated seven industrial estates, including the Rojana Industrial Park in Ayutthaya Province, which is home to many Japanese companies. Consequently, hundreds of Japanese firms, including Toyota, Nissan, Honda, Nikon, TDK, and Toray, were affected. As such, the impact of the floods was immense. According to World Bank estimates, economic losses in Thailand amounted to approximately ¥3.6 trillion, and the disruption extended beyond Thailand, affecting global supply chains as well (World Bank, 2011). This event was one of the factors contributing to Japan recording its first trade deficit in 31 years since 1980. Climate change is expected to increase the damage caused by severe floods, abnormal rainfall, and typhoons. Naturally, there is a risk for such weather disasters causing significant damage in Japan. Moreover, given Japan’s strong economic ties with neighboring Asian countries, any major natural disaster in the region could have a ripple effect on the Japanese economy. 2. Labor Productivity Drop Due to Extreme Heat and Heatwaves (1) Risks for Extreme Heat and Heatwaves The term “global warming” also evokes risks associated with extremely high temperatures, such as heatwaves and heat-related illnesses. Indeed, as noted earlier, there has been a noticeable increase in the impact of heatwaves worldwide in recent years. According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, extreme heat events that occurred approximately once every ten years in the late 19th century are now occurring with a frequency that is 2.8 times greater due to a 1°C increase in global temperatures. As temperatures rise further, these events are projected to occur 4.1 times more frequently with a 1.5°C increase and 5.6 times more frequently with a 2°C increase. Additionally, even extreme heat events that occurred about once every 50 years in the late 19th century are now occurring with a frequency 4.8 times greater because of the current 1°C increase, and this frequency is expected to rise to 8.6 times with a 1.5°C increase and to 13.9 times with a 2°C increase (IPCC, 2022a). (2) Impact on Business Because of such extreme heat, heatstroke-related deaths are becoming increasingly common worldwide. In Japan, the summer of 2023 was the hottest since records began in 1898, with 104 people dying from heatstroke between July and September (Japan Meteorological Agency, 2024). For those in professions that require outdoor work or working indoors without air conditioning, the intensifying heat presents a life-threatening issue. If global warming continues at its current pace, it is predicted that by 2050, global labor productivity could decrease by as much as 20% (Dunne et al., 2013). For instance, in Japan, more than half of the prefectures and designated cities have already marked days with temperatures above 35°C as non-working days for public works projects. As a result, project timelines have been extended, increasing overall costs. Moreover, the 2019 amendment to the Construction Business Act prohibits setting excessively short project deadlines without considering non-working days due to extreme heat. This practice is also spreading to private sector projects. As the number of extreme heat days from May to October is expected to increase nationwide, the project timelines are anticipated to lengthen even further. 3. Impact on Agriculture, Hydroelectric Power Generation, and Water Transportation Due to Droughts and Water Shortage (1) Risks for Droughts and Water Shortage As global warming progresses, some areas will experience more severe droughts. The mechanism behind this is that, as the temperature rises, the atmosphere can hold more water vapor, leading to heavier localized rainfall. However, this also increases the number of dry and sunny days. According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, droughts affecting agriculture and ecosystems in arid regions have already increased by 1.7 times compared with the late 19th century because of a 1°C rise in global temperatures. With 2°C of warming, severe droughts will occur 2.4 times more frequently (IPCC, 2022a). In particular, rainfall is expected to decrease in mid-latitude or subtropical dry regions as the world warms, including the Mediterranean coastlines of Europe and Africa, Florida, and California in the U.S., southwestern Australia, southern and western Africa, and southwestern South America. This will increase the likelihood of drought throughout the year in these areas. Additionally, global warming is expected to reduce snowfall worldwide, meaning that rivers dependent on snowmelt may experience up to a 20% reduction in water flow usable for irrigation under 2°C of warming (IPCC, 2022b). In the longer term, up to 31% of the world’s glaciers could disappear, further decreasing the water flow in rivers sourced from glacial melt. This poses significant risks for regions dependent on these rivers, such as China, Southeast Asia, and India, where the Yellow River, Yangtze River, Mekong River, Indus River, and Ganges River flow from Himalayan glaciers (ibid). (2) Impact on Business A decrease in river flow raises concerns about disruptions to agriculture, hydroelectric power generation, water transportation, and drinking water supply. In agriculture, water shortages combined with rising temperatures and more severe weather events are expected to negatively impact various aspects of farming. This includes soil degradation, a decline in pollinators, such as insects, and an increase in pests and diseases. In regions such as Russia, where the current average annual temperature is below 10°C, a 2°C rise in temperature may actually increase crop yields (the amount of harvest per unit area). However, in areas where the average annual temperature exceeds 20°C such as Southern Japan, even a slight increase in temperature could result in significant reductions in crop yields (IPCC, 2022b). Although technological improvements have led to annual increases in crop yields of approximately 1–2% in recent years, this growth has slowed down because of climate change. According to the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report, global crop yields are projected to decline over the next decade by 2.3% for maize, 3.3% for soybeans, 0.7% for rice, and 1.3% for wheat (ibid). Of particular concern is the increasing risk for simultaneous crop failures for major grains due to global warming. For example, the probability of simultaneous global maize crop failures, which was around 6% in the early 21st century (2001–2010), is expected to rise to 40% with 1.5°C of warming and to 54% with 2°C of warming (ibid). 4. Conclusion As outlined above, even a 1.5°C or 2°C increase in global temperatures significantly heightens the risks for extreme weather events such as heatwaves, droughts, and intense rainfall, which in turn can lead to water shortages, food insecurity, health crises, and even conflict, posing severe threats to human society. The effects of climate change are not limited to industries that are dependent on natural resources, such as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. It also affects a wide range of industries by damaging infrastructure and reducing labor productivity. Furthermore, disruptions in distant developing countries can propagate through supply chains, causing economic turmoil globally. These risks are not issues in the distant future; they are already becoming apparent and are expected to worsen within the next 5–10 years. So, what can we do? Naturally, it is imperative to make every effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and achieve carbon neutrality as quickly as possible to mitigate global warming. However, as mentioned at the outset, even if carbon neutrality is achieved by 2050, the effects of global warming will continue for most of our lifetimes. Moreover, the likelihood of achieving global carbon neutrality by 2050 is low. Realistically, the planet is likely to surpass 1.5°C of warming within the next few years, with temperatures approaching 2°C by 2050. So, what should we do? The only way is to adapt to this new climate reality. Individuals and businesses alike must anticipate the risks that intensifying weather disasters and societal disruptions from climate change will pose to their lives and operations. It is crucial to develop strategies that will minimize these adverse impacts and build resilience. References Dunne, J. P., Stouffer, R. J., & John, J. G. Reductions in labour capacity from heat stress under climate warming. Nature Climate Change, 2013, 3(6), 563–566. IPCC “Sixth Assessment Report The Working Group 1”. 2022a. IPCC “Sixth Assessment Report The Working Group 2”. 2022b. IPCC. Nationally determined contributions under the Paris Agreement. Synthesis report by the secretariat. 2023. WMO. Atlas of Mortality and Economic Loss from Weather, Climate and Water Extremes (1970–2019). 2021. Japan Meteorological Agency. “Major Weather Extremes and Disasters in the World in 2023 (Reiwa 5)”. 2024. World Bank. “The World Bank Supports Thailand’s Post-Floods Recovery Effort”. 2011. Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and Japan Meteorological Agency. “Climate Change in Japan 2020”. 2020. (This is an English translation of a commentary written by SEKIYAMA Takashi, Professor at Kyoto University, which originally appeared on the JFIR website in Japanese on October 7, 2024.)

SEKIYAMA Takashi

July 26,2024

Australia Steps Up to Play a Bigger Role in Regional Defence

Since at least the mid-2010s Canberra has fully embraced the “Indo-Pacific” concept as an organising principle for its foreign and security policy as well as its defence strategy.[1]The Indo-Pacific region is the epicentre of power rivalries and defined by strategic competition. Canberra has joined the US, Japan, and others in its recognition of a “deteriorating security environment”. This environment its characterised by huge increases in military spending around the region, principally by China, and a combustible mix territorial disputes, historical grievances, and an absence of consensus on managing regional security through multilateral organisations. In this context, the Australian government, like its allies and partners, has stepped up its strategic ambitions and defence capabilities in order to preserve the regional “Rules-based order”. A plethora of strategic policy documents have been released by the Australian government over the past couple of years that lend substance to these ambitions. Chief amongst these are: the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, the 2024 National Defence Strategy and accompanying 2024 Integrated Investment Program, and the 2024 Independent Analysis of Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet.[2] Meanwhile, the centrepiece of Australian (maritime) defence strategy – AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) defence-technological partnership – has continued to evolve.[3] Space restrictions in a Commentary format preclude and in-depth analysis of all these documents and their associated debates. Instead, I highlight here some of the most important takeaways as they relate to Australia’s augmented defence aspirations. The 2023 Defence Strategic Review previewed much of the substance of the subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy (the first time Australia has issued such a White Paper). Together they essentially paint a grim picture of the strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific and advocate that Australia as a nation must respond by levering “all elements of national power” (very similar to Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy which speaks of tapping the country’s “comprehensive national power”).[4] The “National Defence Concept” is designed both to project power outwards into the region in tandem with allies and partners, whilst making Australian territory itself a “hard target” through an accompanying defence through “denial” posture (similar to China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial: A2/AD). Australia aims at a phased program to create a “Future Integrated Force” – similar to Japan’s “Multi-Domain Defense Force” – capable of cross-domain (land-sea-air-space-cyber) operations. Defence procurement is focussed on providing the necessary capabilities to establish: A larger and more lethal Navy An Army optimised for littoral operations A highly capable Air Force Strengthened cyber capabilities Integrated space capabilities[5] The procurement implications of these strategic guidance documents are most apparent in the realm of sea power. Given that the Indo-Pacific is primarily a maritime theatre, there is a strong strategic rationale supporting this intention. The most significant initiative is the AUKUS trilateral partnership. The “Optimal Pathway” (announced in March 2023 in San Diego) ultimately aims at the provision of nuclear-powered submarines (Submersible Ship-Nuclear powered or “SSN”) alongside steady integration of American and British submarine capabilities through (rotational) basing in Australia, known as “Pillar I”.[6] But AUKUS also includes Advanced Capabilities collaboration – including (i) underseas capabilities (ii) Quantum technologies (iii) Artificial intelligence and autonomy, (iv) advanced cyber capabilities, (v) Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, (vi) electronic warfare, (vii) innovation, and (viii) information sharing.[7] Together the Pillars contribute to “Integrated Deterrence” – the application of all elements of national power across a spectrum and coordination with partners – and strategic competition more generally.[8] Accompanying this augmentation of undersea capabilities and related technological aspects is a planned surge in the “lethality” of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet. The Independent Analysis of Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet recommends a future establishment of 26 ships including: 3 (upgraded) Hobart-class air warfare destroyers, 6 Hunter-class frigates (built to UK design) 11 new general-purpose frigates (with Japan’s Mogami-class under consideration for acquisition) 6 Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSVs) All of this is designed to enhance the Navy’s “lethality” through enhancing air warfare and strike capabilities.[9] These plans are undoubtedly ambitious and impressive in scale. Yet, prolific strategic commentors in the country have proclaimed their opposition to this new strategic orientation, especially its AUKUS component. First, Sam Roggeveen, Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute thinktank recently published a book calling for a radical revision of the current approach to Australian defence strategy. In The Echidna Strategy: Australia’s Search for Power and Peace, he argues for a more independent national strategy, side-lining the US-Australia alliance, jettisoning AUKUS, and concentrating on a much more locally-circumscribed strategy of “denial”.[10] His proposed defence strategy would entail a combination of missiles, sea-mines, cyber weapons, more limited (littoral) naval capabilities and a steady reinforcement of existing airpower, as opposed to the force projection capabilities outlined by the government above. This is an intriguing notion, but one unlikely to gain traction in policy circles. Second, Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University and former Defence Official, Hugh White – an acknowledged inspiration for Roggeveen – has targeted the AUKUS program with critical scrutiny. In an essay in a special issue of the journal Australian Foreign Affairs, entitled: “Dead in the Water: The AUKUS Delusion” he claims that the project is not only undesirable (as per Roggeveen above) but destined to fail, and thus should be abandoned sooner rather than later.[11] Whites’ arguments, predicated on his widely known earlier writing “The China Choice”, focus on the presumed lack of American staying power in Asia, the unstoppable dominance of China, and the questionable feasibility of the AUKUS submarine project.[12] As always, White is highly persuasive with his logic, but again, the allied governments remain committed to and confident in AUKUS, at least officially. In summary, the forward-leaning strategic and defence posture of Australia will permit it to maintain or even increase its contribution to regional security and the maintenance of the liberal international order. It will also render Australia a more valuable ally of the United States and Strategic Partner to Japan and other like-minded regional states with the same objectives, including its contribution to Integrated Deterrence. While vociferous debates about the wisdom of this approach, and the AUKUS project especially, continue to rumble on in Australia, the new defence posture is being implemented, including the AUKUS program, and this will have major implications for the regional security environment. *Thomas Wilkins is a distinguished research fellow at JFIR and an associate professor at the University of Sydney. [1] Wilkins, Thomas. “Reimagining Australia’s regional security for the Indo-Pacific century.”Australia in World Affairs 2016–2020: A Return to Great-Power Rivalry (2024), pp. 147-160. [2] Government of Australia, National Defence: Defence Strategic Review, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2023; Government of Australia, National Defence Strategy, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2024; Integrated Investment Program, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2024; Government of Australia, Independent Analysis of Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2024. [3] Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, ‘FACT SHEET: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS)’, Canberra, 2022, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/AUKUS-factsheet.pdf [4] Government of Australia, National Defence Strategy, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2024, p. 5; Government of Japan, National Security Strategy, Ministry of Defense, Tokyo, 2022. [5] Government of Australia, National Defence Strategy, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2024. [6] Government of Australia, ‘AUKUS Nuclear-Powered Submarine Pathway’, Australian Submarine Agency, Canberra, 20024, https://www.asa.gov.au/aukus [7] Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, ‘FACT SHEET: Implementation of the Australia – United Kingdom – United States Partnership (AUKUS)’, Canberra, 2022, https://pmtranscripts.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/AUKUS-factsheet.pdf [8] Pederson, Anna and Michael, Akopian, ‘Sharper: Integrated Deterrence’ CNAS Report, Center of New American Security, Washinton DC, 11 January 2023, https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/sharper-integrated-deterrence [9] Government of Australia, Independent Analysis of Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2024. [10] Roggeveen, Sam. The Echidna Strategy: Australia’s Search for Power and Peace. La Trobe University Press, in conjunction with Black Incorporated, 2023. [11] White, Hugh. “Fatal shores: AUKUS is a grave mistake.” Australian Foreign Affairs 20 (2024): 6-50. [12] White, Hugh. The China choice: Why we should share power. OUP Oxford, 2013.

Thomas WILKINS

May 09,2024

China–Cambodia “Diamond Hexagon” Cooperation Framework and Japan

■ China is fortifying its military influence in the South China Sea and CLM The three least economically developed countries of ASEAN, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar (CLM), are attracting attention in Japan in the context of “China plus one” and “Thailand plus one”. One of those countries, Cambodia, has a favorable image of Japan. Nevertheless　, having relied heavily on Chinese aid, Cambodia has become increasingly subservient to China, making its pro-China stance clearer than most Southeast Asian countries. About 90% of the investment projects approved by the Cambodian Development Council in 2022 were linked to China. According to the Cambodian Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF), more than 40% of Cambodia’s $10 billion in external debt is owed to China[1], leaving Cambodia caught in a Chinese “debt trap”[2]. On May 6, 2024, China and Cambodia held “Golden Dragon 2024,” a joint China-Cambodia military exercise in Cambodia from mid to late May to enhance the level of strategic cooperation between the two militaries, according to an announcement by the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. Even with Cambodia’s advocacy of a policy of neutrality and diplomacy in all directions, concerns have arisen about Cambodia’s excessive dependence on China. It has been reported worldwide that Cambodia has signed a secret agreement with China allowing exclusive use of part of the Liam Naval Base. Also, reportedly, China has begun to deploy its warships on a semi-permanent basis as a means of strengthening its military influence in the South China Sea and the CLM[3]. China’s interest in Cambodia extends beyond Cambodia’s geopolitical location; it may also aim to prevent ASEAN from unifying against China’s actions in the South China Sea using the CLM countries as “pawns.” This commentary discusses Cambodia’s deepening “ironclad friendship” with China in the framework of “Diamond Hexagon” cooperation (“钻石六边” 合作架构) and the Chinese presence at the Cambodian port of Liam and the airport at Dara Sakor, 65 kilometers (km) northwest of Liam. Moreover, this commentary will examine Japan’s diplomacy with Cambodia in light of the perceived implications these developments have for the South China Sea and for Japan’s security environment. ■ Proposal for a “Japan Special Zone” by Cambodia, a country that is increasingly “leaning toward China” Cambodia has been expanding its cooperation with China through the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, which serves as a platform for China’s expanding influence, and also through the “Diamond Hexagon” cooperation framework between the two countries. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese aid to Cambodia has expanded rapidly. In 2010, China replaced Japan as Cambodia’s largest bilateral donor. In fact, China accounts for a large share of Cambodia’s aid and foreign direct investment (FDI) . The Cambodian administration is increasingly dependent on China[4]. However, many Chinese real estate companies have pulled out of Sihanoukville in southern Cambodia, leaving behind hundreds of unfinished and unused buildings and plunging the country into a “debt trap.” Under these circumstances, Cambodia has proposed to Japan, the U.K., India, Malaysia, Thailand, and other countries a special economic zone concept based on bilateral cooperation, intended to promote FDI in Cambodia. Cambodia’s prime minister was replaced by hereditary succession in August 2023 for the first time in 38 years, with Hun Manet succeeding Hun Sen. On December 18, 2023, during Prime Minister Hun Manet’s visit to Japan to attend the Japan-ASEAN 50th Anniversary Commemorative Summit, Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida met with him and expressed a desire to strengthen relations in the security field through personnel exchanges, port calls, and other forms of unit-to-unit exchanges. The two prime ministers agreed to establish a defense vice-ministerial meeting in addition to the foreign vice-ministerial meeting held for the first time in November of the same year, to advance cooperation in the security field. Additionally proposed was the establishment of a special economic zone specifically for Japanese companies. Japan needs to develop its policy toward Cambodia by considering this special economic zone proposal not only from the perspective of bilateral business relations between Cambodia and Japan but also from the geopolitical context of the Indo-Pacific region. ■ The “Diamond Hexagon” Cooperation Framework between China and Cambodia In 2023, which marked the 65th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Cambodia, the two countries celebrated the “China–Cambodia Friendship Year.” During this period, then-Prime Minister of Cambodia, Hun Sen, made an official visit to China during February 9–11 (accompanied by his eldest and third sons). Both prime ministers reaffirmed the close ties between their nations and issued a joint statement pledging to advance the “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership” between Cambodia and China and to collaborate in building a community of shared destiny. They agreed to enhance bilateral cooperation through the framework of “One Position, Six Cooperation Areas, and Two Corridors.[5]“ “One Position” refers to the “ironclad friendship” described in the joint statement[6], which declares that ” irrespective of how the international situation changes, China and Cambodia will deepen their unwavering friendship, engage in mutually beneficial practical cooperation, and promote the building of a community with a shared future.” This expression represents the stance that both countries will adopt in their efforts to construct a “China-Cambodia Community of Shared Destiny” in the “New Era.[7]“ “Six Areas of Cooperation” refers to collaboration in the fields of politics, manufacturing, agriculture, energy, security, and cultural exchanges under the framework called the “Diamond Hexagon Cooperation.” The “hexagon” signifies a six-sided shape, representing these six areas. The “diamond” symbolizes a clear message from Hun Sen to Xi Jinping, conveying that “the Cambodian people are always firmly connected with the Chinese people.” “Two Corridors” refers to the “Industrial Development Corridor” developed around Sihanoukville Province and the “Fish and Rice Corridor” in the Tonle Sap Lake region. Xi Jinping assured Hun Sen that China would encourage more Chinese companies to invest in Cambodia to build the “Industrial Development Corridor” and to promote the Sihanoukville Special Economic Zone (SSEZ). The “Fish and Rice Corridor” involves the creation of a modern agricultural system for fish and rice around the lake, a joint initiative agreed upon by both countries to foster agricultural cooperation. Iron is highly durable against impact ; and diamond has a high hardness. The “ironclad friendship” designated as “One Position” and the “Diamond Hexagon” designated as the “Six Areas of Cooperation” form the foundation for building the “China-Cambodia Community of Shared Destiny” in the “New Era.” （However, diamonds are also vulnerable to forces exerted from certain directions, can crack upon impact, and can lose their luster because of oil.) ■ Deep-draft pier capable of accommodating aircraft carriers and Chinese ships In the years since the U.S.-funded facilities at Liam Naval Base in southwestern Cambodia were demolished and replaced by Chinese-funded projects, the U.S. State Department and Pentagon have frequently issued warnings that they have “serious concerns” and that they are closely watching China’s plans for exclusive control of a portion of Liam Naval Base. If a facility for both military and civilian use were built at Liam Port, located near Sihanoukville Airport, and were turned into a Chinese base, the Chinese Navy would have a geopolitical foothold in the South China Sea, the Malacca Strait, the Lombok Strait, Thailand, and Vietnam. At the Port of Liam, which is reportedly about to be “renovated,” a new facility with a pier reported to have “a draft deep sufficient to accommodate the Chinese aircraft carrier Fujian[8]” is already under construction. The first foreign vessels to access it in early December 2023 involved at least two vessels of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (escort corvettes “Wenshan” and “Bazhong”). The Russian Navy’s submarine destroyer “Admiral Panteleyev”, which had docked in Cambodia on November 27, docked at the port of Sihanoukville, approximately 20 km away from there. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force naval destroyer “Suzunami” and training ship “Shimakaze”, which docked on February 22, 2024, also docked at the port of Sihanoukville. Cambodian Defense Minister TEA Seiha, along with her father and predecessor TEA Banh[9] posted on social media that they “visited the base, which is currently under construction with Beijing’s assistance,” and “inspected the infrastructure construction that is actively underway according to the plan.” “Chinese vessels provided onboard and in port training to Cambodian naval personnel,” and “will bring the navy’s capabilities to a higher level.[10]” These arrangements and activities demonstrates the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s deep military involvement in Cambodia. The military and political implications of the port of Liam will be clarified by satellite imagery reports from the United States and other Western countries that will be monitoring the frequency of access by Chinese naval vessels and their port calls against other navies and naval forces over the next several years. In addition, the U.S., Japan, and the rest of the world should devote to how the Dara Sakor Airport, which was built in Koh Kong Province as part of the “One Belt, One Road” project, will be used. It is noteworthy that the airport was scheduled to become operational in early 2021. However, because of the COVID pandemic and other factors, it was postponed repeatedly. As of May 9, 2024, the date of this report’s drafting, the airport had not yet opened. The Dara Sakor development project dates back to 2008 when UDG, based in Tianjin, China, signed a 99-year lease agreement with the Cambodian government to build an international airport, deep-sea port, industrial park, and luxury resort facilities in a special economic zone. The Dara Sakor project by UDG is expected to construct a multipurpose facility complex that uses approximately 20% of the coastal area of Cambodia, but the “development” is skewed toward the airport and the deepwater port. Reportedly, plans also exist for a 3,300-meter (m) runway at Dara Sakor Airport, as well as additional runways of 3,800 meters and 3,200 meters. The U.S. Department of Defense has repeatedly expressed concern over the past several years that the Dara Sakor Airport can potentially serve as a dual-use military and civilian airfield for China. A runway of that length would allow for takeoffs and landings by H6 bombers and Y-20 large transport aircraft. Comparing the expected volume of people and goods traffic at Dara Sakor with that of Japanese airports raises doubts about the intended use of Dara Sakor Airport. Narita Airport in Japan has a 4,000-meter Runway A and a 2,500-meter Runway B. The amplification plan, to be completed by March 31, 2029, with the aim of increasing annual arrival and departure capacity to 500,000 flights, calls for the extension of Runway B from 2,500m to 3,500m, along with the construction of a new 3,500m long Runway C, and a total of 7,471m of new and improved taxiways. Using the figures for Narita Airport as a reference, can the length and function of the runway be considered reasonable, given the scale of Cambodia’s economy and tourism industry, and given the arrival and departure capacity of the Dara Sakor Airport? For security of the Indo-Pacific, Japan’s government and public opinion should also be vigilant about China’s intended use of the important geopolitical chokepoint from the port of Liam to Dara Sakor. ■ Questioning Japan’s Development Cooperation with “China-oriented Cambodia” For many years, Japanese diplomacy has been devoted to promotion of peace and prosperity in the international community. Japan has worked to boost the development of developing countries through official development assistance (ODA) and other forms of development cooperation. In this context, Japan’s “Outline of Development Cooperation” has been designed to contribute actively to ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity in the international community, while adhering to the principle of avoiding the use of development cooperation for military purposes or for promoting international conflict. Cambodia has deepened its relations with China in the security sphere. In the event of conflict in the South China Sea or Taiwan, significant risk exists that Liam and Dara Sakor and other key infrastructure might be used by the Chinese military. Japan’s development assistance to Cambodia is not involved directly in military applications at this time. However, careful consideration of the relations forming along with development projects by China will be increasingly necessary when formulating development assistance from Japan to Cambodia. The percentage of the elderly population among Japan’s total population reached a record high of 29.1% in 2023. Moreover, the percentage of the population aged 75 and older reached a record high of 16.1%. Japan’s Japan’s financial circumstances have become increasingly strained. Especially given that context, foreign aid must contribute more than ever to Japan’s national interests, particularly peace and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Japan’s diplomacy with Cambodia in the Indo-Pacific at a time of intensifying competition for spheres of influence between the U.S., China, and Russia should be conducted with specific scrutiny of the development of the “diamond hexagon” relationship between China and Cambodia. (Originally published on May 9, 2024) [1] “Chinese warships leave Cambodia’s Ream naval base,” Radio Free Asia, January 16, 2024 [https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/chinese-ships-in-cambodia-01162024060348.html. Last accessed May 8, 2024. All URLs mentioned below were last accessed on May 8, 2024. [2] The term “debt trap” refers to a situation in which a country that has received international aid and is struggling to repay its debts is pressured by the creditor country in terms of policies or diplomacy, leading to scenarios in which the creditor country confiscates the infrastructure built with the loans or demands military cooperation. [3] Providing military bases to foreign countries violates Article 53 of the Cambodian Constitution. Therefore, the Cambodian government completely denies any “stationing of Chinese troops” or “leasing to the Chinese military.” [4] For instance, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ “Basic Data on the Kingdom of Cambodia,” the main aid donors and their support amounts (estimated values for 2020, in million US dollars) were China (421.6), Japan (336.5), ADB (283.1), World Bank (140.8), EU (90.3), South Korea (58.0), and the United States (43.9) [https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/cambodia/data.html#section2]. According to the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics for 2021, Cambodia’s trade included the following: China – exports $1.51 billion US dollars (8.6% of total exports), imports $9.68 billion (33.6% of total imports); Japan–exports $1.09 billion (6.2% of total exports), imports $0.64 billion (2.2% of total imports); United States –exports $7.49 billion (42.7% of total exports), imports$0.34 billion (1.2% of total imports); ASEAN–exports $1.18 billion (6.7% of total exports), imports $12.92 billion (44.8% of total imports). The United States has a notable presence in exports, whereas China dominates imports. [5] 中华人民共和国外交部「中华人民共和国和柬埔寨王国关于构建新时代中柬命运共同体的联合声明（全文）」February 11, 2023 [https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/yz_676205/1206_676572/xgxw_676578/202302/t20230211_11023942.shtml]. [6] Op. cit. [7] In an extremely long speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (the so-called “Party Congress,” held once every five years) in October 2017. Xi Jinping stated, “The time has come for China to take the center stage in the world,” and “This means that China has become a great power in the world,” signifying an era where China is positioned at the center of the international order. It does not merely mean a new era. [8] “Fujian” is China’s third most advanced aircraft carrier, launched in Shanghai in June 2022. It was previously reported that “Jiangsu” was a strong candidate, but in an expanded meeting of the Central Military Commission held in early June of the same year, it was reported that Xi Jinping, Chairman of the Central Military Commission, proposed the name “Fujian.” [9] Despite having passed on his position to his son, he still maintains a strong influence in military affairs. [10] “Chinese warships dock at Cambodia’s Ream naval base for ‘training’,” December 5, 2023, Radio Free Asia, [https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/china-cambodia-ream-12052023042209.html]. This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number JP24K04762

MIFUNE Emi