I. Chinese Narratives as a Dimension of Cognitive Warfare: “Justifying” Military Expansionism

China has frequently criticized Japan, asserting that its “steadily increasing defense budget is a reflection of its continuously expanding military ambitions”[1]. Simultaneously, China has pursued rapid acceleration of the militarization of the South China Sea.

In mid-October 2025, Beijing began intensifying land reclamation and infrastructure development when it initiated large-scale dredging operations at Antelope Reef (known in China as Lingyang Jiao)[2] of the Paracel Islands: a feature that had been one of the smallest in the archipelago. Land reclamation and infrastructure construction have since accelerated, expanding the reef’s dimensions through March 2026 to a scale rivaling Mischief Reef (known in China as Meiji Jiao) in the Spratly Islands, which was hitherto regarded as China’s largest artificial outpost in the region. On March 19, 2026, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a U.S. think thank, released an analysis of satellite imagery indicating that the newly developed Antelope Reef might become the largest island in the South China Sea[3].

Furthermore, on March 29, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Southern Theater Command mobilized naval and air forces to conduct “combat readiness patrols” within the waters and airspace surrounding Scarborough Shoal (known in China as Huangyan Dao), with measures including tracking, monitoring, and issuance of warnings to depart.

China, a nation relentlessly pursuing a military buildup with rapid expansion of its nuclear arsenal, employs strong rhetoric when casting a critical gaze at Japan through the lens of “rearmament.” That rhetoric should not be viewed as mere conventional denunciation. Rather, it is characterized most accurately as a component of “Cognitive Warfare” designed to legitimize China’s own attempts to change the status quo unilaterally by force and to justify its rapid military expansion. In essence, these narratives are designed to minimize the perceived importance of China’s actual military activities by diverting international scrutiny toward regional counterparts.

II. China and the “Two Wars”

In March 2026, while China adopts an increasingly assertive posture in the South China Sea, it has concurrently presented itself as a proponent of ceasefire efforts in two regional conflicts: The “U.S.–Israel vs. Iran War” and the “Afghanistan vs. Pakistan War.” Chinese government officials and state media have actively propagated the narrative that Wang Yi, Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Foreign Affairs, has been engaging diligently in high-level dialogue to promote peace and de-escalate tensions in the Middle East. Such efforts are framed as a demonstration of Beijing’s commitment to acting as a “responsible major power”[4].

Nevertheless, since the U.S. military strikes on Iran on February 28, 2026, China’s actual involvement has remained constrained. Although Beijing continues to offer verbal support for Iranian sovereignty, it maintains a cautious stance, avoiding effective or substantive security assistance[5].With regard to the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs dispatched Special Envoy Yue Xiaoyong for shuttle diplomacy during March 7–14. During this mission, Beijing urged both parties to exercise restraint, engage in an immediate ceasefire, and resolve their differences through dialogue[6]. Nevertheless, China’s shuttle diplomacy appears largely performative. It is a rhetorical “pose” for international consumption that lacks the pragmatic mediation efficacy demonstrated by regional actors such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar. Consequently, China’s “major power diplomacy” has proven largely ineffective, yielding no tangible results for either of these two wars[7].

Historically, China maintained a precarious balancing act between the Arab states, Iran, and Israel. However, following the 2023 Gaza conflict, Beijing’s overt support for the Palestinian cause led to an abrogation of trust from Israel. The current U.S. strikes against Iran are reportedly the result of lobbying by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) directed at U.S. President Donald Trump. Iran’s subsequent retaliatory strikes against Arab nations have rendered China’s balancing act between Tehran and Riyadh increasingly untenable.

Iran’s growing dependence on China was originally catalyzed by the 2020 Abraham Accords during the first Trump administration, which prompted a marginalized Tehran to seek a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with Beijing in 2021[8]. These relations remain fundamentally asymmetrical. Recognizing this, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman positioned China strategically as a mediator in the 2023 restoration of Saudi–Iranian diplomatic ties to leverage Beijing’s influence over Tehran. Ultimately, the shifting dynamics between Iran and the Arab world are leading to a marked decline in China’s diplomatic standing in the Middle East. This development represents an important strategic setback hindering Beijing’s pursuit of a multipolar world order.

III. The “Dictator’s Trap” and China

Recent Japanese media coverage has featured some optimistic commentators suggesting that the current situation in Iran might deter China from taking action to resolve the Taiwan issue unilaterally. However, that optimism might be misplaced. In reality, the security environment in East Asia is becoming increasingly precarious.

In my annual lectures on International Relations, I introduce Carl von Clausewitz’s On War as a foundational text for students to understand the school of Realism in international affairs. I invariably highlight his famous dictum: “War is the continuation of politics by other means.” Applying this perspective to the current situation in East Asia, Beijing’s ultimate objective in a Taiwan contingency is the unification of Taiwan, not its total annihilation. Furthermore, Taiwan’s geography makes amphibious operations exceptionally difficult. For Xi Jinping to execute an invasion, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would need to land and secure a force of more than 100,000 troops before U.S. and Japanese Self-Defense Forces could intervene. At present, China lacks sufficient sealift capacity to transport such a force in a short timeframe. From a purely capability-based assessment, a full-scale invasion of Taiwan in 2027 remains militarily unfeasible.

That assessment notwithstanding, political leaders do not always make decisions based on rational calculations. Observing China’s recent economic policies, one would have difficulty characterizing Xi Jinping as a pragmatist.

From the Chinese military establishment, numerous high-ranking officials have been purged. Among them is Zhang Youxia, who served as the military’s second-in-command until last year. In January 2026, the PLA Daily reported Zhang’s offenses, stating that he had “severely trampled upon and undermined the Central Military Commission (CMC) Chairman Responsibility System”[9]. Nevertheless, it is widely rumored that the true cause of his downfall was his advice to Xi Jinping that a 2027 invasion was premature and that it should be postponed until 2035. This suggestion reportedly incurred Xi’s deep displeasure. The ousting of Zhang Youxia suggests that the “brakes” preventing a catastrophic escalation during an accidental contingency involving Taiwan or the Senkaku Islands might no longer be functional.

The reconstruction of a liberal international order appears increasingly difficult in the short to medium term. During the invasion of Ukraine, Russia fell into a structural crisis known as the “Dictator’s Trap,” wherein the Federal Security Service (FSB) reported information the leadership desired to hear rather than the “truth,” leading to catastrophic miscalculations and war. The “Dictator’s Trap” refers to a phenomenon whereby the concentration of power prevents a leader from receiving unfavorable information, thereby leading to flawed decision-making[10].

When considering the confluence of Xi Jinping’s political timeline, the volatile situation in Iran, and the effects of purges within the PLA leadership, the danger is clear. The structural crisis of the “Dictator’s Trap,” which induces leadership miscalculation, has reached an unprecedented level, threatening to destabilize the security of East Asia to a profound degree.