Introduction: Western Vigilance Over China’s Self-Proclaimed Status as a “Near-Arctic State”

In recent years, China has positioned itself as a “Near-Arctic State” and has aimed to build an “Ice Silk Road.” “China’s Arctic Village,” located in Mohe City, Daxing’ anling Prefecture, Heilongjiang Province in northern China, lies at approximately 53.5°N latitude, which is roughly 4,000 km in a straight line from the North Pole and about 1,450 km from the Arctic Circle. The distance from the North Pole to “China’s Arctic Village” is almost identical to the distance to Hamburg, Germany (approx. 53.55°N) or to Liverpool, United Kingdom (approx. 53.4°N). Geographically situated at nearly the same latitude as these European cities, China is by no means a country that is “close to the Arctic Circle.”

Article 2 (Members) of the Declaration on the Establishment of the Arctic Council (Ottawa Declaration), signed in Ottawa, Canada on September 19, 1996, stipulates explicitly that “The Members of the Arctic Council are Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America.”[1] It has been defined legally that only these eight countries are “Arctic States.”

Consequently, when China put forth the rhetoric of being a “Near-Arctic State” in 2018, then-U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo under the Trump administration expressed a sharp retort at the Arctic Council Ministerial Meeting in Rovaniemi, Finland, in May 2019, explicitly targeting Beijing by stating, “There are only Arctic States and Non-Arctic States. No third category exists.”[2]

By promoting itself as a “Near-Arctic State,” China seeks to involve itself deeply in rule-making and governance for the region, an effort that has heightened awareness considerably among the United States and NATO allies. One underlying reason the U.S. administration under Donald Trump had described purchasing Greenland was strong apprehension that Beijing’s aggressive expansion into the island posed a severe security risk.

Given this backdrop, this paper has been structured as follows. Section I presents discussion of how global warming is accelerating the scramble for resources and military expansion, thereby rendering the Arctic as one frontline of great-power competition. Section II outlines the trajectory in recent Arctic geopolitical debates, highlighting that China, alongside Russia, has increasingly become a target of Western vigilance. Section III explains specific priorities China assigns to the polar regions (the Arctic and Antarctic), outer space, and the deep seabed within its national security framework. Finally, Section IV presents analysis of the implications signified by the “four-vessel Arctic research expedition in July 2026.”

I. The Arctic as a Frontline of Geopolitical Competition: China as a Target of NATO Vigilance and Surveillance

The global crisis of climate change is accelerating both a scramble for resources and one for military expansion. The Arctic, which is rich in undeveloped oil, natural gas, rare earth, and marine resources, is warming approximately four times faster than the remainder of the planet.

Occurring in parallel to climate shifts, the international order surrounding the Arctic is in the midst of reorganization. Great-power competition over rare minerals, maritime lines of communication, fisheries, natural resources, seabed mining, and satellite communications has intensified, making the Arctic a “heated” geopolitical frontline among the many being drawn worldwide today.

In the wake of Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, cooperative relations in the Arctic have dissolved completely. New military lines of division are being created or identified. Following the accession into NATO of Finland in April 2023 and Sweden in March 2024, all seven Arctic nations (excluding Russia) are now NATO members.[3] Russia, which regards the Arctic as a domain of “vital national interest,” has been redeveloping military bases rapidly in the region. In August 2024, it established a new “Maritime Council” to administer its maritime strategy.

The NATO alliance, for its part, launched “Arctic Sentry” in February 2026, a multi-domain military operation aimed at enhancing integrated operational capabilities in the Arctic. Led by the Joint Force Command Norfolk, this new initiative reinforces surveillance and alertness across the Arctic, including Greenland. A primary mission of this command is the securing of strategic transatlantic sea lines of communication. The command also coordinates its activities with the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and the U.S. European Command.[4]

What is noteworthy here is that NATO’s surveillance and alertness targets under “Arctic Sentry” include not only Russia but also China. China is elevating its interest in the Arctic in pursuit of access to polar orbits, which are linked directly to space policies involving missile defense and satellites, in addition to energy, critical minerals, and maritime routes. Furthermore, strengthening Sino-Russian cooperation presents strategic and operational implications for NATO’s deterrence and defense posture in the region.

The enhanced Sino-Russian alignment which forms the backdrop to NATO’s launch of “Arctic Sentry” has also manifested itself in coercive behaviors around Japan, such as joint naval navigations and joint bomber flights in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk. The Japanese Ministry of Defense perceives this Sino-Russian coordination as a “direct security challenge to our country.”[5]

As explained above, intensifying great-power competition in the Arctic is occurring concomitantly with China’s assumption of a pivotal role in tandem with Russia, bringing new geopolitical tensions to Western nations.

II. China’s Dual-Use Research Activities in the Arctic

Sea ice reduction caused by global warming is transforming the Arctic Ocean from a “world shielded by thick ice”. That ice, which once served as an ideal hiding place for strategic nuclear submarines, is expected to become a “strategic crossroads for great-power confrontation.” Amid such rising tensions, hypersonic weapons have drawn considerable attention. Hypersonic weapons flying at speeds exceeding Mach 5 (approximately 6,000 km per hour) can dominate the vast Arctic region in a short period. “Hypersonic Glide Vehicles” (HGVs) and “Hypersonic Cruise Missiles” (HCMs), which fly at low altitudes on irregular trajectories, can bypass or neutralize existing Arctic air defense radars and interceptor systems.

The shortest flight path for an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launched from China to strike the U.S. mainland is a trajectory passing over the Arctic. However, in August and November 2021, China tested its “Fractional Orbital Bombardment System” (FOBS) that places a nuclear-capable HGV into low Earth orbit.[6] Because the FOBS can orbit the Earth, it eliminates the concept of an attack arriving from a “specific direction,” thereby forcing the United States to build an alert posture against surprise attacks from all directions.

In response, the Trump administration officially announced in May 2025 (following reports of the plan’s directives in January of the same year) an integrated missile air defense system known as the “Golden Dome,” designed to protect the United States from “air attacks by any adversary.”[7]

Furthermore, extending beyond these direct military threats, the “dual-use” (civil–military) activities conducted by commercial and research vessels are also alarming Western nations. In October 2023, an incident occurred in which an anchor from a Chinese container ship navigating the Northern Sea Route damaged a subsea natural gas pipeline connecting Finland and Estonia in the Baltic Sea. Once it became apparent that Chinese commercial and research vessels using the Arctic route, not just warships, could pose risks of hybrid attacks or accidents threatening the critical infrastructure of NATO countries, these nations raised their alert levels markedly and intensified their surveillance of China.

The rapid escalation of vigilance directed at “Chinese activities in the Arctic” is evident when comparing the two Arctic Strategy reports published by the U.S. Department of Defense in 2019 and 2024.

The 2019 edition of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Arctic Strategy,[8] while critical of China’s pretension as a “Near-Arctic State,” assessed that China’s operational presence in the Arctic was limited compared to that of Russia, that its activities could potentially support the future enhancement of China’s military presence, including submarine deployments to the Arctic Ocean, and that Beijing was seeking a role in Arctic governance.

However, the 2024 Arctic Strategy, revised after five years, listed China ahead of Russia in its assessment of changes in the strategic environment. It expressed strong concern over Chinese efforts, despite being a non-Arctic state, to position the Arctic as a “global commons” and to seek further expansion of its own influence in the region. The strategy also highlighted China’s execution of dual-use research activities using icebreakers, positioned Sino-Russian military cooperation and law enforcement alignment in the Arctic as top-priority targets for surveillance, and emphasized the need for cross-domain responses involving the Space Force and cyber units.[9]

In July 2024, the same month this U.S. Arctic Strategy was published, a NATO summit held in Washington invited leaders from Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand (IP4). At this summit, NATO reaffirmed its global expansion strategy, emphasizing the “indivisibility of security” between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions in areas such as cyber defense and countermeasures against disinformation.[10]

Consequently, marine surveys using icebreakers and commercial shipping activities near critical infrastructure by China have transcended the realm of mere environmental research or economic activities. As a “dual-use risk” capable of being diverted for military purposes, they have now become targets of vigilance by the United States and NATO member states.

III. Beyond Sovereignty and Rules: China’s Push to Secure Rights in “Unexplored Human Frontiers”

China’s Arctic policy pursues three primary objectives. First, it is aimed at securing strategic space for military and security operations, advancing the covert operation of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) while building and improving infrastructure such as satellites and communication networks in the Arctic under the guise of scientific observation to enhance global early warning and surveillance capabilities. This includes dual-use survey activities, ranging from seabed topographical surveys for creating navigational charts required by both naval forces and civilian commercial vessels, to underwater acoustic environment surveys in operational areas for submarine units to operate effectively. Second, it seeks to secure the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as an alternative pathway to circumvent geopolitical risks in areas such as the Strait of Malacca, while simultaneously acquiring undeveloped natural resources in the Arctic, such as oil and rare materials (rare earths). Third, it intends to guarantee and expand its voice by participating in Arctic governance, positioning the Arctic Ocean as the “common heritage of mankind” to prevent its exclusive exploitation by the five coastal states: the United States, Russia, Canada, Norway, and Denmark.

As articulated in China’s Arctic Policy, the so-called “Arctic White Paper” published in 2018,[11] China has asserted repeatedly that it is an “important stakeholder in Arctic affairs.” The white paper emphasizes that China has been engaged in Arctic affairs for many years since joining the Spitsbergen Treaty in 1925. However, because China was the Republic of China at that time, tracing the Arctic expansion of the People’s Republic of China, founded in 1949, reveals that its substantive entry into the Arctic began when it joined the International Arctic Science Committee in 1996 and, from 1999, dispatched the research vessel Xuelong (Snow Dragon) for scientific exploration in the Arctic. In 2004, China constructed the Arctic Yellow River Station in Ny-Ålesund in the Norwegian archipelago of Svalbard,[12] developing a platform for a permanent observation station. In 2013, it became an observer on the Arctic Council (AC), thereby securing a platform to participate in discussions on Arctic governance.

Article 32 of the “National Security Law,” which came into effect in July 2015, stipulates that the State shall persist in the peaceful exploration and utilization of outer space, the deep seabed, and polar regions (the Arctic and Antarctic), shall enhance capacities for safe access and return, scientific investigation, and resource development, shall strengthen international cooperation, and shall safeguard the security of China’s activities, assets, and other interests in outer space, the deep seabed, and polar regions.[13] Since enforcement of this law, China began referring to space, the deep seabed, and the polar regions as “new domains” and “strategic new domains,” rapidly strengthening its legal frameworks and exploration activities. Through this effort, China has moved beyond the framework of national sovereignty, initiating in earnest the enhancement of its military power and civil–military integrated scientific and technological hegemony to acquire national rights and interests in the “unexplored frontiers of humanity.”

The “15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030),” adopted in China in March 2026, positioned the strengthening of exploration capabilities in extreme environments, such as the deep sea and polar regions, as a “strategic frontier.” The “Five-Year Plan” is the economic and social operational policy formulated by the State Council (the central government) for a five-year period based on guidance of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

IV. Significance of the “Four Research Vessels in 2026”

Following the directives of this “15th Five-Year Plan,” on July 3, 2026, a joint expedition team consisting of four vessels departed from Dalian City in Liaoning Province. They were the Xuelong (Snow Dragon) and Xuelong 2 belonging to the Polar Research Institute of the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Jidi (Polar) belonging to the North Sea Bureau of the Ministry of Natural Resources, and the Tansuo 3 (Discovery 3) belonging to the Institute of Deep-Sea Science and Engineering of the Chinese Academy of Sciences.[14] The expedition is scheduled to conclude in early October.

This expedition not only conducts surveys and observations related to sea ice, ecosystems, and atmospheric environments in key areas of the Arctic Ocean; it also undertakes exploration and research on the expansion mechanism of the Gakkel Ridge and the dynamic evolution of the oceanic crust. The Gakkel Ridge, known as the Mid-Arctic Ridge, is a 1,800-km-long underwater mountain range extending from north of Greenland to the Laptev Sea off the coast of Siberia.

China upholds “civil–military fusion” (dual-use) as a national strategy. Data collected by observation vessels of state and research institutions are used to improve the operational capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army. As pointed out by Professor Andrew S. Erickson of the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) at the U.S. Naval War College during a hearing of the U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) held on March 2, 2026, top-tier scientists from institutions such as the Chinese Academy of Sciences are advancing the civil–military integrated utilization of developments and operations related to communication facilities, icebreakers, and unmanned submersibles in the Arctic and Antarctic. According to his analysis, China’s oceanographic research fleets have already conducted extensive seabed mapping and marine surveys on the U.S. extended continental shelf in areas such as the Bering Sea, the “gateway to the Arctic.” The research activities of these Chinese scientists are laying the technical and operational foundation for future submarine operations in the Arctic Ocean.[15]

Furthermore, China’s scientific research in the Arctic incorporates public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare, the so-called “Three Warfares”. “Public opinion warfare” is intended to build international support for China. “Psychological warfare” seeks to degrade the enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through psychological operations. “Legal warfare” involves using international and domestic laws to garner international support or to manage backlash. China is deploying influence operations targeting the Arctic governance system, scientific research, and economic investments in an effort to achieve its long-term strategic goals.[16]

The political implications of “public opinion warfare” and “psychological warfare” under the “dual-use” strategy can likely be read from each of the previously described four vessels which set sail for the Arctic in 2026.

The Xuelong, purchased from Ukraine in 1993, conducted its first Arctic exploration in 1999. Since that voyage, it has been a symbolic presence in China’s polar policy, supporting China’s expansion into the Arctic and Antarctic for over 30 years. It serves the purpose of displaying to the international community the narrative which holds that China has sustained its commitment to the polar regions over many years.

The Xuelong 2, commissioned in 2019, is China’s first domestically produced polar research icebreaker. It carries the political importance of demonstrating to the world China’s self-reliance in building and improving icebreakers.

The Jidi, a new-generation scientific observation icebreaker delivered to the North Sea Bureau of the Ministry of Natural Resources in June 2024, was designed and built independently by China. Connected directly to the BeiDou satellite system and equipped with high-end marine survey equipment such as drones, unmanned surface vessels, and autonomous underwater vehicles (AUVs), it is designed to conduct comprehensive observation and data collection of various marine environments, including sea ice analysis, three-dimensional water body surveys, geophysical exploration, and atmospheric monitoring.[17] In other words, although promoted ostensibly as an environmental survey of sea ice and the atmosphere, it is linked directly to securing military communication networks.

The Tansuo 3, a deep-sea and pelagic multifunctional scientific research vessel delivered in late 2024, was designed and built independently by China to conduct explorations in global deep-sea and far-ocean waters. It is China’s first comprehensive scientific research vessel with manned submersible support capabilities in ice-covered marine environments.[18] Although the Tansuo 3, a multifunctional research vessel capable of carrying manned deep-sea submersibles, is advertised by China as the “Scientific Research and Cultural Relics Archaeological Vessel Tansuo 3,” it can be characterized as the vessel with the strongest military and rights-acquisition objectives among the four because it is equipped with the capability to deploy manned submersibles directly under the sea ice through a moonpool opened in the ship’s bottom. Because this mission involves survey of the Gakkel Ridge, it could be argued that China is aiming at meticulous gathering of data related to seabed topography, acoustic characteristics, and water temperatures as a geopolitical stepping stone for the Chinese Navy’s submarines to navigate stealthily beneath the Arctic ice, and to secure concessions for the vast natural gas and rare materials lying on the Arctic seabed. Moreover, because of the development and installation of domestically devised and developed technologies such as deep-sea acoustic exploration, communication, and positioning equipment for ice-covered waters, as well as ship dynamic positioning systems, the Tansuo 3’s expedition holds the political significance of advertising the expansion of China’s manned deep-sea submergence capabilities.

Deployment of these four vessels in the current mission can be interpreted as a comprehensive strategic demonstration: an appeal to past achievements by the Xuelong, a showcase of technology by the Xuelong 2, a display of air and maritime surveillance capabilities by the Jidi, and a demonstration of seabed mastery capabilities by the Tansuo 3. Therefore, Western nations do not perceive these Arctic expeditions by these four vessels as mere “scientific research,” but are instead tightening their vigilance against the expeditions as a military threat.

Conclusion: China’s Arctic Expansion Enters a “New Phase”

When the points of discussion raised in this paper are examined against China’s “14th Five-Year Plan (2021–2025)”[19] and “15th Five-Year Plan (2026–2030)”,[20] China’s ambitions in the Arctic, veiled within the “2026 four-vessel Chinese Arctic expedition fleet,” become evident.

The 14th Five-Year Plan clearly stated the promotion of the construction of a “fair and reasonable international maritime order” and a “maritime community with a shared future,” participation in pragmatic cooperation in the Arctic, and “construction of the Ice Silk Road.” As intimated by the chapter title, “Actively Expanding the Development Space of the Maritime Economy,” the primary emphasis was on active expansion and extension of the development space of the maritime economy.

In contrast, the 15th Five-Year Plan shifts the emphasis, as indicated by the phrasing under the chapter titled “Strengthening the Development, utilization, and Protection of the Oceans”: “Adhere to coordinated land and sea management, enhance the capacity to strategically manage (jinglüe) the oceans, accelerate the construction of a strong maritime nation, and pave a Chinese-style path toward ‘seeking strength through the sea’.” (Note: “Jinglüe” in the context of “China’s strategic management of the oceans toward becoming a strong maritime nation” implies governing, controlling, and managing strategically.) The primary emphasis is now assigned to the intentions of becoming a “strong maritime nation” and executing the “strategic management of the oceans.” The phrase “construction of the Ice Silk Road” from the 14th Plan is nowhere to be found, and the explicit mention of “improving the support and guarantee system for deep-sea and polar expeditions” suggests a change in the tone of activities in the Arctic.

Regarding the approach to the “deep sea,” while the 14th Five-Year Plan centered on the investigation of deep-sea resources and on the development and cultivation of marine engineering technologies, the 15th Five-Year Plan outlines the implementation of deep-sea projects explicitly. It states the intent to “strengthen strategic scientific and technological capabilities in the oceans, promote marine science and technology innovation, improve the support and guarantee system for deep-sea and polar expeditions, and develop far-ocean meteorological navigation services. Implement deep-sea projects to enhance capabilities in reaching, exploring, developing, and safeguarding the deep sea.”

As described in Section IV, Chinese media have reported that the 2026 Arctic expedition by the four-vessel fleet is expected to conduct exploration and research in key areas such as the Gakkel Ridge, carry out joint operations with researchers from countries including Russia and Germany, and provide a scientific basis for promoting the conservation and governance of the Arctic.[21]

By hosting polar researchers not only from Russia but also from Germany, a core member of NATO, onboard the vessel, China seeks to project the image that “we are not destroyers of rules, but a ‘responsible major power’ providing a scientific basis for the international community.” This reveals a diplomatic objective to secure a voice in the formulation of future rules for Arctic resource development and shipping route utilization.

Furthermore, whereas the 14th Five-Year Plan advocated “participation” in international rule-making and “pragmatic cooperation” with coastal states, the 15th Five-Year Plan outlines “proactive participation” in rule-making, in addition to the “establishment or attraction of specialized international maritime organizations within its own country” and the “strengthening of legal struggles and maritime law enforcement capabilities.” This outline demonstrates a strong ambition to secure a more dominant leadership position in the international maritime order.

On January 16, 2026, the day before the UN Agreement on Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ Agreement)[22] came into effect, China notified the UN Secretary-General of its application to propose Xiamen City in Fujian Province as a candidate site for the BBNJ Agreement secretariat.[23] This proposition is also part of the “establishment or attraction of specialized international maritime organizations within its own country” outlined in the 15th Five-Year Plan. It is anticipated that China’s participation in Arctic governance will become even more active.

China, which sought to build foundations and to expand its economic space toward becoming a “strong maritime nation” under the 14th Five-Year Plan, is now aiming in the 15th Five-Year Plan to master the maritime domain and achieve comprehensive management and securing of rights in the deep sea, polar regions, and international governance. It can be said that China’s maritime strategy, including those aspects intended for the Arctic, has transitioned radically into a new phase, moving from mere “expansion and extension” to “strategic management” (jinglüe).