Introduction: How can Chinese diplomacy be interpreted among the evolving affairs in Northeast Asia?

In Seoul on May 27, 2024, Japan, China, and South Korea held their first trilateral in about four and a half years. The previous day (May 26), Prime Minister Fumio Kishida held an hour-long summit conference with Chinese Premier Li Qiang, reaffirming the promotion of a “strategic reciprocal relationship.” The Chinese Communist Party’s official newspaper, the People’s Daily, featured the China–ROK summit conference on its front page the next day (May 27), while the Japan–China summit conference was on the second page[1]. The next day’s (May 28) front page featured Li Qiang’s face, but neither Prime Minister Kishida nor South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s face was included[2]。. Although the People’s Daily did not publish only Li Qiang and Yoon Suk-yeol in its article on the Trilateral Summit, from the Japanese perspective, China’s coverage of the meetings was disrespectful.

For China, the emphasis was on rebuilding stalled China–ROK relations because the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration and accelerating negotiations for the China–Japan–ROK Free Trade Agreement (FTA) amidst the growing U.S.-led decoupling of supply chains from China. In this context, reaffirmation of the Japan–China “strategic reciprocal relationship” was nothing more than a greeting for China’s interests.

Given such circumstances, can Japan and China truly cooperate on regional stabilization in Northeast Asia? In summary, the current state of affairs presents an extremely difficult situation.

As described in this paper, the author reviews recent Japan–China, China–Russia, China–ROK, and U.S.–ROK–Japan relations to examine Chinese diplomacy and Japan–China relations among evolving affairs in Northeast Asia.

1. The “Japan–China Strategic Reciprocal Relationship” in Name Only

At the Japan–China summit on May 26, 2024, Prime Minister Kishida expressed to Premier Li Qiang the desire to continue dialogues at various levels to address issues and concerns in line with the comprehensive promotion of the Japan–China “strategic reciprocal relationship” and the construction of “constructive and stable relations,” which was reaffirmed with President Xi Jinping in November 2023. Premier Li Qiang expressed a similar view. However, the specific details discussed by the two sides were inadequate to be evaluated as “strategically mutually beneficial” or “constructive and stabilizing” relations.

At the China–ROK summit meeting held on the same day as the China–Japan summit meeting, China told the ROK that they “hope to promote bilateral relations to develop in a positive direction and move forward in a stable and steady manner.” Both countries agreed to timely continuance of high-level strategic dialogues between their foreign ministries, 2+2 dialogues between their foreign and defense vice ministers, and activation of the 1.5-track dialogue exchange mechanism. They also agreed to accelerate the second phase of FTA negotiations, use communication mechanisms such as economic ministerial meetings, industrial investment cooperation, industrial chain and supply chain cooperation, export control dialogues, and promotion of cultural and youth exchanges[3].

One can reasonably infer that the Chinese were drawing a line in the sand in their diplomatic stance toward South Korea and Japan.

Furthermore, on the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website regarding the Japan–China summit, it was stated that Premier Li Qiang urged Prime Minister Kishida to “show more sincerity and constructive attitude on issues such as the long-term international monitoring system” related to the discharge of ALPS-treated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant into the ocean (claimed by China as contaminated water, not treated water), and to fulfill Japan’s responsibilities and obligations appropriately by addressing legitimate and reasonable concerns domestically and internationally[4]. Considering that the 2023 edition of the China Nuclear Energy Yearbook, which presented nuclear power plant operations in 2022, revealed that the tritium levels in the wastewater from 15 out of 19 monitoring points at Chinese nuclear power plants exceeded the annual upper limit for tritium in the wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi plant, China is in no position to make such demands on Japan[5].

However, just two weeks later on November 29, President Xi Jinping visited the East China Sea Command of the People’s Armed Police Force[6], declaring that “China can only move forward, not backward. We must continuously strengthen the struggle to protect sovereignty without losing even a millimeter of China’s territory” related to the Senkaku Islands in Ishigaki City, Okinawa Prefecture, and instructed them to enhance their law enforcement capabilities[7].

China Central Television (CCTV) highlighted one noteworthy point during Xi’s visit as the presence of the largest ship, “Coast Guard 2901,” in the Coast Guard fleet reporting to Xi[8]. Since March 2023, “Coast Guard 2901” has been sailing repeatedly into the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands with its Automatic Identification System (AIS) turned on. This can be regarded as a part of China’s psychological and public opinion warfare because public ships usually turn off the AIS during missions.

Following Xi Jinping’s directives, the Chinese Coast Guard has intensified its activities around the Senkaku Islands. Since January 2024, Chinese Coast Guard vessels sailing in the contiguous zone around the Senkaku Islands have been communicating by radio to Japanese Self-Defense Force aircraft flying in Japanese airspace to leave. On June 15, 2024, the “Administrative Law Enforcement Procedures of the Chinese Coast Guard” were implemented. This law, based on the “Coast Guard Law” enacted in 2021, stipulates specific procedures for Chinese Coast Guard enforcement, including the use of weapons if foreign vessels do not comply with stop orders, and allows for the detention of foreign nationals for up to 60 days if suspected of invading China’s claimed territorial waters.

Considering these points, it is clear that China is not making efforts to realize a “strategic reciprocal relationship.” Rather, attempts to change the status quo unilaterally have intensified.

China is whispering to Japan about a “strategic reciprocal relationship”, cautious about China’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). However, the essence of China’s stance toward Japan remains a hardline approach.

2. Russia – North Korea Relations Associated with Putin’s Visit to North Korea

Next, one can discuss how changes in Russia – North Korea relations increase Japan’s security risk[9].

On June 19, 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un in Pyongyang and signed the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty.” Despite North Korea’s declaration of restoration of the alliance with Russia for the first time in 28 years, Russia did not define it as an “alliance,” characterizing it as a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with some differences in perception. The Kremlin had announced a one-night, two-day visit to North Korea on June 18–19, but Putin’s private jet landed in North Korea at 1:14 AM on June 19. He stayed for only about 10 hours. Considering that when Mr. Putin visited China on May 16–17, he arrived in Beijing early in the morning of May 16 at 4:00 a.m., his marked tardiness in North Korea could be considered a performance by Russia to demonstrate its deference to China.

On June 18, the day before the signing of the Russia – North Korea treaty, the “Korea–China Diplomatic Security Dialogue” (2+2) was held at the South Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs building in Seoul with senior officials from the foreign and defense ministries of both countries. This was the first Korea–China 2+2 meeting since the upgrade from director-general to vice-minister level. From China, Vice Foreign Minister Sun Weidong and Deputy Director-General of the International Military Cooperation Office of the Central Military Commission Zhang Baojun (Major General) attended. From South Korea, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Hong-kyun and Director of International Policy at the Ministry of National Defense Lee Seung-bum attended. Reportedly, a considerable amount of time was spent discussing North Korea and Russia – North Korea relations. The South Korean side requested that China play a constructive role in maintaining peace, stability, and denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula because the strengthening of military relations between Russia and North Korea could heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula, which is also not in China’s interest[10].

The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated during its regular press conference on June 17 that the Korea–China 2+2 was not coordinated with Putin’s visit to North Korea. However, from China’s perspective, the strengthening of Russia – North Korea relations might prompt strengthening of the US–ROK alliance and Japan–US–ROK relations, changing China’s influence over North Korea, which could negatively affect China. Despite the Chinese government’s statements, the Korea–China 2+2 initiative was a check on both Russia and North Korea.

Moreover, in the context of sanctions against Russia, the emphasis on “China–Russia – North Korea vs. US–Japan–ROK” is not desirable for China. On June 12, the US Department of Treasury and State Department imposed new sanctions to block products and services necessary for Russia’s military production involved in the invasion of Ukraine, targeting over 300 entities and individuals, including Chinese companies, as Specially Designated Nationals (SDNs)[11]. The US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) also strengthened export controls, including the addition of specific addresses in Hong Kong to the trade restriction list to counter sanction evasion through name changes or dummy companies.

On June 13, US Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen stated that major Chinese banks were mindful of US sanctions against Russia and did not want to violate them[12], indicating that China sent a message to the US that it did not want to be divided into zero-sum camps of “China–Russia – North Korea vs. US–Japan–ROK[13].”

Therefore, holding the Korea–China 2+2 on June 18 can be regarded as a “message” from China to Russia, North Korea, and the US.

3. Japan and the US More Cautious About Russia– North Korea Rapprochement Than China

The signing of the “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty” between Russia and North Korea has raised “serious concerns” for the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in South Korea that North Korea might escalate provocations through strengthened military cooperation with Russia, prompting consideration of arms support to Ukraine. Despite Putin’s attempt to deter South Korea from transferring arms to Ukraine, the South Korean administration has been stimulated excessively. In a press conference with Russian media in Vietnam, Putin responded by saying, “Military support to North Korea under the treaty we signed will only occur if there is an invasion of the signatory countries. As far as I know, South Korea is not planning to invade North Korea. Therefore, there is no need to worry about our cooperation in this area[14].”

From the exchanges between Russia and South Korea, it is evident that Russia intends to avoid deep involvement in any emergency on the Korean Peninsula. This intent is reflected in the treaty wording, which states, “We do not exclude the possibility of providing weapons to North Korea,” rather than “We will provide weapons to North Korea.”

Given these points, the strengthening of Russia – North Korea relations, limited to North Korea’s support of Russia with ammunition and labor, is not at a level of concern for China. Moreover, in July 2024, President Putin stated that China–Russia relations are “at their best in history,” while President Xi Jinping emphasized “strengthening strategic coordination” between China and Russia and voiced support for “preventing a new Cold War” and opposing “illegal unilateral sanctions and hegemony.” This emphasis suggests that Russia gave detailed prior explanations to China regarding the Russia – North Korea rapprochement.

China is likely to be more concerned about the strengthening of US–ROK–Japan cooperation than the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea. The South Korean government is aware that North Korea has sent at least 10,000 containers to Russia, which can transport up to 4.8 million artillery shells used for Russia’s attacks on Ukraine. According to the Ukrainian Prosecutor’s Office and other sources, approximately half of the North Korean missiles launched by Russia towards Ukraine between December 2023 and February 2024 were duds, exploded in the air, or killed Russian soldiers[15]. If Russia were to support upgrading of these “useless shells” from North Korea into “usable shells,” then it would increase security risks in Northeast Asia.

In fact, the rapprochement between Russia and North Korea offers China more opportunities than risks. Accompanying Putin’s visit to North Korea were Russian Transport Minister Roman Starovoit and Primorsky Krai Governor Oleg Kozhemyako. Notably, the joint statement from the China–Russia summit on May 16 described that “both parties will engage in constructive dialogue with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regarding China’s ships navigating to the sea via the lower Tumen River.”

The Tumen River, which flows along the borders of North Korea, China, and Russia, has total length of 521 km, originating from Mount Paektu and flowing into the Sea of Japan. In 2023, Western satellites observed numerous freight cars from the North Korean Tumangang Station to the Russian Sakhalin Station and Vladivostok, suggesting North Korea’s provision of weapons and ammunition to Russia.

Chinese ships can navigate the Tumen River freely up to the eastern end of Jilin Province. However, to travel the remaining 15 km to the Sea of Japan, Chinese ships need permission from Russia and North Korea. The “Sino-Soviet Friendship Bridge” built by the former Soviet Union, which stands 7 meters high, currently obstructs large Chinese vessels. China has repeatedly requested that Russia and North Korea raise the bridge and dredge the lower Tumen River, but both countries have refused. However, the weakened state of Russia because of the invasion of Ukraine has led to a change in its stance, allowing Chinese navigation. Furthermore, during the May 2024 China–Russia summit, both countries agreed to establish a subcommittee on Arctic route cooperation within the regular prime ministerial meeting mechanism, developing mutually beneficial cooperation for Arctic development and infrastructure improvement.

Russia’s change in stance to allow China access from the Tumen River to the Sea of Japan is part of the China–Russia cooperation under the “Belt and Road” Arctic route (“Ice Silk Road”), resulting in the Chinese military’s permanent presence in the Sea of Japan. For Japan, this means increased presence of Chinese ships in the Tsugaru and Soya Straits, while for the US, it means heightened vigilance over Chinese military activities in the Sea of Okhotsk, potentially increasing the China risk to Japan and the US’ security environment.

4. China’s Concerns: “Recently, China–ROK Relations Face Difficulties and Challenges”

The focus of this discussion can now be shifted to China–ROK relations.

On May 1, 2024, during the 2+2 (foreign and defense ministers’ meeting) with Australia, South Korea agreed to participate in the second pillar of the US–UK–Australia security framework AUKUS, cooperating in advanced technologies such as hypersonic weapons, drones, cyber, and space. Both countries reaffirmed in their joint statement the importance of freedom of navigation in the East China Sea and South China Sea along with the necessity of maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for regional security and prosperity[16].

During the Moon Jae-in administration, China repeatedly emphasized that “South Korea should have an independent foreign policy” and that “China welcomes South Korea making decisions based on its fundamental interests.” However, under the Biden administration, South Korea joined the semiconductor supply chain network “Chip 4,” leading to friction in China–ROK relations.

Wang Yi, member of the Political Bureau of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, Director of the Office of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, met with South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Tae-yong in Beijing for about four hours on May 13, 2024, to coordinate the trilateral summit. After both countries agreed to create momentum for improving China–ROK relations, which have cooled since the inauguration of the Yoon Suk-yeol administration, they exchanged opinions on the North Korean situation.

Wang Yi emphasized that, since the establishment of the Strategic Cooperative Partnership in 2008, China and South Korea have placed each other’s relationship at an important position in their respective milieus of diplomacy. Then, bearing in mind South Korea’s foreign policy since the inauguration of the Yun Si-yue administration, which has been strengthening the U.S.–ROK alliance and U.S.–ROK–Japan relations, he said, “Recently, China–ROK relations have been facing difficulties and challenges. However, this is neither in the common interest of the two countries nor what China wants,” and “Korea and China should cooperate to uphold the original purpose of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, maintain the direction of good neighborly friendship, adhere to the goal of mutually beneficial cooperation, eliminate interference, move in the same direction, and work together to promote the healthy and stable development of China–ROK relations. We will work together in the same direction to promote the healthy and stable development of Sino-South Korean relations[17].” Wang Yi’s remarks indicated that China was irritated by the fact that the ROK, since the inauguration of the Yun administration, has been moving away from China and increasing its tilt toward the United States.

Foreign Minister Cho responded that the South Korean government highly values its relationship with China and does not agree with a zero-sum game, aiming to develop balanced relations with all countries, to strengthen mutual trust with China, to expand agreements, to focus on cooperation specifically, to avoid geopolitical constraints to the greatest extent possible, and to open a new phase of Korea–China cooperation. He also requested that China play a constructive role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula[18].

However, during the “Korea–China 2+2” on June 19, the Chinese side only reiterated that “Russia and North Korea, as friendly neighbors, need to interact, cooperate, and develop their relations” in response to South Korea’s concerns about the strengthening of Russia – North Korea military cooperation because of Putin’s visit to North Korea, emphasizing that “China will play a constructive role in its way regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula[19].”

5. Strengthening of US–Japan–ROK Relations: From “Hub-and-Spoke” to “Lattice Fence” under the Biden Administration

Wang Yi’s dissatisfaction expressed to Cho Tae-yong was indicative of China’s desire to undermine South Korea’s inclination towards the US in response to the Biden administration’s multilayered and multi-tiered alliance strengthening.

Since the Cold War, the US security policy in the Asia–Pacific region has been based on the “hub-and-spoke” system of bilateral alliances, with the US as the “hub” and its allies in Asia, such as Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, as “spokes.” No network has linked these several bilateral alliances. However, the current Biden administration is shifting from the traditional system to the “lattice fence” system with China in mind[20].

Given Asia’s adversarial history and international relations since the 19th century, the “lattice fence” system is not, and will never be, a multilateral alliance similar to NATO. Therefore, under a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” with “China as a threat” in mind, key U.S. allies, friends and partners are trying to build a platform by expanding and strengthening their networks and connectivity, forming a mutual grid of barriers with the U.S. as the central axis. In this sense, the “lattice fence” system, which is a strengthening of the partnership among allies that the U.S. puts up in a “lattice” pattern, is a system to share the burden between the U.S. and its allies, which differs greatly from multilateral alliances such as NATO.

What the U.S. side calls a “lattice fence[21],” has made the Chinese side wary, regarding it as a “small group” (i.e., several exclusive, Cold War minded, “small groups”).

The joint statement[22] signed by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 16, 2024, to deepen the comprehensive strategic partnership also highlighted concerns about “small groups.” The statement expressed concern about US efforts that violate the balance of strategic nuclear forces, global missile defense plans, and non-nuclear high-precision weapon programs threatening China and Russia, and emphasized that cooperation in the defense sector between China and Russia would contribute to strengthening of regional and global security. The Sino-Russian joint statement criticizes the U.S. for “putting the security of ‘small groups’ above regional security and stability, putting regional security at risk,” and calls on the international community to support a constructive joint initiative by China and Russia on the North Korea issue.

6. China’s Concerns About US Alliances

In addition to the statements presented above, the joint statement included concerns about “the deployment of ground-based mid-range missile systems in the Asia–Pacific region under the pretext of joint military exercises with allies.” This statement refers directly to the temporary deployment of ground-based mid-range “Typhon” missile launchers (MRC) capable of reaching up to 1,600 kilometers (within range of Chinese military bases in the South China Sea and southern China) on Luzon Island during the US–Philippines joint military exercise “Balikatan 2024” in April. These concerns reflect China’s wariness of the US deploying MRCs in the Asia–Pacific region, particularly under the framework of the strengthened US–ROK and Japan–US alliances, aimed at China.

On April 4, US Army Pacific Commander General Charles Flynn described at the US Embassy in Tokyo that the US would deploy launchers with mid-range capabilities in the Asia–Pacific region by the end of 2024[23]. China sees U.S. deployment of medium-range missiles in the Asia–Pacific as a warning to China[24]. In a regular press conference of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 18, a reporter from the People’s Daily affiliated Global Times was asked for comments on the temporary deployment of “Typhon” in Luzon Island during the US–Philippines joint military exercise, the first deployment in the Asia–Pacific region since the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The reporter noted that some commentators believed the US move aimed to deter China. In response, the spokesperson stated that China was monitoring the developments closely, with consistent opposition against the deployment of mid-range ballistic missiles by the US in the Asia–Pacific region to achieve unilateral military superiority and strengthen military deployment at “China’s doorstep”[25].

China is not only wary of the US; it is also dissatisfied with the Yoon Suk-yeol administration in South Korea, which is distancing itself from China, unlike the previous Moon Jae-in administration’s submissive diplomacy towards China. The Moon administration pledged “Three No’s and One Restriction” (3 No’s of (1) No additional deployment of THAAD, (2) No participation in US missile defense, (3) No trilateral military alliance with the US and Japan, and 1 Restriction of Restricting the operation of the deployed THAAD) in response to China’s instructions, delaying the environmental impact assessment and maintaining the THAAD deployment as “temporary.” However, the Yoon administration subsequently withdrew the “Three No’s and One Restriction.”

China is wary of the Yoon administration’s guidance of Korea from China, unlike the Moon Jae-in administration’s submissive stance towards China.

7. China Wants to Pull South Korea Back

Despite its ruling conservative party “People Power Party” suffering a significant defeat in the April general election and facing tough administration under the Yoon administration, the pro-US stance and reconciliation policy with Japan remain as of July 2024.

On the day before the second anniversary of his inauguration, May 9, 2024, President Yoon spoke about Japan–ROK relations, pointing out differences in historical issues but emphasizing the need to endure and move forward and cooperate for future responses to North Korea’s nuclear issue and economic aspects. He also emphasized strengthening security and expanding economic opportunities for US–Japan–ROK cooperation[26].

he South Korean opposition party criticizes the Yoon administration’s reconciliation diplomacy with Japan. For example, Cho Kuk, leader of the Democratic Party of Korea and known as the “Onion Man”[27] in Japan, strongly criticized the Yoon administration’s diplomatic stance toward Japan as “the worst pro-Japanese government in history” and a “selling-out government” during his visit to Takeshima on May 13.

However, the pro-Japan stance of the Yoon administration seems likely to continue until the administration enters a lame-duck period. One background factor is tensions stirred up by North Korea.

Since the latter half of 2023, North Korea started referring to South Korea as the “Republic of Korea” instead of the “Korean Peninsula,” marking a shift in the “Federal Republic” concept advocated by Kim Il-sung. At the Central Committee Plenary Meeting held on December 26–30, 2023, Kim Jong-un stated that the relationship with South Korea was “no longer between the same people but two hostile states, warring countries,” clarifying that North Korea no longer sees South Korea as a target for unification. Kim criticized the Yoon administration for referring to North Korea as the “main enemy” and attempting to collapse the North Korean regime and unify the Korean Peninsula by absorbing the North, stating that it was no longer accurate to consider South Korea a reconciliation and unification partner. He also announced plans to reorganize and reform organizations such as the Party’s United Front Department.

On January 14, 2024, North Korea conducted its first test launch of a solid-fuel intermediate-range ballistic missile, demonstrating its intention to improve surprise capabilities by replacing conventional liquid-fuel missiles with solid-fuel ones. The next day, Kim Jong-un advocated amendment of the constitution to position South Korea as the “primary hostile state, unchanging main enemy” in the Supreme People’s Assembly.

These changes in the situation on the Korean Peninsula are pushing the Yoon administration in South Korea toward strengthening the US–ROK alliance. Given this situation, China will likely act to maintain good relations with South Korea to prevent it from standing on the American side in the US–China hegemony competition, seeking opportunities to undermine US–Japan–ROK security cooperation.

Conclusion

The outcome document of the Eighth Japan–China–ROK Summit in 2019 stated, “We will strive to achieve peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, emphasizing that only through international cooperation, including dialogue and diplomacy in line with relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, can complete denuclearization and permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula be achieved. The leaders of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of Korea hope that the abduction issue between Japan and North Korea will be resolved as soon as possible through dialogue[28].”

However, the joint declaration of the Ninth Japan–China–ROK Summit in 2024 showed marked regression, stating, “We reaffirmed that maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia is our common interest and responsibility. We emphasized our respective positions on regional peace and stability, denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the abduction issue. We agreed to continue positive efforts for a political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue[29].”

Considering new developments among China, Russia, and North Korea, such as the Tumen River development, the China risk continues to rise. It is extremely unlikely that Japan and China will find a cooperative landing point on security issues surrounding the Korean Peninsula and Japan.

The Japanese government agreed to position China as the “greatest strategic challenge” at the Japan–US Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2) on January 11, 2023. In his speech to the US Congress on April 11, 2024, Prime Minister Kishida also emphasized that China’s military actions are the greatest strategic challenge to global peace and stability. Nevertheless, if Japan continues to bring up the “strategic reciprocal relationship” in diplomacy, it will highlight the lightness of Japan’s diplomatic words and engender a loss of credibility among the Japanese people.

Amidst the turbulent situation in Northeast Asia, the Japanese government and people must calmly assess the ambitions of China, which brought up the “strategic reciprocal relationship,” and the risks it poses.