Introduction

The summit of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was held in Beijing on September 4–6, 2024. The FOCAC includes[1] China, 53 African countries with which China has established diplomatic relations, and 55 countries and organizations from the African Union Commission (AUC)[2]. The 2024 Beijing Summit was attended by Chinese President Xi Jinping, heads of state of 51 countries, heads of government of 2 countries[3], President of the African Union Commission Musa Faki Mahamat, United Nations Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, and more than 3,200 other participants.

The Beijing Declaration on Building an All-Weather China–Africa Community with a Shared Future for the New Era (hereinafter designated as the “FOCAC Beijing Declaration”) and the associated Action Plan (2025–2027) were adopted at the FOCAC Beijing Summit. By “new era,” Xi Jinping explains that it means “China has become a world power” and “China is playing an important role in the history of mankind.”[4] In the context of the “new era,” which is envisioned with China holding a leading position in the international order, what is China’s goal in aiming to build an “All-Weather Community” with Africa? How does China position Africa within this framework?

Based on this awareness of these issues, this paper will discuss relations between China and African nations as seen through the eyes of a Japanese scholar specializing in contemporary Chinese diplomacy, using the following structure. Section I presents an examination of the “FOCAC Beijing Declaration” and the “Action Plan (2025–2027),” along with the argument that China’s current Africa policy, which Xi Jinping has positioned as a “new era,” has raised the stage to a more comprehensive relationship that encompasses more aspects of governance and security than ever before. Section II points out the five pillars of China’s policy toward Africa as expressed from the FOCAC Beijing Summit. Section III presents discussion of China’s expanding maritime expansion and the construction of a defense line to West Africa.

Ⅰ FOCAC Beijing Summit: Advancing a More Comprehensive Relationship

◆ The goal is developing a sustainable relationship with Africa

Although African countries had demanded debt forgiveness from China, China did not respond at the FOCAC Beijing Summit. However, China pledged about $50 billion in financial assistance to Africa over three years (about $40 billion was pledged at the 2021 FOCAC ministerial meeting). In monetary terms alone, this amount represented a marked reduction from the approximately $60 billion at the 2015 Johannesburg FOCAC and the 2018 Beijing FOCAC. Because of fiscal constraints from China’s economic slowdown and increased debt risk in Africa, China is on track to increase its investments in about 1,000 more small projects, which it has designated as “small and beautiful projects.” Nevertheless, the dollar amount does not reflect the scale and scope of China’s involvement in Africa directly. China has been developing “efficient engagement” in supporting economically developing countries through projects of international financial institutions and multilateral development banks.

The “FOCAC Beijing Declaration” links Africa’s “Agenda 2063,” China’s “Belt and Road Initiative,” and the United Nations’ “2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” It advocates for the joint efforts of China and Africa for joint construction of the “Global Development Initiative (GDI),” “Global Security Initiative (GSI),” and “Global Civilization Initiative (GCI).”[5]。

Since approximately 2016, China has shifted from providing aid to a broad range of countries to particularly emphasis on support for key strategic regions in its global strategy[6]. According to the “Action Plan (2025–2027),” this shift emphasizes moving away from traditional debt-driven infrastructure investments towards strengthening cooperation in trade relations, governance models, and security and safety governance. The goal is to develop sustainable relations with Africa. In other words, although the loan amount has shrunk, in terms of their content, they are more comprehensive and applied deeper than before. China is moving decisively in the direction of expanding its influence in Africa.

◆ Africa seeks to maximize its own profits in anticipation of U.S.–China competition

Nevertheless, this is not a one-sided relationship by which China can control Africa.

Generally, the term “Win–Win” refers to a situation in which both parties benefit, commonly used in business. However, Western officials have joked with dark humor that the “new meaning of Win–Win” is that China wins twice[7]. Nevertheless, in the competition for spheres of influence in Africa, through which China has been expanding its presence, China has not necessarily strengthened its dominance over the West. African countries are striving to strengthen their bargaining power over China, citing the presence of support from Western countries as well. For example, in Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia, where China has an overwhelming presence because of U.S.–China competition over cobalt, the West’s “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII)[8]” has been working on a large-scale development initiative known as the “Lobito Corridor”.

African countries are maneuvering to take advantage of the U.S.–China power bloc competition to advance their own interests.

◆ Strong awareness of the UN “Agreement for the Future”

The FOCAC “Action Plan (2025–2027)” is influenced strongly by the UN’s “Pact for the Future” (Resolution A/RES/79/1), which was adopted on September 22, 2024 with the aim of transforming global governance. The “Pact for the Future” outlines 56 actions beginning with “We Will.” It is based on the vision “Our Common Agenda,” announced by Secretary-General António Guterres on September 10, 2021, reflecting the dialogue of UN member states. The draft proposal (Zero Draft) was released on January 26, 2024 with subsequent discussions, which led to the publication of the “Revised Draft (Rev.1)” on May 14, 2024[9], and to adoption on September 22.

The “Pact for the Future” calls for the development of a global code of conduct to end the infodemic and the “war on science,” which are undermining the world, while seeking new modes of cooperation in achieving common interests with global solidarity. It reflects efforts to address international conflicts and environmental destruction, advocates for improvements in political representation, education, and skills training. Moreover, it emphasizes the need for an inclusive multilateral system supported by the UN, with advanced networking, including multi-stakeholder dialogue on outer space. The “Pact for the Future” is also intended to enhance the representation and voice of developing countries in agreements aimed at strengthening international frameworks for space governance and reforming the international financial architecture.

Of particular interest in relation to FOCAC is the Global Digital Compact, an annex to the Pact for the Future. The document will be the first comprehensive global framework for digital cooperation and artificial intelligence (AI) governance. The Global Digital Compact, the first international commitment on data governance, puts data governance responsibility with the UN agenda and calls on countries to take concrete action by 2030. With the formulation of rules for global digital governance and data governance in mind, it is clear that China is keenly aware of building a network of friend blocs that will support the “rules it wants to create.”

◆ Xi Jinping’s “Ten Major Partnership Actions”

In his keynote speech at the FOCAC Beijing Summit, Xi Jinping set forth the “Ten Major Partnership Actions” for the modernization of Africa and articulated concrete directions for China–Africa cooperation [10]. Specifically, he raised the following avenues for development.

(1) “Partnership Action for Inter-Civilizational Mutual Recognition,” including the establishment of a platform for the exchange of governance experiences. (2) “Partnership Action for Trade Prosperity,” including zero tariffs for 33 least-developed countries, expanding market access for African agricultural products, and deepening cooperation in e-commerce. (3) “Partnership Action for Industrial Chain Cooperation,” including the establishment of a digital technology cooperation center and the implementation of digital demonstration projects. (4) “Partnership Action for Connectivity,” characterized by land–sea cooperation and coordinated development. (5) “Partnership Action for Development Cooperation” under the Global Development Initiative (GDI). (6) “Partnership Action for Health and Well-being,” including the establishment of the China–Africa Hospital Alliance and the joint construction of healthcare centers. (7) “Partnership Action for Agricultural Promotion and Livelihood Focus,” including the provision of 1 billion RMB in emergency food aid, the construction of 100,000 acres of agricultural standardization demonstration zones, the dispatch of 500 agricultural experts, the creation of the China–Africa Agricultural Science and Technology Innovation Alliance, the implementation of 500 public welfare projects, creating industrial added value for Africa and generating over 1 million jobs in Africa. (8) “Partnership Action for Human and Cultural Exchange,” including the joint construction of engineering technical universities and vocational schools, and the construction of 10 “魯班工房[11](Luban Workshops: China’s foreign vocational education cooperation institutions)”. (9) “Partnership Action for Green Development,” including the implementation of 30 clean energy projects, the establishment of early warning weather business platforms, disaster prevention, reduction, and relief efforts, cooperation in biodiversity conservation, the establishment of a China–Africa Forum for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Technology, the construction of 30 joint research institutes, along with cooperation in satellite remote sensing, lunar and deep space exploration. (10) “Partnership Action for Security Cooperation,” including the establishment of a partnership with Africa for the implementation of the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the creation of cooperative demonstration areas for GSI collaboration, the provision of 1 billion RMB in free military aid to Africa, training 6,000 military personnel and 1,000 police and law enforcement officers, inviting 500 young military officers to China, conducting joint military exercises, training, and patrols, implementing the “Africa Mine Removal Assistance Operation,” and jointly maintaining personnel and project safety.

Compared to the “Eight Major Action Guidelines” proposed at the 2018 Beijing Summit[12], the “Ten Major Partnership Actions” for 2024 are more in-depth than before in the areas of governance, inter-party exchange, military exchange, digital development, satellite development, and security development.

◆ Mutual Support for Regime Maintenance: China’s “Modernization Does Not Mean Westernization”

The Beijing FOCAC partnership actions prioritize the “growth of exports” from Africa’s natural resources and agriculture. In recent years, China has faced criticism from Western countries related to the “debt trap” associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. Consequently, the emphasis of the program has shifted from debt-driven infrastructure investment to trade relations.

Within the FOCAC framework, African countries can receive support from China without the typical conditionalities that are inherent with aid from Western countries, such as democracy, human rights, freedom, and environmental considerations: the so-called “Washington Consensus”. This relative lack of conditions allows China to solidify its position as a “partner” to African nations. For China, its relations with African nations hold significance not only for the stable acquisition of mineral resources and global South diplomacy but also as part of the broader strategy to promote a governance model distinct from that of the West[13]. This strategy of promotion is key to China’s “distinctive great power diplomacy.” The most important axis of this diplomacy is to maintain the leadership of the Communist Party of China, strengthen confidence in China’s socialist path, theory, system, and culture, and work towards increasing the number of countries and people who understand and support the social system and development path that China has chosen[14].

For China, the top priority in security is the maintenance of the one-party dictatorship and democratic centralism political system under leadership of the Communist Party of China.

In the aftermath of the Beijing FOCAC, the Chinese foreign affairs magazine “World Knowledge”, published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, criticized Walt Whitman Rostow’s modernization theory as a narrow perspective and argued that “modernization does not mean Westernization.” The magazine also criticized how Western neoliberalism has forced deindustrialization on Africa[15]. The neoliberal Washington Consensus is regarded by African countries as an imposition of good governance. The criticism of the Washington Consensus from authoritarian African governments resonates with China.

◆ China’s Efforts to Incorporate Africa into the Formulation of International Rules for AI and Cybersecurity

Africa’s AI market size accounts for only 2.5% of the global share[16]. However, the potential demand for digitalization in Africa is immense. For example, 70% of global mobile payment transactions take place in Sub-Saharan Africa[17]. According to the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Africa’s share of global internet users is still about 14%, but investments in digital infrastructure, such as the expansion of submarine cables, are expected to reach $6 billion annually by 2027[18].

Africa’s appeal lies not only in its potential markets and key minerals. The “Action Plan (2025–2027)” outlines China’s vision for collaboration with Africa through initiatives such as the “Global AI Governance Initiative (GAII)” and the “Global Data Initiative (GDI).” These initiatives are aimed at establishing the Global Security Initiative (GSI) through mutual cooperation between China and Africa.

A key objective of China in Africa is to work with the Global South for the joint construction of a “Digital Community of Shared Destiny” and position China’s leadership in the GDI at the core of international rule-making for digital governance.

◆ GSI and Africa’s Inclusion in SSA

China’s efforts to engage Africa extend beyond merely the GAII and GDI. Establishment of a partnership with Africa for the construction of the Global Security Initiative (GSI) was emphasized repeatedly by China during the FOCAC and was included in the “Action Plan (2025–2027).”

When reading President Xi Jinping’s keynote speech alongside the “Action Plan (2025–2027),” it becomes readily apparent that the “Green Development Partnership Action” and the “Security Cooperation Partnership Action” have become increasingly comprehensive compared to past years. Additionally, the plan includes local perspectives such as the protection of Chinese citizens and companies operating in Africa, and global perspectives on security cooperation in widely diverse fields including space, satellites, AI, and cybersecurity. This inclusion of cooperative projects suggests that China is seeking to integrate Africa into its Space Situational Awareness (SSA) framework.

The “Green Development Partnership Action” between China and Africa includes the establishment of a meteorological early warning operation platform, the creation of a peaceful nuclear technology platform, and cooperation in areas such as satellite remote sensing, lunar exploration, and deep space exploration, which indicates that China intends to strengthen its green cooperation with Africa while also solidifying Africa’s support in the development of space governance rules, all while securing resources and rights for China. China has already expressed its intention to enhance space traffic management, including improvement of space debris monitoring systems, and to develop integrated space–climate monitoring systems linking space and the Earth’s surface. In this context, China is actively advocating for participation in the development of international rules within the UN framework.

◆ Safe Access to Resources and China’s Private Security Companies

One focal point of the recent FOCAC “Action Plan (2025–2027)” is the direction in which China’s security companies in Africa are expected to strengthen their roles.

China has provided “military subsidies” to African countries, invited 6,000 African military personnel and 1,000 law enforcement officers for training, and conducted joint military exercises, training, and patrols, all aimed at incorporating Africa into the Global Security Initiative (GSI) proposed by China. Furthermore, China is set to enhance its support for counterterrorism capabilities in regions such as the Horn of Africa and the Sahel, and to collaborate with 14 East African countries, Interpol, and the African Police Cooperation Organisation (AFRIPOL) to establish a “security Silk Road,” particularly addressing the establishment and enhancement of the capabilities of law enforcement agencies.

The proposal for jointly building a security partnership reflects the increasing gravity of protecting Chinese citizens and businesses in Africa, a concern that has become increasingly urgent as China’s presence in Africa grows. With over 10,000 Chinese companies and more than one million Chinese citizens working across Africa, Chinese citizens and businesses are increasingly exposed to risks such as kidnappings, terrorist attacks, anti-China violence, and local coups, especially as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) expands.

However, despite the growing Chinese presence, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) remains reluctant to engage in large-scale military deployments across Africa as of October 2024. Instead, China remains in a situation of not fully trusting African security forces to protect Chinese citizens and businesses. In response, China has turned to private security companies such as Beijing DeWe Security Service[19], Huaxin Zhongan Security Service (HZSS), and China Security Technology Group (CISG), which have expanded their presence in Africa in recent years. Although these companies are officially “private enterprises,” their core personnel often come from the PLA, the People’s Armed Police, or the police forces[20].

Unlike Russian private military companies, China’s private security firms are not allowed to engage in combat operations. According to China’s “Security Services Management Regulations” (adopted in September 2009 and effective January 2010), private security personnel are only allowed limited access to firearms. The use of violence to resolve conflicts is prohibited (with exceptions for security operations in the Gulf of Aden)[21]. Instead, Chinese security companies are required to “cooperate closely” with the local military and police forces. These companies do not participate directly in African conflicts but instead hire local armed personnel and train police and other security forces behind the scenes[22]. However, incidents of human rights violations have arisen, as in cases where Chinese private military companies have lent firearms to local militias and security companies, contributing to human rights abuses in countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. These events have exacerbated anti-China sentiment in the region.

In terms of protecting Chinese citizens in Africa, President Xi Jinping emphasized in the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022 that “the ability to safeguard national security should be strengthened… overseas security capabilities should be built up, and the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens and overseas entities should be protected.[23]” Nevertheless, the murder of nine Chinese workers in a mine in the Central African Republic in March 2023, an unresolved case, highlighted the growing risks faced by Chinese citizens working in Africa and further intensified the sense of urgency among the Chinese leadership.

From the content outlined in the 2024 FOCAC “Action Plan (2025–2027)” and “Security Cooperation Partnership Action,” it seems likely that the role and scope of China’s private security companies in Africa will expand in the near future.

Ⅱ The Five Pillars of China’s Africa Policy

From analyses of the “FOCAC Beijing Declaration” and the “FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025–2027),” the main objectives of China’s Africa policy can be outlined as the following: (1) Support for Non-Western Governance Models and Mutual Support, (2) Expansion of the Representation and Influence of the Global South in Multilateral Rulemaking, (3) Ensuring Stable Supply Chains for Mineral Trade, Including Critical Minerals, and Securing Global Value Chains, (4) Protection of Chinese Citizens and Companies Operating in Africa, (5) Establishment of a Second Overseas Base in Africa, (6) Incorporation of Africa into SSA and the Development of International Rules for Space-Based and Ground-Integrated Space Situational Awareness at the UN. Points [4] and [6] are discussed in Section I. Point [5] is discussed in Section III. This section will specifically examine points [1]– [3].

◆ Support for Non-Western Governance Models and Mutual Support, and Expansion of the Representation and Influence of the Global South

The first goal is joint promotion of governance models that differ from Western-style democracy and collaboration with African countries in resisting Western criticism. In other words, China is advocating for the promotion of a “new type of international relations” and the formation of a “friendship circle” or network to resist the West’s decoupling and de-risking efforts against China[24].

The second goal, which is linked closely to the first, is the expansion of representation and influence in multilateral institutions. Cooperation with the Global South for China is not only about promoting South–South cooperation but also about enabling the Global South to rise as a group and play an important role in forming a power balance against the West in international society.

Both China and Africa assert that “Africa is not a battleground for great power struggles but a partner in international cooperation,” as stated in the “Action Plan (2025–2027)[25].” However, in reality, the content strongly reflects the competition for spheres of influence among great powers and opposition to the United States. For instance, the plan includes opposition to the politicization of human rights issues, cooperation in the United Nations and BRICS, collaboration on discussions to integrate the “Agreement on Investment Facilitation for Development” into the WTO framework, and cooperation in the Fourth International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD4), to be held in Spain during June 30 through July 3, 2025[26]. At the FfD4, stronger efforts will be made reform the international financial architecture, including the ways of providing development financing, grants, and technical assistance to economically developing countries by institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

The “Action Plan (2025–2027)” states clearly that Africa will cooperate with China to promote modernization for common development and prosperity, will respect each other’s right to choose their own political systems, and will explore modernization models based on the characteristics of each civilization and development needs. China also calls for strengthening the integration of development philosophies between China and Africa, and establishing a platform for the exchange of modern experiences and autonomous knowledge systems between the two sides[27]. Both China and Africa are committed to poverty reduction, expanding exchanges among national governments, legislatures, and local provinces and cities, to deepening experience exchanges on governance, modernization, and development, and to continuous mutual support in a quest for modernization based on agreements.

Before the FOCAC Beijing Summit, the 13th “China–Africa Think Tank Forum” was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, on March 8, 2024, with more than 300 participants including government officials, scholars, and entrepreneurs from China and Africa. At this forum, the “Consensus on Deepening International Development Cooperation between China and Africa Think Tanks,” also known as the “Dar es Salaam Consensus,” was announced. In this statement, China emphasized the need to achieve modernization based on each country’s national conditions and the cultural and historical aspects of its people[28].

Furthermore, China stated in the “Action Plan (2025–2027)” that it respects the political and economic choices made by African countries based on their own circumstances, that it refrains from interfering in their internal affairs, and that it does not impose conditions on aid to Africa. China also highlighted its support for African countries to play a larger role in global governance, particularly in solving global issues. China expressed support for the African Union to become a formal member of the G20 and its support for more African countries in joining the BRICS family. Additionally, China is advocating for reforms in the United Nations Security Council, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, aiming at increasing African representation in protecting the legitimate interests of developing countries, and aiming at expanding the representation and influence of developing nations in global governance[29].

◆ Critical Minerals

The third key objective is the expansion of trade relations centered around “critical minerals.[30]” As the world shifts toward decarbonization, the importance of critical minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and nickel has increased dramatically because of the necessary production and infrastructure related to renewable energy sources such as solar panels, wind turbines, and electric vehicles (EVs). Africa holds abundant reserves of these critical minerals. As one would expect, investment in renewable energy is also on the rise[31].

According to the International Energy Agency’s Critical Minerals Market Review 2023, released in July 2023, the demand for major energy transition minerals such as lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements is increasing rapidly, with demand for critical minerals expected to double by 2030 because of the growth of clean energy and the expansion of power grids. Although Western companies are the main suppliers of copper and lithium, Chinese companies have a marked presence in the production of nickel (mined mainly in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia) and cobalt (mined primarily in the Democratic Republic of the Congo)[32].

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), as reported in its Economic Development in Africa Report 2023, analyzed Africa’s renewable energy and supply chains. The analyses revealed that Africa holds remarkable shares of the world’s critical mineral reserves, including cobalt (48.1%), manganese (47.6%), natural graphite (21.6%), copper (5.9%), and nickel (5.6%). South Africa alone holds 640 million tons of the world’s total manganese reserves of 1.5 billion tons, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) accounts for about 46% (3.5 million tons) of the world’s cobalt reserves of 7.6 million tons, which are used in devices such as smartphone batteries[33]. Moreover, Africa produces other crucially important metals and minerals for low-carbon transition such as chrome, lithium, natural graphite, niobium, rare earth metals, silver, tellurium, and titanium.

In light of these natural endowments of strategically important minerals, during the FOCAC Beijing Summit, particularly noteworthy were the meetings between Chinese President Xi Jinping and the heads of state of key African nations: South Africa, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

◆ South Africa

As a member of BRICS and set to chair the G20 in 2025, South Africa is gaining prominence in China’s Global South diplomacy.

The South African government has highlighted the eight agreements signed during President Cyril Ramaphosa’s visit to China under FOCAC, which are expected to engender the expansion of exports to China, including those of minerals, goods, products, and agricultural products. Additionally, South Africa must regard China as a key partner in addressing its energy security challenges[34].

On September 2, 2024, President Xi Jinping and President Ramaphosa elevated the bilateral relationship to a “new era comprehensive strategic cooperation partnership,” aimed at accelerating the construction of a high-level community of shared destiny between the two countries. In their joint statement, the two leaders emphasized deepening cooperation in traditional areas such as agriculture, health, medicine, and infrastructure construction, while particularly addressing key sectors such as the digital economy, new energy, and artificial intelligence. They also agreed to expand mutual cooperation in renewable energy, energy storage, and power transmission and distribution[35].

Investment in the renewable energy sector is expanding rapidly across Africa, with considerable increases in solar panel manufacturing in countries such as South Africa, Egypt, and Morocco. These projects not only supply raw materials from South Africa to China but also contribute to product manufacturing within Africa, consequently strengthening China’s supply chains and global value chains. Amid the U.S. push for decoupling and de-risking, China is integrating Africa into the restructuring of its supply chains to mitigate risks of fragmentation.

◆ Zimbabwe

Rich in mineral resources such as gold, platinum group metals, nickel, chrome, and diamonds, Zimbabwe tightly controls the export of unprocessed minerals such as lithium, which is mined by hand. However, three major Chinese mining companies (Zhejiang Huayou, Zhongtai Resources Group, and Chengxin Group) are exempt from these restrictions, making China a special partner for Zimbabwe. In the fall of 2023, the chairman of Zhongtai Resources, Wang Pingwei, emphasized China’s plans to build a lithium product industrial chain in Zimbabwe, accelerate the construction of solar power plants, and support sustainable development[36]. In countries such as Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Nigeria, where Chinese companies dominate the mining sector, the governments of these countries restrict lithium exports while allowing Chinese-built refineries to process the raw material locally. This arrangement enables China to create supply chains with added value in the region[37].

On September 3, 2024, China and Zimbabwe agreed to enhance and elevate their relationship further to a “Comprehensive and Strategic Cooperation Partnership.” President Emerson Mnangagwa of Zimbabwe and President Xi Jinping held discussions and agreed on the need to build a strong cooperation framework based on five pillars: politics, economics and trade, security, culture, and international cooperation. They also emphasized the importance of constructing a high-level “China–Zimbabwe Community of Shared Destiny.”

The joint statement released on September 3, 2024 highlighted China’s commitment to protecting Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, security, and development interests. It also emphasized the need to align Zimbabwe’s development strategies with China’s, expanding mutual cooperation in investment, trade, infrastructure, energy and minerals, clean energy, digital economy, agriculture (including avocados), and the building of connectivity networks. The statement also underscored the exchange of experiences in the management of rare earths and key minerals between the two countries. Furthermore, the statement included a commitment to supporting Chinese investment in Zimbabwe’s new energy value chain projects, as well as in the renovation of Zimbabwe’s railway system and various infrastructure projects under the “Digital Zimbabwe” initiative[38].

Relations between China and Zimbabwe are by no means limited to mineral trade. China supports Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, security, and development interests, and opposes “external interference” and “illegal sanctions,” particularly those imposed by Western countries. China, having pledged continued support for Zimbabwe’s governance and administrative experience exchanges, continues to provide scholarships to Zimbabwean students studying in China. On September 3, Zimbabwe expressed its appreciation for Xi Jinping’s concept of a Community of Shared Destiny for Humanity, particularly valuing the “common values” of peace, development, fairness, justice, democracy, and freedom proposed by Xi. Zimbabwe also expressed support for China’s vision of a multipolar world order[39]. This mutual appreciation underscores how China’s concept of a “Community of Shared Destiny” aligns with resistance against interference and sanctions from Western countries, as well as supporting non-democratic political systems.

◆ Nigeria

Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa, holds a leading position in West Africa. The country has strong relations not only with emerging economies but also with the G7 nations. In China’s Africa policy, Nigeria occupies a particularly important position diplomatically, geopolitically, and in terms of mineral strategy.

Rich in natural resources such as crude oil, natural gas, lithium, tin, niobium-tantalum ore, gold, and iron ore, Nigeria has become a critical source of raw materials. However, with respect to lithium mining, the Nigerian government has intensified regulations by requiring foreign companies to establish lithium processing and refining plants in the country before they are allowed to mine and export lithium. Similarly to its arrangements in Zimbabwe, China has methodically established a favorable supply chain for itself in Nigeria.

In this context, China’s Ministry of Ecology and Environment announced on December 8, 2023, at the 28th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP28) in Dubai that it had agreed to an investment contract with Nigeria’s Ministry of Power for the construction of a lithium-ion battery manufacturing plant by Chinese companies.

Ahead of the FOCAC summit, on September 3, 2024, Nigerian President Bola Tinubu and President Xi Jinping agreed to deepen their “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”; they released a joint statement on the construction of a “Community of Shared Destiny.[40]” China expressed support for Nigeria’s leadership role within ECOWAS and pledged military equipment and intelligence support. Nigeria, in turn, affirmed its support for the “One China” policy. The two countries agreed to support China’s initiatives such as the “Community of Shared Destiny for Humanity,” the Belt and Road Initiative, the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), while strengthening mutual cooperation within the UN, G20, and BRICS. Additionally, China and Nigeria have agreed to expand the use of the Chinese yuan through a currency swap agreement. Moreover, they welcomed the establishment of factories in Nigeria by Chinese companies in sectors such as new energy, mineral resource development, agriculture (including peanuts), infrastructure construction, artificial intelligence, digital technology, and the application of the BeiDou satellite navigation system. The two countries have signed bilateral cooperation documents, which include collaboration in nuclear power generation[41].

◆ The Two Congos: The Democratic Republic of Congo and the Republic of Congo

Africa has two countries named Congo. The Republic of Congo, which gained independence from France in 1960, changed its name to the People’s Republic of Congo in 1969, later reverting to the Republic of Congo in 1991. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), after gaining independence from Belgium, changed its name to the Republic of Zaire in 1971 before reverting to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1997.

In the Republic of Congo[42], exports of a wide scope of are closely associated with the crude oil industry. Its economy is intensively dependent on oil.

By contrast, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) boasts abundant mineral resources, including cobalt (the world’s largest producer), tantalum (also leading in production), copper, and diamonds. Approximately a quarter of the DRC’s GDP and around 90% of its exports derive from oil and mineral resources, with mineral production driving its GDP growth. The DRC is necessary for China’s critical mineral strategy because it holds nearly half of the world’s reserves of cobalt[43]: a particularly vital material for smartphone batteries.

In response, the U.S. and EU have taken steps to counter China’s substantial influence in the DRC. As part of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), they have proposed the “Lobito Corridor” project, connecting Angola’s Lobito Port on Africa’s west coast to the “Copper Belt” region of the DRC and Zambia. This initiative counters China’s transcontinental railway, which already links Angola, the DRC, Zambia, and Tanzania, sparking a “China vs. U.S. + EU” competition for influence in the DRC. Caught in the middle of this geopolitical rivalry, the DRC seeks to avoid exclusive alignment with China’s Belt and Road Initiative and instead aims at attracting investment from both sides, and at maximizing commitments extended from both China and the West.

The salient importance of the DRC to China was evident in the placement of the summit meeting between DRC President Félix Antoine Tshisekedi Tshilombo and President Xi Jinping at the top of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ FOCAC summit webpage.

During their meeting on September 2, 2024 in the Great Hall of the People, Xi noted the elevation of China–DRC relations to a “Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership” in May 2023. The two nations agreed to expand trade and investment cooperation, enhance trade liberalization and facilitation, and encourage more Chinese companies to invest in the DRC. They also committed to deepening cooperation in infrastructure, energy, mining, forestry, civil aviation, and other sectors, aiming to strengthen global supply chains and to develop industries jointly. The partnership extends to human resource development, customs capacity building, and journalism, with numerous bilateral agreements signed to support these initiatives[45].

China’s agreements with the DRC reflect its strategy to strengthen supply chains and value chains by advancing the local processing of intermediate products in Africa, even in the challenging environment of U.S.–China “decoupling.” The mineral supply chain encompasses extraction, transportation, shipment, processing, refining, and alloying, culminating in the manufacture and sale of mineral-based products.

The DRC is also known for its severe human rights issues infractions, including “conflict diamonds,” exploitation through low-wage labor, child conscription, and systematic violence against women, leading to regulation under Section 1502 of the U.S. Dodd–Frank Act. From China’s perspective, increasing local processing and manufacturing in the DRC would help reduce transportation costs for raw materials, consequently extending China’s reach in the region’s critical mineral sector.

Ⅲ China’s Expansion of the “Space Information Corridor” and the Development of the “Sixth Island Chain”

◆ The First to Fifth Island Chains

China is actively expanding its sphere of influence in Africa.

High-ranking officials in the Biden administration, including Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, have sounded alarms, claiming that China has become increasingly aggressive and authoritarian in regions such as the Indo-Pacific. They warn that Chinese leaders are working to expand their power projection capabilities and to establish a global network of military bases[46].

Whereas the U.S. Department of Defense’s official reports primarily discuss the First and Second Island Chains, scholars, media, and practitioners are paying close attention to China’s activities extending to the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Island Chains. The Fourth and Fifth Chains are not fully established yet, but through the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s efforts toward achieving them have gathered momentum.

The First Island Chain is China’s minimum defensive line, stretching from the Kuril Islands through Japan, Kyushu, Okinawa, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Borneo, reaching the South China Sea.

The Second Island Chain runs through the Ogasawara Islands and U.S.-held Guam, ending in Papua New Guinea. Surrounding this line are countries that have entered the Compact of Free Association (COFA) with the U.S., including the Republic of Palau, the Marshall Islands, and the Federated States of Micronesia.

The Third Island Chain extends from the Aleutian Islands to Hawaii, American Samoa, Fiji, and reaches New Zealand. In recent years, China has gained an upper hand in key geopolitical locations along the Third Island Chain, such as Kiribati and the Solomon Islands[47].

The Fourth Island Chain moves southward, from Gwadar in Pakistan to Hambantota in Sri Lanka and the Maldives[48]. As China strengthens its presence in this area, India is preparing a military base in the Republic of Mauritius. In October 2024, the U.K. announced it would return the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius, but under an agreement, the U.S.–U.K. military base on Diego Garcia, the largest island, will continue to operate for the next 99 years.

The Fifth Island Chain curves around Djibouti, following the coastline of East Africa, through the Mozambique Channel, and down to South Africa. China’s Doraleh base in Djibouti reflects its commitment to using economic resources, conducting anti-piracy operations, and protecting overseas Chinese citizens, marking China’s deepening involvement in Africa and the Western Indian Ocean[49]. Based on these developments, the U.S. Department of Defense has expressed concern that China might be considering establishing PLA bases or logistics facilities in Kenya, Tanzania, Mozambique, and the Seychelles[50].

◆ Strategic Pursuit of Interests in Sub-Saharan Africa

In recent years, China has increasingly directed loans to West African countries, including the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the Republic of Senegal, the Republic of Benin, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe, the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, the Republic of Cameroon, and the Republic of Ghana. This shift to the Atlantic-facing side from earlier emphases on East Africa and Southern Africa is noteworthy from a geopolitical perspective. The People’s Liberation Army’s access to ports, including availability through military cooperation, has the potential to enhance China’s power projection capabilities and to increase threats to vital maritime routes.

China’s “support” for the Global South became more focused geopolitically and strategically after 2016, concentrating efforts on key countries. China has reduced government loans considerably because many infrastructure projects in Africa such as ports, hydroelectric power plants, and railways have proven to be financially unsustainable. Whereas the Chinese government encourages public-private partnerships (PPP) as a new means of investing in Africa, the private sector is cautious about projects in Africa because of the difficulties in debt repayment[51]. Despite this caution, investment in sub-Saharan Africa, which remains trapped in poverty, continues to attract attention because of the region’s geopolitical importance.

◆ China’s Pursuit of its First Permanent Military Base in the Atlantic

Since China established its first overseas military base in Djibouti in 2017, discussions have centered on China’s military presence, especially in the Indo-Pacific region. However, starting around 2014, China’s expanding economic footprint in Portugal’s Terceira Islands in the Atlantic caught the attention of Western media. From 2019 onward, the U.S. military has grown increasingly wary of China’s activities stretching southward from Terceira’s strategic Lajes area (notably, Praia da Vitória Port) to West Africa.

China, with aspirations of becoming both a “maritime power” and a “space power,” is investing aggressively in infrastructure, space, ports, maritime, and industry along the Atlantic-facing west coast of Africa, starting from the Terceira Islands. The expanding Chinese presence in this area, along with its influence in places such as Trinidad and Tobago in the Caribbean, is attracting interest by U.S. government and military officials for its potential as a strategy to counterbalance American interests.

In 2019, as the U.S. military’s concerns about China’s moves in West Africa grew, China began fortifying its domestic laws to facilitate overseas military base construction for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). This effort included revision of the National Defense Law, undertaken by the Ministry of National Defense, with two reviews by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. The amended law after adoption on December 26, 2020, came into effect on January 1, 2021. The new Article 22 of the amended law states explicitly that one of the PLA’s missions is to “protect national interests overseas” in the “new era.” Article 68 adds a mandate to “safeguard the safety of citizens, organizations, and facilities abroad.”[52]

China appears to be positioning itself to establish its first permanent military base on Africa’s Atlantic side. Because this base would likely serve purposes beyond simply safeguarding Chinese citizens and businesses in Africa, it remains an emphasis of U.S. vigilance.

◆ Strategic Significance of the Equatorial Region: China’s Development of ASAT Capabilities to Target Geostationary Satellites

The port of Bata, a large port in Equatorial Guinea’s mainland and its largest city, received initial funding from the China Exim Bank in 2006. It was constructed by a subsidiary of China Communications Construction Company in 2014. In 2015, Huawei Marine Networks secured a contract from the Equatorial Guinean government to build a submarine cable system connecting the country to Europe.

In 2021, China reached out to officials in Equatorial Guinea with the aim of establishing its first permanent military base on the Atlantic coast. This facility would potentially allow Chinese warships to rearm and conduct repairs opposite the U.S. East Coast, raising concerns in both the White House and the Department of Defense. In response, John Finer, Deputy National Security Advisor for the United States, visited Equatorial Guinea and other nations in October of the same year, meeting with President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo and his son, urging them to reject China’s proposal[53].

However, the U.S.–China struggle did not end there. In March 2022, then U.S. Army General Stephen J. Townsend, commander of U.S. Africa Command, stated that China was seeking new base locations across a range from Mauritania to Namibia, posing a challenge to U.S. national security[54]. Townsend reiterated this point at a press briefing on July 28 of that same year.

China’s expanded presence in the Gulf of Guinea, and by extension around the equatorial region, entails important military implications. Satellites used for purposes such as weather monitoring and broadcasting rely on geostationary orbits, which follow a circular path approximately 36,000 km above the equator[55]. These satellites move at the same rate as the Earth’s rotation. Therefore, the satellites can observe nearly the same area on the planet continuously. Moreover, because the Earth’s rotational speed increases closer to the equator, launching rockets from near-equatorial locations is advantageous.

A report on space security published by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency on April 12, 2022, highlighted that China and Russia are expanding their development of anti-satellite weapons, with the aim of deterring U.S. military intervention. The report warned that China, which has already deployed ground-based anti-satellite missiles targeting satellites in low Earth orbit (below 2,000 km), might develop missiles capable of reaching satellites in geostationary orbit (36,000 km)[56]. In October of the following year, the U.S. Department of Defense’s annual report to Congress stated that China’s People’s Liberation Army is developing directed energy weapons and satellite jamming equipment, as well as ground-based anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles targeting low Earth orbit satellites. The report suggests that China intends to develop weapons capable of destroying satellites in geostationary orbit[57].

Given China’s military strategy, it is crucially important that Western countries carefully analyze the potential space strategy behind China’s satellite support for African countries around the Gulf of Guinea.

◆ “Space Information Corridor” and Africa

The 11th item in Africa’s “Agenda 2063” flagship projects is the “African Outer Space Strategy,” indicating Africa’s ambitions to advance its space development. China has been the most proactive country involved in Africa’s space industry, providing funding and training, building satellites and ground stations, and collaborating on efforts in support of satellite navigation and climate monitoring to support Africa’s capacity in satellite communications and Earth observation. China’s support for Africa in this area pre-dates President Xi Jinping launching of his vision for China to become a “space power.”

In Nigeria, China’s cooperation began in 2011 under a 2009 contract between China Great Wall Industry Corporation, a subsidiary of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC), and the Nigerian Communications Satellite Ltd. In December 2011, a Long March 3B rocket launched Nigeria’s communication satellite, NigComSat-1R, from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Sichuan Province. Developed using China Academy of Space Technology’s Dong Fang Hong-4 technology, the NigComSat-1R satellite covers West Africa and Southern Africa, parts of Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia.

Since Xi Jinping launched his “space power” vision in 2017, China’s support has accelerated. From Algeria, CASC launched the Alcomsat-1 communication satellite in December 2017 on behalf of the Algerian Space Agency, achieving stable positioning of the device. This project included an integrated system of satellites, rockets, ground control, and application systems. In 2020, the ALCOMSAT-1 satellite and ground station exported by CASC’s Fifth Academy were featured on a 500-dinar banknote in Algeria. In November 2019, Sudan’s first satellite was launched from China. The following month, China provided Ethiopia with a multispectral remote-sensing satellite to aid in climate change research, agriculture, forestry, water resources, and disaster monitoring.

In June 2023, China helped Egypt establish a satellite assembly and testing center in Cairo, followed by the successful launch of Egypt’s MisrSat-2 satellite in December. This satellite is used for agriculture, mineral exploration, surface water identification, and environmental monitoring related to climate change. Additionally, in December, China and Egypt signed a series of space agreements, including cooperation on the China-led International Lunar Research Station (ILRS). In August 2024, the Egyptian Space Agency (EGSA) announced a joint venture with Hong Kong’s USPACE Technology Group to develop space technology. South Africa joined the ILRS project in September 2023, with the South African National Space Agency (SANSA) collaborating in areas such as project demonstration, mission implementation, operations, and training. The space agencies of South Africa and China also agreed to mutual cooperation in remote sensing data exchange and satellite ground stations under the BRICS remote-sensing satellite framework.

A primary motivation of China for its space initiatives in Africa is promoting the adoption of its BeiDou Satellite Navigation System as a replacement for the U.S.-led GPS, asserting a more competitive stance in the IoT era for Space Situational Awareness (SSA). On April 10, 2018, China established the first overseas facility of the BeiDou system, the China–Arab BeiDou Center, in a science and technology park north of Tunis, Tunisia. Since then, China has engaged in discussions with the AU and with African countries on the adoption of BeiDou.

China expects Africa to play a “significant and favorable role” for China in shaping the rules of global governance for space activities. Moreover, it fully expects the support of China’s interests by AU and African nations.

Conclusion

As examined above, although the amount of Chinese financing for Africa announced at the 2024 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has been reduced, this reduction does not signify a decrease in China’s engagement with Africa. Rather, considering its content, the aid reflects a more comprehensive and assertive approach, influenced by U.S.–China competition, and suggesting that China is moving forward with expansion of its influence in Africa.

Both China and Africa proclaim that they will not make Africa a battleground for major power competition. Nevertheless, Africa has increasingly become a stage for geopolitical competition, not only as a noteworthy player in global governance norm-setting but also as a focus of power struggles taking place in space and cyber domains. That said, African nations, which are gaining more agency, appear to be leveraging the U.S.–China rivalry to attract investment from both sides for their national development ambitions.

Western countries, even if they are unable to outcompete China’s growing presence in Africa, must advance their diplomatic efforts to keep African nations from aligning too closely with China, with the aim of maintaining Africa’s neutral stance.

(This is an English translation of a commentary written by MIFUNE Emi, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Komazawa University, which originally appeared on the JFIR website in Japanese on November 4, 2024.)