Since at least the mid-2010s Canberra has fully embraced the “Indo-Pacific” concept as an organising principle for its foreign and security policy as well as its defence strategy.[1]The Indo-Pacific region is the epicentre of power rivalries and defined by strategic competition. Canberra has joined the US, Japan, and others in its recognition of a “deteriorating security environment”. This environment its characterised by huge increases in military spending around the region, principally by China, and a combustible mix territorial disputes, historical grievances, and an absence of consensus on managing regional security through multilateral organisations. In this context, the Australian government, like its allies and partners, has stepped up its strategic ambitions and defence capabilities in order to preserve the regional “Rules-based order”.

A plethora of strategic policy documents have been released by the Australian government over the past couple of years that lend substance to these ambitions. Chief amongst these are: the 2023 Defence Strategic Review, the 2024 National Defence Strategy and accompanying 2024 Integrated Investment Program, and the 2024 Independent Analysis of Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet.[2] Meanwhile, the centrepiece of Australian (maritime) defence strategy – AUKUS (Australia-UK-US) defence-technological partnership – has continued to evolve.[3] Space restrictions in a Commentary format preclude and in-depth analysis of all these documents and their associated debates. Instead, I highlight here some of the most important takeaways as they relate to Australia’s augmented defence aspirations.

The 2023 Defence Strategic Review previewed much of the substance of the subsequent 2024 National Defence Strategy (the first time Australia has issued such a White Paper). Together they essentially paint a grim picture of the strategic outlook in the Indo-Pacific and advocate that Australia as a nation must respond by levering “all elements of national power” (very similar to Japan’s 2022 National Security Strategy which speaks of tapping the country’s “comprehensive national power”).[4] The “National Defence Concept” is designed both to project power outwards into the region in tandem with allies and partners, whilst making Australian territory itself a “hard target” through an accompanying defence through “denial” posture (similar to China’s Anti-Access/Area-Denial: A2/AD). Australia aims at a phased program to create a “Future Integrated Force” – similar to Japan’s “Multi-Domain Defense Force” – capable of cross-domain (land-sea-air-space-cyber) operations. Defence procurement is focussed on providing the necessary capabilities to establish:

• A larger and more lethal Navy
• An Army optimised for littoral operations
• A highly capable Air Force
• Strengthened cyber capabilities
• Integrated space capabilities[5]

The procurement implications of these strategic guidance documents are most apparent in the realm of sea power. Given that the Indo-Pacific is primarily a maritime theatre, there is a strong strategic rationale supporting this intention. The most significant initiative is the AUKUS trilateral partnership. The “Optimal Pathway” (announced in March 2023 in San Diego) ultimately aims at the provision of nuclear-powered submarines (Submersible Ship-Nuclear powered or “SSN”) alongside steady integration of American and British submarine capabilities through (rotational) basing in Australia, known as “Pillar I”.[6] But AUKUS also includes Advanced Capabilities collaboration – including (i) underseas capabilities (ii) Quantum technologies (iii) Artificial intelligence and autonomy, (iv) advanced cyber capabilities, (v) Hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, (vi) electronic warfare, (vii) innovation, and (viii) information sharing.[7] Together the Pillars contribute to “Integrated Deterrence” – the application of all elements of national power across a spectrum and coordination with partners – and strategic competition more generally.[8]

Accompanying this augmentation of undersea capabilities and related technological aspects is a planned surge in the “lethality” of the Royal Australian Navy’s surface fleet. The Independent Analysis of Navy’s Surface Combatant Fleet recommends a future establishment of 26 ships including:

• 3 (upgraded) Hobart-class air warfare destroyers,
• 6 Hunter-class frigates (built to UK design)
• 11 new general-purpose frigates (with Japan’s Mogami-class under consideration for acquisition)
• 6 Large Optionally Crewed Surface Vessels (LOSVs)

All of this is designed to enhance the Navy’s “lethality” through enhancing air warfare and strike capabilities.[9]

These plans are undoubtedly ambitious and impressive in scale. Yet, prolific strategic commentors in the country have proclaimed their opposition to this new strategic orientation, especially its AUKUS component. First, Sam Roggeveen, Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute thinktank recently published a book calling for a radical revision of the current approach to Australian defence strategy. In The Echidna Strategy: Australia’s Search for Power and Peace, he argues for a more independent national strategy, side-lining the US-Australia alliance, jettisoning AUKUS, and concentrating on a much more locally-circumscribed strategy of “denial”.[10] His proposed defence strategy would entail a combination of missiles, sea-mines, cyber weapons, more limited (littoral) naval capabilities and a steady reinforcement of existing airpower, as opposed to the force projection capabilities outlined by the government above. This is an intriguing notion, but one unlikely to gain traction in policy circles.

Second, Professor Emeritus at the Australian National University and former Defence Official, Hugh White – an acknowledged inspiration for Roggeveen – has targeted the AUKUS program with critical scrutiny. In an essay in a special issue of the journal Australian Foreign Affairs, entitled: “Dead in the Water: The AUKUS Delusion” he claims that the project is not only undesirable (as per Roggeveen above) but destined to fail, and thus should be abandoned sooner rather than later.[11] Whites’ arguments, predicated on his widely known earlier writing “The China Choice”, focus on the presumed lack of American staying power in Asia, the unstoppable dominance of China, and the questionable feasibility of the AUKUS submarine project.[12] As always, White is highly persuasive with his logic, but again, the allied governments remain committed to and confident in AUKUS, at least officially.

In summary, the forward-leaning strategic and defence posture of Australia will permit it to maintain or even increase its contribution to regional security and the maintenance of the liberal international order. It will also render Australia a more valuable ally of the United States and Strategic Partner to Japan and other like-minded regional states with the same objectives, including its contribution to Integrated Deterrence. While vociferous debates about the wisdom of this approach, and the AUKUS project especially, continue to rumble on in Australia, the new defence posture is being implemented, including the AUKUS program, and this will have major implications for the regional security environment.

*Thomas Wilkins is a distinguished research fellow at JFIR and an associate professor at the University of Sydney.