December 19,2025

A Reformulation of New Theory of War in the Reiwa Era: A Compass for Japanese Foreign and Security Policy in a Multipolar Age

Introduction: What Comes After New Theory of War In 2025, Japan began a new chapter in its postwar political history. Sanae Takaichi was selected as the Liberal Democratic Party’s 29th president in the party’s presidential election and assumed office as Japan’s 104th prime minister. The appointment of the first female prime minister in Japan’s history as a constitutional state is more than a symbol of gender equality: it marks a historical turning point in the principles underlying Japanese politics and foreign policy. The new Takaichi administration should seize this historical moment, confront the new realities of an international society that is increasingly fractured and contentious, and carve out a new direction for Reiwa-era diplomacy marked by dialogue and connection. In setting the course of Japanese foreign policy, the appointment of the “First Female Premier” carries civilizational weight beyond mere political symbolism. Prime Minister Takaichi vigorously kickstarted a flurry of diplomatic activity only five days after assuming office. Beginning with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Summit, she went on to have talks with US President Donald Trump and then attended the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit; this packed diplomatic schedule signaled a new phase called “Takaichi Diplomacy.” Her appearance on the world stage facing world leaders as the new face of Japan symbolized a turning point in Japan’s postwar diplomacy. The 21st-century international order is entering a phase in which one cannot simply speak of “peace” and “stability.” Reignited great-power confrontation, emergence of non-state actors, global challenges such as climate change and infectious diseases, and expansion of information warfare in domains such as AI and cyberspace are simultaneously coming to the fore in our present day. The line between war and peace has become more blurred than ever, and traditional security studies cannot include such a reality within its boundaries. The war in Ukraine has indicated that great power war is not a “relic of the past,” and the conflict in Gaza has demonstrated that violence from non-state actors can rock the very foundations of the international order. The isolationist tendencies of the United States, rise of emerging powers such as China and India, and growing prominence of countries referred to as the Global South have revealed the difficulty of regulating the international order according to a single set of values. This structural transformation becomes clearer if we focus on BRICS, of which many countries in the Global South are member states. According to a 2024 estimate by JETRO, the BRICS countries are home to 3.5 billion people, or 45% of the world’s population, and their combined GDP exceeds US$28 trillion. Although BRICS is actively growing as a core framework for the Global South, differences in the values and political positions and diversity in religion and culture among its member states have led to various forms of friction. Thus, the formation of an integrated order remains unstable. In addition, the geopolitical challenges facing Japan have grown more complex, including an arms race in East Asia, tension in the Taiwan Straits and on the Korean Peninsula, and uncertainty in the supply of energy. Further, a declining birthrate and aging population have shaken the foundations of Japan’s security. Considering this reality, with its complex combination of risk and opportunity, revisiting the late Kenichi Ito’s New Theory of War (2007) has become highly meaningful. The book was a pioneering work written against the backdrop of the confusing state of affairs after the Cold War. It advanced a unique perspective that war is not an inescapable part of our destiny but a phenomenon that arises only when certain social, technological, and political conditions are fulfilled. Thus, war arose from the process of humanity’s evolution from “unconnected herds” to “institutionalized groups”; it changes in its form as conditions do and may even disappear. Ito re-examined war on the scale of human history—tracing the changing meaning of war as a social phenomenon from the Peloponnesian War in Ancient Greece, through the Thirty Years’ War in early-modern Europe, and to the two world wars. Based on this, he proposed the idea of “active pacificism.” This idea does not simply refer to military buildup but to the eradication of the conditions that lead to war in the first place. This idea meant that peace should not be considered as “someone else’s problem” but as a task that Japanese people must “conceptualize and act upon for themselves.” Considering this perspective in the realm of Japanese foreign policy, postwar Japan has lived with the US–Japan security alliance and Article 9 of its constitution to maintain a framework of being a non-military state. However, through Japan’s more active international role after the Gulf War, its PKO act, and its advocacy for human security, Japan has sought ways to transcend a postwar regime of passivity and engage proactively in shaping the international order. New Theory of War emerged at this juncture of Japanese history and served as a catalyst to awaken Japan’s “power to conceive” its foreign policy vision. However, today, the environment in Reiwa Japan has become even more severe. The recurring “discontinuity of governance” in Japan, as exemplified by the short life of the prior Ishiba administration, risks damaging Japan’s credibility on the international stage. Therefore, whether Japan can institutionalize its diplomatic vision to persist across changes in administration should be considered. An important challenge facing contemporary Japan is precisely whether it can maintain and strengthen the governing capacity needed to maintain a durable and highly networked diplomatic strategy. This article draws on Ito’s insights to examine new strategic challenges stemming from an age of “composite crises” in the 21st century. The watershed for whether Japan drifts along as “a state caught in between” or participates in shaping the international order as “a builder of bridges” depends not only on the three pillars of Japanese foreign policy—of strengthening the US–Japan alliance, achieving a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), and working with the Global South—but also on networked engagement with Eurasia (Eurasian diplomacy for the Reiwa era) and the concrete realization of the concept of human security and the Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) agenda. However, the insights from New Theory of War are, in some respects, approaching their limits in our present day, nearly 20 years after its publication. AI, space, cyberspace, and the growing strategic autonomy of the Global South are elements that it could not have anticipated in its time. Thus, to discuss the international order in the Reiwa era, we must build on Ito’s theoretical framework while supplementing it with new conditions, thus pointing the way toward what may be called A Sequel to the New Theory of War. Considering this era situated between war and peace, we bear the responsibility of not only examining Ito’s insights but also of updating and transcending them. １．The Framework of New Theory of War and its Contemporary Significance (1) The Emergence and Background of New Theory of War New Theory of War emerged at a time when the international order appeared to be shifting into a “unipolar era” after the end of the Cold War. However, a continued series of tragedies such as the conflict in Yugoslavia and genocide in Rwanda rapidly dispelled any illusion of a post-Cold War peace, bucking expectations of the United States’ unipolar dominance following the fall of the Soviet Union. We often hear claims that “war has changed the conduct of international politics.” However, Ito states that war is a necessary consequence of the social phenomenon that is international politics; specifically, unlike domestic politics, where conflict is resolved through institutionalized processes, international politics is such that conflict can only be resolved through military force in the form of war. Thus, he argued that the problem of war cannot be overcome unless the institution of international relations itself is transformed. Regarding the relationship between war and “international politics” or “international relations,” I would like to emphasize that war, as a social phenomenon, has always been linked to structural shifts in the international order. For example, the Peloponnesian War shook the city-state system in Ancient Greece, Wars of Religion led to the modern system of sovereign states, and two world wars led to the dismantling of the imperialist order and creation of the United Nations system. These function as evidence that war is a mirror that reflects transformations in order. This idea resonates strongly with Western views of war. Thucydides portrayed war as a transformation in the balance of power, and Clausewitz defined it as “the continuation of politics by other means.” Moreover, the notion of war as a phenomenon of order resonates with East Asian thought. According to Sun Tzu, “To fight and conquer in all one’s battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” Here, the essence of war is framed not as attrition through military might but as a “technique of governance” that incorporates information, psychology, and diplomacy. In addition, Takeda Shingen’s motto “as swift as the wind, as quiet as the forest, as fierce as fire, and as steadfast as the mountain” and the Yangming school’s saying that “soldiers are instruments of benevolence” sought, as did Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, to situate war in the context of order and ethics. In this respect, as we attempt to comprehensively understand the increasing complexity of modern conflicts, we must remind ourselves that war occurs together with the conduct of international politics. We can help the Japanese public cultivate a flexible and multi-faceted conception of war, by weaving together East-Asian and Western thought—by supplementing Clausewitz’s central thesis with Sun Tzu’s emphasis on information, psychology, and governance. Consequently, this can lead to the intellectual foundations that Japanese foreign policy can depend on. (2) Issues Confronting Japanese Foreign Policy I have long been searching for answers on how Japanese foreign policy ought to be from the perspective of Track II diplomacy. At the root of this search lies a searing reflection on postwar Japan’s strategic passivity, as exemplified in criticisms that Japan had “only given its treasure and not blood” in the Gulf War, its failure to acquire a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, and its equivocal involvement in the Iraq War. These events are symbolic of a Japan that has settled into a “postwar regime” and lacking the power to conceive how it can proactively shape the international order. Traditional international relations theory has centered on a Western paradigm of sovereign states, hegemony, and great powers. However, the rise of the Global South and the increasing prominence of non-Western conceptions of order have exposed the limits of this logic of “domination and balancing.” Increasingly, the reality of international politics is found not in the projection of power but in precisely the dynamic interaction between relationality, coexistence, and coordination. Thus, the starting point for the next phase of Japanese foreign policy lies in visualizing those relations emerging from the interstitial spaces between competing states and values—that is, in visualizing that dynamism between coordination, mutual resonance, and emergence. Japan has explored its own room for diplomatic maneuver while being a quintessential “in-between state”—positioned in between and occasionally buffeted by multiple great powers and pivotal states. In the post-Cold War order, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia, the Central Asian states, and countries in Africa and the Middle East have also been quintessential “in-between states” that have sought to expand their strategic autonomy while operating in the cracks between rival great powers. As competition between China and the United States heats up and as Japan continues to live in an unstable neighborhood alongside Russia and the Korean Peninsula, Japan will need to consider whether it will be passively tossed about or leverage its “in-betweenness” and transform it into strategic autonomy. The significance of New Theory of War lies in how it speaks directly to this question. During its publication in 2007, the world was steeped in the lingering echoes of a unipolar order. However, the international environment has since undergone an upheaval. The war in Ukraine represents not only the return of great power war but also the development of “hybrid warfare,” marked by cyberwarfare and disinformation campaigns. Moreover, the conflict between Israel and Hamas has laid bare the reality that violence from non-state actors has rocked the foundations of the international order. The tug of war over drones, AI weapons, space, and cyberspace is increasingly redefining the meaning of war. Furthermore, US domestic instability, the rise of China, and growing strategic autonomy of the Global South are intersecting to produce a multipolar order that would have been unfathomable to anyone in 2007. In such complex times, Japanese foreign policy is confronted not simply with considering which side it is on but rather with the challenge of how it can shape its “in-between-ness” to become an autonomous subject that connects parts of the international system together. This entails becoming a “mediating actor” that creates new channels of engagement in the fissures opened up by rival blocs and possibly becoming a bearer of a “connective international order” that softens ruptures between states. (3) Contemporary Challenges As the international community transitions toward a multipolar order, Japan must not only center itself on its alliance with the United States but also calibrate its relations with China and Russia and strategically formulate linkages with Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In this process, multiple layers of issues surrounding security, energy, the economy, and norms-based diplomacy intersect, and a simplistic policy of merely hewing to the United States and deterring China would fall short in addressing them. It is precisely because Japan is situated between the great powers that it has room to leverage the dual nature of interdependence and friction to become an agent with a hand in shaping the international order. However, today, Japan is once again demonstrating the fragility of its political foundations. The foreign press characterized the abrupt end of the Ishiba administration’s short-lived tenure as evidence of “chronic political instability” and a call for “doubt surrounding (Japan’s) strategic continuity.” Although long-lived administrations, such as those of Nakasone, Koizumi, and Abe, provided postwar Japan with rare episodes of stability, a series of short-lived ones have impeded continuity in national strategy. Thus, how Japan can institutionalize domestic political stability and strategic planning capacity is the biggest blind spot in Japanese foreign policy. Therefore, for Japan to evolve into being the “autonomous bridge between parts of the international system,” it must overcome its pathology of short-lived administrations and institutionalize its capacity for strategy formulation. In this respect, what matters going forward is how the new Takaichi administration can expand Japan’s menu of foreign policy options. ２．Expanding and Fostering Connectivity in Japanese Foreign Policy (1) The Apparent Strengths and Underlying Weaknesses of Japanese Foreign Policy Postwar Japan has accumulated a distinctive stock of diplomatic assets even while operating under constraints on its military. The first is Japan’s engagement in “coordinative diplomacy.” During the Cold War, Japan sought points of contact with non-aligned countries through economic cooperation with Southeast Asia, and after the Cold War it was an active participant in multilateral frameworks. Japan has transformed its limitations as a quasi-non-military state into a strength: its foreign policy is characterized by fostering consensus not through hard-power balancing but by its role as a mediator between competing interests. The second is normative credence forged through a foreign policy of human security. In an era marked by an uptick of civil wars and weak states, Japan has given international society a new normative resource in the form of its diplomatic philosophy centered on the dignity of the individual. Its leadership in the United Nations and in providing development aid has been highly valued and has made Japan a key player in norms-based diplomacy. The third lies in the accumulated fruits of its ODA diplomacy. Through engagement in infrastructure projects, support in education and health, and participation in environmental initiatives, Japanese aid has transcended mere financial transfers to become a pillar of confidence building and regional stability. Although Japan’s comparative advantage has diminished in the face of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, the traditional hallmarks of Japanese aid as being of “high quality” and rooted in “cooperation on the ground” remain a major diplomatic asset. However, we must not ignore the inescapable structural constraints under which Japanese foreign policy operates. The first is population decline and economic stagnation. A shrinking economic base eats away at the foundation of Japan’s international influence and stock of diplomatic resources. The second is military constraints. The Self-Defense Forces have undergone modernization but their deployment in collective self-defense remains limited; this limits Japan’s ability to deal with the great powers. The third is limits placed by public opinion. Public caution regarding overseas deployments and the use of military force has pushed Japanese foreign policy toward a “better safe than sorry” posture. A further institution constraint that deserves attention is the pattern of short-lived administrations. Many Japanese cabinets have been too short-lived to leave behind any tangible diplomatic achievements, and this structural problem of a lack of strategic continuity that they have exposed cannot be ignored. (2) The Means and Meaning of Turning Weaknesses into Strengths Constraints are not always weaknesses. Japan’s key diplomatic assets have been forged within these constraints. Precisely because of Japan’s limited military capacity did it develop its coordinative diplomacy approach and a values-based foreign policy centered on human security. Furthermore, Japan has made notable contributions to the WPS agenda in recent years. Since its ratification of the WPS resolution, Japan has formulated three successive action plans and implemented proactive measures to discharge its commitments under the resolution. These efforts have been wide-ranging, involving responses to climate change, natural disasters, and crises from armed conflict as well as initiatives in human resource development aimed at popularizing the WPS agenda. Even if Japan’s relative economic position declines in the future, its flexibility in delivering high-quality aid and engaging in trust-building diplomacy will remain unshaken. The problem of short-lived administrations, paradoxically, highlights the importance of diplomatic assets that do not depend on any single institution. Foreign policy grounded in networks comprising academia, civil society, international organizations, and the civil service can persist beyond the life of any one administration. One task for Japanese foreign policy is to build an “architecture for diplomatic continuity” based on a recognition of Japan’s limitations. The meaning of Japanese foreign policy lies not in a simple dichotomy of strengths versus constraints but in the use of both as part of a wider strategy. Japan’s coordinative diplomacy approach is valued precisely because it rests on the premise of constraints on its use of military force, and its accumulation of diplomatic assets that lie outside the formal political system can serve as both its strength and a buffer against the weakness of short-lived political administrations. Therefore, Japan’s distinctiveness resides in its ability to “turn constraints into resources.” As an extension of its vision of an FOIP, Japan must also explore a new strategy of creating a space for collaborative dialogue with the Global South and jointly advance the competing objectives of “institutional inclusion” and “a shared set of values.” A strategy of transforming one’s weaknesses on their head to establish one’s agency while caught in between the great powers (and other state actors) is indeed a strategy that is suited to present-day Japan. As I argued in my essay “Japan’s Choice of ‘Eurasian Diplomacy’” (Chuokoron-Shinsha, 2022), Japan’s mission is not to passively follow along with a changing international order but to harness its strengths and constraints as strategic resources to exercise its agency (i.e., to play a proactive role) in a fluid international order. 3. The Core of a Reiwa-Era New Theory of War (1) Japan’s Self-Conception as a State with Both Strengths and Limitations In considering Japan’s position in a Reiwa-era international order, we must first begin with the characteristics of its strategic and geopolitical situation. During the Cold War, Japan prospered under the US–Japan security arrangement as a “major economic power” and “minor military power.” However, at the dawn of the 21st century, Japan faces a world where a strategy of “going all in on a single alliance” is insufficient to secure its interests amid a decline in the United States’ relative position, the rise of China, resurgence of Russia, and growing autonomy of the Global South. As evident in the United States’ turn inward and a “Trump 2.0” administration, the iron-clad nature of the US–Japan alliance cannot be taken for granted. Faced with such uncertainty, Japan must now transform its awareness of itself as a state with both strengths and constraints into a strategic asset. At first glance, the constraints faced by postwar Japan—legal norms, limitations on its use of force, and economic dependence—highlight its vulnerability. However, their “institutionalized restraint” has led to moral credibility. To say that Japan is a state that configures that “space in between” is simply to say that it is determined to play a part in the international order without the use of hard power. This perspective is one wellspring from which a distinctly Reiwa-era Japanese foreign policy can take shape. (2) A Dual Strategy Based on Multilateral Diplomacy and the US–Japan Alliance What strategy should Japan adopt? One answer is to add a perspective of what I call “connective diplomacy” to the three aforementioned pillars of foreign policy, thus allowing Japan to transcend the dichotomy of “alliance or autonomy.” The US–Japan alliance remains foundational to Japan’s foreign and security policy. Cooperation with the United States is indispensable for deterring attempts to revise the status quo by China as it builds up its military and by North Korea as it test-fires nuclear and ballistic missiles. However, there are issues that the alliance alone cannot resolve. Non-traditional security challenges, such as climate change, infectious diseases, migration and refugees, and resource and food security, cannot be addressed by the logic of military deterrence. Thus, Japan must center its foreign policy around the alliance while pivoting to form multilayered networks with actors, such as BRICS, ASEAN, the EU, and countries in Africa and Central and South America—thus transforming itself into “a diplomatic player that bridges gaps between rival blocs.” The “connectivity” that I envision is first and foremost an ethic and only then a strategy; it is a determination to shape the world together with others. This is the concrete expression of the ambition of “a foreign policy that transforms the conditions giving rise to war” set out in A Sequel to the New Theory of War. (3) Combining Eurasia Diplomacy, the WPS Agenda, and SDGs In such a context, new strategic resources for Japanese foreign policy are emerging, that is, “Eurasia diplomacy” and international norms such as the WPS agenda and SDGs. Eurasia had long fallen outside the radar of Japanese diplomacy; however, today, the region is re-emerging as a strategic focal point encompassing issues pertaining to resources, infrastructure, security, and cultural pluralism. Eurasia is a geopolitical space including Russia, China, Central Asia, and Central and Eastern Europe that is indeed symbolic of the “in-between spaces” in the international system. The WPS agenda and SDGs are normative frameworks that constitute a non-military domain in which Japan can assume a leading role. The WPS agenda incorporates the perspective of gender into peacebuilding, disaster response, and conflict prevention and dovetails naturally with the idea of human security. Similarly, the SDGs, which range across the domains of development, social inclusion, and the environment, can become a stage on which Japan institutionalizes international trust. What matters is not to treat these as separate initiatives but to integrate them under a shared “philosophy of connectivity.” Japan can establish itself as “a security actor that centers the human being,” by ensuring sustainability in its resource diplomacy, promoting the WPS agenda in multilateral cooperation, and positioning the SDGs in the mainstream of its diplomacy. In this respect, Eurasia is not merely a geographical region; it is an ideal of institutionalized coexistence. (4) The Core Proposition of a Reiwa-Era New Theory of War The core of a Reiwa-era New Theory of War lies in the following: Japan should transform its position as an “in-between state” into a strategic asset to become a “proactive shaper of the international order.” It should do so through Eurasian diplomacy, the WPS agenda, and the SDGs while centering its foreign policy on the twin pillars of connective diplomacy and the US–Japan alliance. Today’s wars are multilayered, involving not only inter-state conflict and violence by non-state actors but also non-military crises such as climate change and pandemics. Thus, in this context, Japan should not be a “passive follower,” but contribute to the shaping of the international system as an “active architect.” Constraints such as an aging population and limits on its military buildup can, conversely, become a resource by serving as grounds for Japan to take the lead in non-military domains. To shape the international order by means of ideas, institutions, and cooperation, rather than military force, is the central proposition of the Reiwa-era New Theory of War. As Japanese diplomacy eventually came to be praised for its “ability to get things done” in Cold War–era negotiations, Japan is once again being called on to demonstrate its capacity for strategic imagination from within the interstices of history. Precisely because of the instability in the international order today, Japan bears the responsibility of sketching out a new vision of coexistence through “the power to connect” and “the power to mediate.” The historical task of Reiwa-era Japanese diplomacy is to unearth the seeds of strategic imagination that lie hidden in the shadows of short-lived administrations and cultivate them into a strategy for the next generation. Conclusion—Toward a Sequel: A Vision for the Future of Japanese Foreign Policy From New Theory of War to A Sequel to The New Theory of War In the present Reiwa era, the fundamental question we must ask is: “How should Japanese foreign policy confront this transforming relationship between war and order?” This article has attempted to take up the mantle of Kenichi Ito’s thought and explore how Japan can leverage its uniqueness as an international actor in the face of the multilayered complex of risks in the 21st century. In New Theory of War, Ito asked the basic question: “Can Japan remain a mere bystander to the international order?” We in the Reiwa era are being asked the very same question but in circumstances far more complex than those in Ito’s day. In an age of “multilayered risks” with returning great-power war, expanding violence by non-state actors, and increasing global challenges, Japan’s role is not that of a direct party to war, but that of a designer of a new order that transcends the binary of war and peace. The guiding principles that Japan should advance in such an endeavor are “coordinative capacity” and “human-centeredness.” Rather than flaunting its military power, Japan should present inclusive frameworks that connect different values and institutions. Rather than only preserving state security, Japan should construct security arrangements that protect our everyday lives and the dignity of the human being. These are strengths that Japan has honed over its history, and they lie at the heart of the Reiwa-era New Theory of War. Japan, by actively embracing its status as an “in-between state,” can participate in shaping the order by being a bridge linking Europe, Eurasia, Africa, the United States, and the Global South. Such a posture transcends the dichotomies of war versus peace and alliance versus autonomy and constitutes a vision that Japan ought to pursue. In the afterword to New Theory of War, Ito wrote the following about the word “new” in the book’s title. “Amidst the many theories of war out there, I have deliberately chosen to send this work out into the world with the word “new” in its title because I harbor the hope that this will be the last theory of war.” Amid the disarray of the Reiwa-era international order, we continue to find ourselves compelled to speak of “A Sequel to the New Theory of War.” However, this is not contrary to Ito’s wish. Rather, it is an attempt to inherit Ito’s thought to reconceptualize a foreign policy that does not merely deter war but transform the conditions that lead to war. Once again Japan stands in the interstices of history. However, this interstitial space is also that blank canvas on which the future can be designed. From here begins a new chapter of Reiwa-era Japanese foreign policy. (End) (This is the English translation of an article written by TAKAHATA Yohei, Distinguished Research Fellow and Executive Director at the Japan Forum on International Relations, and Senior Researcher, Keio Research Institute at SFC. The original Japanese version was published on the JFIR website on October 24, 2025.)

TAKAHATA Yohei

October 14,2025

China–Japan Relations in the Trump 2.0 Era

Seven months have passed since the beginning of the second Trump administration. Whereas the first term concentrated its attacks primarily on China, the second term, under the banner of “MAGA”, has expanded its focus, imposing a series of so-called “reciprocal tariffs” on any country or region deemed detrimental to U.S. national interests. Although major powers harbor strong dissatisfaction, each finds itself compelled to search for new ways of negotiating with President Trump. China has not only taken countermeasures against U.S. tariffs but has also engaged proactively in diplomatic dialogue. Within this evolving environment, new signs of change have begun to emerge in China–Japan relations. In short, the Trump 2.0 era has, albeit “unintentionally”, encouraged improvement in China–Japan relations. This is because both countries have begun to seek ways to avoid risks in response to this growing “uncertainty.” The reciprocal tariffs now apply to almost every country, and even Japan, a U.S. ally, has not been spared their impact. China’s dual approach of taking firm countermeasures while simultaneously pursuing negotiations could provide Japan with some valuable insights. Paradoxically, the widening sphere of “uncertainty” has expanded the space for cooperation between China and Japan. Furthermore, given the structural similarities between the Japanese and South Korean economies, a trend has emerged toward policy coordination between the two countries in their approaches toward China. The recent trilateral meeting of agriculture ministers from China, Japan, and South Korea symbolizes this more positive trilateral dynamic. Next, changes in Japan’s domestic politics are also influencing China–Japan relations. In the Upper House election held in July, the Liberal Democratic Party lost a large number of seats. China generally does not welcome sudden political changes within Japan. Of course, within the Liberal Democratic Party, a considerable number of members criticize Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba as being “pro-China.” Some have also argued that his remarks on historical recognition might be “used” by China, but such claims seem to contain a certain degree of logical confusion. The debate surrounding the so-called “Ishiba Statement” mainly reflects differences in domestic political positions within Japan, particularly over how issues of war and history should be understood. For China, the ceremonies and military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan were part of a predetermined course, and in President Xi Jinping’s address, there were few direct expressions that “used” or “criticized” Japan. Instead, the emphasis was placed on highlighting China’s path of peaceful development and its determination to safeguard world peace. Finally, I would like to consider the future of China–Japan relations. This year marks both the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance against Japan and the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat, the end of the war. Advancing China–Japan relations at such a symbolic juncture will not be easy. Yet, it cannot be denied that, ironically, President Trump has in some ways provided an “impetus” for this progress. However, the improvement of China–Japan relations should not depend on Trump; rather, both countries must take the initiative to pursue their own path toward better relations. Since the inauguration of the Ishiba administration, summit meetings between China and Japan have been held only twice, both on multilateral occasions, with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. This can hardly be regarded as a normal state of affairs. High-level exchanges should be rebuilt in the form of “shuttle diplomacy,” as seen during the later years of the Abe administration. It is hoped that the upcoming APEC summit in South Korea and the China–Japan–ROK trilateral summit to be held in Japan will provide opportunities for more frequent dialogue between the two leaders. At the same time, China and Japan, as well as the three countries collectively, should deepen discussions in practical areas, paving the way for progress in trilateral cooperation and FTA negotiations. (This is the English translation of an article written by WANG Guangtao, Associate Professor, Center for Japanese Studies, Fudan University, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on September 7, 2025.)

WANG Guangtao

August 01,2025

Gender Mainstreaming as a Global Trend

(1) Definition of Gender Mainstreaming and International Norms Gender mainstreaming is a comprehensive policy approach aimed at ensuring that women and men participate equally in decision-making and benefit equally at all stages of policy, legislation, institutional design, and implementation. According to the definition issued by the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) in 1997, a gender perspective must be integrated into the entire process of policy formulation, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation across all sectors. In other words, gender mainstreaming is not simply a policy to support women. It is positioned as a strategy to reassess and transform the very structure of society in order to achieve the ultimate goal of gender equality. It is considered relevant to all fields, including the environment, welfare, education, foreign affairs, politics, economics, and society as a whole. Its importance continues to grow as a means to realize a sustainable and inclusive society. At the international level, the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) serves as a foundational treaty. However, the importance of gender mainstreaming began to receive more focused attention through the 1992 Rio Declaration and the 1995 Beijing Platform for Action. Furthermore, the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 not only include a dedicated goal for achieving gender equality (Goal 5), but also make clear that a gender perspective should be incorporated across all goals and targets. This reflects a shared understanding among the international community that gender equality is critically important to the achievement of a sustainable society. (2) Institutionalization in the EU and Nordic Countries The European Union (EU) is known as a region where gender mainstreaming progressed relatively early. For example, the 1957 Treaty of Rome already stipulated the principle of “equal pay for equal work,” embedding the foundation of gender equality within the legal system. France strongly advocated for this provision, partly due to concerns that, despite gender pay equality being guaranteed under its domestic law, the influx of low-wage female labor from other countries could undermine the competitiveness of its domestic industries. In this way, economic reasoning based on fairness in the labor market became the starting point for the institutionalization of gender equality. In the EU, the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam clearly stated that gender equality should be a principle applied across all policy areas, including not only employment but also education, healthcare, environmental policy, and information and communication technology (ICT). This treaty served as a catalyst that rapidly accelerated the institutional incorporation of a gender perspective. More recently, the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020–2025 was introduced, identifying priority areas such as wage transparency, gender quotas for corporate board members (with a target of at least 30 percent women), and the elimination of gender-based violence. One particularly notable concept is the “reversal of the burden of proof.” In cases where discrimination is suspected, the traditional approach required the victim to bear the burden of proof. Under EU directives, however, the employer is now responsible for proving that no discrimination occurred. This system design is regarded as a significant step toward correcting structural inequalities. (3) Case Studies of Norway and Sweden Among European countries, the Nordic states have made particularly strong progress in gender mainstreaming. In Norway, Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, who took office in the 1980s, linked the concept of “sustainable development” with gender equality and introduced a gender quota system. This system, which accelerated women’s political participation, has led to women now making up 40 to 45 percent of members in both the political and corporate leadership spheres. In the case of Sweden, I had the opportunity to observe firsthand how gender mainstreaming was institutionalized and embedded as part of the culture during an extended period of academic research there. In Sweden, the parental leave system allows for up to 480 days, with a minimum of 90 days allocated to each parent and 80 percent of salary covered. Universities and public institutions have implemented systems such as “holding meetings only between 9 a.m. and 4 p.m.”, “offering flexible options for online participation”, and “providing additional child-rearing support payments”. These measures make it possible for researchers and staff to balance work and family responsibilities. What left a particularly strong impression was the widely shared understanding that “child-rearing is not a private matter but a social responsibility to be supported by society as a whole”. (4) Gender and the Environment In the field of environmental politics, which is my area of specialization, the intersection with gender is often explored through the lens of ecofeminist thought. A number of theoretical and empirical studies have analyzed how Western modern imperialism and male-dominated power structures have objectified and exploited both nature and women. One of the most well-known examples is the Chipko Movement in India. This was a protest in which women, who recognized the forest not merely as rock or timber but as a vital water source and the foundation of life and livelihood, hugged trees to oppose deforestation. Vandana Shiva, an Indian philosopher and environmental activist, emphasizes the importance of knowledge rooted in lived experience, stating that “ecology is the science of household.” This perspective centers on everyday sensitivity and the ethics of “care” cultivated through daily life. It contains a way of seeing life and the environment that cannot be fully captured by scientific or institutional language and becomes a form of resistance. The act of hugging a tree “simply out of love” embodies a new kind of ethics that stands against power and violence. Through her work on “Seed Saving”, Shiva advocates for the regeneration of ecosystems without dependence on genetically modified crops, using nonviolent methods. This is both a critique of technology-centered agriculture and a revaluation of knowledge rooted in everyday life. (5) Current Situation and Institutional Challenges in Japan Similar developments have also been seen in Japan. For example, in the 1960s and 1970s, a grassroots movement known as the anti-synthetic detergent campaign (the so-called “soap movement”) spread, driven primarily by housewives seeking improvements in their living environment. Some aspects of this movement were linked to policy changes, showing that gender perspectives are essential as a form of “citizen knowledge” in policy-making. This serves as a reminder of the importance of incorporating gender-based insights into public policy. However, it is widely recognized that gender mainstreaming in Japan still faces significant challenges both institutionally and culturally. Japan ranks at the bottom among OECD countries in gender equality rankings. For instance, Japan is the only OECD country that has not introduced a system of “optional separate surnames for married couples”, reflecting the absence of an institutional foundation that respects individual dignity and acknowledges diverse forms of family. Looking at the political sphere, the proportion of women in the House of Representatives has remained around 10 percent, falling short of the benchmark of “at least 30 percent.” In local assemblies, approximately 27 percent of municipalities still have no female legislators at all. In the economic domain as well, the proportion of women among corporate executives remains extremely low at about 9 percent, indicating that decision-making structures continue to be male-dominated. In the labor market, the gender wage gap remains pronounced. Women’s wages are approximately 77 percent of men’s on average. Furthermore, in terms of unpaid labor, it has been revealed that women spend about five times more time than men on housework and childcare. These figures suggest that gender mainstreaming has not been fully realized, not only at the policy level but also at the micro level, including within households and local communities. At the same time, it is important to recognize that Japan has seen the emergence of many significant women-led social movements. Beyond the aforementioned “soap movement,” women have played a pivotal role in promoting waste separation and recycling systems, initiating local activities that led to administrative reforms. Following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster, a citizen movement led mainly by mothers contributed to the enactment of the Act on Support for Children and Other Victims of the Nuclear Disaster, which was passed as a parliamentary bill. Notably, around 25 to 30 percent of the lawmakers involved in drafting the bill were women. These achievements demonstrate that women’s perspectives can help bring visibility to socially overlooked issues and become a driving force toward institutional reform. (6) Future Prospects and Recommendations In order to further advance gender mainstreaming, I believe that three key pillars are essential moving forward. The first is the “integration of digitalization and gender.” In recent years, the advancement of digital technologies has made it possible to visualize wage disparities and analyze gender composition in workplaces. For example, systems that use artificial intelligence and big data to objectively detect inequality in wage setting are being introduced in several countries. Additionally, the digitalization of education and employment can enable more flexible working styles for those who bear responsibilities such as childcare or elder care. In Japan, telework and online learning expanded rapidly during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, rather than treating these developments as temporary responses, it is necessary to establish them as permanent institutional frameworks. The second pillar is the “development of inclusive policies based on intersectionality.” Gender inequality does not stem from gender alone but is shaped by the complex interplay of factors such as race, class, disability, sexual orientation, and age. For this reason, policy design and implementation must involve careful analysis of these intersecting factors and ensure consideration for those in vulnerable positions. For instance, among women, individuals with disabilities, single mothers, and those with foreign roots are more likely to face multiple layers of disadvantage. Institutional designs must ensure that such individuals are not excluded from participation in any aspect of society. The third pillar is “international cooperation and the sharing of best practices.” As a nation committed to democracy and pacifism, Japan has earned a degree of trust within the international community. Building on this position, it is important for Japan to engage actively with EU countries and UN gender-related agencies, learning from each other’s institutional frameworks and policy practices and applying these lessons domestically. For example, Sweden’s parental leave system, Iceland’s gender pay certification system, and EU directives promoting transparency all offer valuable insights for Japan to consider. (This article is an English translation of the summary of remarks delivered by Professor Wakana Takahashi of Utsunomiya University and Distinguished Research Fellow of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) at the Foreign Policy Luncheon, originally published on June 23, 2025, in the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR.)

TAKAHASHI Wakana

June 20,2025

Climate Change and Migration — Focusing on the Asia-Pacific Region

1. Climate Change and the Current Status and Outlook of Refugees and Displaced Persons Worldwide The number of refugees and displaced persons is increasing globally. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 117.3 million people were forcibly displaced in 2023 due to conflict, persecution, and other causes. This means that a number of people nearly equivalent to Japan’s population have been forced to flee their homes around the world.　In addition to “refugees,” who are forced to cross international borders, there are also “internally displaced persons” (IDPs), who are compelled to flee within their own countries. According to the 2024 report by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the number of IDPs globally has reached 75.9 million. Nearly 47 million people were newly displaced or forced to move in 2023 alone. Of these, 20.5 million were displaced due to conflict or violence, while 26.4 million, representing 56 percent of the total, were displaced by disasters such as major earthquakes and cyclones. A notable recent trend is the increase in disaster-related displacement even in high-income countries. For example, in Canada in 2023, unprecedented wildfires forced 185,000 people into internal displacement. A 2009 projection by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimated that environmental changes would compel 200 million people to migrate by 2050. In reality, the pace of displacement appears to be exceeding even that forecast. In response to these developments, the World Bank published Part I of its report Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration in 2018, followed by Part II in 2021. The report highlights internal displacement and migration driven by environmental factors, an area that had traditionally received limited attention, and presents projections for the future increase in internally displaced persons. According to the report, if proactive climate change mitigation and development policies are not implemented, as many as 216 million people around the world could be forced to move within their countries by 2050 due to factors such as water scarcity, declining agricultural productivity, sea-level rise, heat stress, and extreme weather events. It is also pointed out generally that migration will not necessarily occur suddenly or uniformly. Rather, it will follow a variety of patterns and coping mechanisms, such as people temporarily migrating to urban areas during periods when crops cannot be harvested. These diverse forms of mobility indicate that migration and displacement are not monolithic in nature. While the importance of climate change mitigation through greenhouse gas reduction is undeniable, the need for adaptation measures is becoming increasingly urgent. Even if countries fulfill their current “Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)”, it is unlikely that global warming will be limited to within 1.5 degrees Celsius. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) classifies the impacts of climate change on migration into four categories. The first is “adaptive migration,” where individuals or households choose to move. The second is “involuntary or forced migration,” where there are few alternatives to relocation. The third involves “planned relocation from areas with high climate risk.” The final category refers to situations where movement is not possible, due to cultural, economic, or social constraints, leaving people unable or unwilling to flee high-risk areas. Observations around the world indicate that those who are socially most vulnerable or lack the necessary resources are often the ones who remain behind, unable to evacuate or relocate when climate risks intensify. It is worth noting that the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees defines a refugee as someone who has fled their country “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.” Under international law, so-called “climate refugees” or “environmental refugees” have generally not been recognized as refugees in the legal sense. The Convention protects individuals who are at risk of persecution in their home country due to factors such as race, religion, or political beliefs and who have sought refuge abroad. In contrast, the gradual nature of climate change often leads to it receiving less attention as a driver of displacement. However, in 2020, the UNHCR published a document titled Legal Considerations Regarding Claims for International Protection Made in the Context of the Adverse Effects of Climate Change and Disasters[1]. This document presented a new perspective, stating that individuals affected by climate change and disasters may be entitled to claim refugee status under the existing framework of international law. The implementation and interpretation of this position will be important to pay due attention in the coming years. 2. The Relationship Between Climate-Induced Migration and the Risk of Conflict Does climate-induced migration have any impact on peace and security? A joint study conducted by the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) offers interesting andcompelling analysis of this question. The study identifies four primary pathways through which such effects can emerge. First, extreme weather events and natural disasters can destroy livelihoods and undermine the foundations of daily life, leading to social destabilization. Second, large-scale migration or population movement can intensify competition for resources and employment between host communities and incoming refugees or displaced persons, potentially exacerbating existing tensions. Third, military forces and armed groups may exploit environmental changes caused by extreme weather to expand their power, for example by securing new sources of revenue or recruiting personnel. Fourth, political and economic exploitation can take root in unstable conditions, further deepening insecurity. In an interview with Professor Cedric de Coning of NUPI, who led the study, he noted that these are not necessarily typical pathways but rather should be seen as extreme cases, some of which have drawn attention at the United Nations. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University in Sweden, defines armed conflict as involving “at least 25 battle-related deaths per year” and “at least one party being the government of a state.” UCDP collects and publishes global data on such conflicts. However, it is important to note that conflict does not always manifest as violence. It can emerge in various aspects of social life, especially when differences in ideology, goals, or values are involved. The existence of conflict itself is not inherently negative. However, when destructive methods are used to resolve conflict, serious harms can result. Mechanisms of conflict resolution include legal proceedings, debate, and voting, among others. Yet, if structural violence remains unaddressed, achieving genuine peace becomes difficult. In the context of climate change, when natural resources that form the basis of livelihoods are damaged or their distribution is altered, structural inequalities and injustices may deepen. This, in turn, raises concerns about an increased risk of conflict within the society. 3. Case Studies from the Asia Region A study was conducted by Associate Professor Tobias Ide of Murdoch University in Australia on how disasters shape the dynamics of armed conflict, analyzing 36 case studies from countries in Asia[2]. The findings categorize the impacts of disasters on conflict into three types: “no significant impact” (18 cases), “exacerbated conflict” (9 cases), and “alleviated conflict” (9 cases). The nature of these outcomes was found to be heavily influenced by the motivations of group leaders and members. When grievances existed prior to a disaster, conflict tended to intensify. On the other hand, disasters could also foster social cohesion among affected populations. In some cases, armed groups exploited these grievances to recruit youth, while in others, the disaster disrupted the activities of such groups. One example where a disaster had little impact on conflict is Typhoon Haiyan, which struck the Philippines in 2013. A case where conflict worsened was the 1998 flood in Assam, India, where armed groups reportedly used the disaster as an opportunity for recruitment. An example of conflict being alleviated is Cyclone Sidr, which struck Bangladesh in 2007. In this case, weakened leadership among armed factions and declining public support for them contributed to a reduction in conflict. The study further notes several factors that make conflict more likely to arise in the aftermath of a disaster. These include high dependence on agriculture, the absence of democratic political systems, and high levels of poverty. In addition, a 1996 study by Swain[3] examined the impact of environmental change in the context of the Farakka Barrage in India. Since the Green Revolution of the 1960s, water extraction from the Ganges River has increased significantly in the upstream areas of India due to population growth. As a result, people living in the southwestern part of downstream Bangladesh have suffered from severe water shortages. This led to saltwater intrusion, a decline in mangrove forests, and large-scale population outflows, with tens of thousands migrating to Assam and Delhi in India. One particularly serious consequence was the violence in Assam in 1983, where incoming Bangladeshi Muslim migrants faced violent attacks from local Indian Hindus. According to reports, 1,700 people lost their lives, and the total death toll from both sides reached approximately 3,000. While this case cannot be classified as climate-induced migration per se, it demonstrates how large-scale population movements triggered by environmental changes can have severe regional impacts. 4. Conclusion and Outlook In conclusion, and drawing on the discussions held in the 2024 research group organized by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) titled “Establishing a Framework for Assessing Social Risks of Conflict Indirectly Caused by Climate Change,” this section offers a forward-looking perspective. A review of existing studies reveals that there are relatively few cases in which a direct causal relationship has been established between weather-related disasters, the resulting generation of migrants or refugees, and subsequent conflict. However, a recurring theme underlying the four conflict pathways identified by SIPRI and NUPI is the loss of livelihoods among displaced populations. In response, various emergency, humanitarian, and development assistance programs have been implemented to protect the livelihoods of both displaced people and host communities. Going forward, expanded support and more preventive measures will be essential. One of the key insights from Professor Ide’s research is that the degree of vulnerability among conflict actors and society plays a decisive role in determining whether a disaster will escalate or de-escalate conflict. As research on climate change and migration advances, several emerging issues warrant closer attention. These include securing the legitimacy of using climate finance to support emergency displacement and planned relocation, ensuring that migration as a form of climate adaptation does not lead to new forms of conflict or tension, and exploring how post-disaster recovery assistance can be designed to mitigate conflict risks. In addition to existing research on the economic losses associated with short-term displacement, there is an increasing need to strengthen studies on preventive measures and urban planning to address long-term impacts. For instance, in Japan, more detailed analyses are required to assess how coastal areas may be affected by future sea-level rise. Until now, a significant portion of research funding has been allocated to short-term disasters such as typhoons. In particular, in developing countries, support for planned relocation remains limited, with such moves often carried out primarily through self-help. Strengthening assistance for involuntary relocations, as well as support to ensure economic stability and livelihoods after relocation, is an area where research on climate change and migration can provide valuable insights. It has also been noted that host communities receiving migrants often receive little assistance. Tensions may arise between relocated individuals and host populations due to disparities in aid, making long-term, forward-looking research and practice all the more critical. These efforts are especially important to ensure that people who have not been adequately protected under existing legal frameworks can receive the support they need. Furthermore, there is a lack of research that considers the temporal dimension of displacement. Specifically, it remains unclear to what extent long-term disasters such as sea-level rise have contributed to increases in the number of migrants and refugees. While short-term disasters more readily lead to displacement, many of those affected often return to their original homes. As a result, host communities tend to be more receptive, and such situations are less likely to lead to conflict. On the other hand, those displaced by prolonged drought or rising sea levels are often unable to return and tend to remain in the receiving areas, which can increase the risk of tensions. However, this point still requires further empirical research. Notably, Professor Ide’s study previously mentioned found no significant relationship between the duration of a disaster and the likelihood or form of conflict. One example of large-scale migration in Europe linked to climate-related conflict, as introduced by members of the research group, is the displacement of an estimated 13 million refugees and internally displaced persons from Syria in the mid-2010s, some of whom were accepted by European countries. Sweden, a long-standing destination for migrants, began accepting migrants as early as the 1960s during the Vietnam War and has historically received large numbers from regions such as the Middle East and Eastern Europe. While Sweden has been known for its inclusive and tolerant immigration policies that emphasize diversity, recent years have seen signs of social instability within host communities. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Sweden shifted to a center-right government in 2022, and its policies have since moved toward restricting immigration. At the same time, Sweden is also engaged in international cooperation aimed at strengthening “adaptation measures” as a form of preventive strategy to avoid the large-scale displacement of people in the first place. It can be said that the heightened awareness of climate issues in Europe is in part driven by the influx of migrants. In contrast, in New Zealand, the Minister for Climate Change announced in 2017 that the government was considering issuing an “experimental humanitarian visa” for Pacific Islanders who had been forced to flee due to climate impacts. However, the plan was withdrawn six months later. One reason for this reversal was criticism from the Pacific Island nations themselves, who urged instead for enhanced adaptation support within their own countries. The author recalls a discussion with leaders from the Pacific Islands, who expressed that they “do not want to be treated as refugees.” More broadly, in recent years, many developed countries have seen a political shift toward conservatism and right-leaning governments, accompanied by increasingly restrictive immigration policies and tighter border controls. Against this backdrop, there is a risk that linking migration too simplistically to security concerns could fuel narratives that portray displaced people as threats to host societies. Such framing may reinforce harmful prejudices and obstruct calm, evidence-based discussion on migration issues. Initial conditions vary by country and region, and as a result, societal responses to disasters differ significantly. Given the characteristics of the Asia-Pacific region, it is important to analyze both short-term and medium- to long-term timeframes. Additionally, mapping socially vulnerable areas alongside regions with high climate risk is essential for identifying future high-risk zones. Developing plans to strengthen resilience and investing in infrastructure are also critical measures. While disaster response requires attention to local context, countries in the Asia-Pacific region share many commonalities, making mutual learning and technical cooperation both possible and desirable. As economic growth continues in the region, funding sources are becoming more diverse. It is therefore increasingly important to consider the intersection of climate change and human mobility, and to focus on the potential opportunities this presents. Resources [1]　The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Legal considerations regarding claims for international protection made in the context of the adverse effects of climate change and disasters”　https://www.refworld.org/policy/legalguidance/unhcr/2020/en/123356 (Accessed on January 10th, 2025) [2]　Tobias Ide, Catastrophes, Confrontations, and Constraints: How Disasters Shape the Dynamics of Armed Conflict, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2023). doi:10.1017/S0892679423000333 [3]　Swain, A. (1996). Displacing the Conflict: Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and Ethnic Conflict in India. Journal of Peace Research, 33(2), 189-204. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343396033002005 (Original work published 1996) (This is an English translation of a commentary by MAEKAWA Miko, Senior Research Fellow at the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and Visiting Professor at the International Research Institute of Disaster Science (IRIDeS), Tohoku University. The original Japanese version was published on the JFIR website on March 31, 2025. )

MAEKAWA Miko

March 31,2025

The Growing Importance of U.S.-Japan Cooperation on Non-Military Issues Under the Second Trump Administration

With the inauguration of the second Trump administration, which once again places “America First” at the forefront of its agenda, there is a growing sense that global affairs have entered a period of intensified uncertainty. The era in which the United States singlehandedly upheld the international order and exercised unchallenged leadership is undergoing a significant transformation, and the very structure of the international order itself is beginning to shift dramatically. The Crisis of Global Governance Of particular significance is the fact that global governance, which is the response to major global agendas such as the global environment, pandemics, international terrorism, refugees, and human rights that cannot be solved by the governance of a single country alone, is now facing a major crisis. Global governance means responding to major global agendas such as the global environment, pandemics, international terrorism, refugees, and human rights, and to movements in the international order that cannot be resolved by the governance of a single country alone, in an age when people, goods, money, and information move across borders. The Trump administration’s flurry of presidential authorizations include abandoning climate change measures, tariffs, dismantling USAID (United States Agency for International Development), mass layoffs of government employees in the field of international cooperation, freezing funding for international exchanges, and many other non-military global governance issues. All of these are extensions of the fight against America’s domestic “enemies within,” and the intensity of their hatred of “wokeness” makes the Trump administration appear to be distancing itself from global governance. Various issues of global governance are now being replaced by partisan rivalries in the United States. In Trump’s campaign last year, the term “illegal immigrants” was the most important keyword to solidify support among conservatives. There are “sanctuary cities” where illegal immigrants are not removed even humanely in areas and urban areas where there is a large Democratic support base, but Trump has shown signs of a thoroughgoing ban on this as well. Moreover, as Trump himself pointed out in his speech to Congress in early March, this change has only just begun. It is likely that a great purge like China’s “Cultural Revolution” will continue in the future. How to Turn a “Trump Risk” into a “Trump Opportunity” However, in Japan-U.S. cooperation, this major change in the U.S., especially in the non-military field, is not always exclusively negative. How can we turn the “Trump risk” into a “Trump opportunity”? It is up to Japan and the U.S. to further explore common issues. For example, if, as the Trump administration has variously argued, the very mechanisms that support global governance today are already dysfunctional and the U.S. is being “preyed upon” by countries around the world, then expanding opportunities to update these complaints to fit the current situation is also possible in the context of a stronger U.S.-Japan relationship. For example, if China is abusing the WTO by not adhering to the principles of free trade, it is possible to create a forum for the US and Japan to discuss together how to correct the “injustice” and ensure the full rule of law. This is much more rational than the rough-and-tumble approach of holding the US economy hostage with tariffs, which would lead to a “Trump recession.” If Europe and other countries can be brought into the discussion, the dysfunctional reform of the WTO will move forward at a rapid pace. Beyond that, a new framework that replaces the WTO reform may also be presented. Because the Trump administration is fundamentally transactional in its approach, some have viewed its use of tariffs as merely a bargaining tool in negotiations. However, it is becoming increasingly clear that these tariffs are also intended to attract direct investment from foreign companies. The underlying objective is to promote the development of American industries and to expand domestic employment. In the case of Japanese companies, however, direct investment in the United States has already progressed considerably. Any further sharp acceleration in this trend could lead to the hollowing out of Japan’s domestic industries. To reduce such negative impacts, it may be worth considering the creation of a framework for dialogue, similar to the former U.S.-Japan Structural Impediments Initiative, which would facilitate structured discussions through mutual consultation. In any case, as the international community learned in the aftermath of the Great Depression, it must be reaffirmed that there are no winners in a trade war triggered by tariff hikes. It is essential for Japan and the United States to develop mechanisms to thoroughly prevent the escalation into a trade war, not only through bilateral frameworks but also by incorporating other countries into the process. If this U.S.-Japan dialogue can serve as a model for Europe and other Asian nations, it could help prevent the destabilization of the global economy caused by the Trump administration’s tariff measures. With regard to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership), from which the United States withdrew, it should be noted that no progress was made toward rejoining even under the previous Biden administration. In light of this, the likelihood of the United States returning to the agreement at this point in time appears to be extremely low. Nevertheless, Japan should continue to maintain a structure that allows for the United States to return at any time, in order to uphold its commitment to free trade. Various Possibilities for Cooperation Beyond tariffs, there are various possibilities for cooperation between Japan and the United States. For example, the Trump administration’s return to fossil fuels, embodied in the slogan “drill, baby, drill,” is scientifically problematic when considering the long-term state of the global environment. While Japan has taken steps to align with the United States in certain respects, such as through the purchase of liquefied natural gas (LNG), it must also continue to advance its own climate change mitigation efforts. One potential area for deeper cooperation between the two countries is the development of technologies that reduce the environmental impact of fossil fuel use. From the Trump administration’s perspective, the transition to electric vehicles (EVs) serves only to benefit China, and the United States should instead focus on strengthening its fossil fuel industries, where it holds a comparative advantage. It is likely that the administration will continue to promote energy extraction and position it at the core of its economic policy, alongside tariffs and tax cuts. Even if the Trump administration abandons climate change mitigation efforts, it will be Japan’s role to maintain international cooperation on this front. Alternative energy technologies inherently face a wide range of challenges that must be addressed from multiple perspectives. For example, in the case of solar panels, some of the mineral resources used in their production are reportedly sourced through forced labor in the Xinjiang Uyghur region of China. In order to achieve truly sustainable energy generation, it will be necessary to develop materials that are both environmentally and ethically sound. Although partisan perspectives certainly differ, the seriousness of misinformation on social media is a shared concern for both Japan and the United States, as well as a global issue. If Japan and the United States can work together to develop mechanisms that ensure information accuracy in the age of artificial intelligence, such efforts would represent a meaningful contribution to the international community. Cooperation is also possible in the area of human mobility. Japan has traditionally not been proactive in accepting refugees, and this stance has often drawn criticism from the international community. However, if the United States under the Trump administration moves to reduce immigration, Japan could consider measures such as accepting a portion of the individuals who would otherwise have been received by the United States. This would serve as a way to strengthen Japan’s engagement with the international community. At the same time, it is important to remember that the right to seek asylum is protected under international law. If Japan expands its acceptance of refugees, it could also provide a basis for advocating improvements in the U.S. approach to refugee and immigration policy. In addition, Japan should consider partially covering the costs of Japan-U.S. exchange programs such as the Fulbright Program, which the United States may suspend due to budget freezes. It is important to ensure that the cultivation of the next generation of leaders and the advancement of academic and educational exchange are not hindered by such fiscal constraints. America’s “Unprecedented Polarization and Political Stalemate”, and the Language the Administration Cannot Deny Amid an environment of “unprecedented polarization and political stalemate”, it is important to recognize that there remains substantial public opposition within American society to the Trump administration’s efforts to dismantle policies related to global governance. The outcome of last year’s presidential election was decided by a margin of only 1.48 percentage points. Contrary to widespread misconceptions in Japan, it was by no means a “landslide victory” for Trump. The notion of a “landslide” or a “popular mandate” represents nothing more than the uncritical repetition of the Trump camp’s own claims. Furthermore, while the Republican Party holds a majority in both houses of Congress, it does so by an extremely narrow margin. At the same time, Republican voters continue to strongly support the Trump administration’s policies. The various changes introduced under this administration are likely to be regarded as part of the “new normal”, and the international community, including Japan, must learn to adapt accordingly. One key area of adaptation is the strategic use of language. When promoting climate change measures, for example, it is important to recognize that the Trump administration tends to avoid and even reject terms such as “global warming” or “sustainable development.” These are not simply policy disagreements but issues of wording. In order to engage the administration effectively, it may be necessary to reframe the same climate-related initiatives using alternative language, such as policies for achieving long-term “energy independence”. In other words, it is essential to adopt terminology that the Trump administration itself cannot openly reject. By choosing language that the Trump administration cannot deny, even in the face of “unprecedented polarization and political stalemate”, it is possible to signal solidarity with segments of the American public who still support the continuation of global governance policies. This approach also represents a forward-looking strategy that anticipates potential shifts in U.S. politics and society in the lead-up to the 2026 midterm elections and the 2028 presidential and congressional elections. Japan’s Role The second Trump administration is likely to bring about even greater changes. The era in which the United States sought to assert leadership unilaterally is undergoing a major shift, and the country is increasingly distancing itself from global governance. The transformation of the United States, once the central actor in sustaining the international order, is becoming more pronounced, and it is gradually relinquishing the very international system it helped to create. Within this broader trend, Japan is expected to play a vital role in keeping the United States engaged with the international community. In this sense, Japan’s role has become all the more significant. European countries, which share common values with Japan, have high expectations for Japanese leadership and may choose to coordinate first with Japan not only on issues related to the United States but also in their approach to China. Although the return of Trump to power brings with it a number of risks, it may also present opportunities for Japan to assume greater leadership on the global stage. From this perspective, it is important to reframe our thinking and move toward a new era in the Japan-U.S. relationship. When it comes to non-military areas of cooperation between Japan and the United States, it is essential to first examine closely how these dynamics may evolve in the coming years. (This is an English translation of a commentary written by MAESHIMA Kazuhiro, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Sophia University, which originally appeared on the JFIR website in Japanese on March 23, 2025.)

MAESHIMA Kazuhiro

January 24,2025

“Middle Power Minilateralism”: The Australia-Japan-Korea Trilateral

Introduction Meetings in a “minilateral” format between the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific are proliferating widely.[2]. At the end of 2024, the Defence Ministers of the US, Australia and Japan met in Darwin to firm up their collective regional deterrence posture (originally initiated under the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) process).[3]The US, Japan, Australia and the Philippines held a quadrilateral meeting shortly afterwards to coordinate on approaches to regional security.[4] Prior to this, in July of 2024, a vice Foreign Ministers/Deputy Secretary of State meeting took place between the US, Japan and the ROK to consolidate their trilateral cooperation as agreed under the ground-breaking Camp David Summit back in 2023.[5] Different forms of minilateral cooperation continue to expand and progress through both the convocation of government officials, and through more formalised institutional structures such as the Anglo-American-Australian AUKUS configuration.[6] But attention has now turned to a potential new minilateral grouping between key American allies in the Indo-Pacific without the inclusion of the US: an Australia-Japan-ROK “trilateral” forum. This minilateral configuration remains at the nascent stage, but Canberra, Tokyo and Seoul appear eager to explore the possibilities. An inaugural trilateral Defence Ministers Meeting and Officials-level Indo-Pacific Dialogue was held in June 2024.[7] The same month a dedicated Track 1.5 Dialogue was hosted by the US Studies Centre think tank in Sydney to further discussion and affirm trilateral connections.[8] A solid basis for three-way minilateral cooperation There are several factors motivating Australia-Japan-ROK trilateral coordination. First, the three US allies are united in their appreciation of a deteriorating security environment in the Indo-Pacific region, concerned about instability in the South and East China Seas, the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula. In the context of accelerating Sino-US rivalry and strategic competition exploring enhanced three-way collaboration makes good strategic sense. Second, Canberra, Tokyo and Seoul are equally apprehensive over what the second Trump Presidency will mean for allies and the regional order in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, sharing assessments and creating new policy options without total reliance on the US is deemed worthy of exploration. Third, there is good reason to build upon the strong convergence of shared values and interests between the three liberal democratic powers in itself. With each of the three partners limited in their national power resources and capabilities compared to the US and China, pooling resources and aligning policies is a way to create room for manoeuvre for “secondary” states within the contested regional landscape. Lastly, Seoul appears keen to pursue minilateral cooperation to strengthen its presence within the regional security architecture; an architecture that is increasingly becoming more defined by minilateral configurations such as the TSD, the Quad and AUKUS, none of which Korea is a party to. A quick assessment of the compatibility of the three states reveals a strong potential partnership. Australia, Japan and Korea are the three most important US allies in the Indo-Pacific, they are all firmly established liberal democracies championing the shared values, and all crucially depend upon the maintenance of a rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, frequently referred to as “middle powers” (though some caveats are attached to Japan under this denominator), they possess an inclination to work with multilateral organisations, play the role of “good international citizens” and build coalitions (such as the trilateral itself).[9] Moreover, possessing significant economic, diplomatic and military power individually, their influence would be further magnified if they act in concert. With robust bilateral ties between Australia and Japan through their Strategic Partnership, a deepening Australia-ROK Strategic Partnership, and a relatively positive bilateral relationship between Japan and Korea, there is a good basis upon which to pursue trilateral cooperation. Towards a trilateral agenda At this nascent stage trilateral cooperation could evolve in many policy directions, building on an existing web of ongoing bilateral collaborations. A brief summary of functional areas of cooperation prospectively includes the following foci. At the sharper (and most “difficult”) end of the collaboration spectrum, the partners could concentrate on coordinating regional deterrence (as per the TSD). In particular, a degree of trilateral cooperation on maritime security – intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and maritime domain awareness (MDA) would appear compelling and feasible. More robust activities such as combined military exercises, though, are likely confined to more distant horizons. Cooperation in this area however is inhibited first by its inherent sensitivity, and second, by the necessity of US involvement (suggesting a “quadrilateral” format with the US?). Plus, trilateral threat perceptions toward the region are not entirely aligned, with the ROK understandably placing higher emphasis on the North Korean threat than Japan, and especially, Australia.[10] This limits the extent to which this activity can be pursued in this space outside of the US context, though does not preclude it, since better trilateral defence integration also serves towards reinforcing a common US-led deterrence front. As a result of the constraints just identified, such cooperation will likely be minimal and piecemeal, and probably not the primary focus of the trilateral agenda. Nevertheless, the three partners could prospectively concentrate on the enabling factors behind an overall improvement in regional deterrence capabilities through defence-industrial-technological cooperation. Both Japan and Korea have impressive defence-industrial bases and technological advantages, whilst Australia has demand for these, as well as some niche technological specialisations it could contribute (e.g. Quantum computing). Potentially, the partners could explore joint research development and/or co-production enterprises. Other minilateral formations such as AUKUS and the UK-Japan-Italy Global Combat Aircraft Programme (GCAP) are models that could be emulated, perhaps at a lower level of the value chain, such as munitions production or other enabling systems. Meanwhile, cooperation on Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET), such as AI, Quantum computing, robotics and so forth, would be easier to achieve, with such advanced technologies having commercial as well as military application. This neatly segues into broader economic cooperation. The three countries are already mutually significant trading partners, each with comparative advantages. Free Trade Agreements (FTA) are in place across each of the partner dyads, that could be further exploited and energised trilaterally. With the need to “de-risk” trade with China being accompanied by the prospect of harsh tariff measures by President Trump, there are strong incentives to focus trilaterally, and to coordinate to mutually mitigate such hazards. This also involves an accent on “economic security”, through securing unimpeded access to supply chains, including critical minerals, and a preparedness to withstand (or deter) economic coercion. Thus, mutually assisting one another with improving national (and collective) economic resilience is a prospective area for increased cooperation. Other forms of economic-technological cooperation, such as working together to progress green energy transition might be considered. Lastly, mutual support and engagement with multilateral economic fora, such as in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CTTP), Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and Indo-Pacific Economic Forum (IPEF), are venues in which the three partners could make a greater impression if they coordinated their policies. The three partners are highly committed to a rules-based regional order in both security and economic terms. This is exemplified by the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, first championed by Japan, adopted by Australia, and effectively endorsed by Korea.[11] This envisions a region governed by a rules-based order, enhancing economic prosperity, and a commitment to peace and stability.[12] To expedite this, the trilateral partners can play a role in providing a measure of economic and security governance to regional states, building on their national/bilateral efforts. The provision of Official Development Assistance (ODA), investment and capacity-building to key sub-regions such as the Pacific Islands and South East Asia is something that each nation is already deeply engaged in and could be coordinated trilaterally to improve outcomes. This extends to Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), something that could be facilitated trilaterally as well given the maritime capabilities of the three partner states.[13] Support for ASEAN-led regional security architecture, including connection with the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, would also provide scope for reinforcing the regional order. Next steps and challenges The discussion above has concentrated on potential and probable areas within which trilateral coordination could be effective, building on accomplishments to date. But whether this emergent minilateral will become effective and durable may depend upon its appropriate institutionalisation. It could remain an “informal” configuration, through sporadic trilateral Minsters meetings, accompanied by Track 1.5 or Track 2 dialogues and ad hoc trilateral agreements/activities. The partners would do more to harmonise their parallel national lines of effort towards common goals and view them “through a trilateral lens”.[14] This would maintain flexibility, not require extensive resource allocation, and would be unlikely to cause any internal or external issues (such as condemnation from Beijing). Alternatively, as seen with other minilaterals such as AUKUS and the TSD, and to a lesser extent, the Quad, it could assume a more “formal” institutional guise. In this case, high-profile Ministerial or leaders meetings would become regularised, the trilateral would issue an official statement of aims and agenda (and action plan for implementation), and would create new organisational infrastructure, such as working groups and trilateral agreements to facilitate this. This would necessitate a higher degree of commitment both in terms of political/diplomatic capital and resources but would be far more impactful. The application of a recognisable denomination – e.g. “Australia-Japan-Korea” (AJK) – or other suitably eye-catching acronym would serve to better lodge it in the regional policy discourse and distinguish it from a plethora of other (easily forgettable) “trilaterals”. Apart from this, there are other conceivable impediments to progressing the trilateral project. First, it needs a strong raison d’être through a mandate that cannot be (better) accomplished through existing channels of coordination, most saliently the US-alliance framework (particularly in the case of deterrence issues). Though an AJK trilateral will certainly further the process of “connecting the spokes” within the US-alliance network, which is a worthy aim, the value proposition of the trilateral outside of, or in addition to, this function needs to be clearly justified.[15] One unofficial purpose of the trilateral might be the creation of a space for “secondary powers”/US-allies to discuss how to deal with a more isolationist or destabilising American policy under Trump. There are also the vicissitudes of internal policy to be considered. Not only domestically, with the ROK government currently in turmoil, but between Seoul and Tokyo specifically. The bilateral relationship has typically been subject to disruption when unresolved historical or territorial issues have gained political exposure. While the current state of bilateral relations is favourable, much work remains to be done, and a positive trajectory is not a certainty. In summary, there are compelling reasons for greater trilateral coordination, though what issues this concentrates on and what form this takes have yet to be determined. However, even if trilateral cooperation can be made to fulfil a useful purpose for these middle power states, it will remain supplementary (or complimentary) to their US-alliance relations, which cannot be effectively replaced or replicated. *Thomas Wilkins is a distinguished research fellow at JFIR and an associate professor at the University of Sydney. [1] ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: The author would like to thank the East Asia Institute, Seoul, for the invitation to speak at the ROK-Japan-Australia Trilateral Conference: “ROK-Japan-Australia Cooperation in Trump 2.0”’, (18 Jan 2025). [2] Wilkins, Thomas, The “Minilateral Moment” and The Regional Security Architecture in The Indo-Pacific”, NIDS Commentary, No. 25 National Institute for Defense Studies, Tokyo, (16 Feb 2023). http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/commentary/pdf/commentary254e.pdf [3] Wilkins, Thomas. “US-Japan-Australia Trilateralism: The Inner Core of Regional Order Building and Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.” Asia Policy 19, no. 2 (2024): 159-185. [4] US Department of Defense, ‘Joint Readout from Australia-Japan-Philippines-Republic of Korea-United States Defense Ministers’ Meeting’, (21 Nov 2024). https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3973807/joint-readout-from-australia-japan-philippines-republic-of-korea-united-states/ [5] US Department of Defense, ‘Japan-United States-Republic of Korea Trilateral Ministerial Joint Press Statement’, (27 July 2024). https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852146/japan-united-states-republic-of-korea-trilateral-ministerial-joint-press-statem/ [6] Wilkins, Thomas, ‘Australia and AUKUS into the 2030s’ International Information Network Analysis, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, (14 Sept 2023), https://www.spf.org/iina/en/articles/thomas_08.html [7] Australian Government: Defence, ‘Eleventh Australia-Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations’ (5 Sept 2024). https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2024-09-05/eleventh-australia-japan-22-foreign-and-defence-ministerial-consultations [8] Watterson, Christopher, ‘Seizing the moment: Outcomes of the inaugural Australia-Japan-South Korea trilateral dialogue’, (18 Sept 2024). https://www.ussc.edu.au/outcomes-of-the-inaugural-australia-japan-south-korea-trilateral-dialogue [9] See: Struye de Swielande, Tanguy, Dorothée Vandamme, David Walton, Thomas Wilkins (eds.), Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century: New Theories, New Cases (London: Taylor & Francis, 2018); Abbondanza, Gabriele. “The odd axis: Germany, Italy, and Japan as awkward great powers.” Awkward powers: Escaping traditional great and middle power theory (2022): 43-71. [10] Lee Dongkeun ‘“ROK-Australia-Japan Cooperation”: A Perspective from the ROK’, National Commentaries, (Sept 30 2024), The Asan Forum. https://theasanforum.org/a-perspective-from-the-rok/ [11] Kim, Jiye and Thomas Wilkins, ‘South Korea and America’s Indo-Pacific Strategy: Yes, But Not Quite’, Fulcrum, (26 Nov, 2020). https://fulcrum.sg/south-korea-and-americas-indo-pacific-strategy-yes-but-not-quite/ [12] Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Japan, ‘Achieving the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” Vision Japan Ministry of Defense’s Approach’, MOFA, (no date). https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_act/exc/india_pacific/india_pacific-en.html [13] Richardson, Lauren, ‘Trilateral Cooperation Between Australia, Japan and South Korea: Potential And Possibilities’, Research Paper, Griffith Asia Institute, (2022). https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0028/1507717/Richardson-trilateral-cooperation-web.pdf [14] East Asia Institute, “ROK-Japan-Australia Cooperation in Trump 2.0”’, ROK-Japan-Australia Trilateral Conference, East Asia Institute, (18 Jan 2025). https://www.eai.or.kr/new/en/event/view.asp?intSeq=22834&board=eng_event [15] Wilkins, Thomas. “A Hub-and-Spokes “Plus” Model of us Alliances in the Indo-Pacific: Towards a New “Networked” Design.” Asian Affairs 53, no. 3 (2022): 457-480.

Thomas WILKINS