Ⅰ. China’s Top Diplomat Meets with Russian Presidential Aide Overseeing the Shipbuilding Industry

Nikolai Patrushev, Aide to the President of Russia and Chairman of the Maritime Board, visited China from October 8 to 13, 2026, to hold working-level consultations on China-Russia cooperation in the maritime sector and other areas. Prior to assuming his current position upon the establishment of the Russian Maritime Board (an overarching maritime policy body directly reporting to the President) in August 2024, Patrushev had been at the center of Russian politics for 16 years as Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation. Known as a prominent figure among the siloviki (individuals from security and intelligence agencies), Patrushev currently serves as the Presidential Aide overseeing the shipbuilding industry.

On October 12, Patrushev met in Beijing with Wang Yi, Member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Central Committee and Director of the Office of the Central Commission for Foreign Affairs. Although Wang Yi concurrently serves as the Chinese Foreign Minister, he attended this meeting in his higher capacity as China’s top diplomat.

China and Russia confirmed that the direction of China’s “Polar Silk Road”[1] under the Belt and Road Initiative aligns with Russia’s “Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor,” and agreed to enhance the coherence of their respective maritime strategies. (Note: The “Polar Silk Road” connects major Chinese ports to major European ports via the Arctic Ocean; the “Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor” connects St. Petersburg to Vladivostok via the Arctic Ocean; Russia’s legally defined “Northern Sea Route” spans the waters from the Kara Strait to Cape Dezhnev in the Bering Strait.)

Wang Yi expressed the view that China and Russia should cooperate to strengthen the alignment of their maritime strategies, leverage complementary advantages, protect each other’s legitimate maritime rights and interests, maintain maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region, and ensure the normal navigation of major international sea lanes. Furthermore, Wang called on Russia to ensure the stable supply of energy resources between the two countries, secure the safe operation of supply chains, expand exchanges on maritime and Arctic affairs, improve global maritime governance, and promote the building of a maritime community with a shared future.[2]

II. Consultations on Expanding Shipbuilding and Logistics Networks within Arctic Policy

During his initial stop in Shanghai, Patrushev visited Shanghai Waigaoqiao Shipbuilding (SWS), Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and the Yangshan Port.[3] Located in the Pudong New Area, SWS is one of China’s largest and most advanced shipyards. Shanghai Jiao Tong University is a prestigious institution renowned for its research in naval architecture and ocean engineering. Yangshan Port is known as a fully automated, smart terminal that handles one of the world’s largest volumes of container cargo.

On October 10 in Beijing, Patrushev met with the Vice Minister of China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) to discuss the construction of shipyards in Russia by Chinese shipbuilding companies and their participation in shipbuilding projects.[4] The MIIT is a government agency responsible for overall industrial policy, the fostering of high-tech industries, and information and communication policy. The ministry is also involved in establishing the foundation for Arctic navigation, including shipbuilding supply chains, communication networks, satellite infrastructure, and submarine cables, as well as the promotion, budgeting, and management of civil-military “dual-use” technology development.

On October 12, Patrushev also met with Liu Wei, China’s Minister of Transport. During their meeting, the two officials discussed the importance of joint efforts to ensure the transport sovereignty of Russia and China (referring to logistics that are immune to Western sanctions), the interaction between the “Polar Silk Road” and the “Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor,” challenges for Chinese enterprises in building transport networks, the development of bilateral river routes, and the increase in maritime freight transport by logistics operators of both countries.[5]。

Additionally, during this meeting, Patrushev conveyed to the Chinese side his accusations that the United Kingdom, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are advancing plans to blockade the Baltic Sea and attempting to seize Russian vessels. Amid the ongoing tensions in the Strait of Hormuz and the pressure exerted by the Houthis on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea,[6] Russia explained to China that it is developing the “Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor” as an alternative route.[7]

Until now, China and Russia have repeatedly invoked the term “cooperation” regarding the Arctic. However, wary of China—which positions itself as a “Near-Arctic State” despite having no territory in the Arctic Circle—Russia historically maintained a cautious stance toward full-scale practical cooperation involving the construction of ice-class vessels or the use of its domestic infrastructure. That same Russia is now undergoing a major strategic shift.

Behind this shift lies the confluence of interests between Russia, which seeks to bolster its shipbuilding capacity under Western sanctions, and China, which aims to expand its Arctic shipping and logistics networks.

III. The EU’s “22nd Sanctions Package Against Russia”

One of the principal reasons why the strengthening of China-Russia ties over Arctic policy in 2026 can be characterized as a “turning point” is the intensification of Western sanctions against Russia.[8]

On October 12, 2026, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union adopted the “22nd Sanctions Package Against Russia,” imposing additional restrictive measures on 1,569 individuals and entities affiliated with Russia’s military-industrial complex—the largest single tranche of designations since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine in 2022.[9]

Aiming in part to sever the supply chains supporting the military-industrial complex, the EU’s 22nd sanctions package added more than 20 major Russian shipyards and naval ship repair facilities to the list of entities subject to asset freezes and transaction bans. The Russian shipbuilding industry has long relied on EU-based firms for many critical components, including propulsion systems and advanced navigation equipment. Under the 22nd package, however, individuals and entities within the EU are comprehensively prohibited from “directly or indirectly providing” economic resources, funds, or services to the designated companies. Consequently, the delivery of essential parts and the provision of maintenance support to Russian shipyards have been brought to a halt. The facilities impacted by these measures encompass not only docks building naval warships, but also shipyards that construct icebreakers, ice-class cargo vessels, and offshore support vessels operating along the Arctic shipping routes.

Russia has exported more than a third of its crude oil utilizing tankers operated by Western shipping companies. However, the 22nd sanctions package will effectively terminate transactions involving vessels from EU member states. Faced with an urgent need to build up its domestic capabilities while being severed from the technological and component procurement networks of EU enterprises, Russia has been left with little choice but to turn to Chinese cooperation. In particular, Russia is looking to China—a key importer of Russian energy resources transported via the Arctic route—to provide the critical shipbuilding support for maintaining these operations.

IV. China’s Expanding Arctic Footprint and Japan’s “Designated Sea Areas”

The primary objective of the October 12 meeting between Wang Yi and Nikolai Patrushev was to strengthen China-Russia cooperation on Arctic policy. However, another crucial point that warrants the close attention of Japanese observers is the following statement by Wang Yi, published by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the evening of the same day:

“The Chinese side is willing to work with the Russian side to strengthen the synergy of the two countries’ maritime strategies, achieve complementary advantages, protect each other’s legitimate maritime rights and interests, maintain maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region, and ensure normal navigation along major global sea lanes.”[10]

China was explicitly calling on Russia to deepen bilateral coordination not only regarding practical cooperation along the Arctic shipping routes and major international shipping corridors, but also concerning the maritime rights and interests of both nations, extending directly into the Asia-Pacific region.

Russia’s alignment with China’s narrative of “new militarism” leveled against Japan[11] became distinct around May 2026 during deliberations at the United Nations and at the bilateral China-Russia summit. On October 13, the day following the Wang-Patrushev meeting, the authorities of Russia’s Far Eastern Sakhalin Oblast announced a visit to Etorofu Island by a delegation composed of administrative officials and business figures from China’s Heilongjiang Province. Although Etorofu Island is an inherent territory of Japan, Russia continues its illegal occupation of the island. The Heilongjiang delegation inspected sea urchin aquaculture facilities and other sites on Etorofu as part of a Russian-organized investment promotion tour. By accepting Chinese investment and fisheries inspections on Etorofu, Russia has shifted toward an approach of entangling China in its effective control over the Northern Territories as an instrument of deterrence against Japan.

On October 14, the day after the Heilongjiang delegation’s visit to Etorofu, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning stated during a regular press conference that “China consistently maintains that the outcomes of the victory in World War II should be respected and upheld, ”[12] thereby demonstrating a pro-Russian posture. Such China-Russia alignment is anticipated to progress beyond Moscow merely accommodating the historical narratives propagated by Beijing. Should China expand its foray into Arctic shipping routes, its vessels would either traverse the Soya Strait into the Sea of Okhotsk and sail north toward the Pacific Ocean and the Bering Sea via the Etorofu Strait or Kunashiri Strait, or pass through the Tsugaru Strait into the Pacific Ocean and proceed north off the Kuril Islands.

Regarding the Soya and Tsugaru Straits, Japan sets the breadth of its territorial sea at three nautical miles as “Designated Sea Areas” (Tokutei Kaiiki), rather than the standard twelve nautical miles.[13] In these Designated Sea Areas where the territorial sea is limited to three nautical miles, high seas corridors are maintained in the center. Pursuant to Article 38 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), all ships and aircraft, including submarines and warships, enjoy the right of transit passage through straits used for international navigation.

Even if these Designated Sea Areas were reclassified as standard twelve-nautical-mile territorial seas, foreign vessels would still enjoy the “right of innocent passage” under UNCLOS Article 17, provided their passage is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State. However, coastal authorities would be entitled to prohibit acts of propaganda affecting defense or security, serious acts of pollution, fishing activities, research or survey activities, acts aimed at interfering with coastal communications systems, and “any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage.”[14]。

As China’s presence along Arctic sea routes grows, deterrence and geopolitical pressure directed at Japan by China and Russia are expected to escalate sharply. Under such circumstances, calls are likely to mount within Japan to convert the three-nautical-mile “Designated Sea Areas” into standard twelve-nautical-mile territorial seas in order to place vital waterways linking the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean under tighter surveillance, with China’s northward transit in mind. China’s expanding presence in the Arctic Ocean will inevitably prompt intensified domestic debate on strengthening Japan’s defense-related regulatory and administrative authority over these straits.