Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who was visiting Gyeongju, South Korea for the APEC Leaders’ Meeting, held her first Japan–China Summit with China’s President Xi Jinping on October 31, 2025.
This paper first points out in Section I that the main achievement of this Japan–China Summit was the realization of the Takaichi–Xi meeting itself. Then, in Section II, it is noted, by comparing the meeting with the summits under the Kishida and Ishiba administrations, that there was no major difference in the content of the discussions. Next, Section III discusses one of the background factors that led to the summit: the “proactive signals” (“positive signals” from China’s perspective) sent by the Takaichi Cabinet toward China. Subsequently, Section IV examines the promotion of China’s “Asia-Pacific Community” concept and the shift in security policy brought about by the establishment of the Takaichi administration as backgrounds for the realization of the Takaichi–Xi meeting, considering why the Chinese side, initially reluctant, moved to realize the summit. Finally, Section V argues that precisely because the liberal international order is collapsing and we have entered an era of power struggle, Japan’s stance should be a two-pronged approach based on realism: “backed by power” and “continuing diplomacy,” and that crisis management through the continuation of dialogue (diplomacy) is essential to prevent unintended conflicts (crises).
Ⅰ The Takaichi–Xi Meeting: Opening a “Window” for Dialogue
At the outset of the summit meeting, President Xi expressed his “congratulations” to Prime Minister Takaichi. This gesture can be highly regarded as a diplomatic achievement in the sense that the top political leaders of both countries opened a “window” for dialogue, though not yet a “door.”
Since Xi assumed the presidency in 2013, he had sent congratulatory messages to successive Japanese prime ministers, including Suga Yoshihide, Kishida Fumio, and Ishiba Shigeru. However, due to its wariness of Prime Minister Takaichi’s political stance, Beijing took the unusual step of not sending a congratulatory telegram upon her inauguration as prime minister. (※It was later revealed, however, that Premier Li Qiang did send a congratulatory message to Prime Minister Takaichi.)
On October 4, immediately after assuming the presidency of the Liberal Democratic Party, Takaichi, as chair of the “Parliamentary League to Support Southern Mongolia,” submitted a message in writing to an international forum titled “The History and Prospects of the Southern Mongolian Freedom and Independence Movement,” held at the First Members’ Office Building of the House of Representatives on October 9. In her message, she expressed “outrage at the continued repression by the Chinese Communist Party,” voiced strong concern, and appealed for strengthened solidarity to defend universal values such as freedom, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights. In response, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a sharp protest the following day, condemning the remarks as “interference in China’s internal affairs” and “the politicization and instrumentalization of human rights.”
Prime Minister Takaichi attended the 28th Japan–ASEAN Summit held in Kuala Lumpur on October 26. However, she did not participate in the 28th ASEAN+3 (Japan–China–ROK) Summit held on the 27th, when U.S. President Donald Trump was visiting Japan; Foreign Minister Motegi Toshimitsu attended in her place. Consequently, no meeting was held between Prime Minister Takaichi and Chinese Premier Li Qiang.
Prime Minister Takaichi held summit meetings on October 26 with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese. As of the 26th, it can be said that China was still taking a reserved stance toward Japan’s new prime minister.
At the Japan–Australia summit on October 26, the two leaders agreed to strengthen cooperation toward realizing a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) and to deepen collaboration in economic security, including supply chains for critical minerals. The joint statement signed at the United States–Australia summit on October 20, which outlined enhanced cooperation for securing rare earths and other critical minerals, included projects involving Japan. In addition, on October 26, the day the United States signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Malaysia on rare earth development, Japan and Malaysia confirmed that they would further strengthen cooperation in economic security fields such as rare earths. (※Australia is expected to take on the principal role of extraction and resource supply, while Malaysia is expected to become a major Southeast Asian hub for processing and refining. The United States is therefore regarded as aiming to establish a new supply chain structured as extraction [Australia] → processing and refining [Malaysia and others] → end use [United States], a supply chain that does not pass through China. These developments indicate that Washington is accelerating the reorganization of global critical mineral supply chains by deepening cooperation not only with Japan and Australia but also with ASEAN member states.) Japan also agreed to provide unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), rescue boats, and a diving support vessel to Malaysia through the Official Security Assistance (OSA). In the meeting with the Philippines, where cooperation under OSA is advancing, the two sides welcomed the fact that the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) had effectively reached agreement.
These three summits were, in essence, strategic diplomatic engagements conducted with China in mind.
Because China remained wary of Prime Minister Takaichi’s positions and statements, Beijing approached the possibility of a summit meeting with considerable caution. As a result, the Japan–China summit was not announced publicly until the day it took place, October 31.
Given that China had taken the unprecedented step of not sending a congratulatory message upon Takaichi’s inauguration, the main achievement of the summit lies in the simple fact that the Takaichi–Xi meeting was realized.
【※ Note: Following the Japan–China summit, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed that it had lodged a “strong protest” with the Japanese side after Prime Minister Takaichi met with Lin Hsin-yi, the representative of Taiwan at the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting, and posted about the meeting on social media. However, APEC is a framework for economic cooperation among 21 economies in the Asia-Pacific region. Taiwan participates formally as an economy under the name “Chinese Taipei.” Exchanges between representatives of participating economies, including those from Taiwan, are a customary practice within the context of economic cooperation. For this reason, China’s protest regarding the meeting between the Japanese prime minister and the Taiwanese representative does not align with APEC’s founding purpose or its actual operating practices. 】
Ⅱ Continuity from the Previous Administrations: Comprehensive Promotion of the “Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship” and Building a “Constructive and Stable Relationship”
There has been no change since the Fumio Kishida administration in the “broad direction” confirmed by both Japan and China, namely the comprehensive advancement of a “Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship” and the building of a “constructive and stable relationship.” The concerns conveyed by Prime Minister Takaichi to the Chinese side were the same “concerns” previously communicated by Prime Ministers Kishida and Ishiba.
Below is an outline of the past five Japan–China summit meetings. Substantively, there have been no major differences.
(1) Kishida–Xi Summit Meeting (October 8, 2021, telephone talks)
Prime Minister Kishida (at the time, same hereafter) raised various pending issues between the two countries in a candid manner and stated his intention to continue dialogue, including on these matters. He conveyed to President Xi that both sides must work together to build a “constructive and stable relationship,” taking the fiftieth anniversary of the normalization of Japan–China diplomatic relations in 2022 as an opportunity. President Xi expressed agreement. The two leaders also concurred on cooperating on shared challenges.
(2) Kishida–Xi Summit Meeting (November 17, 2022, first in-person meeting held in Thailand on the occasion of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting)
Prime Minister Kishida emphasized that, as responsible major powers, both countries should act constructively on international challenges and accelerate efforts to build a “constructive and stable Japan–China relationship” based on their shared direction. He stressed that this required efforts from both sides.
(3) Kishida–Xi Summit Meeting (November 16, 2023, in-person meeting held in San Francisco, United States, on the occasion of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting)
The two leaders reaffirmed that Japan and China would uphold the principles and shared understandings embodied in the four basic documents between the two countries and would comprehensively advance their Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship. They also confirmed the broad direction of opening a new era in Japan–China relations through the building of a constructive and stable relationship. In addition, the leaders welcomed the ministerial-level dialogues held that year in the fields of foreign affairs, economy and industry, defense, and the environment, and agreed to continue close communication at all levels, including at the summit level.
(4) Ishiba–Xi Summit Meeting (November 15, 2024, meeting held in Peru on the occasion of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting)
The two leaders confirmed that Japan and China continued to share the broad direction of comprehensively advancing their “Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship” and of building a “constructive and stable relationship”. They also confirmed that both sides would uphold the principles and shared understandings of the four basic documents between Japan and China and would build a relationship that allows for candid dialogue. Under this broad direction, the leaders confirmed that both sides would work to further strengthen communication across a wide range of fields at all levels, including the summit level, in order to reduce challenges and outstanding issues and to increase cooperation and coordination. Prime Minister Ishiba urged China to restore imports of Japanese fishery products, resume exports of Japanese beef, and restart at an early date intergovernmental consultations regarding the expansion of exports of Japanese rice. He also expressed serious concern regarding the situation surrounding the Senkaku Islands, the increasingly active operations of the Chinese military, the safety of Japanese nationals, the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, and developments related to the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.
(5) Takaichi–Xi Summit Meeting (October 31, 2025, meeting held in South Korea on the occasion of the APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting)
President Xi conveyed his congratulations on Prime Minister Takaichi’s assumption of office. The two leaders reaffirmed the broad direction of comprehensively advancing their “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” and building a “constructive and stable relationship”. Prime Minister Takaichi urged President Xi on the importance of fulfilling the heavy responsibility of ensuring peace and prosperity in the region and the international community. The two leaders confirmed the importance of dialogue at the summit level and of multilayered communication across a wide range of fields between Japan and China.
Prime Minister Takaichi requested the early realization of the removal of import restrictions on agricultural, forestry, and fishery products from ten prefectures in Japan, the resumption of Japanese beef exports, and cooperation on global challenges. She expressed serious concern regarding the situation surrounding the Senkaku Islands, the escalation of Chinese military activities and maritime survey operations, China’s export control measures related to rare earths, the safety of Japanese nationals, the peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait, and developments related to the South China Sea, Hong Kong, and the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. The two leaders also exchanged views on issues related to North Korea, including the abduction issue.
Ⅲ We have taken note of several forward-looking signals sent by the new Japanese cabinet.”
One factor behind the realization of the Takaichi–Xi summit meeting was that the Takaichi cabinet, inaugurated on October 21, continued to send “active signals” (interpreted by Beijing as “forward-looking signals”) toward China.
Prime Minister Takaichi and Chief Cabinet Secretary Minoru Kihara refrained from visiting Yasukuni Shrine during the “Reiwa 7th Grand Autumn Festival” on October 17. In her policy speech on October 24, Prime Minister Takaichi stated that “China is an important neighbor for Japan, and it is necessary to build a constructive and stable relationship,” and further noted that “it is also true that security concerns exist between Japan and China, including those related to economic security. The Japanese and Chinese leaders will continue candid dialogue and comprehensively advance the Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests.”
Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi held a telephone conference with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi from 2:00 p.m. for approximately thirty minutes on October 28. Motegi conveyed that China is an important neighbor for Japan and that Prime Minister Takaichi places great importance on Japan–China relations, and also stated that Japan has never intended decoupling or the disruption of supply chains with China. He expressed Japan’s hope that both sides would strengthen exchanges at all levels, deepen mutually beneficial cooperation, address differences appropriately, and comprehensively advance a constructive and stable strategic relationship of mutual benefit. During the call, both sides confirmed that Japan and China shared the broad direction of comprehensively advancing their “Mutually Beneficial Relationship Based on Common Strategic Interests” and building a “constructive and stable relationship”. They also agreed that, under this “broad direction”, both sides would work to reduce challenges and outstanding issues and to increase mutual understanding and cooperation. Motegi expressed concerns regarding China’s export control measures related to rare earths and activities in the East China Sea, and requested the early release of Japanese nationals detained in China, the safety of Japanese residents, the smooth import of Japanese marine products, the early resumption of Japanese beef imports, and the lifting of import restrictions on agricultural, forestry, and fishery products from ten prefectures. These points were also conveyed by the prime minister to the Chinese side during the summit meeting on October 31.
Ⅳ China’s Objectives
How should we understand China’s objectives in realizing the summit meeting? The main points can be summarized in terms of the following two areas: the economic domain and the security domain.
(1) Promotion of the construction of an “Asia-Pacific Community” in view of the FTAAP
On the morning of November 1, President Xi Jinping attended the handover ceremony for the host economy of the 32nd APEC Informal Economic Leaders’ Meeting and announced that China would host the 33rd APEC Informal Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Shenzhen, Guangdong Province, in November 2026. This will mark the third time China serves as APEC host. China has indicated that it intends to use this opportunity to work with relevant parties to advance the construction of an “Asia-Pacific Community,” placing emphasis on promoting the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP), connectivity, the digital economy, artificial intelligence (AI), and other forms of practical cooperation.
Prior to this, at Session 1 of the APEC Informal Economic Leaders’ Meeting held on the morning of October 31, President Xi delivered what he labeled an “important speech” titled “Jointly Building an Inclusive and Open Asia-Pacific Economy that Delivers Universal Benefits.” In the Japan–China summit meeting held later that same day, Xi also proposed to Prime Minister Takaichi that both sides should promote the construction of an Asia-Pacific Community.
The FTAAP is a concept aimed at forming a free trade area among APEC economies. Originating from a proposal made by the APEC Business Advisory Council (ABAC) in 2004, the pathway toward the FTAAP was adopted at the 2010 APEC Economic Leaders’ Meeting in Yokohama.
A key process for APEC in moving toward the FTAAP is the CPTPP. Originally, the pathway to the FTAAP was expected to proceed either through the United States–led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) or the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). However, with the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP at the start of the first Trump administration, the Japanese government took on the leading role and concluded the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), bringing it into force. Furthermore, when the United Kingdom acceded to the CPTPP in 2024, Japan actively led the accession process, serving as chair of the Working Group on Accession. The Japanese government has assessed whether economies seeking to join have both the capacity and the willingness to meet fully the high standards and rules of the CPTPP, thereby striving to maintain the quality of the agreement.
By maintaining and strengthening the CPTPP as a foundation for a “free and fair economic order,” the Japanese government has ensured that the CPTPP functions as a key strategic partnership framework contributing to trade and economic development in the Indo-Pacific region.
In China’s push for constructing the “Asia-Pacific Community,” the CPTPP and the role of Japan as a key actor in the FTAAP process are extremely important. In her policy speech, Prime Minister Takaichi positioned a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) as a central pillar of her diplomacy and stated that Japan would work under this vision to strengthen cooperation with like-minded states and the Global South, and would seek to expand CPTPP membership from a strategic perspective.
Given the high domestic approval ratings for the Takaichi administration at the time the Japan–China summit was arranged, China must recognize the need to engage with the Takaichi administration from a medium-term perspective. In light of the timeline of international politics and international relations in 2025 and 2026, taking the first step toward high-level dialogue with the Takaichi administration is also important for China.
(2) The Takaichi–Trump meeting and Japan–China relations
In the field of security as well, China had its own reasons to consider it important to move toward holding the summit meeting.
On October 28, the day Prime Minister Takaichi signed the document marking a new “golden age” in Japan–United States relations and another document concerning critical minerals, she boarded the presidential helicopter “Marine One” together with U.S. President Donald Trump and headed to the U.S. military base in Yokosuka, Kanagawa Prefecture. Prime Minister Takaichi, who boarded the U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS George Washington with President Trump, declared that “Japan will fundamentally strengthen its defense capabilities and contribute more proactively to the peace and stability of this region.” Behind the podium where she delivered her speech hung a large banner reading “Peace Through Strength.” In front of this banner, with its very large lettering, Prime Minister Takaichi raised her fist straight upward in response to the cheers of U.S. service members.
In the summit meeting on October 31, President Xi Jinping emphasized that “opportunities and challenges coexist in the current China–Japan relationship” and expressed his hope that “Japan’s new cabinet will establish an accurate understanding of China, value the dedication and efforts poured into developing China–Japan relations by senior statesmen and people from all sectors in both countries, and uphold the broad direction of peace, friendship, and cooperation.” Among the five proposals he put forward, one was “the proper management of differences.” Xi conveyed to the Japanese side that both countries should take a long-term view, respect differences as differences, seek common ground, focus on what they share, work to overcome differences with the aim of understanding and harmony, and avoid allowing disagreements and disputes to define the bilateral relationship. On the Taiwan question, it was China that raised the issue with the Japanese government, requesting adherence to the position outlined in the 1972 Japan–China Joint Communique.
These remarks cannot be understood as referring solely to cross-Strait relations.
The background to these statements can be interpreted as China’s concern over the “fundamental strengthening of defense capabilities” articulated by Prime Minister Takaichi in her policy speech.
In particular, China has been closely watching the direction of the Takaichi administration in responding to changes in the security environment since the issuance of the three security documents in December 2022. The three security documents refer to the National Security Strategy, which sets out the basic policy of Japan’s national security; the National Defense Strategy, which stipulates levels of defense capabilities and planning guidelines; and the Defense Buildup Program, which specifies the content of concrete defense capability development. The three documents, originally formulated in 2013, were revised in 2022. Although the previous revision occurred after nine years, the next revision is expected to take place within a much shorter time frame. The underlying reason is believed to be Japan’s increasingly acute sense of threat from China, prompting accelerated efforts to fundamentally strengthen its defense capabilities. The revision is expected to bring major changes not only to the timeline for achieving the defense budget as a share of GDP but also to the scale and speed of the Defense Buildup Program. China is wary that such developments may represent a major turning point in Japan’s security policy.
Aiming for the 2026 revision of the three security documents, the Takaichi administration appointed Keiichi Ichikawa as Director-General of the National Security Secretariat on October 21, succeeding Masataka Okano. Ichikawa’s appointment as Ambassador to Indonesia had been approved by the Cabinet on October 10, under the Ishiba cabinet. The Takaichi administration has indicated its intention to pursue policy reforms such as revising the rules for the transfer of defense equipment and introducing legislation equivalent to an anti-espionage law. China recognizes the significance of appointing Ichikawa to the key post responsible for coordinating such policies.
The inauguration of the Takaichi administration may represent a turning point in Japan’s security policy and in debates over constitutional revision. The dissolution of the coalition with Komeito, which had long prioritized stable relations with China, carries significance beyond ordinary political maneuvering. Forming a new coalition with Nippon Ishin no Kai, a party that has consistently advocated a firm stance on security issues, clearly suggests the possibility of a shift in Japan’s security policy. Under the new ruling coalition, there is also the possibility that efforts toward constitutional revision may advance and discussions on anti-espionage legislation may accelerate.
One of the factors behind China’s move toward holding the summit meeting was its heightened vigilance as it observed these political shifts within Japan.
Ⅴ A Firm, National-Interest-Oriented Posture and Dialogue with an “Important Neighbor”
Japan’s security environment has undergone significant changes and has become increasingly severe. The primary factor driving this shift is China. Against this backdrop, Prime Minister Takaichi concluded her policy speech on October 24 with the strong statement that “Japan will confront the challenges facing the world and reclaim a diplomacy that stands proudly at the center of the international community. With unwavering determination, I will work boldly and tirelessly for our nation and its people.”
Takaichi’s diplomacy seeks to balance two elements: a firm, national-interest-oriented posture and the advancement of a Strategic Mutually Beneficial Relationship through continued dialogue with China, regarded as an important neighbor.
In thinking about Takaichi’s diplomacy, what comes to mind is the realism of Hans Morgenthau, one of the founders of classical realism in international politics. Morgenthau, who argued that “international politics is a struggle for power,” analyzed international relations through the concepts of power and national interest. The sources of political power that Morgenthau identified derive from three psychological elements: the expectation of benefits, the fear of disadvantages, and respect for persons or institutions. On this basis, Morgenthau emphasized the importance of dialogue and negotiation to avoid miscalculations and unnecessary wars, stressing the need for cautious and rational diplomacy grounded in the assumption that states always act to ensure their survival and security.
Based on this realist theory, the posture Japan should adopt consists of two pillars: backing by power and the continuation of diplomacy. In an era where the liberal international order is eroding and power struggles define international politics, crisis management through sustained diplomatic dialogue becomes essential for preventing unintended clashes or crises.
Prime Minister Takaichi has articulated the principle of “strong and proactive diplomacy” while also emphasizing the need to “manage” Japan–China relations. President Xi Jinping, in the Japan–China summit meeting, stated that he appreciated the Takaichi cabinet’s emphasis on the relationship with China. China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs also acknowledged that Prime Minister Takaichi places importance on Japan–China relations and that Japan has sent “multiple signals.” This suggests that although China remains wary of the Takaichi administration’s China policy, it also values its economic relationship with Japan and “to some extent” appreciates the posture of the new administration. Furthermore, at a time when China–United States relations remain unstable, Beijing cannot afford to neglect its relationship with Japan.
Precisely because Japan is operating in an extremely severe security environment, it is necessary to maintain diplomatic dialogue, including crisis management mechanisms to prevent accidental clashes in the East China Sea. The true value of the “strong and proactive diplomacy” advocated by Prime Minister Takaichi will be tested through the diplomatic course she has set by opening this “window for dialogue.”
(This article is an English translation of a commentary by MIFUNE Emi, Professor, Komazawa University / Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR. The original Japanese version was published on the JFIR website on November 6, 2025.)