At first glance, the overall U.S.–Japan relationship appears to be in an exceptionally stable phase. Interest in Japanese culture, ranging from cuisine and animation to cosplay and other forms of popular culture, continues to grow in the United States. Public opinion surveys consistently show that American favorability toward Japan remains remarkably high.

In practical terms, bilateral ties are also more institutionalized than they were in the 1980s and 1990s. More than 60 percent of Japanese-brand vehicles sold in the United States are manufactured in the U.S., exemplifying the steady expansion of Japanese direct investment. Although the direction of a second Trump administration has been marked by volatility, Japan’s security commitments have become more proactive than ever before.

However, this apparent stability in U.S.–Japan relations reflects, in many respects, a perspective seen primarily from Japan. In the United States, Japan faces an undeniable and substantial decline in presence. In particular, the extent to which Japan’s policy importance and position as an ally are fully shared and understood cannot be taken for granted.

There are multiple reasons for this development. First, the number of Japanese nationals residing in the United States has declined significantly. People-to-people exchange constitutes a pillar of economic, political, and cultural influence. Japan’s visibility in the United States was most pronounced from the 1980s through the mid-1990s. However, Japan’s prolonged economic stagnation led to a reduction in the number of corporate offices and expatriate personnel stationed in the United States.

Even more consequential has been the decline in the number of Japanese students studying in the United States. In the mid-1990s, the number exceeded 45,000, and from 1994 to 1997 Japan ranked first by country of origin. At that time, in cities such as Washington, D.C. and New York, if one heard a language other than English in passing, there was a significant chance it was Japanese. Since the beginning of the 21st century, however, the number has steadily declined. As of 2023, it has fallen below 13,000, less than one-third of its peak. Meanwhile, the number of students from other countries, including Japan’s regional competitors, has increased substantially. In 2023, India ranked first with 330,000 students, followed by China with 270,000, each more than twenty times the number of Japanese students.

Strikingly, the number of Japanese students in the United States has been surpassed by those from developing countries such as Nigeria, ranked seventh with 20,000 students, Bangladesh, ranked eighth with 17,000, and Nepal, ranked tenth with 16,000. Japan now ranks thirteenth. South Korea, whose population is smaller than Japan’s, sends 43,000 students and ranks third, while Taiwan with 23,000 ranks fifth and Vietnam with 22,000 ranks sixth, all significantly outpacing Japan.

To be sure, the decline in the youth population in Japan itself makes some reduction unavoidable. Japan’s economic stagnation and the inward orientation of many young Japanese are also contributing factors. Nonetheless, the physical opportunities created by people-to-people exchange foster deeper interest in culture and society and positively influence American citizens who interact with Japanese students. Study abroad should not be viewed merely as a temporary educational experience lasting several years. It generates friendships and long-term connections that underpin the U.S.–Japan relationship. In other words, it contributes directly to the strengthening of Japan’s diplomatic soft power.

As the number of Japanese students going to the United States continues to decline, a second Trump administration has accelerated what might be termed a “closing America” phenomenon, tightening restrictions not only on students and workers but also on foreign visitors more broadly.

A survey released in late November 2025 by the Institute of International Education, conducted across 825 U.S. higher education institutions, found that the number of new international students enrolled in the most recent fall term declined by 17 percent year on year. The primary reason cited by institutions, with multiple responses allowed, was concern over whether visas would be issued at 96 percent. The impact of the Trump administration’s rapid introduction of stricter student visa screening and caps on international admissions has been substantial.

In an effort to identify individuals deemed hostile to the United States, the administration instructed overseas consulates to require visa applicants to disclose their social media accounts. As a result, some student visas have been revoked, and delays in the review process have become increasingly common. Significant cuts to research funding for universities have further heightened uncertainty for prospective international students.

Although the reported decline stands at 17 percent, conversations with colleagues working at American universities suggest that the actual impact may be even greater. Many believe that the decline is particularly pronounced at leading institutions. With continued political pressure on universities, a further reduction in international student enrollment next year appears inevitable. American higher education is therefore approaching a historic inflection point.

In parallel with the tightening of student visa policies, in December of last year the disclosure of social media accounts was also made mandatory for tourists applying for ESTA authorization. The administration cited the need to identify criminals and “anti-American” individuals. A continued decline in students and travelers from abroad is all but certain. If the reduction in international students is left unaddressed, the human capital necessary to sustain the next generation of U.S.–Japan relations may erode significantly.

The decline in Japan’s presence extends beyond human exchange. Japan’s capacity to articulate and project its national positions remains limited. As a close ally of the United States, Japan has tended to adopt a restrained approach to public diplomacy strategy. In contrast, China and South Korea have strengthened their governmental communications capabilities, established their own media outlets and think tanks, and strategically provided funding to Washington-based policy institutions. Their messaging often contains criticism of Japan, and in some cases criticism of Japan appears to be an explicit component of their broader public diplomacy efforts.

Public opinion among the American people, the audience on the receiving end of such messaging, has also shifted. Since the bursting of Japan’s economic bubble, declining American interest in Japan has frequently been noted. That interest has increasingly been supplanted by attention to China. As reflected in President Trump’s own use of the term “G2,” the U.S.–China relationship is perceived as the most consequential in the international system, with Japan increasingly viewed as a card in managing that relationship. This shift is evident not only at the governmental level but also within American secondary and higher education, where Japanese language and Japan-related programs have in many cases been replaced by Chinese language and China-focused studies.

Moreover, in the case of China, information dissemination has sometimes taken the form of what is described as “sharp power,” exemplified by institutions such as Confucius Institutes, which extend beyond pure soft power and include elements promoting China’s authoritarian system. This presents a complex challenge not only for the United States but also for Japan, which, while an American ally, is geographically adjacent to China.

In light of these developments, Japan should redesign human and cultural exchange as an integral component of its foreign policy and consider comprehensive measures to stem the decline in students studying in the United States, one of the key determinants of Japan’s diminishing presence.

First, efforts should focus on strengthening connectivity at policy hubs such as Washington, D.C. and New York by improving media narrative formation and revitalizing the institutional foundations of Japan studies within academic and think tank communities.

More importantly, however, Japan must reinforce the foundations of the bilateral relationship on a nationwide scale, extending beyond major metropolitan centers. As younger generations grow increasingly distant from the United States, it is urgent to redesign people-to-people exchange with an awareness of generational gaps. Japan should strategically support the expansion of bilateral student exchanges, promote understanding of Japanese culture, and deepen collaboration between Japanese and Japanese American communities and broader American society. In addition, sustained engagement not only with the U.S. Congress but also at the state government level will be essential.

The restoration of Japan’s presence in the United States will not occur organically. It requires deliberate policy and strategic direction. Now is the time for Japan to move beyond the assumption of a “stable alliance” and to undertake a serious effort to rebuild the human and intellectual foundations that will sustain the next generation of U.S.–Japan relations.

(This is the English translation of an article written by MAESHIMA Kazuhiro, Distinguished Research Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations and Professor at Sophia University. The original Japanese version was published on the JFIR website on February 16, 2026.)