Seven months have passed since the beginning of the second Trump administration. Whereas the first term concentrated its attacks primarily on China, the second term, under the banner of “MAGA”, has expanded its focus, imposing a series of so-called “reciprocal tariffs” on any country or region deemed detrimental to U.S. national interests. Although major powers harbor strong dissatisfaction, each finds itself compelled to search for new ways of negotiating with President Trump. China has not only taken countermeasures against U.S. tariffs but has also engaged proactively in diplomatic dialogue. Within this evolving environment, new signs of change have begun to emerge in China–Japan relations.

In short, the Trump 2.0 era has, albeit “unintentionally”, encouraged improvement in China–Japan relations. This is because both countries have begun to seek ways to avoid risks in response to this growing “uncertainty.” The reciprocal tariffs now apply to almost every country, and even Japan, a U.S. ally, has not been spared their impact. China’s dual approach of taking firm countermeasures while simultaneously pursuing negotiations could provide Japan with some valuable insights. Paradoxically, the widening sphere of “uncertainty” has expanded the space for cooperation between China and Japan. Furthermore, given the structural similarities between the Japanese and South Korean economies, a trend has emerged toward policy coordination between the two countries in their approaches toward China. The recent trilateral meeting of agriculture ministers from China, Japan, and South Korea symbolizes this more positive trilateral dynamic.

Next, changes in Japan’s domestic politics are also influencing China–Japan relations. In the Upper House election held in July, the Liberal Democratic Party lost a large number of seats. China generally does not welcome sudden political changes within Japan. Of course, within the Liberal Democratic Party, a considerable number of members criticize Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba as being “pro-China.” Some have also argued that his remarks on historical recognition might be “used” by China, but such claims seem to contain a certain degree of logical confusion. The debate surrounding the so-called “Ishiba Statement” mainly reflects differences in domestic political positions within Japan, particularly over how issues of war and history should be understood. For China, the ceremonies and military parade commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan were part of a predetermined course, and in President Xi Jinping’s address, there were few direct expressions that “used” or “criticized” Japan. Instead, the emphasis was placed on highlighting China’s path of peaceful development and its determination to safeguard world peace.

Finally, I would like to consider the future of China–Japan relations. This year marks both the 80th anniversary of China’s victory in the War of Resistance against Japan and the 80th anniversary of Japan’s defeat, the end of the war. Advancing China–Japan relations at such a symbolic juncture will not be easy. Yet, it cannot be denied that, ironically, President Trump has in some ways provided an “impetus” for this progress. However, the improvement of China–Japan relations should not depend on Trump; rather, both countries must take the initiative to pursue their own path toward better relations.

Since the inauguration of the Ishiba administration, summit meetings between China and Japan have been held only twice, both on multilateral occasions, with President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Qiang. This can hardly be regarded as a normal state of affairs. High-level exchanges should be rebuilt in the form of “shuttle diplomacy,” as seen during the later years of the Abe administration. It is hoped that the upcoming APEC summit in South Korea and the China–Japan–ROK trilateral summit to be held in Japan will provide opportunities for more frequent dialogue between the two leaders. At the same time, China and Japan, as well as the three countries collectively, should deepen discussions in practical areas, paving the way for progress in trilateral cooperation and FTA negotiations.

(This is the English translation of an article written by WANG Guangtao, Associate Professor, Center for Japanese Studies, Fudan University, which originally appeared on the e-forum “Hyakka-Seiho (Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom)” of JFIR on September 7, 2025.)