Examining China’s Revised National Defense Mobilization Law
MIFUNE Emi
I. Beyond Military Contingencies: Building a Framework for Comprehensive National Security
On October 1, 2026, China implemented its revised National Defense Mobilization Law (comprising 14 chapters and 82 articles). The law, which was significantly overhauled from its 2010 predecessor (14 chapters and 72 articles), was adopted on August 28, 2026, by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC, China’s legislative body).
Article 2, which defines “national defense mobilization,” explicitly adds “development interests” to the list of core interests to be defended against threats, alongside “national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security,” which were stipulated in the previous law. Under the revised law, the scope of national defense mobilization has been expanded to encompass responses to economic decoupling, economic sanctions, and the protection of overseas assets, advanced technologies, and data. The framework has thus been broadened to prepare for comprehensive national security—covering not only military contingencies involving Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines, but also economic security frictions stemming from Western de-risking strategies.
Furthermore, by defining national defense mobilization as activities that “guarantee a rapid transition between peacetime and wartime, converting overall economic and social strength into national defense capability,” the law represents a major institutional shift. This shift poses direct risks to the business continuity and data management of foreign enterprises operating in China—not only during contingencies, but also in peacetime.
II. Key Elements of the Revision
This section examines the principal revisions introduced in the revised National Defense Mobilization Law.
Chapter 1: General Provisions — Explicit Inclusion of “Development Interests,” “Military-Locality Coordination,” and “Emerging Domains”
“Development interests” are explicitly included among the core interests to be defended against threats (Article 2), enabling the law to apply not only to armed conflicts but also to “gray-zone situations” falling short of military clashes, such as supply chain disruptions, economic sanctions, and cyberattacks. The law aims to enhance the level of informatization and artificial intelligence (AI) in national defense mobilization, consolidating and elevating an integrated national strategic system and capabilities (Article 4), while promoting the application of advanced technologies to develop mobilization capabilities in “emerging domains” (Article 8). Consequently, this revised law extends its scope to a broad spectrum of modern warfare, including the cyber and AI domains.
Regarding national defense mobilization, principles such as “upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China” and “adhering to the integration of peacetime and wartime, military-locality coordination, and Military-Civil Fusion” are explicitly set forth (Article 3). The law introduces a “target responsibility system for national defense mobilization work” to strengthen supervision and inspection over relevant departments of central state organs, local people’s governments at all levels, and relevant military organs (Article 5). Furthermore, the state will establish a “verification and evaluation mechanism for mobilization capabilities” (Article 6) and a data service support system to collect, use, and secure data closely related to mobilization (Article 7). Expenditures required for mobilization shall, in principle, be shared based on the division of fiscal responsibilities between the central and local governments (Article 9).
Information acquired in the course of national defense mobilization work is subject to confidentiality obligations covering not only state secrets, but also work-related secrets, trade secrets, personal privacy, and personal information. The leakage or unauthorized provision of such information is strictly prohibited (Article 11).
Chapter 3: National Defense Mobilization Plans, Implementation Preparation Plans, and Mobilization Potential Statistical Surveys
Preparations for national defense mobilization are integrated into the economic and social development plans of provincial and county-level governments, while implementation preparation plans are incorporated into military operational readiness plans (Articles 20–25). Regarding mobilization potential, the state incorporates defense mobilization potential into the government statistical survey system to enhance its analysis and utilization (Article 26).
Chapter 4: Projects and Key Products Closely Related to National Defense
To promote the “coordinated development of economic construction and national defense construction”—namely Military-Civil Fusion (Article 27)—a catalog of projects and key products closely related to national defense shall be jointly formulated by the development and reform department under the State Council and relevant departments of the Central Military Commission (CMC), subject to approval by the State Council and the CMC (Article 28). Listed projects and key products must adhere to national defense standards and technical specifications across design, production, construction, supervision, acceptance inspection, and maintenance, while prioritizing the adoption of advanced and applicable civilian standards and technical specifications.
Chapter 7: Scientific Research, Production, and Maintenance Support for Military Products
Relevant departments of the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC) shall organize and conduct security evaluations of the industrial and supply chains for military products, enhancing their resilience and security levels (Article 46). Governments and military organs at all levels shall promote the commonality, serialization, and modularization of military products; foster the socialization of maintenance support for military products; support and assist in the development and application of advanced dual-use technologies and equipment; elevate the level of commonality between military and civilian standards; and improve comprehensive capabilities for scientific research, production conversion, production expansion, and maintenance support for military products (Article 48).
Chapter 9: National Defense Duty
National defense duties are defined as tasks that support and guarantee military operations, prevent and relieve war damage, and assist in maintaining social order (Article 57).
Chinese citizens (males aged 18–60 and females aged 18–55) are obligated to perform national defense duties. In addition to the urban infrastructure and key sectors specified under the previous law—such as transportation, postal services, telecommunications, healthcare, food supply, energy, news media, and defense research and production—the revised law explicitly imposes obligations on cybersecurity-related enterprises (Articles 58–60). Because national defense duties apply exclusively to Chinese citizens, Japanese expatriates and other foreign nationals are not subject to individual mobilization.
Chapter 10: Expropriation, Requisition, and Compensation of Civilian Resources (formerly “Requisition and Compensation of Civilian Resources”)
During national defense mobilization, if reserve materials are insufficient, the government may expropriate, requisition, or militarily modify civilian facilities, equipment, means of transportation, and venues (Article 63). While personal and household necessities and residences are exempt (Article 65), all organizations and individuals are obliged to comply with the expropriation and requisition of civilian resources required by the military, the People’s Armed Police, or the militia (Article 64). Thus, even if foreign individuals (such as Japanese expatriates) are exempt, local legal entities (foreign enterprise subsidiaries) remain subject to expropriation, requisition, and associated legal penalties.
A critical point of this chapter for Japanese and other foreign enterprises is that while the previous law only stipulated “requisition” (implying temporary use, return, and compensation), the revised law explicitly adds “expropriation” (involving the transfer of ownership without the premise of return). Although Article 67 provides for “fair and reasonable compensation” for requisitioned resources, the explicit inclusion of expropriation introduces a distinct risk of permanent asset loss.
Chapter 11: Publicity and Education
The revised law newly stipulates that, upon a decision to execute national defense mobilization, relevant departments and organs of the central government, local governments, and the military shall standardize the order of information release and dissemination, and handle, in accordance with the law, organizations or individuals that disrupt or sabotage mobilization through disinformation (Article 72). This establishes a framework for rigorous information control and the shaping of state propaganda.
Chapter 13: Legal Liabilities
Article 78 stipulates individual violations and penalties, covering acts such as refusing or delaying the provision of data on defense mobilization potential, refusing the expropriation or requisition of civilian resources, obstructing modifications to requisitioned resources, fabricating or spreading mobilization disinformation, and disrupting or sabotaging the order of national defense mobilization work.
Article 79 outlines violations and penalties for enterprises and organizations, specifying acts such as refusing or delaying the provision of data on mobilization potential, failing to execute contracted projects implementing national defense requirements, failing to fulfill duties regarding strategic material stockpiling and allocation, failing to perform tasks related to scientific research, production conversion, production expansion, and maintenance support for military products, refusing or delaying military procurement, and refusing or delaying the expropriation or requisition of civilian resources.
III. The Revised Law: Integrating “Peacetime Monitoring and Tracking” into the “Wartime Mobilization Foundation”
This revision of the National Defense Mobilization Law was undertaken to eliminate inconsistencies among the national security legal frameworks developed under the Xi Jinping administration, forming part of an effort to enable physical enforcement, coercion, and seizure not only during contingencies but also in peacetime.
The National Security Law enacted in 2015 was grounded in the “Overall National Security Concept” proposed in 2014—a governing philosophy that prioritizes the maintenance of Communist Party of China (CPC) rule and political security, while encompassing political, economic, military, social, and cyber domains to safeguard national security. Similarly, the “Military Strategic Guidelines for a New Era” released in 2019 outlined a comprehensive security approach incorporating the economic, technological, and data domains, aiming to deepen joint operational capabilities to adapt to modern warfare evolving with informatization and artificial intelligence (AI).
Furthermore, provisions authorizing defense mobilization when “development interests” are threatened—in addition to national sovereignty and territorial integrity—had already been incorporated into the 2020 revision of the National Defense Law.
Regarding peacetime information gathering, a series of legislative measures have been enacted:
– the Counter-Espionage Law in 2014 (targeting state secrets and intelligence gathering);
– the National Intelligence Law in 2017 (mandating cooperation with state intelligence work from organizations and individuals, both domestic and overseas);
– the Cybersecurity Law in 2017 (introducing data localization and codifying cybersecurity protection);
– the Data Security Law in 2021 (prohibiting domestic and cross-border data processing and transfers that harm China’s national security and interests);
– the revised Counter-Espionage Law in 2023 (expanding the scope of espionage to include the theft or provision of documents, data, materials, and items concerning national security and interests, as well as cyberattacks);
– the revised Law on Guarding State Secrets in 2024 (extending protected information to “work secrets” and enabling administrative departments to independently designate secrecy levels); and
– the revised Cybersecurity Law in 2026 (strengthening penalties, introducing new AI-related provisions, and extending coverage to extraterritorial organizations and individuals).
The revised National Defense Mobilization Law does not merely alter wartime rules; through the “rapid transition between peacetime and wartime,” it enables the physical seizure, requisition, and operationalization of human, material, and information resources tracked under a series of national security laws. For Japanese enterprises, this implies that mobilization will not begin abruptly during a crisis. Rather, cooperation in peacetime—including information provision, data integration, mobilization potential surveys, and stockpiling—is already mandatory, effectively incorporating foreign corporate entities into China’s mobilization foundation for contingencies.
I. Beyond Military Contingencies: Building a Framework for Comprehensive National Security
On October 1, 2026, China implemented its revised National Defense Mobilization Law (comprising 14 chapters and 82 articles). The law, which was significantly overhauled from its 2010 predecessor (14 chapters and 72 articles), was adopted on August 28, 2026, by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC, China’s legislative body).
Article 2, which defines “national defense mobilization,” explicitly adds “development interests” to the list of core interests to be defended against threats, alongside “national sovereignty, unity, territorial integrity, and security,” which were stipulated in the previous law. Under the revised law, the scope of national defense mobilization has been expanded to encompass responses to economic decoupling, economic sanctions, and the protection of overseas assets, advanced technologies, and data. The framework has thus been broadened to prepare for comprehensive national security—covering not only military contingencies involving Taiwan, Japan, or the Philippines, but also economic security frictions stemming from Western de-risking strategies.
Furthermore, by defining national defense mobilization as activities that “guarantee a rapid transition between peacetime and wartime, converting overall economic and social strength into national defense capability,” the law represents a major institutional shift. This shift poses direct risks to the business continuity and data management of foreign enterprises operating in China—not only during contingencies, but also in peacetime.
II. Key Elements of the Revision
This section examines the principal revisions introduced in the revised National Defense Mobilization Law.
Chapter 1: General Provisions — Explicit Inclusion of “Development Interests,” “Military-Locality Coordination,” and “Emerging Domains”
“Development interests” are explicitly included among the core interests to be defended against threats (Article 2), enabling the law to apply not only to armed conflicts but also to “gray-zone situations” falling short of military clashes, such as supply chain disruptions, economic sanctions, and cyberattacks. The law aims to enhance the level of informatization and artificial intelligence (AI) in national defense mobilization, consolidating and elevating an integrated national strategic system and capabilities (Article 4), while promoting the application of advanced technologies to develop mobilization capabilities in “emerging domains” (Article 8). Consequently, this revised law extends its scope to a broad spectrum of modern warfare, including the cyber and AI domains.
Regarding national defense mobilization, principles such as “upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China” and “adhering to the integration of peacetime and wartime, military-locality coordination, and Military-Civil Fusion” are explicitly set forth (Article 3). The law introduces a “target responsibility system for national defense mobilization work” to strengthen supervision and inspection over relevant departments of central state organs, local people’s governments at all levels, and relevant military organs (Article 5). Furthermore, the state will establish a “verification and evaluation mechanism for mobilization capabilities” (Article 6) and a data service support system to collect, use, and secure data closely related to mobilization (Article 7). Expenditures required for mobilization shall, in principle, be shared based on the division of fiscal responsibilities between the central and local governments (Article 9).
Information acquired in the course of national defense mobilization work is subject to confidentiality obligations covering not only state secrets, but also work-related secrets, trade secrets, personal privacy, and personal information. The leakage or unauthorized provision of such information is strictly prohibited (Article 11).
Chapter 3: National Defense Mobilization Plans, Implementation Preparation Plans, and Mobilization Potential Statistical Surveys
Preparations for national defense mobilization are integrated into the economic and social development plans of provincial and county-level governments, while implementation preparation plans are incorporated into military operational readiness plans (Articles 20–25). Regarding mobilization potential, the state incorporates defense mobilization potential into the government statistical survey system to enhance its analysis and utilization (Article 26).
Chapter 4: Projects and Key Products Closely Related to National Defense
To promote the “coordinated development of economic construction and national defense construction”—namely Military-Civil Fusion (Article 27)—a catalog of projects and key products closely related to national defense shall be jointly formulated by the development and reform department under the State Council and relevant departments of the Central Military Commission (CMC), subject to approval by the State Council and the CMC (Article 28). Listed projects and key products must adhere to national defense standards and technical specifications across design, production, construction, supervision, acceptance inspection, and maintenance, while prioritizing the adoption of advanced and applicable civilian standards and technical specifications.
Chapter 7: Scientific Research, Production, and Maintenance Support for Military Products
Relevant departments of the State Council and the Central Military Commission (CMC) shall organize and conduct security evaluations of the industrial and supply chains for military products, enhancing their resilience and security levels (Article 46). Governments and military organs at all levels shall promote the commonality, serialization, and modularization of military products; foster the socialization of maintenance support for military products; support and assist in the development and application of advanced dual-use technologies and equipment; elevate the level of commonality between military and civilian standards; and improve comprehensive capabilities for scientific research, production conversion, production expansion, and maintenance support for military products (Article 48).
Chapter 9: National Defense Duty
National defense duties are defined as tasks that support and guarantee military operations, prevent and relieve war damage, and assist in maintaining social order (Article 57).
Chinese citizens (males aged 18–60 and females aged 18–55) are obligated to perform national defense duties. In addition to the urban infrastructure and key sectors specified under the previous law—such as transportation, postal services, telecommunications, healthcare, food supply, energy, news media, and defense research and production—the revised law explicitly imposes obligations on cybersecurity-related enterprises (Articles 58–60). Because national defense duties apply exclusively to Chinese citizens, Japanese expatriates and other foreign nationals are not subject to individual mobilization.
Chapter 10: Expropriation, Requisition, and Compensation of Civilian Resources (formerly “Requisition and Compensation of Civilian Resources”)
During national defense mobilization, if reserve materials are insufficient, the government may expropriate, requisition, or militarily modify civilian facilities, equipment, means of transportation, and venues (Article 63). While personal and household necessities and residences are exempt (Article 65), all organizations and individuals are obliged to comply with the expropriation and requisition of civilian resources required by the military, the People’s Armed Police, or the militia (Article 64). Thus, even if foreign individuals (such as Japanese expatriates) are exempt, local legal entities (foreign enterprise subsidiaries) remain subject to expropriation, requisition, and associated legal penalties.
A critical point of this chapter for Japanese and other foreign enterprises is that while the previous law only stipulated “requisition” (implying temporary use, return, and compensation), the revised law explicitly adds “expropriation” (involving the transfer of ownership without the premise of return). Although Article 67 provides for “fair and reasonable compensation” for requisitioned resources, the explicit inclusion of expropriation introduces a distinct risk of permanent asset loss.
Chapter 11: Publicity and Education
The revised law newly stipulates that, upon a decision to execute national defense mobilization, relevant departments and organs of the central government, local governments, and the military shall standardize the order of information release and dissemination, and handle, in accordance with the law, organizations or individuals that disrupt or sabotage mobilization through disinformation (Article 72). This establishes a framework for rigorous information control and the shaping of state propaganda.
Chapter 13: Legal Liabilities
Article 78 stipulates individual violations and penalties, covering acts such as refusing or delaying the provision of data on defense mobilization potential, refusing the expropriation or requisition of civilian resources, obstructing modifications to requisitioned resources, fabricating or spreading mobilization disinformation, and disrupting or sabotaging the order of national defense mobilization work.
Article 79 outlines violations and penalties for enterprises and organizations, specifying acts such as refusing or delaying the provision of data on mobilization potential, failing to execute contracted projects implementing national defense requirements, failing to fulfill duties regarding strategic material stockpiling and allocation, failing to perform tasks related to scientific research, production conversion, production expansion, and maintenance support for military products, refusing or delaying military procurement, and refusing or delaying the expropriation or requisition of civilian resources.
III. The Revised Law: Integrating “Peacetime Monitoring and Tracking” into the “Wartime Mobilization Foundation”
This revision of the National Defense Mobilization Law was undertaken to eliminate inconsistencies among the national security legal frameworks developed under the Xi Jinping administration, forming part of an effort to enable physical enforcement, coercion, and seizure not only during contingencies but also in peacetime.
The National Security Law enacted in 2015 was grounded in the “Overall National Security Concept” proposed in 2014—a governing philosophy that prioritizes the maintenance of Communist Party of China (CPC) rule and political security, while encompassing political, economic, military, social, and cyber domains to safeguard national security. Similarly, the “Military Strategic Guidelines for a New Era” released in 2019 outlined a comprehensive security approach incorporating the economic, technological, and data domains, aiming to deepen joint operational capabilities to adapt to modern warfare evolving with informatization and artificial intelligence (AI).
Furthermore, provisions authorizing defense mobilization when “development interests” are threatened—in addition to national sovereignty and territorial integrity—had already been incorporated into the 2020 revision of the National Defense Law.
Regarding peacetime information gathering, a series of legislative measures have been enacted:
– the Counter-Espionage Law in 2014 (targeting state secrets and intelligence gathering);
– the National Intelligence Law in 2017 (mandating cooperation with state intelligence work from organizations and individuals, both domestic and overseas);
– the Cybersecurity Law in 2017 (introducing data localization and codifying cybersecurity protection);
– the Data Security Law in 2021 (prohibiting domestic and cross-border data processing and transfers that harm China’s national security and interests);
– the revised Counter-Espionage Law in 2023 (expanding the scope of espionage to include the theft or provision of documents, data, materials, and items concerning national security and interests, as well as cyberattacks);
– the revised Law on Guarding State Secrets in 2024 (extending protected information to “work secrets” and enabling administrative departments to independently designate secrecy levels); and
– the revised Cybersecurity Law in 2026 (strengthening penalties, introducing new AI-related provisions, and extending coverage to extraterritorial organizations and individuals).
The revised National Defense Mobilization Law does not merely alter wartime rules; through the “rapid transition between peacetime and wartime,” it enables the physical seizure, requisition, and operationalization of human, material, and information resources tracked under a series of national security laws. For Japanese enterprises, this implies that mobilization will not begin abruptly during a crisis. Rather, cooperation in peacetime—including information provision, data integration, mobilization potential surveys, and stockpiling—is already mandatory, effectively incorporating foreign corporate entities into China’s mobilization foundation for contingencies.