Japan was one of a few U.S. allies able to arrange an early audience with the second Trump administration and get a head start at interpreting the meaning of “America First.” The February 7 Ishiba-Trump summit meeting in Washington reaffirmed core pillars of the U.S.-Japan alliance agenda and established momentum for bilateral ties. But in the weeks since, Japan has been pressured to satisfy multiple concerns of the Trump administration, which would like allies to do more to defend themselves and support the U.S. economy. Meanwhile, President Trump is orchestrating a dramatic shift in U.S. foreign policy questioning conventional views of America’s leadership role in the world. This could complicate Japan’s efforts to preserve a rules-based order under its Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision as it tries to understand Trump administration priorities and identify new avenues for bilateral cooperation.

The Ishiba-Trump summit was a source of reassurance for Japan. Prime Minister Ishiba reinforced the message conveyed by Abe Shinzo during President Trump’s first term that Japan is a strong and reliable ally, and the deference with which Trump engaged Ishiba during their joint press conference was evidence to that effect. The two leaders also issued a joint statement emphasizing three core pillars of the U.S.-Japan alliance agenda: defense cooperation, economic ties, and coordination with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region in a nod to the enduring allure of Japan’s FOIP vision. The Ishiba-Trump summit signaled continuity and assuaged concerns about what an “America First” foreign policy in the second Trump administration might mean for alliance ties.

But since that time, Japan has been exposed to the unpredictable nature of Trump administration foreign policy and come to the realization that successful summitry does not grant immunity from pressure to do more. Elbridge Colby, the nominee for U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, declared Japanese defense spending woefully insufficient and urged a rapid increase to three percent of GDP. George Glass, during his nomination hearing to become the next U.S. Ambassador to Japan, emphasized the need for Japan to further increase host nation support for U.S. forces. And President Trump recently complained that the U.S.-Japan security treaty is unfair because Japan does not have to defend the United States (technically inaccurate if one considers Japan’s 2015 defense policy reforms allowing the exercise of collective self-defense, but the grievance revealed a desire for more reciprocity). In short, the need for more burden sharing will feature prominently in dialogue on bilateral defense ties.

Then there is the economic agenda. The Trump administration is frustrated by trade imbalances with allies and introduced a range of tariffs that could adversely affect Japan despite its status as the largest overseas investor in the United States and Ishiba’s pledge during the summit to increase Japanese FDI to $1 trillion. Relatedly, the fate of Nippon Steel’s bid to acquire U.S. steel remains unclear after President Trump expressed openness to investment short of a controlling stake. Japan assumed that its proud history of economic integration with the United States defined by investment and a sustained commitment to that cause would bolster the economic pillar of the U.S.-Japan alliance. That may turn out to be the case, but the momentum from the leaders’ summit has since been overshadowed by U.S. tariff policy that could be a recipe for economic friction.

The prospects for strategic alignment under the FOIP vision are also unclear. Networking with like-minded countries is foundational to FOIP, and the fact that U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio hosted a foreign ministers’ meeting of the Quad (U.S.-Japan-Australia-India) countries in January indicated a sustained interest in coordinating initiatives on issues such as economic security and supply chain resiliency; less certain is the degree to which the Trump administration will be animated by the original purpose of the Quad as a provider of public goods across the region. Japan also wishes to promote regional economic integration under FOIP, but the United States no longer believes in multilateral trade liberalization and the Trump administration has doubled down on protectionism as a vehicle for shoring up the U.S. industrial base. Former Prime Minister Kishida unveiled “FOIP 2.0” in 2023 and argued that Japan and other partners had to accelerate development assistance to the Global South. But one of the first acts of the Trump administration was to dismantle the U.S. Agency for International Development.

Then there is the normative dimension to Japan’s FOIP vision: a commitment to ensuring a free and open international order based on the rule of law. Japan wants to preserve a rules-based order, but Trump administration foreign policy thus far seemingly reveals an instinct to disrupt that order, to foster disorder and fundamentally redefine the core national interests of the United States. Therein lies the challenge for Japan: how to address the challenges posed by a U.S. administration that appears disinclined to undergird the existing international order while identifying new avenues of cooperation with the United States to further a bilateral relationship fundamental to Japan’s national security and prosperity.

It is still early days, but some themes have emerged as potential Trump administration priorities that Japan can develop as targets for bilateral cooperation. One theme is a desire to secure resources—examples include Trump administration entreaties for Japan to invest in the Alaska LNG project and increase LNG imports, or the reference in the summit joint statement to diversifying critical mineral supply chains. Another theme is strengthening the U.S. industrial base, perhaps an opportunity for Japan to enhance defense industrial cooperation in areas such as shipbuilding. Cooperation on emerging technologies such as AI could also prove promising as the Trump administration considers ways to harness AI’s economic potential and provide the energy required to fuel this new engine of the digital economy. These are illustrative examples of arenas in which Japan and the United States have shared interests and can further bilateral ties in innovative ways. Aligning broader strategic objectives under multipronged initiatives such as FOIP may prove more challenging, but Japan will likely manage this period of disruption by keeping the United States close, bringing its regional partners even closer, and furthering its leadership role as a champion of norms to encourage stability and prosperity in an increasingly tumultuous global environment.