

# Expansion of China and Japan’s Response

The incident of a Chinese fishing boat ramming against Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels off the Senkaku Islands in September 2010, the ban on the export of rare earth metals to Japan that followed, and a series of other strong measures against Japan, including the arrest and detention of Japanese citizens staying in China, not only shocked Japan and the Japanese but also flared up their distrust of China. Those incidents were considered as actions related to the intensified self-assertion of China, which had been observed earlier in China's seizures of fishing boats of Southeast Asian nations in the South China Sea and her opposition to the U.S.-South Korea joint military exercise in the Yellow Sea. In this context, there arose a concern that the expanding China, having economically surpassed Japan to be the second largest economy in the world, might have finally abandoned her cooperative line of diplomacy called “Tao Guang Yang Hui.”

Under these circumstances, it is vitally important to comprehend the macroscopic background of the problem before reacting to each of the microscopic phenomena. After World War I, the “outlawry of war” was achieved. Then, after World War II, a war between major powers became essentially impossible due to the realization of “Mutual Assured Destruction.” Even so, during the Cold War, politics of “Balance of Power” were practiced in which the two camps led by the U.S. and the Soviet Union confronted each other. However, as the end of the Cold War arrived, the U.S.-Soviet confrontation was resolved and universal values such as freedom, democracy, market economy and renunciation of war have spread to every corner of the globe, the core bearers of which being the advanced democracies participating in NATO and/or the Japan-U.S. alliance. In the era when “human security” and “responsibility to protect” are presented as principles of international society, the advanced democracies, who have become the core bearers of those principles, can be described as a “no-war community” or “collective security community.” In the post-Cold War world, nations are required to address themselves to the resolution of the global issues beyond the command of their narrowly defined national interests. While “post-modern” stage nations, who are ready to squarely address themselves to the issues, can be called “no-war community” nations, “modern” stage nations, such as China, Russia, etc., are not yet ready to do the same, and put up resistance.

When seen from a macroscopic standpoint, we can say that the incident over the Senkaku Islands in September 2010 clearly exposed differences between Japan and China in the positions they occupied in the world and the stages of development. China, as customary with a “modern” stage nation, tends to adhere to assertions of national sovereignty and to pursue narrowly defined egoistic national interests. On the other hand, Japan, as a “post-modern” stage nation, interprets the concept of national interests more widely and realizes the need to respect international public interests more keenly. It must be noted that the factors that define Japan-China

relations include not only historical conflicts and territorial disputes inevitable for neighboring big powers, but also the difference in the stages of development as a state and the difference in the positions assumed in world politics.

Questioned here is how China, who has been strengthening her presence in the world as a result of her sustainable high growth over three decades, will exert her growing influence on the formation of the future international order. In other words, it is whether China is able to behave as a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system. We cannot help being concerned about three things. First, China does not share such values as human rights, freedom and democracy with the advanced democracies including Japan. Second, China's military expansion and modernization are devoid of transparency in its long-term goals. And, third, the possibility cannot be denied that the aggravation of China's domestic contradictions generated by her economic development may result in political instabilities. Speaking from this perspective and taking it into consideration that bearers of governance of our globalizing world economy expanded from the G-8 to the G-20, we must make efforts to engage “modern” stage nations including China and Russia in roles as bearers of a “no-war community,” which has been responsible for the formulation and maintenance of an international order in the post-Cold War world. If we call it an “engagement” policy, the “engagement” policy must be the very basis of the macroscopic policy line toward China of Japan or a “no-war community.”

Even if the incident of a Chinese fishing boat ramming against Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels off the Senkaku Islands in September 2010 was not intended by the Chinese government for the purpose of changing the status quo, the Japanese government will not be condoned to be at a loss again when another crisis of the same sort happens. After the incident, China has modified her strong line of self-assertions, given the repugnance of international society. Especially in her relations with Japan, China demonstrated her cooperative attitude in the wake of the 3.11 Great East Japan Earthquake. However, it would be too early to conclude that China's hard line has finally been abandoned. Though we adopt an “engagement” policy in the context of our macroscopic judgement, we need to prepare ourselves in advance for the scenario in which China may shift to a hard line and choose the worst course of actions, including an exercise of military means. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the forces involved in China's foreign policymaking are diversified, and that complicated political games are played over each diplomatic issue. Generally speaking, there are two forces struggling against each other, i.e. “hard-liners” and “soft-liners.” When confronted with China's hard-line attitude, it is important for us to avoid being emotionally caught in a trap of the scene spreading immediately before us. It is always important to grasp, calmly and appropriately, the macroscopic context of the situation.

Even though it is undeniable that China is growing gigantic with a potential to be an eventual threat, Japan has no other option but to adopt an “engagement” policy toward China as already mentioned. The “engagement” policy is possible and necessary because we have a macroscopic recognition that a “no-war community” has been created and functioning in the post-Cold War world, and because a “no-war community” as a whole, not Japan alone, is expected to act jointly in case China shifts to adventurism. Today, the “expanding China” is not an issue for Japan alone, but rather an issue which must be coped with through widely coordinated actions among the U.S. and other “like-minded countries” who share common values. To achieve its objectives, the “engagement policy” must have a set of consistent policies. This set of policy recommendations presents the nine items as shown below.

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## The Policy Recommendations

### 1. Do Our Best to Perfect the Systems of the Defense of the Territory, Territorial Sea, Sovereignty and Dignity of Japan

This set of policy recommendations adopts the position of “engagement” toward China as its macroscopic judgement. However, it does not mean that Japan needs no system to protect her territory, territorial sea, sovereignty and dignity. On the contrary, the very success of Japan's “engagement” policy toward China hinges upon the presence of such systems. The incident of a Chinese fishing boat ramming against Japan Coast Guard patrol vessels off the Senkaku Islands in September 2010, be it intentional or not on the part of China, caught Japan off her guard and the then Kan administration of Japan was completely at a loss over what to do. Japan, as a sovereign nation, should never tolerate the recurrence of such an off-guard situation, whatever country may be involved. The Japanese government should not only strengthen effective control over its territory and territorial sea but examine in advance every likely scenario of crisis and do our best to prepare ourselves for the crisis. In peace we must prepare for adversity.

### 2. Review Japan's System of Survival and Self-Defense in a National Emergency in Terms of Both Hardware and Software

With the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) and Japan Coast Guard being the linchpins of Japan's system of ensuring her survival and self-defense in times of national emergency, developing the operational software of her capabilities in legal and strategic perspectives is as important as, or even more important than, developing such hardware capabilities as arms, ships, etc. With regard to the JSDF, the concept of the “Dynamic Defense Force” as indicated in the new “National Defense Program Guidelines” should be considered an appropriate one. And it is imperative that the enhancement of island defense capabilities be steadily implemented, centering on the strengthening of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) activities in south-western Japan during the life of the “New Mid-Term Defense Program.” Besides, while the enactment of national emergency legislation is in pressing need, the present strict interpretation of the constitution on the operation of the JSDF should not be left unaddressed, but be reconsidered in a prompt manner, including the possibility of constitutional amendment, taking the realities on the ground into consideration.

### 3. Make Constant and Best Efforts to Maintain the Credibility of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

It goes without saying that Japan's own self-help efforts are a prerequisite to the defense of Japan, without which Japan could never expect any country to come to succor Japan. Practically speaking, however, Japan cannot survive alone on her own efforts, and the U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan, including the U.S. “nuclear umbrella,” under the Japan-U.S. alliance is the last resort for the security of Japan. Therefore, it is imperative for Japan to constantly make her best efforts to maintain the credibility of the Japan-U.S. alliance. While continuing the highest-level strategic dialogues between the leaders of Japan and the U.S., Japan should make such efforts as to solve the issue of the relocation of the Futenma base, to approve exercise of the constitutional right to collective self-defense, and to re-examine the Three Principles on Arms Exports, etc.

### 4. Further Strengthen the Relations of “Engagement” with China in Various Fields

While trying to “forge solid footing” as indicated in Recommendations 1-3 on the one hand, Japan should further strengthen her relations of “engagement” with China in various fields on the other. The establishment of a “communication mechanism between the defense authorities” of the two countries to “prevent the occurrence of unexpected circumstances at sea,” which was agreed upon on the occasion of the visit of Premier Wen Jiabao to Japan in 2007, is urgently needed for the crisis management as the recent incident off the Senkaku Islands demonstrated. However, this task is yet to be achieved, despite a series of subsequent agreements to accelerate negotiations on it. Nevertheless, it is highly appreciated that Japan and China agreed to set up “Japan-China High-Level Consultation on Maritime Affairs” and to conclude “Japan-China Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR) Cooperation” in principle on the occasion of the visit of Prime Minister NODA Yoshihiko to China in December 2011. Besides, there are many other fields of cooperation where Japan should “engage” China, such as those against pandemics, drug trafficking and illegal immigration, etc. Also, it is of significance for us to take part in U.N. Peacekeeping Operations together with China, thereby making joint efforts in pursuit of common goals. Along with participation in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to which the U.S. attaches importance, Japan should also express her understanding toward the realization of the East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) to which China attaches priority.

### 5. Develop Multilateral Approaches of Japan into a “No-War Community” and Let China Take Part in It

Japan should call on other “like-minded countries” than the U.S. to expand the scope of regional security cooperation. As for Australia, the “Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on

Security Cooperation” was adopted in March 2007 and a Japan-U.S.-Australia joint military exercise was conducted in the South China Sea in July 2011. Military exercises are also planned to be jointly conducted by Japan and the U.S. plus India, and further by Japan and the U.S. plus South Korea. There is a further prospect of such military exercises to be expanded to include ASEAN member countries. It is also noted that the East Asia Summit (EAS) held in November 2011 adopted the “Declaration of EAS,” which took security of the South China Sea into consideration. While these arrangements are meant to serve for the freedom of the seas and the security of the sea lanes, we must see to it that they should not be seen as “containment of China.” They are essentially an embodiment of a “no-war community” composed of “post-modern” stage nations and is ideologically not designed to rule out the participation of China.

### 6. Let the “Six-Party Talks” and the “Japan-China-South Korea Summit Meeting” Assume Roles of Regional Security Mechanisms

Though Northeast Asia inherited from the Cold-War era potential flash points in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, it is still devoid of any effective mechanisms for regional security to address crises that may occur in the area. Under such circumstances, however, it is a valuable fact that the “Six-Party Talks” agreed “to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia” in their joint statement of 2005. Though the activities of the “Six-Party Talks” have been regrettably suspended since 2008, the parties concerned are urged to resume and revitalize the talks promptly. Meanwhile, the “Japan-China-South Korea Summit Meeting” was institutionalized in 2008 and has since been convened every year. We should seek the possibility of letting the “Japan-China-South Korea Summit Meeting” assume the role of a regional security mechanism in Northeast Asia.

### 7. Encourage China to Enhance her International Contributions for the Resolution of Global Issues

Both Japan and China are confronted with such global issues common to humankind as food, energy and environment, etc. Besides, it is an undeniable fact that China, with her rapid economic growth, is partially responsible for the deterioration of these issues. For instance, China is the world's biggest emitter of greenhouse gases and is also one of the sources of trans-border pollution. It is imperative for China to participate in establishing and steering international institutions and/or frameworks for the resolution of global issues. Especially, China is expected to play a significant role in the maintenance of world peace and stability in the U.N. Security Council, and in the coordination for stability and

growth of the global economy in the IMF, World Bank and G-20, etc. Encouraging China to address herself to the global issues will serve not only to resolve those issues as such, but to work as an instrument of our “engagement” policy toward China, as it will help China to awake to its role as a “responsible power.”

### 8. While Introducing the Vitality of the Chinese Economy into Japan, Refrain from Excessive Dependency on the Chinese Economy

The enormous size of the Chinese market brought about by the growth of not only the wealthy but also the middle class is steadily expanding. The Japanese economy, on the other hand, is falling into a long-term stagnation due to her low birthrate and high longevity, with the addition of the recent great earthquake and tsunamis, the appreciation of the yen, etc. While facilitating development and the sharing of rules and institutions concerned in both Japan and China, we should positively attract Chinese capital and tourists into Japan. Meanwhile, the incident of the ban on the export of rare earth metals by China lucidly illustrated a risk of excessive dependency in the procurement of important resources on any one specific country. As for important resources, we should not only multiply the sources of our procurement and increase our strategic stockpiles, but work for the establishment of a multilateral framework to ensure stable supplies of these resources.

### 9. Deepen Mutual Understanding on the Opinion Leader Level

As is clearly demonstrated in the tones of argument of the mass media and the findings of public opinion polls both in Japan and China, the perception of the two peoples on the image of each other has deteriorated recently. The incident of a Chinese fishing boat off the Senkaku Islands in 2010 broke out under such circumstances and exerted a significantly adverse impact on the mutual perception of the peoples of Japan and China. Against this background there have been observed among the Japanese a variety of anti-Chinese sentiments inspired by the diffusion of anti-Japanese sentiments fostered by the “patriotic education” in China during the reign of then President Jiang Zemin and also by the persistent objection of China against Japan's entry into the U.N. Security Council as a permanent member, etc. Additionally, with the rapid advance of various media and the Internet, emotional conflicts between the two peoples have been amplified. Never before has mutual understanding, especially that on the level of opinion leaders, been so much asked for as it is today. Besides, there is such a new trend of life as the surge of Chinese tourists pouring into Japan. We must see to it that they return home with positive impressions of Japan.

[Note 1] This set of Policy Recommendations, which is the 35th in the series of Policy Recommendations presented by the Policy Council of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), is a product of the deliberations of the Policy Council for more than one year. But those other parties to JFIR who did not sign them are exempted from any responsibility for the contents of these Policy Recommendations.

[Note 2] All the expenses for the insertion of this opinion advertisement are shared by the voluntary donations of individuals, who either did or did not sign the Policy Recommendations, and by the contributions of the Policy Council of JFIR.



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