

# Positive Pacifism and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance

For the past half a century or so, Japan's standing in the world has undergone a complete change from the one as "a country under occupation" to the one as "a major economic power." And the world, too, has gone through a profound transition from "the Cold War era" to "the post-Cold War era" and then to "the post-post-Cold War era." Throughout these years, Japan has aspired to become, under the protection of the Japan-U.S. alliance, a lightly armed and intensely economic development oriented country. Such a line was then often called "the Yoshida Doctrine." Japan dispatched her Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq and the Indian Ocean because she was requested to do so by the U.S. and because it was considered "less costly" and "less risky" by the Japanese than other ways of response.

Such a passive nature of Japan's response has become no more able to pass in the international community. It is high time for us to consider seriously, without any preconceptions, new strategic options for Japan in the years to come. The question is whether or not we are prepared to advance a new "doctrine," which is to replace "the Yoshida Doctrine." With this awareness in mind, the biggest reason why we present this set of policy recommendations now is, needless to say, the very end of the Cold War which was characterized by the confrontation between East and West and the fundamental changes that have taken place subsequently in the international relations.

From the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of "the Communist bloc" ensued. And the political and economic systems of "the Democratic bloc" started to expand its reaches globally as known in the name of the "Big Ban." What is "the Democratic bloc"? Economically, it was the Bretton Woods system, that was a liberal market economy system, in contrast to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) system, that was a socialist planned economy system. Politically, it was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Japan-U.S. alliance, that were confronting the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Sino-Soviet alliance. Although NATO and the Japan-U.S. alliance put on the appearance of alliances against external threats, what was intrinsically of greater importance was the fact that they internally constituted a "no-war community," in which all the parties renounced war against each other.

This fact is quite obvious if compared with the repressive nature of WTO as demonstrated when Soviet tanks trampled down "the Prague Spring" under their caterpillars. The most profound significance of the end of the Cold War lies in the fact that the regime of "the Democratic bloc" has finally prevailed over the world. Under the initiative of the U.S. and other member countries of "the Democratic bloc," a trans-boundary public space known as the "Global Commons" has expanded resulting in the freer movement of people, goods, capital and information. This has laid the foundation for the peace and prosperity of the world and Japan as we enjoy it today. In such a world as has emerged in the wake of the end of the Cold War, Japan could have the fortune to assume an integral and central part of this regime.

Although the Japanese fail to understand fully the weight of this fortune, it is

in fundamental national interests of Japan that she, standing on the basis of this given fortune, does her best to enhance and expand the regime of "a no-war community." Only in acknowledging this point of view could Japan be possessed of a new "Doctrine," which is to replace "the Yoshida Doctrine." However, the fantasy, which swept the world immediately after the end of the Cold War, that "the world has finally entered a Garden-of-Eden era of eternal peace" soon turned out to be an illusion, bitterly shattered by an ensuing series of events such as genocide in "failed states," aggression of a neighboring country by "a rogue state," and, more pointedly than anything else, the September 11 incident by "international terrorists."

Against this background, the international community, especially the member countries of "the Democratic bloc," have come to recognize strongly that the security of the world is so indivisible that incidents taking place even in the remotest places are matters of common concern to the entire world. Also, NATO and the Japan-U.S. alliance have come to be proclaimed as "public goods," which are supposed to contribute not only to the national defense but to the peace and stability of the region and the world. Pacifism of Japan in the past was the one naively content with a mere fact of not being involved in an act of war as a perpetrator. When Japan talked about "defense" or "peace," she did so only in negative propositions saying, "No, no, no" endlessly. The question "What does Japan want to do?" has, therefore, long remained unanswered not only to the world but to the Japanese themselves.

However, the world in the 21st century asks Japan what a role she can play in positive propositions for the peace and stability of the region and the world, let alone not becoming an aggressor or a perpetrator in an act of war. In other words, the world asks Japan to fulfill her duties as a responsible member of the global civil society. Pacifism of Japan must now evolve from "negative pacifism" or "passive pacifism" to "positive pacifism" or "active pacifism." This is what the world asks Japan to do. Japan can neither carve out her way otherwise in the future.

Under what was called "the Yoshida Doctrine," the Japanese perception of security was so narrowly defined that it could not cover anything beyond the national territorial defense. Even in that case, the protection of the homeland by a foreign country, namely the U.S., was taken for granted. As for the regional security, Japan has at long last managed to entertain a sense of responsibility for "situations in areas surrounding Japan." As for the global security, Japan has made contributions to the global security because she was so requested by the U.S. and felt obliged in her relations with the U.S. There has been neither a sense of responsibility nor a sense of mission worthy of a great economic power benefiting from the global peace and stability.

What should guide Japan to the formation of her policy in the regional as well as the global security is, regardless of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan's own conviction of how the region and the world should be. It is not the kind of thing that Japan should undertake on behalf of the U.S. When the world is becoming more and more borderless and interdependent, it is obvious that

neither "one-country pacifism," which is content with the peace in Japan alone, nor "one-country defense," which rejects any reliance on alliances, could be an option that Japan should choose.

We should know that "one-country pacifism" cannot but end up in being "a peace protected by the U.S.," while "one-country defense," "an anachronistic military state." The peace and safety of Japan as we enjoy it today could not be maintained unless we fully recognize the fact that Japan is a member of the global "no-war community" led by member countries of "the Democratic bloc." If so, we should exert ourselves to strengthen our alliance with the U.S., the core member of "the Democratic bloc." Protecting "the no-war community" leads to being protected by "the no-war community." Thus, Japan can have a new doctrine called "Positive Pacifism," which will replace "the Yoshida Doctrine," and, at the same time, make it possible for Japan to stand on an equal footing with the U.S.

Based upon the conviction that Japan is one of the members of "the no-war community," we are reminded of a fact that the security of Japan must be discussed not only in the context of the national defense but in the broader contexts of regional and global security. This is the reason why we present this set of policy recommendations on "Positive Pacifism and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance" in the three perspectives of (1) the national defense, (2) the regional security, and (3) the global security.

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## I. Recommendations on the National Defense

### 1. Review the "Basic Principles of National Defense," Including the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles"

Japan's "Basic Principles of National Defense" have been declared to consist of (1) "Exclusively Defense-Only Principle," (2) "Not Becoming a Military Power," (3) "Securing Civilian Control," and (4) "Three Non-Nuclear Principles." But the time has come for them to be reviewed or redefined. When faced with North Korea's nuclear threat, we must clearly redefine what the "Exclusively Defense-Only Principle" means. The meaning of the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles" also needs to be clarified in a way consistent with Japan's position to rely upon the U.S. nuclear deterrence.

### 2. Cooperate with the U.S. Military Transformation Process and Approve the Exercise of the Right to Collective Self-Defense

Japan should make her utmost efforts to implement what have been agreed upon between Japan and the U.S., especially the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) of Futenma. However, what is more important is for the Japanese government to revise its understanding of the concept of collective self-defense. The Japan-U.S. alliance could be fatally flawed if Japan hesitates to intercept ballistic missiles launched from North Korea in the direction of the U.S., or if she fails to defend U.S. military vessels which are attacked by North Korea in the midst of Japan-U.S. joint operations.

### 3. Thoroughly Review "the Three Principles on Arms Exports" "The Three Principles on Arms Exports" prohibited Japan

from exporting arms to certain categories of countries, but in 1976 were revised to cover "all the countries." In today's world, where the global "no-war community" has been established, every country is expected to cooperate in, and contribute to, the global actions in the spirit of "positive pacifism." In fact, member countries of "the Democratic bloc" are strengthening their ties in their cooperation in every aspect of security. Development and production of weapons are no exception. Thus, it becomes in order that we thoroughly review "the Principles."

### 4. Improve and Strengthen the National System of Intelligence Gathering and Analysis

Like other countries, Japan must have national intelligence which she gathers and analyzes independently. Japan must, first of all, (1) remove the existing sectionalism among ministries and agencies, thereby making it possible for the Prime Minister to grasp the essence of intelligence in a more speedy and accurate manner. Secondly, Japan must (2) correct the current system of intelligence gathering, which is overdependent on open information, and attach more importance to covert intelligence including "human intelligence." Thirdly, Japan must (3) urgently rectify defects in her current system of confidentiality protection.

## II. Recommendations on the Regional Security

### 5. Take the Initiative in Promoting Dialogues and Cooperation in East Asia

For the maintenance of "peace" or at least "no-war" situation in East Asia, it is vitally important that dialogues and cooperation are pursued both on government and private levels among

the countries in the region in such multiple fields as politics, economy, security, etc. Currently, there exist ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Six-Party Talks, etc. Japan should actively engage herself in such dialogues and cooperation, and take the initiative in close liaison with the ASEAN countries.

### 6. Strengthen and Develop Japan-U.S. Strategic Concert toward China

While welcoming the rise of China in the economic field, Japan and the U.S. in the political field are urging China to act as a "responsible stakeholder." China, however, has registered a two-digit yearly increase in her defense budgets for the past 21 years and advanced not only nuclear but maritime, space and information capabilities. No wonder, concerns are growing among countries in and out of the region. Japan and the U.S. should strengthen and develop their strategic concert toward China, and, through the institutionalization of Japan-U.S.-China trilateral dialogue, encourage China to become a stabilizing factor in the region.

### 7. Confront the Existing Cases of Infringement upon Japan's National Sovereignty

The illegal occupation of the inherent "Northern Territory" of Japan by Russia and the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea are existing cases of infringement upon Japan's national sovereignty. If we disregard these cases of infringement, any arguments about the national security of Japan would become empty. Although Japan renounces the use of force as "means of settling international disputes," she must all the more be determined to resolve those issues by mobilizing

every possible means and resources other than the military force.

## III. Recommendations on the Global Security

### 8. Establish a "General Law for International Peace Cooperation" and Contribute to the Global "Collective Security"

In the theory of "collective security," all the countries are jointly obliged to impose sanctions upon any country which resorts to an act of aggression. The United Nations was originally intended to become an institution of "collective security," but in reality it has a number of deficiencies. Japan should contribute to the global "collective security" in the spirit of "positive pacifism." Japan's contribution has been inadequate because her response has been on an ad-hoc basis resorting to the use of one-time "enabling acts." Japan should hasten to enact a "general law" applicable to the needs of international peace cooperation at large.

### 9. Simultaneously Pursue Nuclear Nonproliferation, Disarmament and Strict Control of Peaceful Use

President Obama's speech in Prague seems to reflect his strong sense of crisis over the rapid deterioration of the NPT system. The most important thing is to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. The international community must pursue nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament and strict control of peaceful use at the same time. While aspiring for the total elimination of nuclear weapons on one hand, Japan is in a position to depend upon the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" for her ultimate security. We should never lose sight of the strategic stability of Japan, the region, and the world.

[Note 1] This set of Policy Recommendations, which is the 32nd in the series of Policy Recommendations presented by the Policy Council of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), is a product of the deliberations of the Policy Council for more than one year. But those other parties to JFIR who did not sign them are exempted from any responsibility for the contents of these Policy Recommendations.  
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