

## JFIR Webinar

# Voices for “Maritime Stability”: Navigation Freedom and Territorial Integrity

## Conference Papers

March 10, 2023

Sponsored by



The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

# Table of Contents

1. Program	3
2. Biographies of the Panelists (In Order of Appearance)	5
WATANABE Mayu	6
ITO Go	7
NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh	8
KOMORI Yuta	9
Virginia WATSON	10
YAMADA Yoshihiko	11
John BRADFORD	12
Stephen NAGY	13
3. Talking Points (In Order of Appearance)	14
ITO Go	15
NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh	16
KOMORI Yuta	17
Virginia WATSON	18
YAMADA Yoshihiko	19
John BRADFORD	21
Stephen NAGY	23
4. Appendix: About the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)	25

# Program

Friday, March 10, 2023, 4:00-5:30 pm/JST

**JFIR Webinar**  
**Voices for "Maritime Stability":**  
**Navigation Freedom and Territorial Integrity**  
**Program**

**Moderator: ITO Go, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR/ Professor, Meiji University**

**16:00-16:05 Opening Remarks**

**WATANABE Mayu President, JFIR**

**16:05-16:15 Introductory Remarks**

**ITO Go, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR**

**16:15 – 17:10 Presentations (8 minutes each)**

**NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh, Director of Research, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam**

**KOMORI Yuta, Senior Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace Foundation**

**Virginia WATSON, Professor, the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies**

**YAMADA Yoshihiko, Professor, Tokai University**

**John BRADFORD, Senior Fellow, Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)**

**Stephen NAGY, Professor, International Christian University (ICU)**

**17:10 – 17:25 Panel Discussion and Q & A**

**17:25 – 17:30 Wrap-up**

**ITO Go, Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR**

# Biographies of the Panelists

(In Order of Appearance)



**WATANABE Mayu**

**President  
The Japan Forum on  
International Relations (JFIR)**

Graduated from Chiba University. Received M.A. in Education from the Graduate School of the University of Tokyo in 1997. Joined the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) in 2000 and appointed Senior research fellow in 2007, during which period she specialized in global human resource development and public diplomacy. Appointed Executive Director in 2011 and assumed Senior Executive Director in 2017. She has served as Vice President since 2018. Concurrently serving as President of the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).



## **ITO Go**

**Distinguished Research Fellow  
The Japan Forum on International Relations**

**Professor  
Meiji University**

Graduated from Sophia University. Received Ph.D. at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, University of Denver in 1997. Served as Associate Professor at Meiji University in 1998, and assumed the current position in 2006. Also served as Visiting Professor at Beijing University, Academia Sinica (Taiwan), Bristol University(Britain), Australian National University, and Victoria University (Canada), Adjunct Professor (International Security) at Waseda University as well as Sophia University, and as Adjunct Researcher of the House of Councilors. Recipients of the Eisenhower Fellowships in 2005 and the Nakasone Yasuhiro Award in 2006. Concurrently serves as Distinguished Research Fellow, JFIR.



**NGUYEN Thi Lan Anh**

**Director of Research  
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam**

Assoc. Prof Lan-Anh T. Nguyen is Director General of the East Sea (South China Sea) Institute and Dean of the International Law Faculty of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam (DAV).

She is a legal expert on the law of the sea. Her research focuses on the South China Sea disputes as well as other issues related to ocean law and policy. In her role at the DAV, she offers legal analysis and advisory opinions to political, diplomatic, and security deliberations. Assoc. Prof. Nguyen often participates as a resource person and leads Vietnamese delegation to track II and 1.5 conferences and workshops to engage other regional countries on maritime security and the ocean law and policy. Assoc. Prof. Nguyen received her Ph.D. in International Law from University of Bristol, the United Kingdom, and L.L.M. from University of Sheffield. She was the DHM in her diplomatic posting at the Embassy of Vietnam in London (2018-2021).





## **KOMORI, Yuta**

**Senior Fellow  
Ocean Policy Research Institute,  
Sasakawa Peace Foundation**

Affiliation and Position: Senior Research Fellow, Ocean Policy Research Institute, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation

Expertise:

International Politics & International Relations (especially Security Studies and Peace Studies)

Political Institutions (especially State Theory and Civil-Military Relations)

Political Sociology (especially Political Process)

Research Administration (especially Humanities and Social Sciences)

Academic/Professional Background:

Dr. Yuta Komori studied political science at the College of Law and Graduate School of Law, Nihon University. After graduation, Dr. Komori worked as a research fellow and lecturer at some Universities and Institutes, a secretary of a member of the House of Representatives, a manager of a startup company, and an executive director of some NPOs. Also, he received a Ph.D. degree from the Graduate School of Political Science and Economics, Meiji University, and has worked at the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (currently the Ocean Policy Research Institute of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation) since October 2013.



## **Virginia WATSON**

### **Professor**

### **The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies**

Dr. Virginia Bacay Watson is a faculty member of the College of Security Studies at the DKI Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, Hawaii. Her areas of research and publication include Southeast Asia, geopolitics, and technology and security. Dr. Watson obtained her bachelor's degrees in Asian Studies and Management of Financial Institutions from the Philippines. She holds a master's degree in Asian Studies from Cornell University and a doctorate in International Studies from the Korbel School of International Studies at the University of Denver. She is fluent in Tagalog and Ilonggo and conversant in Japanese and Spanish.



## **YAMADA Yoshihiko**

### **Professor Tokai University**

D. (Economics) Professor, Faculty of Maritime Studies, Tokai University  
Specialized in maritime policy, maritime security, maritime economics, remote islands development, etc.

After graduating from Gakushuin University with a degree in economics in 1986, he joined The Toyo Trust and Banking Company (now Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation), and in 1991 joined the Japan Maritime Foundation (now the Nippon Foundation), where he served in a variety of positions, including Director of the Marine Ship Department and Director of the Marine Group. While working for the foundation, he completed a master's program at Tama University Graduate School and a doctoral program at Saitama University Graduate School of Economic Sciences. 2007 Associate Professor, Faculty of Oceanography, Tokai University; 2008 Professor, Tokai University; 2019 Dean and Assistant to the President, Tokai University Shizuoka Campus

He has served as a member of the PT for understanding the situation of border islands using MDA, Headquarters for Ocean Policy, Cabinet Office; member of the Ocean Policy Roundtable, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism; expert member of Tokyo Metropolitan Government (in charge of Senkaku Islands); chairman of the Taketomi Town Ocean Basic Plan Formulation Committee; chairman of Ishigaki City Ocean Basic Plan Formulation Committee; chairman of Imabari City Shipbuilding Promotion Plan Formulation Committee, etc.

Yaeyama Nature Ambassador, Director of the Japanese Society of Coastal Studies, President of the Northern Research Center, a non-profit specified corporation.

Major books: Japan's Borders (Shincho Shinsho), Pirates' Code (Shincho Shinsho), Japan is the World's Fourth Largest Oceanic Power (Kodansha + Alpha Shinsho), Fully Illustrated: The World Economy from the Sea's Perspective (Diamond Inc.), People at the Border: Portrait of Japan as a Maritime Nation (Shincho Sensho), One Piece Victory Study (Shueisha), Japan's National Fish Dictionary (Kairyusha) The Sea is Stolen (Bunshun Shinsho), etc.



## **John BRADFORD**

### **Senior Fellow Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS)**

Mr John Frederick Bradford is Senior Fellow in the Maritime Security Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. Mr Bradford holds a Master of Science in Strategic Studies from RSIS (Gold Medal winner) and Bachelor of Arts (Magna Cum Laude in Asian Studies) from Cornell University. He retired from the U.S. Navy with the rank of Commander. His U.S. Navy assignments included service as the Deputy Director of the 7th Fleet Maritime Headquarters, as Country Director for Japan in the Office of the Secretary of Defense-Policy, and as Commanding Officer of a ballistic missile defense-capable Aegis destroyer forward deployed to Japan. His research interests focus on Indo-Pacific maritime issues and security cooperation. His work can be found in publications such as *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, *Asia Policy*, *Asian Security*, *Asian Survey*, *Naval War College Review*, and *Naval Institute Proceedings*. He has also written book chapters, online articles, and monographs published by leading international think tanks.



## **Stephen NAGY**

### **Professor International Christian University (ICU)**

Dr. Stephen Nagy received his PhD in International Relations/Studies from Waseda University in 2008. His main affiliation is as a professor at the International Christian University, Tokyo. He is also a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI); a visiting fellow with the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA); a senior fellow at the MacDonald Laurier Institute (MLI); and a senior fellow with the East Asia Security Centre (EASC). He also serves as the Director of Policy Studies for the Yokosuka Council of Asia Pacific Studies (YCAPS) spearheading their Indo-Pacific Policy Dialogue series.

His recent funded research projects are “Sino-Japanese Relations in the Wake of the 2012 Territorial Disputes: Investigating changes in Japanese Business’ trade and investment strategy in China”, and “Perceptions and drivers of Chinese view on Japanese and US Foreign Policy in the Region”. He is currently working on middle power approaches to great power competition in the Indo-Pacific. His latest publications include Deterrence, resilience, and engagement: Tokyo’s response to the Ukraine war and Russia-China alignment. *StoMiedIntRelat* 2023, 3:4 (<https://doi.org/10.12688/stomiedintrelat.17632.1>); Middle-Power Alignment in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Securing Agency through Neo-Middle-Power Diplomacy (*Asia Policy* 17, no. 3, 2022), US-China Strategic Competition and Converging Middle Power Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (*Strategic Analysis* 46, no. 3, 2022), Economic Headwinds and a Chance of Slower Growth: What the forecast holds for the Belt Road Initiative (MacDonald Laurier Institute, 2022), Sino-Japanese Reactive Diplomacy as seen through the Interplay of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision (FOIP) (*China Report*, 2021: 1–15), Quad- Plus? Carving out Canada’s Middle Power Role (*Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs*, Special Issue, 2020), Quad Plus: Form versus Substance, (*Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs* 3, no. 5, 2020: 179–195).

# Talking Points

(In Order of Appearance)

# Introductory Remarks by Chair

ITO Go

## I. Maritime Security Projects

Changes in the Status Quo: the status quo is always changing, and can be seen as unsatisfactory for a rising country.

An ameba-type of foreign behaviors: Unless we deter against them, they tend to expand. We cannot create any political vacuum.

The status quo is unsatisfactory. They will say that the rule-based international system has been backed by US military hegemony.

## II. Rule-based International Order

You cannot do.....The PCA award was called “garbage.”

International law is important, but what can we do beyond this? We have to find out something resilient against the countries seeking to alter the status quo

## III. Who governs the Sea?

An old, but new problem: not just between today’s rising country and others, but also between coastal and inland countries. The maritime areas are not territories, but a wider control over them has been what coastal states seek, while the “high sea” concept of oceans has been claimed by countries not facing the sea.

Different and opposite vectors: what can we do for the stability?

# Talking Points

Nguyen Thi Lan Anh

Freedom of navigation and overflight are rights that are widely recognized in international customary law, enshrined in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea as well as consistently respected in state practices. Freedom of navigation and overflight plays a vital role in maintaining global connectivity and ensuring the operation of global supply chains. Freedom of navigation and flight play an even greater role in Southeast Asia. As of 2022, half of the world's container fleet and 88 percent of the world's largest ships by tonnage passed through the Taiwan Strait. On a daily basis, more than 300 ships, including very large crude carriers (VLCCs) measuring more than 350 meters long, 60 meters wide, and with a draft of more than 20 meters, pass through the Malacca Strait. Unfortunately, global supply chains and connectivity have experienced disruptions in recent months. The disruption can be caused by black swan, such as the pandemic, navigation incidents... but it can also be caused by actions taken by states, most prominently related to territorial and maritime claims.

Territorial and maritime disputes, leading to the exercise of sovereign rights and jurisdiction at sea, can also be linked to threats to freedom of navigation and overflight. Practices in the South China Sea show that the enforcement of sovereignty claims have led to a series of actions that have negative impacts on freedom of navigation and overflight.

- The recent “laser incident” between China and the Philippines and the interception of Chinese and American aircrafts illustrate the dangers associated with safety of navigation and overflight.

- Developing national legislations allowing the coast guard to use force against foreign sovereign immunity vessels and requiring foreign ships to be piloted through the sea under claimed jurisdiction will introduce another source of risk of excessive use of force, which will limit the freedom of navigation of other countries.

- The deployment of hundreds of maritime militia in the South China Sea merely increases the density of the area and prevents other parties from conducting normal navigation.

- Military drills, in particular live-fire drills for an extended period, up to three months, as well as the restriction and prohibition of ships passing through also hinder the implementation of freedom of navigation.

- A combination of land reclamation and militarization has resulted in the creation of outposts which provide a location for maritime enforcement and maritime militia forces to garrison, provide supplies, and continue their illegal activities at sea, thus obstructing freedom of navigation and overflight.

At worst, activities to exercise sovereignty and maritime claims may lead to misunderstandings that cause conflict at sea. Increasing tensions in the Taiwan Strait, the construction of a military base at Ream, may indicate that we cannot completely rule out the possibility of armed conflict at sea. If this occurs, freedom of navigation will be disrupted and a number of consequences will arise for free trade and global supply chains.



# **Stable Utilization of the Ocean: In the Context of the New Basic Plan on Ocean Policy**

KOMORI Yuta

The Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was approved by the Cabinet in 2008, which states, "Bearing in mind the changes in the situation concerning the oceans, as well as based on an evaluation of the effect of measures concerning the oceans, the Government shall review the Plan almost every five years, and shall make necessary changes." based on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy enacted in 2007, the Plan is revised approximately every five years in accordance with the provisions of the Plan. It is scheduled to be revised for the fourth time in 2023.

To improve the next revision, the Ocean Policy Research Institute of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (OPRI-SPF) conducted a questionnaire aimed at identifying the strengths and weaknesses of the current Plan.

The survey was conducted with approximately 6,000 respondents, including Diet members, local government officials, university faculty and staff, executives and employees of research institutions (including independent administrative agencies and national research and development institutions), executives and employees of organizations (including NPOs and NGOs), and private-sector executives and employees, and was received from 352 responses.

This survey evaluated the nine measures in the current Plan (Chapter 2). As a result, many of the respondents pointed out the importance of not only "1. Maritime Security" but also "2. Promote Industrial Use of the Ocean" and "3. Maintain and Conserve the Marine Environment. This suggests that even the Plan, which puts "Comprehensive Maritime Security" at the forefront, is not limited to mere security but also emphasizes the importance of a comprehensive response in promoting ocean governance, including environmental conservation and economic development. In light of these assessments, expectations for the Plan are considered to be somewhat high, although there are some issues to be addressed.

On the other hand, especially in the area of security, for example, the National Security Strategy of Japan, the National Defense Strategy, and the Defense Buildup Program, which will be revised in 2022 and form the basis of Japan's security policy, make no reference to the Plan, and the relationship between the Plan and these documents is unclear. This suggests a situation in which security policies, which should normally be implemented in an integrated manner, are being carried out in a generalized way. Moreover, given that the relationship with the Plan is clearly stated in the "Science, Technology, and Innovation Basic Plan" and the "Strategic Energy Plan" and other basic plans, it must be said that the Plan is an oddity. It must be noted that this is odd.

In light of these assessments and challenges, promoting future ocean policy in Japan, particularly the establishment of maritime security, requires integrating efforts in various related fields. This challenge is in keeping with the philosophy espoused by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), now in its 40th year of adoption. I hope this presentation will help improve the situation where "the UNCLOS and navies are in a state of divorce."

# TALKING POINTS

Virginia WATSON

## 1. The maritime domain and geopolitical change

- brief remarks on some of the major trends defining the Indo-Pacific region

## 2. Resilience as organizing concept

- examines resilience as a dynamic concept

- discusses resilience-related challenges and opportunities for regional cooperation in the face of new/unresolved/emerging/hybrid security concerns and threats

## 2. Final thoughts

# Japan's Maritime Security: The Case of the Senkaku Islands

YAMADA Yoshihiko

In the Third Basic Plan for Ocean Policy formulated in 2018, the Government of Japan set "the challenge of becoming a new maritime power" as its direction and set comprehensive maritime security as an issue to be put into practice, with the government united to work on territorial sea security, ensuring public safety, disaster response, strengthening maritime situational awareness (MDA) capabilities, and conservation and management of remote border islands. The government aimed to work together to address these issues. However, Japan's maritime policy still has many challenges to overcome. The Senkaku Islands issue is the best example. The Senkaku Islands lie at the heart of the fan-like expanse of the East China Sea. Managing the Senkaku Islands is important for maintaining sovereignty and securing rights and interests in this area of the sea. The islands are also a natural treasure trove of rare species and the surrounding fishery resources are also promising. However, the government, perhaps out of diplomatic concern for other countries claiming territorial rights to the Senkaku Islands, has prohibited the public from entering the uninhabited Senkaku Islands. On the Senkaku Islands' Uotsuri Island, the soil has been decaying due to feeding damage from goats once released by humans. The ecosystem has collapsed, and rare species such as the Senkaku mole and the Senkaku river crab are feared to be extinct. In addition, local residents have requested the construction of a lighthouse to support the fishing industry, a communication facility, and a boat harbor to shelter them during stormy weather.

The government has endorsed the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) set forth by the United Nations, and SDG 14 sets a specific goal to "protect the richness of the sea" and calls for the conservation of the marine environment and protection of small-scale, traditional fishing methods. Ishigaki City, which has the Senkaku Islands within its administrative district, conducted a survey to obtain basic data on the marine environment, the state of fishery resources, and vegetation on the islands in order to put SDG 14 "Protect the richness of the sea" into practice in the sea area surrounding the Senkaku Islands. By surveying the surrounding waters, Ishigaki City demonstrated to the public that it is managing the marine environment and fishing grounds around the island as a local government on behalf of the national government. This survey was distributed worldwide by many media outlets and clearly showed that the Senkaku Islands are under the administration of Japan. Ishigaki City's marine survey was effective in demonstrating its administrative authority over the Senkaku Islands through peaceful means.

Looking beyond the Senkaku Islands, Japan's maritime security system is also under severe pressure. In the area surrounding the Northern Territories, the fishing industry has been suspended due to the threat of Russia. Furthermore, we cannot take our eyes off North Korea, which has repeatedly conducted missile tests aimed at the Sea of Japan. While the Japan Coast Guard's actions for maritime security are commendable, we believe that the coast guard's dependence on the Coast Guard is at its limit and that a new coast guard system needs to be established under the functions of the Ministry of Defense. In addition, to promote the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy," which is the cornerstone of diplomacy and defense, Japan should enhance its own maritime security system and move toward a system to protect the Asian seas.

Japan as a maritime power can only exist if it practices comprehensive maritime security. If Japan's system for promoting maritime security is weak, its standing in the international community will sink, and this will ultimately result in economic hardship for the nation's citizens. In addition,

Japan's maritime transport, which supports Japan's trade, is in an extremely precarious state, with few Japanese-flag vessels and few Japanese seafarers.

As a maritime power, Japan needs to implement comprehensive maritime security measures, which we believe will lead to the safety of Asian waters.

# IMPROVING MARITIME GOVERNANCE: A PATH TO MARITIME STABILITY

John BRADFORD

What is global maritime governance?

- Governance is composed of **two key elements**: the deliberate establishment of common rules and the effective enforcement of those rules.
- To address the **full range of maritime security challenges**, maritime governance necessitates a collective effort among maritime stakeholders with varying interests and allocated authority, which is rooted deeply in the rule of law and a rules-based approach.

What are the main challenges to global maritime governance?

- **State actors** are increasingly turning to grey zone tactics to infringe on the rights of others while ensuring the response does not elevate to the war. Unfortunately, it is too obvious that inter-state warfare remains a contemporary challenge.
- **Non-state actors** such as terrorists, piracy, smuggler, and other criminal continue to plague the maritime space, particularly in waters with poor governance.
- **Environmental threats** also pose risk to mariners and coastal communities. These include weather phenomena, accidents and mariners' workplace safety. These are becoming more acute with expanding reliance on the sea, more vessels being underway, and climate change.

The US & Japan are uniquely situated to offer maritime governance leadership?

- As **2 of 3 world's largest economies**, they are also leading maritime states.
- As such the US and Japan also hold influence over the bulk of maritime stakeholders.
- From a global perspective, USN and JMSDF are the **2 most powerful navies**.
- USCG & JCG are the **2 most influential coast guards**.
- **Japan vies with South Korea and China as the leading shipbuilding nation**. Japan lead in the most sophisticated ship classes.
- Japan & US have the **2<sup>nd</sup> & 4<sup>th</sup> largest merchant fleets**. China overtook Japan in 2021. 3<sup>rd</sup> is Greece. This gives the great influence and responsibility for the global shipping network and the safety of mariners.
- New York, Tokyo & London are the **centers of gravity for the marine insurance system**.
- They are the **leading sources of maritime-related ODA** (even in light of belt-and-road).
- **#1 & #3 largest importer** by sea. **#2 & #3 largest exporter** by sea.
- US & Japan are global leaders (along with European states) in **maritime awareness technology**.

### Specific steps for the US & Japan?

- Develop a **Bilateral Maritime Coordination mechanism**. This needs to be interagency and engagement with other stakeholders (shipping, insurance, law enforcement, insurance, etc.).
- **Establish a policy approach focusing on improving governance** rather than responding to specific threats. Threat response is already addressed by other Alliance features.
- Provide **coordinated global leadership** at key diplomatic and legal maritime venues such as IMO.
- Develop **working-level cooperative mechanisms at embassies** in key maritime partners. Start with other global maritime leaders (China, EU, UK, Greece, Singapore, etc.) and states where maritime challenges most directly impact US & Japan interests (Southeast Asia, West Africa, Pacific Islands).
- **Engage key partners** (Quad members, EU, UK), in targeted minilateral, but resist the type of multilateralism that reduces coordination to the lowest common denominator.
- Include defense issues but **prevent militaries from overshadowing other stakeholders and interests**.

# Indo-Pacific Strategic Convergences: Investing in peace and stability through buttressing a rules-based order

Stephen R NAGY

Whether in Ottawa or Canberra, Paris or New Delhi, Washington or capitals in Southeast Asia, states around the world aspire to have cooperative and mutually beneficial economic, social, cultural, and security relationships with Beijing. Their respective Indo-Pacific strategies highlight that but also explicitly highlight the importance of a rules-based order in which international law, not a Machiavellian might-is-right approach to international relations is the final arbiter of how we manage foreign relations and sea lines of communication in the maritime domain.

		Concerns
Converging Interests	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Growing economic interdependence with China (Glaser, 2017)</li> <li>2. Chinese surrogates in Northeast Asia and South Asia</li> <li>3. UNSC permanent member status(Mohan, 2013, 283)</li> <li>4. China’s expanding maritime claims in ESC, SCS and Indian Ocean (Abe, 2015)</li> <li>5. Challenges ASEAN unity</li> <li>6. Resilience of Global Supply China (Basu, 2020)</li> <li>7. Infrastructure, connectivity</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Economic coercion</li> <li>2. DPRK, Pakistan (missile and nuclear tech)</li> <li>3. Monopolization of Representation</li> <li>4. SLOCs</li> <li>5. ASEAN centrality</li> <li>6. GSC disruption</li> <li>7. Development, integration</li> </ol>
Diverging Interests	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Issue linkage (Panda, 2011, p.8)</li> <li>2. Alliance/ alignment/ mini-laterals</li> <li>3. Competing visions (Roy-Chaudhury and Sullivan de Estrada, 2018)</li> <li>4. Over securitization of QUAD or FOIP</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. DPRK vs Pakistan</li> <li>2. Legacy of NAM, US-JP Alliance, TSR</li> <li>3. Indian Ocean vs Indo-Pacific</li> <li>4. Exclusion of China and conflict</li> </ol>

**Table 1 Strategic Convergences**

**Source:** Author

The [Canadian Indo-Pacific Strategy](#) highlights this stressing Ottawa will “cooperate with China to find solutions to global issues such as climate change, biodiversity loss, global health and nuclear proliferation.” The [EU Indo-Pacific Strategy](#) similarly states that “The EU will also pursue its multifaceted engagement with China, engaging bilaterally to promote solutions to common challenges, cooperating on issues of common interest and encouraging China to play its part in a peaceful and thriving Indo-Pacific region.”

Even [Japan’s new National Security Strategy](#), a strategy that includes provisions for counter strike capabilities, articulates the view that:

*global issues such as climate change, infectious diseases, energy, food problems, and the environment, which have a direct or indirect impact on Japan’s national security, Japan will expand the circle of cooperation not only to include its ally and like-minded countries (read China), but also many other countries and organizations, and then enhance international efforts.*

Japan, Canada, and the European Union are not alone in their aspirations for cooperation with China. In a [speech by Secretary of State Anthony Blinken](#) on the Biden administration’s approach to

the People's Republic of China, "investing, aligning, and competing" remain the core principles of a constructive relationship with China. Blinken stressed like other states, combating climate change, non-proliferation, transnational diseases, and "global macroeconomic coordination between the United States and China is key—through the G20, the IMF, other venues," to overcome the severe socio and economic consequences resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.

### **Traditional security**

-Areas of alignment include stemming weapons proliferation, bolstering rules-based behavior in the maritime domain, strengthening ASEAN intra-regional integration.

-Growing alignment with Canada and other middle/secondary powers working to contribute to the security in the Indo-Pacific including monitoring and surveillance activities against illicit maritime activities, ensuring the openness of sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) and in the case of Canada more regularized middle power diplomacy (Vancouver Foreign Ministers' Meeting on Security and Stability on Korean Peninsula).

-The status quo represented by peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and stable, internationally managed sea lines of communication (SLOCs) throughout the Indo-Pacific region are an important area of alignment. With 5.5\$US Trillion dollars in good being transported through the region, grey zone operations, lawfare, island building in the South China Sea (SCS), militarization of the region, rejection of international law and assertive behaviour of China have the potential to spiral into a regional conflict with global repercussions.

### **Non-traditional security**

-Areas of concern include climate change, piracy, human trafficking, food security, and human security.

-Growing concern about rising sea level causing critical issue such as Food security in Mekong Delta and South Asia (Kontgis et al. 2019), Forced migration, and a disruption of economic growth and export prospects (Vi & Liu 2019).

### **Resilience**

-The weaponization of supply chains, economic coercion, policy choices and black swan events such as the Covid-19 pandemic has raised awareness of the importance of resilience in supply chains in the Indo-Pacific region. This includes the high-tech supply chains associated with semi-conductors from the TSMC based in Taiwan but also sensitive products such as medical equipment, rare earth materials and other essential areas.

-This awareness of the importance of supply chain resilience has led to selective diversification of supply chains (Nagy and Nguyen, 2021), financial support for supply chain relocation, friendshoring and other strategies to insult Indo-Pacific stakeholders from supply chain disruption.

-Taiwan and the South China Sea remain at the center of the supply chain maelstrom. As a result, Indo-Pacific stakeholders are enhancing their diplomatic signaling to relevant countries that disruptions in sea lines of communication (SLOCs) of a kinetic conflict across the Taiwan Strait would be a severe problem for national and the global economy.





## About The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

JFIR is a membership organization with three categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, and (3) individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision-making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

<p><b>■ Board of Directors</b></p> <p>WATANABE Mayu <i>President</i>          ISHIGAKI Yasuji <i>Vice Chairman</i>          KAMIYA Mataka <i>Vice President</i>          HANDA Haruhisa <i>Director</i>          ITO Masanori <i>Director</i>          ITO Tsuyoshi <i>Director</i>          ITO Wakako <i>Director</i>          KIKUCHI Yona <i>Director</i>          TAKUBO Tadae <i>Director</i>          WATANABE Hirotaka <i>Director</i></p>	<p><b>■ Board of Trustees</b></p> <p>ARIMA Tatsuo OHYA Eiko          HAKAMADA Shigeki SAKAMOTO Masahiro          HIRONO Ryokich SATO Ken          IIYAMA Toshiyasui SUGIMURA Miki          KAWAI Masahiro SUZUKI Keisuke          KIUCHI Minoru TAKAHARA Akio          KUROYANAGI Nobuo WATANABE Toshio</p> <hr/> <p><b>■ Auditors</b></p> <p>OHNO Shigeru          WATANABE Kenichi</p>
--	--

The Forum’s activities are composed of seven pillars such as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum,” “Research Programs,” “International Exchanges,” “International Frameworks,” “Information Gathering,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Foramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

### Contact

Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan

TEL: +81-3-3584-2190 FAX: +81-3-3589-5120 E-mail: [jfir@jfir.or.jp](mailto:jfir@jfir.or.jp) URL: <http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/>

