Report of

Prospects and Challenges for the Formation of International Public Goods in the Era of "Smart Power":

~Deepening and Enlarging of the Concept of "an Alliance"~

October 2012

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Preface

In the era of the "smart power" and the changing international political scene, where China is emerging as an expansionist power and threatening the stability of the Asia-Pacific region, role of the Japan-U.S. alliance as a cornerstone of the peace and stability of the region will remain unchanged and need to be further strengthened. The alliance is also expected to be a provider of international public goods for peace, stability and prosperity in the world.

With this awareness in mind, the Japan-U.S. joint research project entitled "Prospects and Challenges for the Formation of International Public Goods in the Era of 'Smart Power': Deepening and Enlarging of the Concept of 'an Alliance'" was launched in April 2011 by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) with the support of the Center for Global Partnership (CGP) of the Japan Foundation. The project was completed on October 31, 2012. The Japanese and the U.S. research teams of this project were comprised of the following:

The Japanese Research Team

Leader:	KAMIYA Matake
Members:	HOSOYA Yuichi
	ISHIKAWA Taku
	IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro
	MIYAOKA Isao
	NAKANISHI Hiroshi

The U.S. Research Team

Leader:	James J. PRZYSTUP
Members:	Michael AUSLIN
	Rust DEMING
	Michael J. GREEN
	Nicholas SZECHENYI

In order to accomplish this project, each research team held research meetings on a regular basis in its own country. As a culmination of this project, "International Workshop" was held on September 12, 2012, in Tokyo, which was followed by "Public Symposium" entitled "Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International Public Goods," was held on the same day, which was attended by 126 participants including 10 panelists.

It is my pleasure to hereby present this Report of the Japan-U.S. joint research project. Upon publication, I would like to thank Prof. KAMIYA Matake, Leader of the Japanese Team, and Prof. James J. PRZYSTUP, Leader of the U.S. Team, for their initiatives and contributions to this research project. I would like to thank CGP for supporting this project. It goes without saying that without their support, this project could not have been possible.

October 31, 2012
ITO Kenichi
President, JFIR

Project Outline

This project mainly aims to examine how the Japan-U.S. Alliance should be redefined amid the ongoing transformation of the concept of power, exemplified in the emerging norm of "Smart power," in the changing international environment. It also attempts to provide theoretical as well as policy-oriented perspectives in which the redefined alliance could serve as international public goods. The project, funded by the Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership (CGP) to contribute to the U.S.-Japan relationship, started on April 1, 2011, in the United States and Japan, co-sponsored by the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University. While the JFIR organized a research team composed of one leader and 5 members, the INSS organized a team composed of one leader and 4 members.

The Japanese research team was set up to conduct this project on April 1, 2011, and held the meeting five times before the completion of this project. The members of the U.S. research team also had several occasions to meet and exchange views on the subjects to be examined on the project.

Both research teams did not only investigate the problems of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, but also paid considerable attention to significant issues in today's world, such as the concept of global public goods, the rise of China and its potential influence on the international order, and the possible reinforcement of the Japan-U.S. Alliance and its impact on the regional integration in Asia. On September 12, 2012, the research teams held the closed workshop in the room of the JFIR to discuss a future plan for the continuation of this project, and to search for the best method to disseminate the outcome of the research to the public in both countries.

As a culmination of this project, the international workshop and symposium was held on September 12, 2012, and both the Japanese and the U.S. teams made lively discussions. The Japanese participant members were KAMIYA Matake, HOSOYA Yuichi, MIYAOKA Isao, and NAKANISHI Hiroshi. (IZUMIKAWA Yasuhiro was also scheduled to participate, but had to cancel his participation due to sudden illness.) The U.S. participants were James J. PRZYSTUP, Michael J. GREEN, Rust DEMING, and Nicholas SZECHENYI. All of them are internationally well-known scholars and/or practitioners on security cooperation between Japan and the U.S.

The conference was divided into two sessions. In the Session 1, on the theme of "Changing Roles of Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Changing World," James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS, gave the first keynote speech, in which he stated that "China has increased its assertiveness in both the South China Sea and the East China Sea. After almost a decade of 'smile diplomacy' following the Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis in 1996, China appears to taking the attitude that it is better to be feared than liked.”

In the second keynote speech, Michael J. Green, Senior Vice President, Japan Chair, CSIS stated that “current Chinese strategy, which is known as A2/AD (Anti Access / Access Denial), is based on the concept of counter-intervention. It is an aggressive strategy that even includes the threat of the use of tactical nuclear weapons. The U.S. can put more pressure in order to deter China at the risk of forcing other states in the region to choose between the U.S. and China.”

Following that, KAMIYA Matake, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan, stated in the third keynote speech, that “effectiveness of the Japan-U.S. Alliance in the new era will depend not only on its collective hard power, but also on its ‘collective soft power.’ Provision of international collective goods, which is the existing international order characterized as liberal, open and rule-based, will be particularly important to increase the attractiveness of the alliance both regionally and globally. The future course of the alliance should be discussed from this perspective.”

The fourth keynote speech was delivered by Rust DEMING, former principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. He stated that “in the area of hard power, the U.S. - Japan Alliance should not seek to contain China, but put pressure on China to make a commitment to the international society as a responsible stakeholder. In the area of soft power, the U.S. and Japan should take the leadership and renew the momentum toward open markets and expanded trade.”

MIYAOKA Isao, Professor, Keio University presented the fifth and last keynote speech in which he said that “today, the concept of global commons includes the high sea and international airspace and the cyber space. The term, Pax Americana, substantially stands for U.S. military dominance over the global commons. The importance of the Article 6 of the Japan-U.S. Treaty has to be reassured in the context of Pax Americana.”

In the Session 2, on the theme of “What needs to Be Done? Assignments to Be Tackled Hand-in-Hand and Independently,” James J. PRZYSTUP, Senior Research Fellow, INSS, gave the first keynote speech, in which he stated that “for Japan, a starting point should be the commitment to fund the ‘dynamic defense’ force outlined in the 2010 New National Defense Program Guidelines. Also, the SDF must continue to increase its joint operational effectiveness in conjunction with the reconsideration of Article IX and the International Peacekeeping Law.

Following that, NAKANISHI Hiroshi, Professor, Kyoto University, stated in the second keynote speech that “for U.S.-Japan alliance, the defense priorities are to secure maritime space around Japan, which requires operational capabilities not only in the Pacific but also in the East and South China Seas. The build-up of ‘Dynamic Defense capabilities’ is planned in the current Defense Guideline and it is advancement in the right direction."

After that, Nicholas SZECHENYI, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS, presented the third keynote speech, mentioning that "the vitality of the U.S.-Japan Alliance will depend on the strength of the two economies that have energy and free trade as common agenda. Taking the leadership in those economic fields will underpin the continuing importance of the alliance."

In the last keynote speech, HOSOYA Yuichi, Professor, Keio University, said that "Japan needs to increase its defense spendings and revise its old-fashioned restraint upon the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, but this may cause severe criticisms from Chinese and Korean people. The Japan-U.S. Alliance faces a paradox situation in which Japan's further commitment to the alliance could contradict its efforts to enhance stability in Asia.

The speech of each panelist and the record of discussions at the symposium are included in the following page, and the stenographic records in Japanese are contained in the end of the report. This report of the Japan-U.S. joint research is based upon the results of the fellow's many years of endeavors.

Finally, the members of the project team, both in Japan and in the United States, would like to extend the greatest gratitude to the CGP for its financial support to this project. Without its support, the project could not have been attempted.

Contributors

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Holds B.A. Summa Cum Laude from the University of Detroit and M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago. Has worked on issues related to East Asia for close to thirty years on Capitol Hill, on the House of Representatives Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs. Serves as the Deputy Director of the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Japan Relations, the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, Director of the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

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Rust DEMING *former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State*

Received B.A. from Rollins College and M.A. in East Asian Studies from Stanford University. Has spent much of his career dealing with Japanese affairs, having served in Japan as charge d'affaires, and as deputy chief of mission. Served as principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs (June 1998 to August 2000), senior advisor to the assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific affairs from December 1997. Also, served as director of the Office of Japanese Affairs in Washington from 1991 to 1993. In 2011 he was recalled to the State Department for six months to serve once again as Japan Director. Concurrently serves as an adjunct professor of Japan studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.

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Graduated from Kenyon College with highest honors in history in 1983. Received his M.A. from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 1987 and his Ph.D. in 1994. Also, did graduate work at the University of Tokyo as a Fulbright fellow. Joined the National Security Council (NSC) in April 2001 as director of Asian affairs. Previously served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Asian affairs at the NSC, from January 2004 to December 2005. Concurrently serves as Associate Professor of international relations at Georgetown University.

Nicholas SZECHENYI *Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, Office of the Japan Chair, CSIS*

Received an M.A. in international economics and Japan studies from the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and a B.A. in Asian studies from Connecticut College. Prior to joining CSIS in 2005, served as news producer for Fuji Television in Washington, D.C., where he covered U.S. policy in Asia and domestic politics. In 2009, selected as an inaugural fellow of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation's "U.S.-Japan Network for the Future" program.

Japan Members

KAMIYA Matake *Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan*

Graduated from the University of Tokyo in 1985 and did graduate study at Columbia University as a Fulbright grantee. Became Research Associate at the National Defense Academy of Japan in 1992, Lecturer with tenure in 1993, Associate Professor in 1996, and became Professor in 2004. Meanwhile, served as Distinguished Research Fellow at Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand (1994-95), and Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (2004-2005). Concurrently serves as Councilor of The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) and Member of the Board of Directors of Japan Association for International Security.

HOSOYA Yuichi *Professor, Keio University*

Received his Ph.D. from Keio University. Served as Visiting Professor and Japan Chair at Sciences-Po in Paris (2009–10), Visiting fellow at Princeton University (2008–2009). His research interests include the postwar international history, British diplomatic history, Japanese diplomacy, and contemporary international security.

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Received his M.A. from the George Washington University in 1994 and Ph.D. from Hitotsubashi University in 1998. Served as a research fellow of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (1996-98), Assistant Professor and then Associate Professor of Toyo Eiwa University (1998-09).

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Received MA from Kyoto University in 1987 and studied in the doctor course of the History Department at the University of Chicago from 1988 to 1990 as Ph.D. candidate. Served as Associate Professor in Kyoto University. His major interests include rise of the global international history of the 20th century, with partiular interest on Japanese foreign and security policy in the Showa Era, and current Japanese foreign and security policy. He has been on the panel of several Governmental advisory committees, such as the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, which issued the final report in August 2010.

Session I

Changing Roles of Japan-U.S. Alliance in a Changing World

- In the Asia-Pacific and Globally -

Chapter 1 U.S.-Japan Alliance in the "Era of Smart Power": Changes and Continuities

KAMIYA Matake

Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan / Councilor, JFIR

The U.S.-Japan alliance will remain the cornerstone of security and stability in the Asia-Pacific, because few security issues in this region will be able to be dealt with effectively without the United States and Japan in the foreseeable future, although few issues will be able to be taken care of only by the two allies. Potential importance of this alliance for global peace and security will remain as before. Roles and functions of the U.S.-Japan alliance, however, will require modifications.

In the past, the U.S.-Japan alliance has exercised a significant influence in the region and globally as an alliance with the largest size of hard power in the world. The "collective hard power"[1] of the U.S.-Japan alliance has been overwhelming, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, both in military and economic power. Despite the Lehman Shock and the prolonged difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. still possess the largest hard power in the world. Surpassed by China in the size of the gross GDP, Japan still accounts for more than 8% of world GDP. It will likely remain the third largest economic power in the world at least until the mid of this century. In the face of the rise of newly emerging powers, the size of the collective hard power of the U.S.-Japan alliance is still the second largest in the world (only second to the NATO).

In today's world, however, the utility and effectiveness of hard power have been increasingly restricted, while the importance of soft power has been growing. Joseph Nye has argued that "[w]inning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in a global information age." This statement applies not only to state actors, but also to alliances.[2] In a world entering into the "era of smart power," alliance cooperation which relies only on collective hard power of allies will face increasing limitations in achieving results. Effectiveness of an alliance in this new era will depend not only on its collective hard power, but also on its "collective soft power,”[3]; i.e., the collective ability of an alliance to attract other countries and non-state actors to its side.

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[1] The concept of "collective hard power" was advocated by the author in the final report of the study group on the "Project on the U.S.-Japan Alliance and Japanese Diplomacy in the Era of 'Smart Power,'" funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan and conducted under the auspices of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR), with the author as the project leader. See the JFIR, ed., *"Smart Power Jidai ni Okeru Nichi-bei Doumei to Nihon Gaikou [The U.S.-Japan Alliance and Japanese Diplomacy in the Era of "Smart Power"]* (Tokyo: The JFIR, March 2011), p. 21.

[2] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 1.

Tokyo and Washington, therefore, will have to find ways to make their alliance not only function effectively, but also perform roles that will be attractive for other countries and non-state actors. Provision of international collective goods will be particularly important to increase attractiveness of the U.S.-Japan alliance for other international actors.

Among various types of international collective goods which this alliance will be able to provide to the international community, the most fundamental and significant will be the maintenance and stewardship of the existing international order, which is characterized as liberal, open, and rule-based.

Throughout the post-World War II period, this order has been formed and maintained by the collective efforts of countries who shares liberal values and principles, including Japan, under the leadership of the United States. While Japan and the United States have been the largest beneficiaries of this order, other countries have also enjoyed significant benefits from the liberal, open, and rule-based nature of this order. In recent years, however, there has been a growing concern in the international society that this existing order may be weakened due to the ongoing shift in the international power balance due to the rise of the newly emerging powers, particularly China. It is still unclear whether China will become a “responsible stakeholder” who will be ready to support, rather than attempt to challenge, this order together with the United States, Japan, and other leading democracies in the world. In this circumstance, the U.S.-Japan alliance should be redefined as an alliance of the two leading status quo-oriented powers in the world. Tokyo and Washington should declare to the Asia-Pacific region and to the entire world that their alliance will seek the maintenance of essential elements of the current international order (liberalness, openness, and rule-basis), both in the Asia Pacific and globally, and in that sense, will be ready to serve as a provider of the most important international public goods to the international society.[4]

Nye suggests that the interstate power competition in the information age, the state with the best “story” or “narrative,” rather than the one with the largest army, tends to prevail.[5] Similarly, the U.S.-Japan alliance requires good "story" or "narrative" to prevail in the ongoing "soft power competition" with China. In the face of the emergence of increasingly stronger, more assertive China, which may not be quite satisfied with the existing international rules, norms, and institutions, the idea that the strongest state in the world and the third largest economy in the world bond together to preserve the existing liberal open order will surely represent a "good story" for the majority of the countries in the world, which can give a sense of good assurance (or reassurance) for them. In other words, the idea of the U.S.-Japan alliance as an alliance of the two leading status quo powers will be able to attract other countries to their side, rather than to the Chinese side, and therefore will be a good source of soft power for the two allies.

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[3] The concept of collective soft power was advocated by the author in the JFIR, ed., *"Smart Power -Jidai ni Okeru Nichi-bei Doumei to Nihon Gaikou*, p. 22.

[4] In the similar sense, “The Study Group on Japan's Grand Strategy,” including the author, and organized by the PHP Research Institute, recently proposed that Japan should play a role of an “advanced stabilizing power” in a changing regional and global environment, in cooperation with the United States. Yoshinobu Yamamoto, Masatsugu Naya, Toshikazu Inoue, Matake Kamiya, and Masafumi Kaneko, *Nihon no Dai-senryaku: Rekishi-teki Power-shift wo dou Norikiru ka [Japan's Grand Strategy: How Japan Should Go through the Historic Power Shift]* (Tokyo: PHP, 2012).

[5] Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “The Future of American Power: Dominance and Decline in Perspective,” *Foreign Affairs*,

As the basic premise of all these, however, one recognition must be shared between the two allies: The U.S.-Japan alliance cannot remain strong and effective without a firm and healthy maintenance of its collective hard power. In the era of smart power, it will become increasingly difficult for an alliance to achieve its goals only using its collective hard power. Cultivation of collective soft power will be crucial. However, the strength of collective soft power of an alliance; i.e., how much attractiveness other international actors find in that alliance, will depend considerably on what it can do (or, to put it more correctly, how others perceive what it can do), in time of need, by utilizing its collective hard power. The prerequisite for an alliance to strengthen its collective soft power is, therefore, the solid maintenance (or strengthening) of its collective hard power.

Currently, the U.S.-Japan alliance serves a good source of hard power to deal with the reality of the rise of China. As Nye properly argues, "The U.S.-Japan alliance . . . mean[s] that China cannot easily expel the Americans from Asia. From that position, the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and others can engage China and provide incentives for it to play a responsible role, while hedging against the possibility of aggressive behavior as China's power grows."[6] Without the maintenance of such collective hard power, the potential of the U.S.-Japan alliance to attract others around it as a guardian of the liberal, open, and rule-based international order will be severely limited.

The Japanese, with a still considerably strong pacifist orientation among them, in particular, needs to understand such an intricate relationship between hard power and soft power, before they discuss the roles and functions of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the era of smart power.

The Japanese also needs to understand that discussing the future of the alliance rhetorically with the United States is not enough to secure an assured future of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The results of such discussions need to be implemented. On the U.S. side, frustration about the

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November/December 2010.

[6] Nye, "The Future of American Power," p.5.

weakness of the political leadership of Japanese leaders to implement the agreement between the two countries with regard to the alliance has been continuing to simmer. The more than sixteen years-history of the Futenma relocation issue has been taken by the U.S. side as a symbol of "Japan that can't implement." When the Japanese government adopted the new National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) in December 2010, Michael Green, in an interview with *Yomiuri Shimbun*, said that he would give A to the strategic aspect of the guidelines, but only B-minus to the financial aspect.[7] What he meant was that although he appreciated the words written in the new NDPG, he was not sure if those words would be followed by deeds. Such a sense of frustration is evident in the two important recent documents concerning the future course of the U.S.-Japan alliance, released by the CSIS, entitled *U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment,*[8] and the *"Third Armitage-Nye Report (U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia*)."[9]

The Third Armitage-Nye Report argues that in the face of the "re-rise of China and its attendant uncertainties, North Korea with its nuclear capabilities and hostile intentions, and the promise of Asia's dynamism," and many other "challenges of a globalized world and an increasingly complex security environment," "[a] stronger and more equal alliance is required to adequately address these and other great issues of the day." The report, however, points out that "[f]or such an alliance to exist, the United States and Japan will need to come to it from the perspective, and as the embodiment, of tier-one nations." The authors of the report say that they "have no doubt of the United States' continuing tier-one status," but as for Japan, they believe that "there is a decision to be made" by the Japanese. They believe that "Japan is fully capable of remaining a tier-one nation," which is defined as a country with "significant economic weight, capable military forces, global vision, and demonstrated leadership on international concerns." They say, however, that there is "a question of her [Japan's] disposition."[10]

In order to remain the tier-one nation, Japan needs to reestablish a political leadership that can implement necessary measures without procrastinating difficult decisions. Among the necessary measures to be implemented as swiftly as possible by Japan, those for strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance are of foremost importance. Japan needs to decide what it should do to promote both collective hard power and collective soft power of the alliance toward the future, and will have to execute those decisions together with the United States.

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[7] "Shin Bouei-Taikou, Michael Green-shi ni Kiku" [Q & A with Michael Green on the new National Defense Program Guidelines], *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 19, 2010.

[8] David J. Berteau and Michael J. Green, Co-directors, *U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia-Pacific Region: An Independent Assessment* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies, August 2012).

[9] Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies, August 2012).

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 1.

Chapter 2　The Alliance and the Rise of China

James J. PRZYSTUP

Senior Research Fellow, INSS

"The rise of China as a great power will be one of the defining events of the 21st century, not only for Asia, but for the world generally. More precisely the degree to which this country with its vast size, economic dynamism, and military potential manages to integrate itself into the international system promises to shape the very nature of the future international order. For the United States and other members of the international community, the challenge will be to structure an environment that encourages China to view integration based solidly on existing international norms as beneficial to its own national interests."

The Enduring China—an Overview

The Communist Party of China remains the sole source of political orthodoxy and authority. Among all but the most faithful, ideological commitment has all but disappeared. Political fervor has been replaced by an overwhelming focus on material success. The Party's claim to legitimacy now depends largely on its ability to produce economic success.

Meanwhile, a surging nationalism has been manifest most recently in Beijing's claims to sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands. This both shapes and constrains the leadership's policy options. Many economists project that, at some point in the first quarter of the next century, China will have the world's largest economy in terms of gross national product, though significant challenges lie ahead.

Although China's ultimate national objectives are open to debate—they still are—but near to mid-term success will require a stable international and regional environment as well as access to international markets, finance and technologies. This also holds true for the success of China's military modernization program.

China has demonstrated an interest in greater international integration—APEC and the WTO; the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Missile Technology Control Regime, though its nuclear assistance program and missile sales to Iran and Pakistan jeopardize vital U.S. and Western security interests. China has also demonstrated a willingness to use force and/or intimidation to advance its interests. There is a long list here going back to the Paracel Islands in 1974; the Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis 1995-1996; Mischief Reef 1999; and extending to present day assertiveness in the South China Sea.

The ambiguity of China's conduct poses fundamental questions about China's nature as an emerging great power and its relationship to the international system and to the United States. For example is China a revolutionary or revisionist power seeking to transform the very nature of the international system or is it an assertive but basically status quo power? If the latter, will it remain so as China's comprehensive power continues to grow?

There are, of course, no appropriate historical models; reality is much more complex. China's conduct will be outlined not in predictable black and white, but in shifting shades of gray, with Beijing managing to be both cooperative and assertive on a wide range of issues. China will undoubtedly seek to shape, to its own advantage, the terms and conditions of its engagement with the world.

So what is to be done? Is containment an option?

It is highly unlikely that Japan or other U.S. allies in the Asia-Pacific region are prepared to join in a concerted effort to contain China. Indeed many countries, fearing that actions taken by Washington, could force them to confront difficult choices, have cautioned against a U.S. policy that could force painful choices involving economic and security interests. China is a major market force in the international economy; today, China is the hub of the Asia economy and the leading trading partner of Japan, the ROK, Australia and the ASEAN countries.

The mix of Western trade and investment has spurred China's economic growth while increasing its interdependence on foreign countries and tying it even more closely to the international economy. At the same time, Beijing's growing confidence in the economic power and political leverage of its huge market promises to complicate international cooperation on policy issues. China's willingness to use its market for political ends has been well demonstrated—going back to a 1996 decision to favor Airbus over Boeing to express its displeasure over the U.S. stand on human rights.

And the list is growing: the 2010 imposition of new health standards on the import of Norwegian salmon following the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu Xiabao; suspension of the rare earth exports during the 2010 Senkaku incident; contract; blocking agricultural exports from the Philippines during the Scarborough Shoals incident; and the use of travel warnings during the Senkaku and Scarborough Shoals incidents.

The above quotes are from "The United States and China: Strategies for the Future" in Between Diplomacy and Deterrence: Strategies for U.S. Relations with China, The Heritage Foundation 1997.

With regard to China, many questions, 15 years later, clearly remain the same. Others with respect to the United States and Japan have changed. The list of changes below is by no means comprehensive but is offered for consideration.

What Has Changed?

The book was written at perhaps the height of the United States unipolar moment. While still unrivaled as military power and a source of technological innovation, the United States, over the past decade, has experienced a relative decline in comprehensive power. At the turn of the century, the United States enjoyed a budget surplus. Today, China holds over $1.2 trillion of U.S. debt. Significant budgetary and fiscal challenges are facing the United States and Japan. In the United States the "fiscal cliff" is looming, and in Japan the debt to GDP ratio has jumped from 135% of GDP in 2000 to over 233% today.

Japan today is fifteen years older and in the United Sates the "boomer" generation is moving toward retirement. This generational change will affect spending priorities in both countries; defense budgets will not go untouched.

China today is a major international market force. In 2006, China became Japan's top trading partner replacing the United States. Across the Asia-Pacific region, China is at the center of the region's economic dynamism. China's market power has enhanced Beijing's political leverage, which it has demonstrated that it is not unwilling to use, most recently at the ASEAN Regional Forum in Phnom Penh.

Of growing concern to both the United States and Japan has been China's increasing assertiveness in the both the South China Sea and the East China Sea. After almost a decade of "smile diplomacy" following the Taiwan Straits Missile Crisis, China appears to taking the attitude that it is better to be feared than liked.

At the same time, over the past 15 years, China's economy has become increasingly integrated into the global economy and its financial markets. In entering the WTO in 2001, China joined a rules-based trade regime and its dispute resolution mechanism. Beijing's compliance with its obligations leaves much to be desired, yet it is operating with a rules based order that has produced double-digit for China growth for over three decades; and it does not appear to be bent on replacing it yet with a made-in-China trade order.

China's economic dynamism has supported the modernization of the PLA. China's military capabilities have been enhanced across the board as a result of over twenty years of double digit increases in defense spending. Of increasing concern to the United States and Japan is China's development of anti-access/area-denial capabilities. If realized, China's counter-intervention capabilities would challenge the United States capacity to access its allies and extend deterrence.

Finally, the United States, after a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, is now in the process of reordering strategic priorities—in pivoting or rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region.

The Alliance and the Rise of China

In this context of continuity and change over the past fifteen years, how then should the alliance address the issues of continuity and change in rise of China? The process should start with a clear definition of our objectives: to engage China toward greater international engagement and support for a rules-based international order as the surest path to China's economic development and prosperity, and, at the same time, to maintain stability, to enhance security and maintain a balance of power favorable to U.S. and Japanese interests the Asia-Pacific region. These are not mutually exclusive goals; neither are they adverse to Chinese interests.

In short, the alliance should continue the strategic approach that the United States and Japan have pursued consistently since Deng Xiaoping opened China to the market in the late 1970's—an approach marked by intensive engagement—one with the aspiration that China emerge as the Responsible Stakeholder envisioned by Bob Zoellick and, at the same time, one that manages the risk that our aspirations for China may not be met.

Within the United States and Japan, this process should begin with the recognition that we face an increasingly complex regional and international environment as well as daunting domestic fiscal and social challenges; that the way ahead in dealing with the rise of China is to enhance prospects for U.S.-Japan cooperation across the board.

In the security field in particular, here's where the alliance can positively contribute to stability and security in the Asia-Pacific region and at the same time manage down-side risks with respect to China. This starts with the United States making unmistakably clear its commitment to extend deterrence (nuclear and conventional) to Japan. This involves not only the verbal reiteration of the long-standing U.S. commitment but also requires demonstrable capabilities to do so. This means maintaining a forward deployed U.S. force presence in Japan and as well developing the capabilities to assure Japan of our ability to extend deterrence.

Today, this means the United States and Japan together meeting the challenge posed by the development of anti-access/area denial capabilities.

To enhance security cooperation within the alliance, Japan should, as advocated by the Council Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era in 2010 and most recently by the Frontier Subcommittee of the National Strategy Council, Japan the review of Article IX and the restrictions on the exercise of collective self-defense. This would serve to strengthen alliance cooperation and, in turn, strengthen deterrence. The deterrence posture of the alliance can be strengthened by enhanced defense cooperation, in particular by expanding joint training and exercises in Japan's southwest, by expanding information sharing, patrolling and surveillance activities, by establishing a coordinated crisis management mechanism; and by cooperation in the hardening of U.S. bases in Japan to allow operations in the face of attack.

The deterrence posture of the alliance can and must be strengthened by increases in Japan's defense spending that will enable Japan to realize the dynamic defense force of the 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines. In a strained fiscal environment this will be a continuing political challenge but one that must be met if Japan is to be able to "effectively deter and respond to various contingencies" and at the same time "to proactively engage in activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and to improve the global security environment."

The United States must also make clear that its alliance commitment to the defense of Japan includes the Senkaku islands. While the United States does take an official position regarding the sovereignty claims, Beijing should be given no reason to doubt that the U.S. treaty commitment to defend Japan extends to the Senkaku islands.

As alliance partners and trading nations, the United States and Japan share an interest in maritime security. In the face of China's increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea, Washington and Tokyo, as they have, must continue to focus their diplomacy on support for freedom of navigation; support for ASEAN and ASEAN's efforts to develop a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea; and for the peaceful resolution of disputes in the region.

In this regard, United States and Japanese efforts in capacity building in Southeast Asia will enhance regional stability and security. Japan's decision to transfer patrol boats to the Philippines, Vietnam, and Malaysia is a case in point; as is the recently reported Ministry of Defense initiative to extend non-combat technical assistance to Indonesia, Vietnam, East Timor, Cambodia, Mongolia, and Tonga. Strengthening national resilience across the Asia-Pacific region and sustaining a rules-based international order, free of coercion, must be key strategic objectives of the alliance.

The Road Ahead

Fifteen years in the future we are likely to find ourselves asking the same questions we asked of our selves fifteen years ago with respect to the rise of China. I think it is a good bet that we will. The challenges posed by the rise of China are significant and will play out over the century ahead. To be addressed successfully will require the concerted efforts of not just the United States, not just Japan, not just the alliance. Rather success will require the concerted efforts of the western world acting together in support of a rules-based international order—one that enhances stability and in which China can advance its own development—one that incentivizes China to play by the rules and makes clear the risks and consequences of unilateralism.

Chapter 3 The Rise of Nuclear Abolitionism and the Japan-US Alliance

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Since the failure of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in 2005, we have witnessed the rise of nuclear abolitionism, as if to confirm the relevance of William Walker's conception of "nuclear order," consisting of not only the "managed system of deterrence" with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty as a pillar, but also the "managed system of abstinence" with the NPT as a pillar.[1] Even the United States, especially under the Barack H. Obama administration, has strengthened its commitment to reducing the number and the role of nuclear weapons. If the United States is to or has to maintain the momentum for nuclear reduction, it will likely be asked over and over again whether and how U.S. extended deterrence for Japan can be maintained effective.

Although it is impossible to prove that deterrence works as is often pointed out, it is possible to argue, based on empirical observations, that Northeast Asia enjoys a high degree of stability at higher levels of the escalation ladder, on the one hand, primarily due to the massive U.S. superiority in military might. On the other hand, however, the region has come to suffer increasing instability at lower levels of the escalation ladder, as indicated by North Korea's intermittent provocations and China's intensifying maritime activities. Thus, despite the concern expressed by some Japanese while the Obama administration was seeking a new nuclear reduction treaty with Russia, there is no need of worrying so much about "nuclear" extended deterrence. What really matters is "conventional" one.

This is not entirely new, to be sure. The United States since the end of the Cold War has tried to change deterrence posture into one based more on denial capabilities, supposedly more adequate for countering lower-level threats. The same can be said of the Japan-U.S. alliance, as indicated by the Japan-U.S. missile defense cooperation since the late 1990s.[2] However, the changes in deterrence posture, together with the U.S. exclusive emphasis on nonproliferation, have had some negative ramifications as well. A prominent instance of such ramifications was the crisis of the NPT regime, which in turn led to the rise of nuclear abolitionism in the late 2000s.[3]

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[1] William Walker, "Nuclear Order and Disorder," *International Affairs*, Vol. 76, No. 4, October 2000, pp. 703-724. See also, William Walker, "International Nuclear Order: A Rejoinder," *International Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 4, July 2007, pp. 747-756.

[2] For the Japan-U.S. missile defense cooperation and its implications for the alliance's deterrence posture, see, for instance, Taku Ishikawa, "Japan: Harmony by Accident?" *Contemporary Security Policy*, Vol. 26, No. 3, December 2005, pp. 639-662.

However, the Obama administration's actual commitment to nuclear reduction has turned out to be rather weak, as indicated by the 2010 *Nuclear Posture Review Report* (2010 NPR). The New START treaty, concluded in April 2010, proved to be a typical "arms control" treaty stipulating considerably modest reduction rather than "deep cuts" of nuclear weapons. Besides, the Obama administration has succeeded an existing logic that if a U.S. ally supports nuclear disarmament, then it has to make contributions in the area of conventional capabilities. In other words, it has to contribute to "regional deterrence" or "regional security architecture" the Unites States is seeking to enhance, as the 2010 NPR states, "Enhancing regional security architectures is a key part of the US strategy for strengthening regional deterrence while reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons."[4]

Although it is not necessarily clear what kind of "regional security architecture" the United States is pursuing in this region, it seems undeniable that the Japan-U.S. alliance has been moving in the right direction since the mid-1990s. The 2010 NPR and Japan's National Defense Program Guideline of 2010 indicate that the alliance is still heading towards the right direction. The problem is whether the alliance, especially Japan, can really implement what they think should be done.

However, due to the severe budgetary constraints on the both sides of the Pacific, it seems increasingly difficult for the alliance to strengthen conventional capabilities. Besides, nuclear abolitionism seems to be losing momentum already, with little prospect of further nuclear arms reductions by both the United States and Russia. Nonetheless, if the Japan-U.S. alliance is to maintain and enhance the momentum for nuclear disarmament.

The alliance should build effective "regional security architecture" in Northeast Asia. It should study America's Air/Sea Battle Concept, among other things, so as to figure out whether and how the concept can be developed into an important component of the architecture. Japan and the United States should also examine the possibility and the desirability of further multilateralizing security cooperation in order to enhance effective architecture.

Although active engagement by Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) in international peace cooperation activities will do some good to the SDF's capabilities and to the Japan-U.S. security relations, Japan should do more "for its own defense."[5] For instance, Japan should reinforce capabilities to address the increasing instability at lower levels of the escalation ladder in Northeast Asia.

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[3] For instance, the first and foremost objective of the "four gangs" in proposing a "World Free of Nuclear Weapons" should be interpreted as reinvigorating the nuclear nonproliferation regime. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn, "A World Free of Nuclear Weapons," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 2007, p. A15.

[4] US Department of Defense, *Nuclear Posture Review Report*, April 2010, p. 32.

[5] Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Getting Asia Right through 2020*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2007, p. 20.

The alliance should establish an effective division of labor between the SDF and U.S. forces through close consultations. Through such consultations, Japan and the United States may perhaps find some disarmament measures, such as adoption of no-first-use policy, possible.

At the same time, the alliance should try to make the regional security architecture more comprehensive than the Obama administration's military-oriented conception so as to avoid provoking a regional arms race, but Japan should not think that efforts to make it more comprehensive can replace its contributions to the military aspect of the architecture. As the alliance makes efforts to get the architecture more inclusive and conciliatory, though inconceivable in the near future, it may perhaps find some restrictions on missile defense inevitable.[6]

Admittedly, however, largely due to the severe budgetary constraints mentioned above, the alliance may likely have to depend to some extent on a fiction as if nuclear deterrents were effective against any level of threat, at least for the time being.[7] Then, it may be a rather urgent task for the alliance to prevent the Non-Aligned Movement countries from upsetting the "nuclear order," although in doing so Japan is very likely to find its dilemma over nuclear disarmament becoming more acute.[8]

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[6] Though still a minority, some analysts have begun to argue that the United States may have to accept a certain degree of vulnerability, especially vis-à-vis a rising China. Robert J. Art, *America's Grand Strategy and World Politics*, Taylor and Francis, 2009, p. 351; George Perkovich, "Principles for Reforming the Nuclear Order," *Proliferation Papers, Security Studies Center*, Fall 2008, p. 21.

[7] For a more detailed view, see, Taku Ishikawa, "The Japan-US Alliance Facing the Age of Nuclear Disarmament: From 'Extended Deterrence' to 'Regional Deterrence,'" in Yuki Tatsumi, ed., *The New Nuclear Agenda: Prospects for US-Japan Cooperation*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2012, pp. 23-39.

[8] A new edition of the so-called "Armitage Report" also refers to the dilemma, stating that "Japan is torn between its desire to see a nonnuclear world and its concern that if the United States decreases its nuclear forces to parity with China, the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence will be weakened and Japan will suffer the consequences." Richard L. Armitage and Joseph S. Nye, *U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia*, Center for Strategic and International Studies, August 2012, p. 14.

Chapter 4 U.S. Forward Presence in a Changing Strategic Environment

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The United States and Japan face a variety of security challenges in the Asia Pacific region today. North Korea remains the most immediate military threat. The North's ability to sustain an invasion of the South may have deteriorated, but Pyongyang's ballistic missile and nuclear weapons programs and uncertainty about stability under Kim Jong-un are forcing the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea to contemplate additional contingencies, including potential North Korean use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in war-fighting scenarios, horizontal proliferation, provocations comparable to the attacks on the ROK's Cheonan naval vessel and the island of Yeongpyeong, and regime collapse or instability. Divergences of Washington and Beijing over the handling of these scenarios would introduce a major element of strategic competition in the U.S.-China relationship. In addition, the Asia Pacific region is prone to major natural disasters comparable to the December 2004 Asian tsunami and the March 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami. These types of mega-disasters create not only a humanitarian imperative for action but also have the potential to heighten competition for strategic influence among major powers to the extent that the event impacts internal political legitimacy or stability of smaller states. Terrorism also continues to pose a threat to the stability of states within South and Southeast Asia and to the U.S. homeland, despite considerable progress against such threats as Jemaah Islamiya and the Abu Sayyaf Group over the past decade in Southeast Asia. Finally, Asia's leading economies remain highly dependent on maritime, cyberspace, and space commons, but they are also becoming technologically equipped—if they were to become adversaries—to threaten or interrupt those domains.

However, the central geostrategic uncertainty we and our allies and partners face in the Asia Pacific region is how China's growing power and influence will impact order and stability in the years ahead. The United States and Japan need a force posture and a strategy of engagement that demonstrates U.S. commitment and reinforces order and cooperation at a time when much of the region perceives a shifting balance of power. This does not mean we need a strategy of containment. Nor is the central purpose of our force posture strategy in Asia to prepare for future conflict with China. Indeed, the United States and China have a stake in each other's success, as the President put it early last year. U.S. strategy must therefore be to "win the peace" by building a relationship with China that makes conflict virtually unthinkable and cooperation mutually attractive. This will require instruments of national power beyond military forces alone. Trade, diplomacy and the broader regional acceptance of American values will be critical.


Landscape of Security Challenges
Legend
Territorial Dispute
Security Tensions
Natural Disasters
Nuclear Proliferation
Russia
hstan
Kuril Islands
Earthquake and Tsunami March 11, 2011
Japan
• Provocation
• Proliferation
• Instability of Regime
North Korea
South Korea
Takeshima/Dokdo
Cyber / Space Vulnerabilities
Mongolia
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
China
Rising / Non Transparent Military Budgets
Sichuan Earthquake May 12, 2008
East China Sea
First Island Chain
Taiwan
Taiwan Strait
A2AD
Northern Mariana Islands
Guam
Second Island Chain
Palau
Nepal
Bhutan
Bangladesh
Myanmar (Burma)
India
Annual Floods
Laos
Philippines
Floods, Storms December 2011
Vietnam
Thailand
Cambodia
Cyclone Nargis May 2, 2008
South China Sea
Indian Ocean Tsunami December 26, 2004
Piracy, Terrorism
Piracy, Terrorism
Brunei
Sri Lanka
Strait of Malacca
Malaysia
Singapore
Sumatra
Malaysia
Borneo
Celebes
Indonesia
New Guinea
Indonesia
Lombok Strait
Timor Leste (East Timor)
Timor
Java
Australia

By remaining persistently engaged across the region our forces shape a more cooperative peacetime environment and demonstrate a readiness and resolve to respond to contingencies that threaten the peace. Specifically, U.S. force posture can enhance the shaping of the peacetime environment by:

- Assuring allies and partners of U.S. security commitments, which encourages solidarity against challenges to their interests and discourages unilateral escalation in a crisis;
- Dissuading Chinese coercion or North Korean aggression by demonstrating solidarity with and among allies and partners;
- Shoring up the security and self-capacity of vulnerable states so that they are neither targets of coercion or expansion nor havens for violent extremists; and Reassuring China where possible through engagement in bilateral and multilateral security cooperation and

confidence-building on common challenges (e.g., counter-proliferation, counter-terrorism).At the same time, U.S. forces that are forward deployed and persistently engaged set the stage for more effective deterrence and better contingency capabilities by:

- Shaping requirements, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures of U.S. allies and partners for more competent coalitions across the range of possible contingencies (with Australia, Japan, and the ROK at the higher spectrum of intensity and with other allies and partners at lower intensity levels, such as HA/DR);
- Networking those allies and partners with each other to enable more effective coalitions when needed (e.g., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Japan-ROK);
- Gaining greater familiarity with the immediate security environment and with combined and/or interoperable interaction with other allied and partner forces;
- Increasing overall maritime domain awareness for individual countries as well as shared awareness across the Indo-Pacific littoral and ensuring the integrity of the first and second island chains with respect to adversaries in a conflict;
- Complicating the military planning of potential adversaries by identifying and developing arrangements for access, prepositioning, over-flight, and other needs, thereby dispersing possible targets and providing redundancy; and Identifying and testing what planners call "off ramps" for crisis avoidance and de-escalation in crises, through regular direct and indirect military-to-military engagement. The United States will have to realign its force posture in the years ahead to achieve these objectives, while managing other pressures on forward presence, including:
- The need to reduce the burden on Okinawa, preferably by implementing the 2006 Roadmap;
- The desire of allies and partners to keep the U.S. present to balance China while not being forced to choose between the United States and China;
- The downward pressure on U.S. defense budgets and continued demands from the Middle East, despite the Obama administration's pledge to "rebalance" forces towards Asia;
- Current shortcomings in U.S. capabilities that will be exacerbated by a more distributed presence, including the need for more lift, missile defense, and combat sustainability;
- The trend towards declining defense budgets among key allies like Japan and Australia.

Chapter 5 The Rise of China and the Challenges for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

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The U.S.-Japan alliance has entered into the third phase after the end of the Cold War. The first phase, what journalist Yoichi Funabashi called "alliance adrift," was characterized by the loss of direction for the U.S.-Japan alliance due to the sudden disappearance of the common security threat: the Soviet Union. The second was the revitalization phase for the U.S.-Japan alliance due to the threats from North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, which enabled both Tokyo and Washington to justify not only the maintenance but also the strengthening of the bilateral alliance after the first phase. At the current third phase, China has become the main focus of the alliance.

The aforementioned interpretation may slightly oversimplify the development of the U.S.-Japan alliance for the last two decades; even while the Japanese government cited North Korea as Japan's major threats when taking steps to strengthen its alliance with the United States, it always had China in mind as a more long-term problem. Still, the interpretation presented above is not just rhetorical. Since the Senkaku Islands incident in September 2010, during which China openly took aggressive actions which alarmed the Japanese public, it has become unnecessary for the Japanese government to point to North Korean threats to justify the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance. The result is that the Japanese public showed little concern when the government in Tokyo unveiled in December 2010 the new National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), which clearly targeted China as a potential threat to Japan. It is probable that China's alarming reactions to the Japanese government's decision to purchase the Senkaku Islands from the latter's private owner have reinforced have the concerns that many Japanese hold about the future direction of China.

While a minority view (such as the one proposed by David Kang) posits that China's rise will have disruptive impacts on the U.S.-Japan alliance, the majority of scholars hold the view that it will help or require Tokyo and Washington to strengthen their bilateral alliance. The logic of power balancing and the role of ideology indeed make it more likely that the alliance will be strengthened to cope with the rise of China rather than either Japan or the United States will abandon the other partners and make a separate deal with China for at least a decade or two. In addition, because both Sino-U.S. and Sino-Japanese relations are characterized by similar trends—deepening economic interdependence and increasing security concerns—one may be inclined to think that Washington and Tokyo may be able to coordinate their approaches to China relatively easily.

This may be true, but it does not mean that the two allies do not face some difficult coordination problems. While it is true that the rise of China tends to converge U.S. and Japanese interests and to prompt them to seek similar security policies, such as strengthening security cooperation with India and Australia, it has not eliminated the divergence of interests between the two allies. Policymakers in both countries, therefore, must recognize clearly where potential differences of interests exist and how to coordinate their security policies. The followings are important potential issues to which both states need to pay sufficient attention.

Taiwan

Since Ma Ying-jeou became the president of Taiwan in 2008, situations surrounding the Taiwan Strait have greatly transformed. China and Taiwan have moved closer in economic realms as a result of the latter's economic dependence upon the former, and Ma took steps to improve and enhance economic and other forms of cooperation between the mainland China and Taiwan. The most symbolic of this trend is the Economic and Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) between them, signed and ratified in 2010. In October 2011, Ma expressed his modified position on the so-called peace accord with the mainland China, showing a more forthcoming attitude toward such an accord while attaching some prior conditions.

Both the United States and Japan have yet to articulate their long-term approaches to Taiwan under the changing dynamics across the Taiwan Strait. Previously, the main concern for Tokyo and Washington was how to prevent the clash between Taiwan and the mainland China, and both capitals have enjoyed the absence of clash in the Taiwan Strait. For a long-term, however, they also need to consider more seriously the implications of the still unlikely but increasingly possible scenario that Taipei and Beijing may agree on some form of security arrangements. This is an extremely sensitive and difficult issue for the two allies, and differences in geographic proximity and capability differences may create divergence between them. For instance, a peaceful resolution of the status of Taiwan between Beijing and Taipei may relieve policymakers in Washington of a huge strategic headache, those in Tokyo may still worry about its implication for its maritime security in East China Sea. Both Tokyo and Washington should use official and track-two processes to discuss this issue in order to coordinate their policy toward Taiwan.

Southeast Asia

While maintaining balance of power in northeast Asia remains an important common goal for the U.S.-Japan alliance, the relative strategic significance of Southeast Asia has been increasing more for the United States as a result of China's (and India's) rise. This is often pointed out by scholars and experts who raise the increasing strategic significance of the area stretching the Strait of Hormuz through the Indian Ocean to the Strait of Malacca, which is the choke point of sea passage for commercial and military vessels. The increasing importance of this area is reflected in U.S.

strategy of diffusing basing arrangements/military assets in the Asia Pacific, and its increasing willingness to express its interests in the freedom of passage in South China Sea.

While this does not create serious differences between the United States and Japan, policymakers in both states must be aware of the implications of Southeast Asia's increasing importance and to avoid misunderstandings. For instance, the new strategic environments are requiring the U.S. military to increase its presence in the region outside northeast Asia, and this may create the perceptions in Japan that the United States may be shifting its focus outside the sub-region most important for Japan. In order to avoid such misunderstandings and to educate the public in Japan and the United States about the shifting security dynamics in East Asia, Tokyo and Washington need to coordinate their respective policies, such as taking measures to reduce vulnerabilities of U.S. bases in Japan and to maintain/enhance the effectiveness of U.S. forces in the region as a whole.

North Korea

Both Japan and the United States understand that they need China's cooperation to deal with North Korea. They also understand that the prospect of China's cooperation will increase when they, as well as South Korea, take a coordinated approach toward North Korea. This does not necessarily mean their policy coordination is easy, however. The past record shows that Japan's obsession with the abductees' issue and U.S. unilateral initiatives toward North Korea could hamper their bargaining power vis-à-vis North Korea and China.

In order to maximize the leverage over North Korea and China, therefore, U.S.-Japan (plus South Korean) policy coordination is essential. This is particularly applicable to Japan, whose overly rigid attitude on the abductees' issues could stall the Six Party process even if the other countries clear the hurdles for initiating the process. Fortunately, Japan's domestic political atmosphere has eased somewhat with some of the abductees' family members for the last several years expressing a desire for a more pragmatic approach to Pyongyang. The Japanese government needs to move forward to create a more room domestically for diplomatic flexibility so that it may be able to take a coordinated approach with the United States (and South Korea) toward North Korea when necessary.

South Korea

The complexity of South Korean-Japanese relations has been widely recognized. Despite the common security threats from North Korea, history issues (broadly defined) between the two U.S. allies tend to hinder their meaningful cooperation, or even to tarnish relations between Seoul and Tokyo. The recent turmoil caused by ROK President Lee Myung-bak's visit to Takeshima/Tokdo

Island and his comment concerning the Japanese emperor's visit to South Korea shows again the fragile nature of this bilateral relationship in the age of Internet nationalism. The rise of China could further complicate this relation since China can effectively use history and other issues to create a wedge between Seoul and Tokyo.

While it would be ideal for Tokyo and Seoul to be able to overcome their differences by themselves and control their excessive nationalism, it is probable that situations will arise where the United States will be required to take a more active role in mediating the two allies. This will expose the United States to certain policy risks of alienating one or even both of its allies if it mismanages its responses to Seoul and/or Tokyo. In order to minimize such policy risks, the United States would need to pay sufficient attention to domestic politics of both countries, and should not hesitate to use its good office to restrain both allies.

Russia

It is fair to assess that the baseline of U.S. policy toward Russia under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations has been to maintain sound relations with Russia to the extent possible although there have been some turbulences. This policy is reasonable given the rise of China, and Russia has recognized the logic underlying U.S. policy. The same strategic rationale can be detected in Japan's approach to Russia, although Japan is still domestically unprepared for moving to strengthen strategic relations with Russia. It is possible that this U.S. approach toward Russia has provided an opportunity for Moscow to take a hard-line position toward Japan on the territorial issues, however. During the Cold War, Japan could expect U.S. diplomatic support to restrain Moscow from taking steps to aggravate the status quo, but this is no longer applicable in the current strategic environments.

Japan and the United States need to understand each other's baseline approach toward Russia and devise their respective Russia policies accordingly. This is especially important for Tokyo, which tends to focus exclusively on the Northern territory issues without considering fully a larger strategic view toward Russia. After all, Japan has already taken steps to increase economic and energy cooperation with Russia, and it is unlikely that Japan will obtain additional bargaining leverage to resolve the territorial issue with its maximum demand of the simultaneous return of the four disputed islands. In other words, it would be in Japan's national interests to strengthen relations with Russia by finding a mutually acceptable formula to break the stalemate on the territorial issue.

The potential differences between the United States and Japan as discussed above by no means suggest that the U.S.-Japan alliance is in peril. (The opposite may be true; the aforementioned issues are not necessarily difficult to overcome or manage, given the significant overlap of Japanese and U.S. strategic interests.) After all, no alliance is perfect, and states in an alliance always have some conflicting as well as similar interests. In order to manage and enhance the efficacy of the U.S.-Japan alliance, policymakers in both countries must keep the aforementioned issues in mind and coordinate their policies effectively.

Session II

What Needs to Be Done?
- Assignments to Be Tackled Hand-in-Hand and Independently -

Chapter 6 Security: The Preeminent Public Goods

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The conference, "the Japan-U.S. Alliance at a New Stage: Toward a Provider of International Public Goods" reflects the continuing evolution of the Alliance. Forged in a bipolar Cold War environment, the U.S.-Japan Alliance focused on providing for the defense of Japan and international peace and security in the Far East. Today, the alliance operates in a globalized world, having evolved into a political, diplomatic as well as a security instrument. As reflected in Joint Statement issued following Prime Minister Noda's visit to the United States in April of this year, the alliance seeks to address global challenges from a shared "commitment to democracy, the rule of law, open societies, human rights, human security and free and open markets…." At the same time, as reaffirmed in the Joint Statement, the alliance remains indispensable to the security of Japan, and to the peace, security and economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region.

These are among the public goods—by definition goods that can be enjoyed by any number of people without affecting other people's enjoyment; goods that are provided for users collectively and can be jointly consumed by many individuals simultaneously; goods that are non-excludable in nature—that are the subject of today's conference.

In this context, my task today is to answer the questions: "What needs to be done? What are we to do hand-in-hand and independently?" In essence, I have attempted to answer these questions by developing what amounts to a personal "to do list" for the alliance. The list is not all encompassing but focused on what I believe are critical tasks and contributions to international stability and security. Some are political in nature, others involve diplomacy; others are military in nature.

Operational Environment

Today, the United States and Japan are facing an international environment that is increasingly complex and challenging, one in which, as recognized in Japan's 2011 Defense White Paper, "it has become extremely difficult for one country to deal with the issues confronting the international community." This reality holds true for the broad Asia-Pacific region and Northeast Asia as well.

At the same time, the United States and Japan are also faced with daunting fiscal and social challenges that will inevitably affect our resp curity interests and policy choices. The fact that our values and interests, while not identical, are compellingly congruent argues for increasingly close policy coordination between the United States and Japan.

Yet there actions we can take individually as alliance partners, that can serve to advance the public goods—that of our respective people and the international community at large.

Security: The Preeminent Public Goods

As alliance partners, the United States and Japan both have roles to play, both independently and hand-in-hand. I want to begin by considering our independent roles in fostering international stability and security.

The United States

Within the context of the alliance, this begins with the United States historic commitment to defend Japan. A secure Japan is a Japan more capable of positively engaging Japan has moved the world beyond Northeast Asia. And, over the life of the alliance, Japan has enhanced its contribution to fostering public goods across the world.

To support Japan's security and international engagement, Washington must make unmistakably clear the U.S. commitment to extend deterrence (nuclear and conventional) to Japan. This involves both the verbal reiteration of the long-standing U.S commitment, but demonstrable capabilities to do so. This involves maintaining a forward deployed U.S. force presence in Japan and as well developing the capabilities necessary to assure Japan, and other U.S. allies, of our ability to extend deterrence. Today, this means meeting the challenge posed by the development of anti-access/area denial capabilities.

In the 2010 QDR, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates tasked the services with developing the capabilities to fight and prevail in an anti-access/area denial environment. This charge was again set out as one of the Primary Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces in the January 2012 Strategic Guidance.

In their February, 2012 article, "Air-Sea Battle—Promoting Stability in an Era of Uncertainty," Air Force Chief of Staff Norton Schwartz and Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert wrote "The United States will continue to make the necessary investments to ensure we maintain regional access and the ability to operate freely in keeping with our treaty obligations." They went on to emphasize that the driving force behind the development of the Air–Sea Battle concept "stems from the importance of our nation's capacity for protecting allies and partners as well as assuring freedom of access to key areas of international air, sea, space and cyberspace;"—all are critical public goods that support international commerce and prosperity and, in turn, stability and security.

To enhance confidence in the U.S. ability to extend deterrence, the United States should seek to expand access across the Asia-Pacific region. The Darwin rotation is a recent case in point. Looking ahead, by looking back, I would note that during the Second World War, U.S. submarines operated out of Perth and Brisbane. Expanding access serves to enhance deterrence by complicating any potential adversary's decision-making.

With regard to the South China Sea, the United States must maintain its principled position on freedom of navigation; its diplomatic support for ASEAN and ASEAN's efforts to develop a Code of Conduct to govern the South China Sea; and for the peace resolution of disputes in the region. Sustaining freedom of navigation through the region is a public good that supports economic prosperity and stability across the broad Asia-Pacific region.

The United States could also strengthen its diplomatic hand by ratifying UNCLOS—though, despite the support of the U.S. military leadership, prospects are unfortunately not favorable for Senate ratification in the next Congress.

And, with sequestration on the horizon, it is also incumbent on our political leadership to address, and resolve, the critical budget and fiscal issues facing the United States today. These are issues at the very core of the sustainability of the U.S. pivot/rebalance to Asia. They will affect the future of the U.S. force structure and presence in the Asia-Pacific region and, in turn, the credibility of the U.S. commitment to extend deterrence and to defend Japan. The United States must be able to resource the naval, air, ground and electronic assets—space and cyber—necessary to sustain the credibility of the United States pivot/rebalance.

Japan

For Japan, a starting point should be the commitment to fund the "dynamic defense" force outlined in the 2010 New National Defense Program Guidelines. This will require difficult choices with regard to the allocation of financial resources and the development of platforms. In a strained fiscal environment this will be a continuing political challenge but one that must be met if Japan is to be able to "effectively deter and respond to various contingencies" and at the same time "to proactively engage in activities to further stabilize the security environment in the Asia-Pacific region and to improve the global security environment."

To deter and respond to various contingencies effectively, the SDF must continue to increase its joint operational effectiveness. The large-scale joint exercises, such as the November 2011 exercise, conducted on Kyushu, Okinawa and the Anami islands south of Okinawa, serve to enhance the SDF's defensive capabilities to meet various contingencies. The SDF is the first-responder in the defense of Japan.

To proactively engage in activities that stabilize the regional and global security environment, there are a number of political decisions that should be taken to advance Japan's standing as an alliance and international partner.

In this context, the Report issued by the Council Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era made a number of recommendations. Many were incorporated into the 2010 NDPG. Two of the recommendations, however, remain to be acted upon. The first called for the review of Article IX and the restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self defense. The second called for a review the International Peace Keeping Law.

In July, the Noda government considered legislation that would allow the SDF, while engaged in Peace Keeping Operations, to use weapons to protect civilians beyond the SDF's assigned area of operations. Yielding to the opinion of the Cabinet legislative Bureau, the government postponed consideration of the legislation. But, as NGOs are integrated into Japan's PKO missions, the use of weapons to protect civilians will have to be addressed.

Both with respect to Article IX and the International Peacekeeping Law, the reconsideration of the restrictions on the exercise of the right of collective self-defense and rules of engagement are steps that Japan could take in support of the public good of security, both its own and that of the international community.

This is not to deny the value and significance of the expanding role the SDF has played in Peace Cooperation activities over the past twenty years under the International Peace Cooperation Law, only to argue the opportunities exist for Japan and the SDF to make a fuller contribution to the international community in support of the public goods of safety and security. And to enhance the efficacy of Japan's participation in international peace cooperation activities, a permanent law governing the dispatch of the SDF should be enacted.

Japan's diplomacy and Official Development Assistance efforts serve to support peace-building in post conflict countries. Programs aimed at human resource development, fostering good governance, the rule of law, and the respect for democratic values support economic development and political evolution across the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Within the Asia-Pacific region, Japan's hosting of the Fourth Mekong Summit in April and the commitment of approximately 6 billion yen for infrastructure projects in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam in support of an East-West Economic Corridor across mainland

Southeast Asia support economic development and enhance prospects for political evolution across the region. With respect to Myanmar, the government's decision to forgive repayment of outstanding loans and to embark on a programs aimed human and infrastructure development, and to resume concessional ODA lending, represent support for the government's incipient efforts at political reform.

Likewise noteworthy is Japan's commitment to the strategic use of ODA to improve maritime security in the South Pacific and in Southeast Asia. In keeping with the revision of the arms export regulations, the decision to transfer patrol boats to the Philippines,Vietnam, and Malaysia underscores Japan's commitment to capacity building with Japan's neighbors in the Asia-Pacific region—a security enhancing contribution.

Particular attention should also be paid to Japan's strong diplomatic support for ASEAN, for ASEAN's efforts to develop a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea, and for a rules-based maritime order. Efforts to stabilize the seas and safeguard freedom of navigation contribute to regional and global prosperity—public goods enjoyed by all.

Beyond the Asia-Pacific region, Japan's contributions to Iraq, Afghanistan and now South Sudan, all serve as contributions to the international public goods. Likewise, the establishment of the SDF base in Djibouti, allowing for the basing of P-3C aircraft, has served to enhance Japan's contribution to anti-piracy efforts off Somalia.

What Should We Be Doing Hand-in-Hand?

The answer to this question is one that both governments have given considerable thought to. Recent Two-Plus-Two Statements, going back to the February 2005 document, which put the alliance in a globalized context, provide a clear sense of direction for cooperation in the defense of Japan, in support of prosperity and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond—all public goods—involving instruments that span the economic, political, diplomatic, and security spectrum.

In the world of 2012 and beyond, fiscal constraints and budget imperatives should spur cooperation across the board. For example:

In the advancement of public goods, respective Japanese and American skills and know-how can be brought together with synergistic effects. In remarks delivered in Washington, DC, Akihiko Tanaka, president of the Japan International Cooperation Agency called for greater Japan-U.S. cooperation in development in the fields of health, food security, the environment and in the promotion of public-private partnerships, citing the recently signed Memorandum of Understanding between the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Japan International Cooperation Agency.

With regard to the Defense of Japan, as agreed to by Secretary of Defense Panetta and Minister of Defense Morimoto both governments should expedite a review of the Defense Guidelines, and in this context, review and update our respective roles, missions and capabilities. In a larger context, this should also involve reviewing what the Defense of Japan entails in 2012 as well as the geographic extent of Situations in Areas Surrounding Japan. The defense of Japan today must be considered in greater depth (distance, east to the Central Pacific and west to the sea-lanes in the South China Sea) and breadth (space and cyber) than considered in earlier Defense Guidelines.

Going forward, a good place to start is The Defense of Japan 2012. The Defense White Paper highlights three areas for defense cooperation: the expansion of joint exercises; consideration of expanding joint use of facilities; and an expansion of information sharing; patrolling and surveillance activities. And, given the rapidly evolving Asian security environment, particular emphasis should be placed on ISR, missile defense and maritime security—sea lanes and anti-submarine—space and cyber security. And, in light of the recent Senkaku landing, we also need to sort out together our respective responsibilities in the "gray areas" of Japan's southwest.

To conclude, for both the United States and Japan respective "to do lists" reflect significant challenges, economic and political, but it has been the strength of the alliance that has allowed Washington and Tokyo to meet similar challenges in the past, to advance individual and shared national interests, and, in the process, to contribute to the international public goods. Looking ahead, new challenges will present new opportunities both to deepen and to expand the alliance as a provider of international public goods.

Chapter 7 Japan-U.S. Alliance as a Provider of International Public Goods

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It is increasingly common for Japanese politicians to describe the Japan-U.S. alliance as an international public good. For example, then Finance Minister Yoshihiko Noda characterized it as "an international public good for the stability and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region and the world" in his administration's vision (Noda 2011, p. 101). Similarly, Sadakazu Tanigaki (2010), then President of the Liberal Democratic Party, published an article titled "Restoring conservative politics on the foundation of the Japan-U.S. alliance that is a 'public good' of Asia." It is not obvious, however, whether the alliance itself can be called a public good. The Japan-U.S. alliance is officially defined as "the relationship, based on the Japan-U.S. Security System, whereby both nations, . . ., coordinate and cooperate closely in a range of areas in security, politics and economics" (Ministry of Defense 2011, p. 136). An interstate relationship itself is neither a good nor a service.

This paper attempts to clarify the concept of public good in the context of the Japan-U.S. alliance, by overviewing the previous academic literatures that focus on alliances or hegemons as providers of public goods. I pay attention first to economic theory of alliances and then to political theory of hegemony.

Economic Theory of Alliances

A public good is originally concept of economics. It is often defined as a good that is both nonexcludable and nonrival in consumption. A standard textbook of microeconomics explains these characteristics as follows (Krugman and Wells 2005, p. 477).

- When a good is nonexcludable, the supplier cannot prevent consumption by people who do not pay for it.
- A good is nonrival in consumption if more than one person can consume the same unit of the good at the same time.

For example, national defense is a public good for the citizens to be protected from dangers. It should be noted that "a military expenditure, or a tariff, or an immigration restriction that is a public good to one country could be a "public bad" to another country, and harmful to world society as a whole" (Olson 1971, p. 15n22).

Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser (1966) published a seminal article on an economic theory of alliances. With a focus on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), they make two major arguments:

- An alliance will tend to provide suboptimal amounts of a public good~~:~~; that is, deterrence against aggression by a common enemy.
- The "larger" members of an alliance will tend to bear a disproportionately large share of

> the burden of collective defense.

Disproportionate burden sharing is explained by differences not in moral responsibility but in national interests. A policy implication drawn by them is that "American attempts to persuade other nations to bear 'fair' shares of the burdens of common ventures are likely to be divisive and harmful even to American interests in the long run" (Olson and Zeckhauser 1966, p. 278).

This seminal article has stimulated a scholarly debate on disproportionate burden sharing in NATO (Sandler 1993; Sandler and Hartley 2001). One notable development is formulating a joint product model, which distinguishes three types of outputs produced by defense activities: deterrence, protection (or damage-limitation) for times of conflict, and ally-specific benefits such as curbing domestic unrest, thwarting terrorism, or providing disaster relief. First, as Olson and Zeckhauser argue, deterrence is regarded as a purely public good because it is both nonrival and nonexcludable. Second, protection is considered an impurely public good because it is partially rival due to "force thinning" effects and partially or wholly excludable. Third, ally-specific benefits are private goods among allies.

The collective action problems of suboptimality and disproportionality were more evident in the earlier period of the Cold War. Some scholars attribute this phenomenon to a nuclear-dependent doctrine during 1949-66 of mutual assured destruction (MAD). Deterrence is largely provided by strategic nuclear forces, exemplified by Trident Submarines. During 1967-90, NATO adopted a doctrine of flexible response, which pays more attention to conventional and tactical forces. Impurely public and private benefits are mainly offered by conventional forces. There are some exceptional cases of nonrival conventional capabilities such as "major naval presence designed to punish wayward adversaries (rather than protect allies)" (Palmer and David 1999, p. 766) and precision-guided cruise missiles (Sandler and Hartley 2001). In the post-Cold War period, nuclear weapons play a less central role in NATO (Palmer and David 1999). The strategic doctrine of an alliance seems to influence the mix of joint products.

NATO's new doctrine of crisis management and new mission of nuclear non-proliferation have increased the share of purely public outputs and thus disproportionate burden sharing. Only a few allies can afford to possess power projection capabilities, which is required especially for out-of-area operations (Sandler and Hartley 1999). Nonetheless, out-of-area peace operations themselves can be considered to be globally nonexcludable yet rival in consumption, owing to thinning effects. This is the worst combination for collective action problem because they are both undersupplied and overconsumed, indicated by the "tragedy of the commons" metaphor (Lepgold 1998).

Economic theory of alliances mainly discusses a public good that is beneficial to the member states of an alliance. Nonmembers are excluded from both a nuclear umbrella and mutual military assistance (Lepgold 1998). Moreover, a public good to one alliance could be a "public bad" to another alliance or non-members. Nevertheless, if mutual deterrence is realized among great powers, it can be called a global public good, as Ruben Mendez (1999, p. 411n6) put it:

> "Although the term also begs the question of its goodness, deterrence—if it in fact served its defined purpose—would be a public good not only for citizens of the country or alliance that produces it but also for other countries and even the world at large as beneficiaries of the

> resulting peace. Thus deterrence could be a global and not only a national public good."

Moreover, "[s]uccessful peacekeeping and crisis-management operations provide an increased measure of world stability and security that supplies nonexcludable and nonrival benefits worldwide" (Sandler and Hartley 2001, p. 879). Charles Kindleberger (1986) mentions peace as the primary example of international public goods. Peace can be strengthened by a single dominant state (hegemon). An alliance is a means for supporting this hegemonic endeavors. This point is discussed in the next section.

Political Theory of Hegemony

Hegemonic stability theory, a variant of realism in International Relations, attempts to explain the stability and openness of international economy, by focusing on the benevolent provision of public goods or coercive leadership by a hegemon (Snidal 1985).

Robert Gilpin expanded the scope of this theory to include international security. He defines hegemony as "the leadership of one state (the *hegemon*) over other states in the system" (Gilpin 1981, p. 116n). According to his theory, hegemons supply public goods such as international security and economic order. Because public goods are beneficial not only to the hegemon but also to other status-quo states, they legitimize the leadership of the provider. (This is why Joseph Nye (2011) emphasizes the provision of international public goods in his discussion about soft power and smart power.) However, the provider of international public goods tends to overpay, which may erode the power of the hegemon in the long term. Two successive hegemonic powers are Great Britain and the United States.

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has contributed to peace and security by maintaining its command of the commons. Barry Posen refers to the commons as "areas [of the sea and space] that belong to no one state and that provide access to much of the globe" and "airspace above 15,000 feet." In addition, command is described as follows (Posen 2003, p. 8):

> "Command means that the United States gets vastly more military use out of the sea, space, and air than do others; that it can credibly threaten to deny their use to others; and that others would lose a military contest for the commons if they attempted to deny them to the United States."

As the subtitle of this article puts it, command of the commons is "the military foundation of U.S. hegemony." It also supports peace and order in the commons, which makes global activities of trade, trade, and telecommunications possible. In essence, command of the commons is a major way to provide a public good not only for U.S. allies (Posen 2003, p. 46) but also for other states.

As a hegemon, the United States has formed and maintained asymmetric alliances with lesser states. In asymmetric alliances, weaker allies' protection from external threats is exchanged for their military bases and concessions in foreign and domestic policies. In other words, weaker allies can gain greater security while the hegemon can increase its autonomy. The United States has extended hegemony by using bases in allies for the projection of power (Morrow 1991). The network of asymmetric alliances also provides a significant foundation of U.S. hegemony.

The Japan-U.S. alliance is a typical example of asymmetric alliances. Article VI of the 1960 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty stipulates that "[f]or the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and *the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East*, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of *facilities and areas in Japan* [emphasis added]." In exchange, Article V provides joint defense of Japan. Through its security arrangements with the United States, Japan has contributed to the hegemonic provision of a critical public good; that is, peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond.

Evelyn Goh (2011) regards maintaining U.S. preponderance as a "crucial public good for regional security" and specifies Japan's contribution to it as follows.

- ➢ The security treaty furnishes the U.S. with a compelling and legal *raison d'etre* for a very significant military presence in the region.
- ➢ Japan . . . bears a disproportionate burden of sustaining the U.S. presence.
- ➢ Japan has contributed increasingly significantly to sustaining U.S. preponderance under new strategic conditions and promoting U.S. hegemony in the face of new threats.

Goh also argues that socializing China is also an important public good that Japan can provide through its alliance with the United State. So long as China remains status quo and committed to the U.S.-centered security order, it can enjoy international public goods provided by the United States and Japan.

Nevertheless, it appears that the U.S. hegemony is eroding, due to relative decline of U.S. power and relative rise of new powers, especially China. In this context, it is worth noting that U.S. command of the global commons seems to be increasingly contested by rising powers and non-state actors (Flournoy and Brimley 2009). For example, China is developing anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Western Pacific.

It is in the national interests of both Japan and the United States to keep providing the public good of "stability on and within the global commons" (Flournoy and Brimley 2009). In order to maintain a liberal international order, which is defined by John Ikenberry as "order that is open and loosely rule-based" (Ikenberry 2011, p. 18), Japan should work with the United State for maintaining the openness of the global commons and creating international norms and rules in this area.

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Chapter 8 U.S.-Japan Alliance as a Provider of Public Goods

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The History

For the last sixty years, the U.S. Japan alliance has played a critical role in providing public goods for East Asia and the international community. This includes:

Security—the alliance provides the platform for the U.S military presence in East Asia that has been the backbone of stability and created the environment that has allowed the region to flourish.

Economic development—the U.S. and Japan have provided the investment, ODA, markets and technology that have allowed East Asian nations to climb the value added curve and become the driving force of the world economy.

Institution building—The U.S. and Japan are the top two contributors to the UN and played key roles in the development and maintenance of other regional and international organizations.

Normative—the U.S. and Japan, as vibrant democracies and market economies, set an example for other countries that helped move them in the direction of democracy and helped bring the Cold War to a successful conclusion.

The New Challenges

We are in a period of dramatic shifts in global and regional power that is seeing the rise of new influential international players. This includes the rise of China and India, the new dynamism of the ROK and ASEAN, and the reemergence of Russia. In the economic area, the G-8 is being supplanted by the G-20. In the military area, the U.S. remains dominant, but Chinese military power is growing, particularly in the maritime area, and its long term objectives are unclear.

In this shifting environment, there are challenges and opportunities for the U.S. and Japan as providers of public goods. In the area of hard power, the revitalization of the U.S.-Japan alliance is critical to the maintenance of stability in East Asia. This includes:

Responding to China's potential threat to maritime security in East Asia, including its effort to develop capabilities to deny access to open seas in the vicinity of the PRC.

Continuing to build the capability to deter and contain the North Korean nuclear and missile threat. This includes trilateral coordination with the ROK.

Maintain the credibility of extended deterrence to ensure that Japan and our other allies do not become vulnerable to nuclear blackmail.

In the area of soft power, there are many opportunities for expanded bilateral and multilateral cooperation to provide public goods. These include:

Renewing the momentum toward open markets and expanded trade, with a particular focus on TPP.

Playing leadership roles in revitalizing international and regional organizations, including the UN, International Financial Institutions, APEC, and ASEAN plus 3.

Building a framework for enhanced cooperation on energy and climate change, working with international organizations and like-minded countries on safe nuclear power generation, more efficient and environmentally friendly exploitation of hydrocarbons, and greater emphasis on developing renewable energy sources.

No two countries are better positioned to take the leadership in these areas. There are many opportunities of collaboration with others, particularly in the soft power arena, including the EU, ROK, ASEAN, and, in many areas, China and Russia. American and Japanese leaders should make providing international public goods a central focus of the alliance. The two countries could use a summit meeting in 2013, when both countries will have been through elections, as an opportunity to put specific proposals for bilateral and multilateral collaboration in this critical area.

Chapter 9 Japan and the US as Provider of Security in Asia-Pacific: a Japanese View

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Japan is the country that has taken the greatest advantage from the postwar international system of widening liberal, political and economic institutions as well as the security commitment by the US in the Cold War system. Despite changing conditions at both domestic and global levels, Japan desires a key postwar framework sustained.

The most significant international change for Japan is that the area surrounding Japan, roughly called as Asia-Pacific, has become the focal point of global politics abundantly endowed with vitality and risks. Located at the center of the Asia-Pacific, Japan recognizes the enormous challenges and that the US commitment to the region as a source of reassurance for peace and prosperity remains vital in the region as well as for Japan.

Japan's strategic landscape has changed dramatically since the Cold War days, and as a general trend, it got worse. North Korea has succeeded in experimenting nuclear explosions and developed medium and long-range missile capability. The military buildup of China and assertive policy in unilaterally pursuing its territorial claims and natural resource rights caused friction and concern with Japan and other neighboring Asian countries. The political upsurge of nationalism made room for maneuver of the government narrower and diplomatic negotiation and compromise more difficult.

The heightened sense of security by the Japanese public led to a series of policy innovation in defense arena. Despite the well-known political turmoil in the last half-decade, Japan recently made significant inroads in updating its defense policy framework by announcing the new National Defense Program Guideline, revising the strongly restrictive arms export policy, selecting the fifth-generation F35 as its next major fighter.

Still, these decisions are far from sufficient to cope with the problems that Japan has to face in coming years. The fundamental challenge for Japan is to keep investing reasonable amount of resources on defense and security area. The most serious issue is to maintain, and if necessary increase, budgetary resources for defense against the extremely stringent fiscal situation chiefly because of the need to support rapidly aging population. Almost as difficult questions are to secure enough human, technological, entrepreneurial resources for defense area and to balance the political movement of increasing local advocacy with the need for national defense burden-sharing. Regrettably right now these issues are not clearly addressed by any political forces in Japan, but they must be tackled by Japan in order to stay in the Asia-Pacific power game.

Under these constraints, Japan needs to be the smartest investor of its resources for defense and foreign policy needs. For that, Japan needs to clarify its strategic objectives as clearly as possible, and finds the most efficient way to achieve goals.

Geopolitically, Japan is precisely on the key strategic fault line, overlapping what Secretary of State Dean Acheson called the American defense perimeter in 1950 and what the analyst of Chinese naval strategy calls the first island chain. In order for Japan to keep its strategic options, Japan needs to have some control over maritime space around itself. This requires operational capability not only in the Pacific but in the East and South China Seas, resisting the rising Anti-Access Area-Denial (A2AD) capability of rising China. This capability includes upgrading coordination levels of the SDFs and the American forces in the Pacific in maritime, amphibious, anti-missile, ISR and other related operations. These arrangements can be a major issue to be tackled with in the new guideline between the two governments.

In addition, the two governments may like to involve other countries in the region such as Republic of Korea, Australia, India, willing members of the ASEAN, and the Pacific Islands, in this maritime cooperation. This sort of deepening cooperation may revitalize the debate over the right of collective defense for Japan. Even though it may be possible for Japan to finesse the issue by coming up with new legal interpretations that has been done before, it is not only time-consuming but logically skewed and unpersuasive to the eyes of the public. The Japanese government needs to tackle the constitutional issue head-on.

Secondly, given the forecast of another big earthquake hitting populous areas in Japan, Japan needs to prepare for the large-scale disasters. Such abilities will be an important resource for Japan to provide assistance in similar disasters in the region as well as the world. Especially important is the higher joint-ness within the Self Defense Forces including use of new commons (space and cyberspace) along with the capability to work together with the American Forces and other helping countries. This also requires higher level of coordination among various sections in Japan: SDF, police forces, firefighters, local government, private companies, NGO, etc. Key issue here is flexible use of the infrastructure such as airports, highways, and trains in time of emergency.

Thirdly, Japan's security is closely connected with the Korean peninsula and Northern pacific area towards the Arctic sea. For the Korean peninsula, Japan continues to provide key facilities for the U.S. to achieve its commitment to the peninsula, while Japan is willing to participate in the US-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation. Japan also sees the North Korean nuclear and missile capability as paramount threats. Japan needs to continue upgrading the missile defense capability along with securing American extended deterrence, while being engaged in the peaceful talk to de-nuclearize and open up the DPRK to the outside world. On Russia, the Japanese public opinion is fired up against the Medvedev's repeated visits to the Northern territories, but Japan has not yet seen Russian comeback in Asia as a serious military threat. Still, Japan pays close attention to the Russian intention in the region, particularly its relations with other countries.

At the Security Consultative Committee on April 27 this year, Japan and the U.S. agreed to deepen "dynamic defense cooperation." This is no doubt a right direction, but this cooperation also needs to be smart in two senses. First, Japan and the U.S. together needs to find smart way to achieve key security objectives with most efficient and politically acceptable way. Particularly, the U.S. is expected a sophisticated doctrine and placement of forces which assures its commitment, limits local burden to reasonable level with the wisest price tag.

Second, defense policy needs to be combined with political, diplomatic, economic, and cultural policies in the Asia-Pacific region, which need to strengthen habits of solving conflicts peacefully. The region also needs more open economic cooperation backed by political realities. The U.S. needs to be part of the multilateral rules both at the regional and global levels. The ratification of the UNCLOS is a matter of serious political contention within the U.S., but its ratification will certainly increase its influence in the diplomatic arena. Japan has its own misery of being unable to make its mind on the issue of the Trans Pacific Partnership. But the U.S. also needs to take the lead with an eye to the days of enlarging this into the FTAAP. By strengthening and creating just and equitable rules which can create sympathetic political forces within countries in Asia, Japan and the U.S. will be able to provide the public goods truly desired in the region.

Another key area for Japan-US security cooperation is natural resources and energy. The over-reliance of rare earths produced in China makes importing countries vulnerable. Development of alternative materials, diversified sources and technology to save rare earths has an important political implication for Japan and the U.S. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident and the so-called "Shale Gas revolution" in the U.S. and elsewhere have led to large-scale energy policy review both countries. Whatever happens to Japanese nuclear policy, Japan needs to maintain its key nuclear expertise and business resources that can contribute safe and secure development of nuclear energy use around the world in the prospective future. In addition, they are needed for disposing nuclear reactors and nuclear spent fuels. But given the inherent paucity of energy resources, Japan needs to lead the world by energy conservation and efficiency. The U.S., on its part, needs to resolve the issue of the disposal of the NSF. Needless to say, energy policy needs to be coupled with reasonable policy on climate change and other environmental issues. Keeping the first-rate energy and environment policy and technology will greatly enhance the diplomatic stance of Japan and the U.S.

More broadly, Japan and the U.S. needs to work together to review the global proliferation regime. The two countries led the postwar world based on the notion that the military and peaceful use of nuclear technology is possible, and the hegemonic country, like the U.S. owns nuclear weapons providing, extended deterrence to non-nuclear-armed countries. This arrangement worked well until the post Cold War era, but it appears eroding. The admission of India into the nuclear community, the trend of the proliferation of nuclear technology to the developing countries that are not necessarily democratic, the issue of Israel and Pakistan as other non-NPT nuclear powers, and the increasing amount of spent fuels and the difficulty of nuclear cycle technology, all direct towards the wholesale review of how mankind deals with the nuclear technology. While the post-Fukushima policies need to be decided and implemented, the world, and particularly two countries, needs to lead the fundamental discussion on this issue.

Chapter 10 What Needs to Be Done?: Assignments to Be Tackled Hand-in-Hand and Independently

Nicholas SZECHENYI

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The joint statement issued in conjunction with the April 30 Obama-Noda summit presents a shared vision for the future of the U.S.-Japan alliance and a framework for enhancing bilateral cooperation. The statement reprises the shared values that underpin the alliance, outlines common strategic objectives and covers a range of issue areas as a testament to the breadth and depth of the bilateral agenda. What must be done to implement this vision, and what are some of the challenges going forward?

Fundamentally, the vitality of the U.S.-Japan alliance will depend on the strength of the two economies. Both countries prioritized stimulus measures in the wake of the global economic crisis but have struggled to outline strategies for long-term growth and a return to fiscal health. Japan is devising a post-3/11 growth strategy that will depend on a stable supply of energy but has yet to reach consensus on an energy mix to support a path towards sustainable growth. The question of trade liberalization and Japan's role in regional economic integration also looms large, especially given the potential for joint leadership with the United States under the rubric of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Looming cuts in defense spending in the United States would carry economic consequences and could raise questions about the durability of strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific. In short, growth strategies and security strategies are inextricably linked. To repeat a core theme from a JFIR conference on "smart power" last year: There is no hard power or soft power without economic power. Downward pressure on defense spending in both countries places a premium on inter-operability between the JSDF and U.S. forces. Joint training, as outlined in the April 27 bilateral Security Consultative Committee statement, as well as efforts to network with other partners in the region are encouraging developments that will further the role of the alliance in preserving regional peace and stability. Also noteworthy is Japan's relaxation of the three arms export principles to allow the joint development and production of defense equipment, which could expand opportunities for defense industrial collaboration with the United States. The next step is to facilitate ways to realize those opportunities and reduce costs.

There also is a need to further explore concepts such as Dynamic Defense and Air-Sea Battle that are animating the strategic debate on security challenges in the Asia-Pacific region. The alliance should be agile in response to a changing international security environment and it will be important to ensure that prevalent themes are integrated into the framework for alliance cooperation from which operational requirements will flow. Dialogues on issues including cyber, space, and extended deterrence, documented in an overview of common strategic objectives released in June 2011, also promise to enhance bilateral coordination on new challenges.

These are but a few of the issues confronting Japan and the United States in an increasingly diverse and complex international arena. Fiscal pressures may necessitate hard choices regarding the allocation of resources but the alliance remains grounded in a shared commitment to champion rules and norms that govern the international order. If the objective of this conference is to ask how the U.S.-Japan alliance will be perceived as a purveyor of public goods, the normative aspects of the alliance agenda—from regional economic integration to maritime security and nuclear nonproliferation—should provide answers well into the future.

Chapter 11 Japan's Tasks for Enhancing the Japan-U.S. Alliance

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Japan is now facing multiple difficulties. Militarily, China is rapidly expanding its maritime activities both in the South China Sea and in the East China Sea, and the Senkaku Islands is currently becoming the "frontline" between the U.S.-Japan alliance and China. Besides, financially, Japan is now facing a huge national debt problem that will further damage the performance of Japanese economy in near future. Above all, Japanese politics has been deadlocked by the situation that political leaders cannot make important decisions.

The important question is, as written in a report by the Center for Strategic & International Studies entitled *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Anchoring Stability in Asia*, whether "Japan desires to continue to be a tier-one nation." The answer must be made by Japan itself. In order to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and to maintain Japan as a "tier-one nation," there are many assignments for Japan.

Firstly, Japan should further contribute to enhance stability in Asia. For the purpose of implementing this aim, the U.S.-Japan alliance is the best tool. It was agreed at the Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee on April 27, 2012, that the U.S.-Japan alliance "continues to provide deterrence and capabilities necessary for the defense of Japan and for the maintenance of peace, security and economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region."

There are many areas in which Japan can further enhance the Japan-U.S. alliance. As the region of the Asia-Pacific shows more uncertainties and less stability with the changing balance of power, Japanese defense contribution is going to become more valuable than before. Japan should revise its old-fashioned restraint upon the exercise of the right to collective self-defense. This restraint has been a symbol of not its peaceful constitution but of its unwillingness to contribute more to international security. However, this issue is exceedingly sensitive one to both Korean and Chinese governments. The trilateral official meeting among the U.S., Japan, and the R.O.K. can be a useful framework where the U.S. officials and ministers could persuade Korean counterparts that the Japanese government should do more for international security. Then the Japanese government would more easily modify this restraint. Less domestic criticisms are now seen while more criticisms will come across the East China Sea.

Secondly, it is more necessary than before to integrate further the facilities, bases, personnel and strategies of Japan and the U.S. As both allies face serious budgetary constraints, and both allies need more efficiency to plan and operate jointly, it would be a smart way to integrate U.S. and Japanese forces further. This kind of integration has been seen in several areas, while several important plans are unfortunately deadlocked by the stalemate in the Futenma U.S. Marine Corp reallocation issue. The success in the Operation "Tomodachi" could partly modify the stalemate. There must be further steps to deepen the cooperation and integration between forces of Japan and the U.S.

This sort of integration of forces cannot be achieved without bold leadership by the Japanese government. The deadlock in Japanese politics has been one of the most virulent factor which has been stagnating Japan's defense evolution. However, the DPJ government has been bold in defense issues than the previous LDP government in several areas. There are several examples such as the decision to send the SDF to Haiti after the earthquake in 2010, the new National Defense Program Guideline of 2010, and the revision of the three principles on arms exports, among others. Furthermore, the Japanese government is now serious to enhance its commitments to maritime security in the Asia-Pacific.

There are more pressing "assignments" in Japanese politics. The problem of weak political leadership in Japan is not mainly rooted in cultural or individualistic reasons, but it is more rooted Japan's institutional foundations. Firstly, without either abolishing or largely weakening the upper house, the House of Councilors of Japanese Diet, future prime ministers will also face similar sorts of leadership problem. No other democratic country has such a powerful the upper house. Secondly, we need to establish Japanese "National Security Council." This can help to mitigate frictions which exist among different Ministries. Each Ministry of Japanese administrative machine has more autonomy and power than that of other democracies. Prime Minister's Office is, on the other hand, much smaller in numbers of staffs and political power in comparison with American White House. Japanese prime minister does not have his or her chiefs of staff. It means that Japanese prime minister usually faces difficulty to think independently and communicate directly with his or her counterparts in Japan's important partner countries.

In short, the Japanese government should radically reform its political institutions. For example, Japan has no national security strategy paper, nor a political institution which produces it. Japanese prime minister is vulnerable not because of his or her lack of eligibility, but largely because of the fact that the upper house has exceeding power to veto any of prime ministers important decisions for the purpose of a next election.

Due largely to these political problems, it is difficult for any cabinet to radically reform

Japan’s security policy. Strong political base can help to create a strong security policy.

This stalemate is made, due largely to democratization of Japanese party politics in the last decade. Before it, the LDP prime ministers did not have to fear the possibility of being defeated by the opposition party. Any current prime ministers have to pay more attention to media and public opinion than before, if he or she wants to remain at the post. Japanese prime minister is now more vulnerable to Japanese media, the opposition party, public opinion than ever. If democracy is good to Japanese people, we need to overcome these challenges.

If Japan can become more prosperous, more stable, and stronger in international society, other Asian countries might think that democracy, freedom, the rule of law, and human rights can be friends to economic growth and national security.

Appendix I: Introduction to the Co-sponsors

1. The Japan Forum on International Relations

The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.

[History]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a "public interest foundation" with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

[Purpose]

The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

[Organization]

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the "Board of Trustees" is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the "Directors" and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the "Board of Directors" is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

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[Activities]

In tandem with the core activities of the "Policy Council" in making policy recommendations, another important pillar of JFIR's activities is the BBS "Hyakka-Seiho" which means "Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom" (http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The BBS, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the BBS are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine "Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu" in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the

English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as "JFIR Commentary." They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine "JFIR E-Letter" in English. "JFIR E-Letter" is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

The JFIR's sister organizations of The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) have their own BBS of "Giron-Hyakushutsu" and "Hyakka-Somei." Each of the troika BBS is visited by about 10,000 visitors daily. It means that the troika system of BBS is visited by about 10 million visitors annually even though many of them are repeaters.

2. Introduction to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University

The mission of Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is to conduct strategic studies for the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Combatant Commands to support the national strategic components of the academic programs at National Defense University (NDU) and to provide outreach to other US governmental agencies and to the broader national security community.

INSS includes the following Centers: Center for Strategic Research (CSR), Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP), Center for Complex Operations (CCO), the Center for Strategic Conferencing (CSC), the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC), the Center for Transatlantic Security Studies (CTSS), and the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs (CSMA).

The military and civilian analysts and staff who comprise INSS and its subcomponents execute their mission by performing the following functions: research and analysis, publication, conferences, policy support, and outreach.

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