

**The 32nd Policy Recommendations of
The Japan Forum on International Relations**

Positive Pacifism and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance



October 2009

**The Policy Council
The Japan Forum on International Relations**

Greeting

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) organized the Policy Council within itself immediately after it was founded in 1987, and has since publicly announced a series of policy recommendations approximately on a biannual basis (see Appendix at the end of this booklet). The Policy Recommendations on "Positive Pacifism and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance," which we hereby present, is the 32nd in such a series. In the profound changes of international relations as demonstrated by the end of the Cold War and the rising threats of terrorism after September 11, Japan's position and code of conduct in the international community are required to evolve from the negative or passive pacifism of the past to a positive or active pacifism of the future. In this context, the Japan-U.S. alliance needs to be reviewed accordingly.

With this awareness in mind, the Policy Council of JFIR started deliberations in its first meeting on this theme on September 10, 2008 and adopted them in their final version at its fifth meeting on September 15, 2009. During this time, the Task Force, headed by Prof. MORIMOTO Satoshi, Director & Professor, Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University, and staffed by Prof. KAWAKAMI Takashi, Professor of Takushoku University Graduate School and Mr. TAKAHASHI Sugio, Senior Fellow of the National Institute for Defense Studies, assisted the Policy Council to draft the final text of the Policy Recommendations. However, Prof. MORIMOTO was appointed Advisor to the Minister of Defense on August 1, 2009 and had to resign as Head of the Task Force. Therefore, as Chairman of the Policy Council, I immediately took over his position as Head of the Task Force.

Until the third meeting of the Policy Council on March 19, 2009, the Policy Council had been deliberating this set of Policy Recommendations under the title of "Readjustment of Japan-US Relations and Japan's Future." But in its fourth meeting on June 23, the title was changed to "Positive Pacifism and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance." After taking over Prof. MORIMOTO's duties as Head of the Task Force, I finalized the text of the Policy Recommendations and sent it to the extraordinary fifth meeting of the Policy Council on September 15 for their final approval. As the final version was approved, it was sent to all the members of the Policy Council, of which 87 members agreed to its contents and signed the Policy Recommendations.

In line with the tradition, the full text of this set of Policy Recommendations, both in Japanese and in English, was submitted to the Prime Minister of Japan, released to the press, distributed to opinion leaders both at home and abroad, and made accessible at the website of the Japan Forum on International Relations, <http://www.jfir.or.jp/>. In view of the fact that these Policy Recommendations deal with the Japan-US alliance, linchpin of Japan's diplomacy, at the time of the unprecedented change of administration from one political party to another, we decided to appeal directly to the public at large by running a full-page opinion advertisement of the full text of the Policy Recommendations in the October 23 issue of; The Sankei Shimbun, The Asahi Shimbun, The Nikkei, The Japan Times (English), and International Herald Tribune/The Asahi Shimbun (English).

We take this opportunity to extend our gratitude to Dr. WATANABE Akio, Vice Chairman of the Research Institute for Peace and Security, for his valuable opinion expressed at the second meeting of the Policy Council on December 12, 2008. Our appreciation goes also to the senior officials of the Japanese government who willingly granted us their precious time and advice in their capacity as Policy Council Counselors. The objective of JFIR is to encourage its members to discuss, study and propose ideas on matters of foreign policy, thereby enlightening the public in and out of Japan. In doing so, however, JFIR as an institution neither takes nor rejects any specific positions on matters of foreign policy. The responsibility for the contents of these Policy Recommendations lies solely with those Members of the Policy Council who signed them. JFIR as an institution and the officers and members of JFIR as well as other parties to JFIR who did not sign them are exempted from any responsibility for the contents.

October, 2009

ITO Kenichi
President
Chairman of the Policy Council
JFIR

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Introduction

For the past half a century or so, Japan's standing in the world has undergone a complete change from the one as "a country under occupation" to the one as "a major economic power." And the world, too, has gone through a profound transition from "the Cold War era" to "the post-Cold War era" and then to "the post-post-Cold War era." Throughout these years, Japan has aspired to become, under the protection of the Japan-U.S. alliance, a lightly armed and intensely economic development oriented country. Such a line was then often called "the Yoshida Doctrine." Japan dispatched her Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Iraq and the Indian Ocean because she was requested to do so by the U.S. and because it was considered "less costly" and "less risky" by the Japanese than other ways of response.

Such a passive nature of Japan's response has become no more able to pass in the international community. It is high time for us to consider seriously, without any preconceptions, new strategic options for Japan in the years to come. The question is whether or not we are prepared to advance a new "doctrine," which is to replace "the Yoshida Doctrine." With this awareness in mind, the biggest reason why we present this set of policy recommendations now is, needless to say, the very end of the Cold War which was characterized by the confrontation between East and West and the fundamental changes that have taken place subsequently in the international relations.

From the collapse of the Soviet Union, the dissolution of "the Communist bloc" ensued. And the political and economic systems of "the Democratic bloc" started to expand its reaches globally as known in the name of the "Big Bang." What is "the Democratic bloc"? Economically, it was the Bretton Woods system, that was a liberal market economy system, in contrast to the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) system, that was a socialist planned economy system. Politically, it was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Japan-U.S. alliance, that were confronting the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and the Sino-Soviet alliance. Although NATO and the Japan-U.S. alliance put on the appearance of alliances against external threats, what was intrinsically of greater importance was the fact that they internally constituted a "no-war community," in which all the parties renounced war against each other.

This fact is quite obvious if compared with the repressive nature of WTO as demonstrated when Soviet tanks trampled down "the Prague Spring" under their caterpillars. The most profound significance of the end of the Cold War lies in the fact that the regime of "the Democratic bloc" has finally prevailed over the world. Under the initiative of the U.S. and other member countries of "the Democratic bloc," a trans-boundary public space known as the "Global Commons" has expanded resulting in the freer movement of people, goods, capital and information. This has laid the foundation for the peace and prosperity of the world and Japan as we enjoy it today. In such a world as has emerged in the wake of the end of the Cold War, Japan could have the fortune to assume an integral and central part of this regime.

Although the Japanese fail to understand fully the weight of this fortune, it is in fundamental national interests of Japan that she, standing on the basis of this given fortune, does her best to enhance and expand the regime of "a no-war community." Only in acknowledging this point of view could Japan be possessed of a new "Doctrine," which is to replace "the Yoshida Doctrine." However, the fantasy, which swept the world immediately after the end of the Cold War, that "the world has finally entered a Garden-of-Eden era of eternal peace" soon turned out to be an illusion, bitterly shattered by an ensuing series of events such as genocide in "failed states," aggression of a neighboring country by "a rogue state," and, more pointedly than anything else, the September 11 incident by "international terrorists."

Against this background, the international community, especially the member countries of "the Democratic bloc," have come to recognize strongly that the security of the world is so indivisible that incidents taking place even in the remotest places are matters of common concern to the entire world. Also, NATO and the Japan-U.S. alliance have come to be proclaimed as "public goods," which are supposed to contribute not only to the national defense but to the peace and stability of the region and the world. Pacifism of Japan in the past was the one naively content with a mere fact of not being involved in an act of war as a perpetrator. When Japan talked about "defense" or "peace," she did so only in negative propositions saying, "No, no, no" endlessly. The question "What does Japan want to do?" has, therefore, long remained unanswered not only to the world but to the Japanese

themselves.

However, the world in the 21st century asks Japan what a role she can play in positive propositions for the peace and stability of the region and the world, let alone not becoming an aggressor or a perpetrator in an act of war. In other words, the world asks Japan to fulfill her duties as a responsible member of the global civil society. Pacifism of Japan must now evolve from "negative pacifism" or "passive pacifism" to "positive pacifism" or "active pacifism." This is what the world asks Japan to do. Japan can neither carve out her way otherwise in the future.

Under what was called "the Yoshida Doctrine," the Japanese perception of security was so narrowly defined that it could not cover anything beyond the national territorial defense. Even in that case, the protection of the homeland by a foreign country, namely the U.S., was taken for granted. As for the regional security, Japan has at long last managed to entertain a sense of responsibility for "situations in areas surrounding Japan." As for the global security, Japan has made contributions to the global security because she was so requested by the U.S. and felt obliged in her relations with the U.S. There has been neither a sense of responsibility nor a sense of mission worthy of a great economic power benefiting from the global peace and stability.

What should guide Japan to the formation of her policy in the regional as well as the global security is, regardless of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Japan's own conviction of how the region and the world should be. It is not the kind of thing that Japan should undertake on behalf of the U.S. When the world is becoming more and more borderless and interdependent, it is obvious that neither "one-country pacifism," which is content with the peace in Japan alone, nor "one -country defense," which rejects any reliance on alliances, could be an option that Japan should choose.

We should know that "one-country pacifism" cannot but end up in being "a peace protected by the U.S.," while "one-country defense," "an anachronistic military state." The peace and safety of Japan as we enjoy it today could not be maintained unless we fully recognize the fact that Japan is a member of the global "no-war community" led by member countries of

"the Democratic bloc." If so, we should exert ourselves to strengthen our alliance with the U.S., the core member of "the Democratic bloc." Protecting "the no-war community" leads to being protected by "the no-war community." Thus, Japan can have a new doctrine called "Positive Pacifism," which will replace "the Yoshida Doctrine," and, at the same time, make it possible for Japan to stand on an equal footing with the U.S.

Based upon the conviction that Japan is one of the members of "the no-war community," we are reminded of a fact that the security of Japan must be discussed not only in the context of the national defense but in the broader contexts of regional and global security. This is the reason why we present this set of policy recommendations on "Positive Pacifism and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance" in the three perspectives of (1) the national defense, (2) the regional security, and (3) the global security.

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Policy Recommendations

I. Recommendations on the National Defense

1. Review the "Basic Principles of National Defense," Including the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles"

Since they were approved by the Cabinet in 1987, Japan's "Basic Principles of National Defense" have been declared to consist of (1) "Exclusively Defense-Only Principle," (2) "Not Becoming a Military Power," (3) "Securing Civilian Control," and (4) "Three Non-Nuclear Principles." But the time has come for them to be reviewed or redefined. It is noted that all those principles are presented in such negative propositions as "not becoming" and/or "not possessing," etc. that they have tended to serve solely as backward-looking logics, putting the brakes on Japan's defense capability building. They have also tended to suppress free thinking and ideas from which to develop Japan's defense strategy. However, the Japan that is now seriously faced with the threat of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons and missiles must clearly redefine what the "Exclusively Defense-Only Principle" means. The meaning of the third principle of the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles," namely "not allowing nuclear weapons to be brought into Japan," also needs to be clarified in a way consistent with Japan's position to rely upon the extended nuclear deterrence of the U.S. Seizing the upcoming opportunity to revise the National Defense Program Guidelines, these "Basic Principles" should thoroughly be reviewed.

2. Cooperate with the U.S. Military Transformation Process and Approve the Exercise of the Right to Collective Self-Defense

In order to maintain the reliability of the Japan-U.S. alliance as well as to strengthen the global "no-war community," Japan should cooperate with the world-wide process of the U.S. military transformation. For this purpose, Japan should make her utmost efforts to implement what have been agreed upon between Japan and the U.S., especially the relocation of Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) of Futenma. However, what is more important for the reliability of the Japan-U.S.

alliance is whether or not the Japanese government can revise its understanding of the concept of collective self-defense. The Japan-U.S. alliance could be fatally flawed if Japan hesitates to intercept ballistic missiles launched from North Korea in the direction of the U.S., or if she fails to defend U.S. military vessels which are attacked by North Korea in the midst of Japan-U.S joint operations. In order to avoid such a situation the Japanese government, regardless of whatever political party may be in power, should approve the exercise of the right to collective self-defense either by re-interpretation or by revision of the Japanese Constitution.

3. Thoroughly Review "the Three Principles on Arms Exports"

At the time when "the Three Principles on Arms Exports" came into effect in 1967, those "Principles" were applied only to (1) communist countries, (2) countries under U.N. arms embargo, and (3) countries in international armed conflict. However, later in 1976 those "Principles" were revised to cover "all the countries." In today's world, where the global "no-war community" has been established around the member countries of "the Democratic bloc," every country is expected to cooperate in, and contribute to, the global actions in the spirit of "positive pacifism." "The Three Principles on Arms Exports" are blind to this reality and fell into a trap of such a self-conceited pacifism as "one-country pacifism" or "one-country defense." In fact, member countries of "the Democratic bloc" are strengthening their ties in their cooperation in every aspect of security. Development and production of weapons are no exception. True, Japan exempts from the application of "the Three Principles" the U.S.-related and other cases where those "Principles" are clearly out of tune, but those cases of exemption are only exceptions. Thus, it becomes in order that we thoroughly review "the Three Principles on Arms Exports."

4. Improve and Strengthen the National System of Intelligence Gathering and Analysis

Like other countries, Japan must have national intelligence which she gathers and analyzes independently, not only for the sake of ensuring the national territorial defense to be flawless, but for the sake of avoiding subordination to other

countries in multilateral security cooperation. Independent and proactive policymaking is not possible if a country is dependent upon other countries in intelligence gathering. However, the present situation of Japan's system for intelligence gathering and analysis is far from satisfactory. Therefore, Japan must, first of all, (1) remove the existing sectionalism among ministries and agencies, thereby making it possible for the Prime Minister to grasp the essence of intelligence in a more speedy and accurate manner. Secondly, Japan must (2) correct the current system of intelligence gathering, which is overdependent on open information, and attach more importance to covert intelligence including "human intelligence." Thirdly, Japan must (3) urgently rectify defects in her current system of confidentiality protection. Unified legislation for confidentiality protection covering state secrets and anti-espionage should be urgently enacted.

II. Recommendations on the Regional Security

5. Take the Initiative in Promoting Dialogues and Cooperation in East Asia

Maintenance of "peace" or at least "no-war" situation in East Asia is very important for the national security of Japan. And for "peace" or "no-war" situation to be maintained in East Asia, it is vitally important that dialogues and cooperation are pursued both on government and private levels among the countries in the region in such multiple fields as politics, economy and security, etc. Currently, there exist such frameworks for multilateral dialogues and cooperation in the region as ASEAN Plus Three (APT), East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Six-Party Talks. In these frameworks, dialogues are being conducted on a wide variety of topics ranging from such a pressing issue as "denuclearization of North Korea" to such a distant future ideal of an "East Asian community." Japan should actively engage herself in such dialogues and cooperation, and take the initiative in close liaison with the ASEAN countries.

6. Strengthen and Develop Japan-U.S. Strategic Concert toward China

It is primarily the U.S. and secondly China that exert decisive influence upon the

peace and stability of East Asia. These two major powers have tried to develop, through "the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue," a special bilateral relationship often referred to as "G2." Japan and China, on the other hand, are adjusting and consolidating their bilateral relations under the banner of "Strategic Mutually-Beneficial Relations." While reacting to the rise of China in the economic field in such a manner as described above, in the political field Japan and the U.S. are urging China to act as a "responsible stakeholder." China, however, has registered a two-digit yearly increase in her defense budgets for the past 21 consecutive years and aggressively advanced not only nuclear but also maritime, space and information capabilities. No wonder, this has stirred serious concerns among countries both in and out of the region. Japan and the U.S. should strengthen and develop their strategic concert toward China, and, through the institutionalization of Japan-U.S.-China trilateral dialogue, encourage China to become a stabilizing factor in the region.

7. Confront the Existing Cases of Infringement upon Japan's National Sovereignty

The illegal occupation of the inherent "Northern Territory" of Japan by Russia and the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea are existing cases of infringement upon Japan's national sovereignty. If we disregard these cases of infringement, any arguments about the national security of Japan would become empty. Although Japan, in accordance with Clause 1 of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, renounces the use of force as "means of settling international disputes," it does not mean that Japan could justifiably neglect to address those issues by other means. Instead, because Japan renounces the use of force, she must all the more be determined to resolve those issues by mobilizing every possible means and resources other than the military force. North Korea is developing nuclear weapons and missiles, thereby posing a threat not only to the neighboring countries but also to the international community at large. Japan should take the lead in resolving all these issues, and must neither evade her responsibility nor make shortsighted compromises at the expense of fundamental solutions.

III. Recommendations on the Global Security

8. Establish a "General Law for International Peace Cooperation" and Contribute to the Global "Collective Security"

The theory of "collective security" has it that, in a group of countries that have pledged among themselves to renounce war against each other, all the countries are obliged to impose sanctions jointly upon any country which, in violation of the pledge, resorts to an act of aggression. The United Nations was established with an aim of becoming an institution of "collective security," but in reality it has a number of deficiencies and has to be supplemented by such "no-war communities" as NATO or the Japan-U.S. alliance. It is against this background that NATO and the Japan-U.S. alliance have come to be proclaimed as "public goods," which are supposed to contribute not only to the national defense of member countries but to the peace and stability of the region and the world. Japan should contribute to the global "collective security" in the spirit of "positive pacifism." However, Japan's contribution has hitherto been totally inadequate because Japan's response has always been on an ad-hoc basis resorting to the use of one-time "enabling acts." Japan should hasten to enact a "general law" applicable to the needs of international peace cooperation at large.

9. Simultaneously Pursue Nuclear Nonproliferation, Disarmament and Strict Control of Peaceful Use

President Obama's speech in Prague has been interpreted by some to indicate the change of direction in U.S. nuclear strategy. However, given the fact that the U.S. continues to acknowledge the necessity of nuclear deterrence, we should rather consider that his speech reflects a strong sense of crisis over the rapid deterioration of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) system. The underlying belief of the U.S. would be that, in order to prevent nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of international terrorists, the worst nightmare imaginable for all humankind, it is imperative for the international community to pursue not only nuclear nonproliferation but, simultaneously, nuclear disarmament. As the only country in the world that suffered from nuclear bombs, Japan aspires

for the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and yet she enjoys the ultimate guarantee of her national security under the "nuclear umbrella" provided by the U.S. Although discussions on nuclear issues tend to evoke emotional response, we must always be rational in dealing with the issues in order not to undermine the strategic stability of Japan, the region, and the world. While enhancing strategic consultation on nuclear issues with the U.S., Japan should endeavor for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament as well as the strict control of the peaceful use of nuclear power on the occasion of the NPT Review Conference in 2010.

Appendix

Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations

[History]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro and 61 other independent citizens from business, academic, political and mass media circles of Japan. They agreed that a policy - oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently looked for in Japan because the world now wanted to know not only what the Japanese government spoke about but also what the Japanese people thought about. They were also convinced that Japan was now expected not only to think about its own role in the international community but also to contribute to breaking new ground in the search for a new world order.

[Purpose]

The Forum is a nonprofit and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

[Organization]

The Japan Forum on International Relations is a private membership organization. There are four categories of membership in the Forum; corporate membership, associate corporate membership, individual membership and associate individual membership. The Forum as a whole is governed by the Board of Directors, which is in charge of the management, and is supervised by the Board of Trustees, which is a consultative body. The Board of Trustees elects Directors and Auditors and advises the Board of Directors on such important issues as the adoption of an annual budget and an annual work program. Chairman, Vice Chairmen, President and Executive Director, are elected for a term of two years by the Board of Directors and are eligible for reelection.

[Activities]

The Japan Forum on International Relations conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations.

(A) The most significant of such activities of the Forum is carried out by the Policy Council, which is engaged in policy research and helps its members to produce policy recommendations. A list of the 31 sets of "Policy Recommendations" which have so far been adopted by the Policy Council, presented to the Prime Minister of Japan and published is as follows;

- (1) *"The Structural Adjustment of Economies of Japan, U.S. and Asian NICs"* drafted by the Task Force headed by Prof. WATANABE Toshio (March 3, 1988)
- (2) *"Long-term Political Vision for Stabilization and Cooperation in Northeast Asia"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KAMIYA Fuji (March 15, 1989)
- (3) *"How to Best Utilize Economic Resources of Japan for Development of World Economy"* by the Task Force headed by Mr. KANAMORI Hisao (July 25, 1989)
- (4) *"Japan, the United States and Global Responsibilities"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. INOBUCHI Takashi (April 5, 1990)
- (5) *"Stabilization of the International Monetary and Trade Systems"* by the Task Force headed by Mr. MANO Teruhiko (August 14, 1990)
- (6) *"Japan's Response to the Changing Soviet Union"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. TAKUBO Tadae (April 10, 1991)
- (7) *"For a More Open Market in Japan"* by the Task Force headed by Mr. TAKENAKA Ichio (failing to be adopted by the Policy Council on February 27, 1992)
- (8) *"The Strengthening of the U.N. Peace Function and Japan's Role"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SATO Seizaburo (October 7, 1992)
- (9) *"Japan's Response to the Transformation of Socialist Economies in Asia"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SATO Tsuneaki (June 8, 1993)
- (10) *"Political Cooperation with Europe: Japan's Agenda for 21st Century"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. NAKANISHI Terumasa (November 16, 1993)
- (11) *"The Future of Regionalism and Japan"* by the Task Force headed by Mr. KOBAYASHI Minoru (June 17, 1994)
- (12) *"The Future of China in the Context of Asian Security"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KOJIMA Tomoyuki (January 25, 1995)
- (13) *"The Essence of U.S.-Japan Economic Conflicts and Japan's Response"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SHIMADA Haruo (August 3, 1995)
- (14) *"The Perspective of Security Regimes in Asia-Pacific Region"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. WATANABE Akio (June 5, 1996)
- (15) *"The WTO System and Japan"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SAKAMOTO Masahiro (November 27, 1997)
- (16) *"Japan's ODA in the 21st Century"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KUSANO Atsushi (March 5, 1998)
- (17) *"Japan and International Society in the Age of Information Revolution"* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KUMON Shunpei (August 24, 1998)

- (18) *“Japan’s Initiatives towards US, China and Russia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. ITO Kenichi (April 19, 1999)
- (19) *“Economic Globalization and Options for Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. TRAN Van Tho (May 27, 2000)
- (20) *“Towards Collective Human Security: A New Internationalism and Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. INOBUCHI Kuniko (July 6, 2001)
- (21) *“Japan’s New Initiative for Global Environment”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. YAMAMOTO Ryoichi (October 24, 2001)
- (22) *“Building a System of Security and Cooperation in East Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. TANAKA Akihiko (December 18, 2002)
- (23) *“Japan’s Initiative for Economic Community in East Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. YOSHIDA Haruki (June 20, 2003)
- (24) *“New World Order of No-War Community and Future of Japan-U.S. Alliance”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. ITO Kenichi (April 28, 2004)
- (25) *“Japan’s Place in the World: The Strategic Value of Culture and Education”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. HAKAMADA Shigeki (December 13, 2004)
- (26) *“Emerging New Threats and Japan’s National Security”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SASE Masamori (August 10, 2005)
- (27) *“The Establishment of an International Energy Security System”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. NAITO Masahisa (May 18, 2006)
- (28) *“Japan and China in the Changing Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KOJIMA Tomoyuki (October 30, 2006)
- (29) *“India’s Leap Forward and Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SAKAKIBARA Eisuke (September 5, 2007)
- (30) *“Nature of Russian State and Japan’s Strategy towards Russia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. HAKAMADA Shigeki (February 20, 2008)
- (31) *“Japan’s Strategy for its Agriculture in the Globalized World”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. HONMA Masayoshi (January 14, 2009)

[Note] Currently under study in the Policy Council are the proposed recommendations on *“Prospects and Challenges for the Acceptance of Foreigners to Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. IGUCHI Yasushi.

(B) In tandem with the core activities of policy recommendations, another important pillar of the Forum’s activities is the **BBS “Hyakka-Seiho”** (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>) which started on April 12, 2006. The **BBS “Hyakka-Seiho”** is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the BBS are sent through the bimonthly Japanese e-mail magazine *“Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu”* to about 10,000 readers. Furthermore, articles worth attention are translated into English and posted on the Forum’s English website (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) under the headline of *“JFIR Commentary.”* They are at the same time sent through the Forum’s bimonthly English e-mail magazine *“JFIR E-Letter”* to about 5,000 readers worldwide.

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