



## THE **30**TH POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

# Nature of Russian State and Japan's Strategy towards Russia

### — Recommendations —

1. Japan and Russia Cannot Enjoy a Truly Normal Relationship without Resolving the Northern Territorial Issue.
2. Russia's Current Approach: Not Change, But the Reassertion of Her Original Character.
3. Build a Clear Understanding in Japan of Issues related to the Sovereignty.
4. Understand that Calling for the Return of Just Four Islands Is in Itself a Concession.
5. Clearly and Strongly Rebut Russia's Misrepresentation of the Facts.
6. Make Steady Effort toward a Satisfactory Resolution, Avoiding Hasty, Ineffective Steps.
7. The Irrationality of Attempts to First Obtain the Return of Two Islands.
8. Remain Aware of the Advantages a Better Bilateral Relationship Would Offer Russia.
9. Monitor and Be Prepared for Changes in the Sino-Russian Relationship.
10. Make Major Improvements in Japan's Supports for Russia and Visa-less Exchanges.

**February 2008**

**THE POLICY COUNCIL  
THE JAPAN FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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# Introduction

What is questioned is how to develop Japan's relations with Russia within the framework of Japan's international strategies. Some aspects of the relationship are ready to be improved, and these aspects should be tackled proactively. There are also troubling aspects to the relationship, however, and Japan must be ready to face Russia as a sovereign nation. Actually, these two sides need not be seen as contradictory. They are organically linked — only if Japan is firm with regard to the difficult part of the relationship can improvements in other areas occur. If Russia truly wishes to negotiate with Japan on major issues, especially a peace treaty, Japan must go to the negotiating table as a sovereign nation with clearly thought-out demands and strategies.

Russia is regaining its confidence as a major power, and has a roadmap to further development. It now faces Western Europe and the United States in a firm, even unyieldingly firm, manner. These countries are expressing their deep disappointment in Russia's retreat from democratization, its turn toward authoritarianism, its corruption, and other factors hindering the development of a healthy market economy. Russia does not need financial assistance, and does not want it. Western nations in the G-8 are beginning to regret having welcomed Russia as a member, and they are taking a hard look at their relations with her. Russia wants better working relations with the West, but at the same time its distrust of Western nations is increasing due to NATO expansion, plans to locate advanced elements of a missile-defense system in Eastern Europe, and Western involvement in political change in former members of the Soviet Union. Russia has recently promoted stronger relations with non-Western countries such as China — for example, through the

Shanghai Cooperation Organization initiative. But the Sino-Russian relationship has often been a distrustful one, and trade friction has recently been added to the list of disagreements.

Russia has a newfound interest in Japan's industrial technology and investment potential. It exports energy to Japan, and hopes to expand economic ties beyond that. This hope, and the recent cooling in relations with Western countries, has prompted Russia to place higher priority on relations with Japan. Meanwhile, Japan's business community is eyeing the Russian market with greater interest, as Japanese corporations expand their operations into Russia and bilateral trade grows. Defense discussions between the two countries are also underway. Despite all this, diplomatic relations between Japan and Russia are discouraging. Russian nationalism is growing as the country strives for Great Power status. This is the backdrop to Russia's even firmer resolve to oppose Japan's calls for the return of the four islands. The upcoming leadership shuffle in Russia offers no cause for optimism, as Putin's endorsement of First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev as the next president will ensure that he maintains his influence.

These Policy Recommendations were drawn up on the basis of the above considerations. They call for greater thought to be given to resolving the Northern Territorial issue. The issue troubles the Japanese, and they regard it as the most difficult part of their relationship with Russia. The solution will involve developing ways to understand Russia more, and discovering the best way to approach her.

The full text of the Policy Recommendations are submitted to the Prime Minister of Japan and are concurrently released to the press. The "Introduction" and the "Recommendations" parts of the Policy Recommendations are translated in English and are distributed to

opinion leaders all over the world and, together with the full text of the Policy Recommendations in Japanese, made accessible at the website of the Japan Forum on International Relations, <http://www.jfir.or.jp/>.

The Policy Council of the Japan Forum on International Relations first met to consider the draft of the Policy Recommendations on February 22, 2007, and adopted them in the final form at its fourth meeting on December 13, 2007. During this time the Task Force, headed by Prof. HAKAMADA Shigeki of Aoyama Gakuin University, and staffed by Mr. NAGOSHI Kenro, Director of Foreign News Section at Jiji-Press, Mr. FUSE Hiroyuki, Senior Research Fellow at Yomiuri Research Institute of Yomiuri Shimbun, and Ms. YOSHIOKA Akiko, Executive Director of Eurasia 21 Research Institute, assisted the Policy Council in drafting the final text of the Policy Recommendations. Once the final text was confirmed, it was sent to all the members of the Policy Council, and the following 80 members of the Council indicated their approval of its contents. Their names appear below as co-signers of the Policy Recommendations.

On this occasion, we would like to thank Prof. Konstantin O. SARKISOV of Yamanashi Gakuin University and Mr. MUTO Akira, Director of the Russian Division, European Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for their valuable opinions expressed respectively at the second and the third meetings of the Policy Council. We would also like to mention the helpful insights we received from senior officials of our government, who willingly granted us their precious time to attend our meetings as individuals in their advisory capacity as Policy Council Counselors.

Let us also add that the views expressed in the Policy Recommendations do not represent those of Prof. SARKISOV and Mr.

MUTO or the ministries represented by the Policy Council Counselors and that sole responsibility for the contents of the Policy Recommendations lies with those members of the Policy Council who signed them.

February 2008

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**(In alphabetical order)**

# The Recommendations

## **1. Japan and Russia Cannot Enjoy a Truly Normal Relationship without Resolving the Northern Territorial Issue.**

The return of the Northern Territories to Japan is central to the very being of our country, an issue that reflects on Japan's dignity and integrity. The fact that the islands have still not been returned is the main reason why the Japanese regard Russia with distrust. Russia often suggests that bilateral ties should be strengthened in areas where progress can be made, such as trade, on the assumption that this will create conditions favorable to signing a peace treaty. The motive here is simply to shelve the territorial issue. This is obvious — at the very same time its economic ties with Japan are quickly strengthening, Russia's position on the peace treaty has grown increasingly rigid. And yet, the consistent policy of the Japanese government, from the announcement of Prime Minister Hashimoto's three principles to the Japan-Russia Action Plan of today, has basically followed what Russia has suggested: to promote bilateral economic ties.

But Japan and Russia cannot enjoy a truly normal relationship of trust without resolution of the Northern Territorial issue. Japan needs to make this clear at home and abroad. Whenever Russia suggests that bilateral economic ties can be furthered even without resolution of the territorial issue, Japan must make it clear to Russia that: (1) the lack of a resolution has led to a serious sense of mistrust; (2) this mistrust restricts Japanese investment and cooperation with Russia; and (3) only a resolution of the issue will prompt Japan to strive for full economic cooperation.

## **2. Russia's Current Approach: Not Change, But the Reassertion of Her Original Character.**

Russia has returned to Great Power status thanks to soaring energy prices. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic depression of the 1990s humiliated Russians, but they have sprung back and their leaders are working hard to concentrate greater authority within the government and return the country to the international forefront. Russia's efforts to become a military superpower, its willingness to confront the United States, and its greater assertiveness vis-à-vis the West are all part of this drive toward Great Power status. This is why Russia refuses assistance from other countries, why she insists on reciprocity, and why she is ready to assist other countries. Inside the country, state controls are growing under the stronger central government, and freedom of speech and democratization are losing ground. Relations with the West are deteriorating because of Russia's growing nationalism and its Great Power posture. As part of this evolution, Russia's position regarding Japan's Northern Territories is hardening, too.

The Japanese government and people must realize that Russia's current approach does not represent a change, but the reassertion of its original character. The Gorbachev and Yeltsin periods were marked by a sharing of values with the West and the beginning of détente, but those days were actually an exception in the overall historic framework. The values of Russia's younger generations and the influence of the new business elite make it impossible for the country to return to the days of the Soviet Union. Even so, in the foreseeable future there is no hope that Russia will adopt the types of government and systems enjoyed in the West and Japan. Japan should join with the international community in

strongly criticizing Russia's democratization backsliding and its trade rule violations.

### **3. Build a Clear Understanding in Japan of Issues related to the Sovereignty.**

The Japanese people tend to be vague or disinterested regarding the question of Japan's sovereignty. It is true that it was necessary to condemn the type of nationalism that was rampant in pre-war Japan. But the ideals embraced by post-war Japanese, and the education they received, have tended to deny Japan's statehood, or to ignore national sovereignty issues. This tendency has faded somewhat in light of recent tensions with North Korea and China, but even so some politicians and senior bureaucrats — whose job it is to manage affairs of state — have often said and done things showing that they do not fully understand the question of Japan's sovereignty. For example, some politicians have given the impression that Japan has shelved the territorial issue, or is nearing agreement on the return of just two of the four islands. For a number of years former Prime Minister Koizumi did not attend the annual national rallies to demand the return of the Northern Territories. On the other hand, he did attend the ceremony held in Russia to mark the 60th anniversary of the Allied victory over Nazi Germany. Koizumi's actions and gestures were consistently conciliatory, even though Japan-Russia issues arising from World War II have still not been settled. Here it is worth noting that the US president criticized the Yalta Agreement while he was in Europe, the presidents of Estonia and Lithuania did not attend the ceremony, and the Latvian president, who did attend, condemned the Soviet occupation of Baltic nations.

Some Diet members and other Japanese politicians tend to ignore

the issue and misunderstand its history. Because of their actions and statements, it is only natural that the Japanese people appear to be losing their strong desire to have the islands returned. The government and politicians should use educational and PR campaigns, plus the forum offered them by the Diet, to make the Japanese people fully aware that the Northern Territorial issue involves more than just Japan-Russia relations — it is a fundamental issue involving the very sovereignty of the nation. Further, to ensure that younger generations do not become lackadaisical about the issue, the school curriculum should examine the issue in greater depth, and link it more closely to the issue of national sovereignty.

#### **4. Understand that Calling for the Return of Just Four Islands Is in Itself a Concession.**

Russia has often stated that, as the victor in war, it had the right to seize and hold Japanese territory. Japan must counter this argument. It is true that, around the time of the Russo-Japanese war (1904-1905), a victor in war had the legal right to demand territory and/or reparations. This right was recognized internationally. However, after World War I, the international consensus came to reject the right for territorial expansion. Furthermore, the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) prohibited war as illegal. After World War II, the international order adopted the parameters of the Atlantic Charter (1941), the Cairo Declaration (1943), and the Charter of the United Nations (1945), all of which were based on the principles of the Pact. The Cairo Declaration vowed that “Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.” After the war, Japan did indeed withdraw from Manchuria and abandoned all claims to Taiwan, the Korean peninsula

and other territories. But at the very least, Japan did not take the Chishima (Kurile) Islands “by violence and greed.” The Cairo Declaration states that the Allies “covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion.” The terms of Japan’s surrender to the Soviet Union were limited to conditions set out in the Potsdam Declaration (1945), and Russia, the successor state to the Soviet Union, became a party to that Declaration and is obliged to see that the “terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out” (as quoted from the Potsdam Declaration). The Yalta Agreement, on which the Soviet Union based its occupation of the Chishima (Kurile) Islands, violated principles set out in the Atlantic Charter and Cairo Declaration. And in any case, Japan was not a party to that Agreement. Japan renounced all claim to the Chishima (Kurile) Islands under the San Francisco Peace Treaty, even though it was not obliged to, but the Soviet Union was not a party to that treaty, so its successor, Russia, is not in a position to use that fact to bolster its case. The Japanese government is calling only for the return of the four islands, and this represents a major concession. For the sake of realism, we support this position of the Japanese government, but let us make it clear that as far as the four islands are concerned, from the viewpoint of history and international law, Japan has absolutely no reason to renounce them and Russia no reason to occupy them. The Japanese people need to clearly understand the logic of Japan’s position, and the government also needs to call resolutely on the international community to share this understanding.

## **5. Clearly and Strongly Rebut Russia’s Misrepresentation of the Facts.**

Over the last few years, Russia has dug in its heels whenever the

Northern Territorial issue is raised. The recent pronouncements of the Russian president, minister of foreign affairs, government representatives, head of the Duma's foreign affairs committee, and others fly in the face of basic historic facts, and clearly contradict previous bilateral agreements and even former Russian positions. Japan must straightforwardly rebut and criticize Russia's illogical assertions, express displeasure, and take a firmer stand on this matter of national importance, without worrying about the risk of temporary complications in diplomatic and economic relations. When Russian officials have made nonsensical arguments or unfounded statements for local consumption, the Japanese government has taken the high diplomatic road, assuming that to make a rebuttal each time would be stooping to the level of a child. But this risks being misinterpreted on the international stage. Moreover, protest only at the diplomatic level is insufficient when such public pronouncements are made in Russia and reported in the local media there. The Japanese government should not refute such pronouncements every single time, but instead continually stress the sound logic of Japan's position and keep sending the message that Japan cannot compromise in a matter involving its sovereignty. Russia appears to nonchalantly believe that it can misrepresent history because the Japanese government is not presenting a uniform, serious front. It also seems to believe that bilateral relations will not suffer even if it takes a firmer position on the issue.

## **6. Make Steady Effort toward a Satisfactory Resolution, Avoiding Hasty, Ineffective Steps.**

The conditions are still not ripe for agreement on a Japan-Russia peace treaty. Under today's circumstances, it would be unseemly for the

Japanese government to scramble about looking for an opening, hoping some compromise proposal will be accepted. Russia would see this as a sign of weakness, and would simply dig in her heels all the more. Indeed, such a negotiation method would have the opposite of its intended effect. In Russia, nationalism and pride in Great Power potential are on the rise, and Silovik strongmen are assuming more power — any objective person can see that the situation does not favor Japan’s position now. President Putin is known to be strongly interested in reaching an agreement on the Northern Territorial issue with Japan, and is calling for both sides to compromise. But for Russia today, “compromise” means, at the most, returning only Shikotan and Habomai. Even then, there would be conditions attached. In other words, there is no room for optimism in the near future, and certainly not as long as Putin remains in power. And there is no guarantee that a new government, after Putin, would offer better conditions. Japan should base its approach on the Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations (1993), while admitting the Joint Declaration of Japan and the USSR (1956), and strive to rebuild the basic framework for peace treaty negotiations. At the same time, Japan should have no illusion that this can be achieved over the short term. This approach does not mean Japan would be shelving the issue. No, it would be preparing a strong and creative initiative for when the window of opportunity opens. That opportunity can be brought closer by consistently stressing to Russia Japan’s basic position. And at the same time, the Japanese government and private sector must work hard to ensure that the issue is not forgotten or ignored by those in Japan who might otherwise do so.

## **7. The Irrationality of Attempts to First Obtain the Return of Two Islands.**

It is sometimes argued that if Russia is truly willing to abide by the Soviet Union's agreement "to hand over to Japan the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan... after the conclusion of a peace treaty between Japan and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (Joint Declaration of Japan and the USSR, 1956), then why not have the two islands returned and continue negotiations on the return of the other two, Etorofu and Kunashiri? The problem is that Russia will not return the Habomai Islands and Shikotan before a peace treaty is signed, but on the other hand signing a peace treaty would signify that all bilateral post-war issues have been resolved, which would preclude negotiations on the status of the other two islands. Russia interprets the Joint Declaration to mean that returning Habomai and Shikotan would resolve the issue in its entirety. There are those in Japan who suggest that a clause agreeing to continue negotiations could be inserted in the peace treaty, or that a separate agreement could be signed to that effect. This is totally unrealistic — it is not likely that Russia would agree to either course, and even if it did, during subsequent negotiations it would certainly not seriously consider returning the larger islands, Etorofu or Kunashiri. So it makes no sense to argue for the initial return of Habomai and Shikotan under the Joint Declaration. Therefore, Japan must maintain its demand for the return of all four islands, and conduct negotiations based on the Tokyo Declaration on Japan-Russia Relations, which agreed to place not two, but all four islands on the table. In any case, if a political decision is needed to reach a final resolution, that decision should arise from negotiations. This is not the time, before substantive negotiations begin, to flail about suggesting compromises.

## **8. Remain Aware of the Advantages a Better Bilateral Relationship Would Offer Russia.**

Some people believe that Russia's only interest in Japan was financial, and that she has now lost that interest because her economy has recovered and she is awash in cash. This is not the case. It would also be wrong to assume that Japan's need for energy makes it dependent on Russia, or that Russia does not need to depend on Japan. Russia's new and well publicized national strategy is to develop an economy that does not depend on the export of natural resources, and this strategy is leading to greater interest in Japan, an interest that amounts to a "rediscovery" of our country. Russia is well aware that Japan has all the technologies and expertise it needs for energy conservation, high-tech applications, high speed railway systems, nuclear power, liquefied natural gas applications and more. Its strong desire to collaborate with Japan comes from its ambition to become a country grounded on industry, not from a need for capital. It has ample supplies of capital, and is looking for a safe place like Japan to invest it. Japan could offer Russia many advantages, especially since Russia's relationship with China appears to be souring. (See Recommendation 9.)

Economic considerations are prompting Russia to look favorably on Japan, but this does not mean we now have an excellent opportunity to resolve the Northern Territorial issue, or that Russia is now ready to make political concessions. However much she may desire stronger working relations with industrialized countries to boost her scientific and technological potential, she is, at the same time, going through a period of growing nationalism and striving for Great Power status. In the face of this growing giant, Japan does not have to adopt a timid, retiring approach — we must regard our status as equal to hers, and take a strong

stand on questions of our national sovereignty.

## **9. Monitor and Be Prepared for Changes in the Sino-Russian Relationship.**

Any changes in Russia's relations with China have a direct bearing on her relations with Japan. The rift that is widening between Russia and Western countries has given Russia a greater diplomatic and strategic interest in strengthening ties with Asia countries, especially China. Russia, a country rich in natural resources, and China, the world's largest market for weapon systems, are rapidly expanding their economic and trade ties. For Russia, China will always be the most important country in Asia. Military collaboration with China is growing and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is taking on a greater military focus. Russia is expanding its weapon system exports to China and deepening bilateral military ties, and Japan must forthrightly express its deep-seated concerns about these issues and develop strategies to address them.

Japan must also monitor other aspects of the Sino-Russian relationship. Russia senses that China's rapidly expanding economy, its military development, and its huge population all pose a potential threat. Both countries are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but this does not mean they always agree on the Organization's orientation. In addition, China competes with Russia for influence and resources in Central Asia. Sino-Russian trade volumes have soared, but trade friction has grown, too. Russia's new national development strategy is to move beyond a resource-based economy. Ironically, though, it has ended up depending more on its growing exports of resources to China, and more on finished goods from that country. These trends

contradict the goals of the new strategy, leading to a sense of crisis in Russia. Its trade balance with China has moved from a large surplus to a deficit, and its attempts at changing the trade structure have been met by opposition from China. Trade friction does not necessarily lead to strained relations at the government level, but the two countries do share a history of mutual distrust. These trends have added to Russia's desire to work more closely with Japan, and to promote Japan's involvement in development projects in Siberia and other parts of its eastern landmass. Russia's interest in the Asia-Pacific region is growing, so it is natural that it would look to Japan to play a larger role in its plans. Japan should remain fully aware of all this when developing new policies involving Russia.

#### **10. Make Major Improvements in Japan's Supports for Russia and Visa-less Exchanges.**

The time has come to re-examine the types of support Japan has provided Russia since the 1990s. Russia does not want support — it wants a stronger working relationship. Japan's support has included humanitarian assistance for schools, medical facilities and generating stations on the four islands presently occupied by Russia, but this assistance is no longer required in light of improvements in the Russian economy. In any case, joint economic projects should not be conducted on the four islands, where Japan's sovereign rights are being violated. Needless to say, however, Japan should offer humanitarian assistance there in the event of a disaster, major accident, medical emergency or the like.

Russia suggested, on humanitarian grounds, that the nationals of both countries be permitted to travel without visas between Japan and

the four islands, and both countries agreed to this in light of the special sovereignty considerations of the four islands. The visa-less arrangements should continue, but the terms and procedures should be modified. For example, both governments should expand visa-less travel to include such purposes as nature conservation, oceanographic research, and cultural and academic exchange. Continuing this type of visa-less interchange will require a new vessel to replace today's dangerously dilapidated one. Nemuro, the Japanese city closest to the islands, is cooperating in inter-island exchange, and Japan's efforts to facilitate exchange would promote further development in Nemuro as well.

The Japan Centers established in seven locations in Russia should also be radically revamped at the organizational level. One of their main functions is to sponsor seminars on corporate management and business skills, but if these types of seminars are still needed they should be implemented by the private sector, or at least on a for-profit basis. The Centers should be transformed into cultural exchange institutes that promote greater understanding of Japan and boost interest in our country. Japan's national and local governments should offer proactive assistance for bilateral cultural and academic exchange, youth exchange programs, and interaction on the regional level, thereby promoting mutual understanding.

# Appendix

## Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations

### [History]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro and 61 other independent citizens from business, academic, political and mass media circles of Japan. They agreed that a policy oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently looked for in Japan because the world now wanted to know not only what the Japanese government spoke about but also what the Japanese people thought about. They were also convinced that Japan was now expected not only to think about its own role in the international community but also to contribute to breaking new ground in the search for a new world order.

### [Purpose]

The Forum is a nonprofit and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

### [Organization]

The Japan Forum on International Relations is a membership organization. There are four categories of membership in the Forum; corporate membership, associate corporate membership, individual membership and associate individual membership. The Forum as a whole is governed by the Board of Directors, which is in charge of the management, and is supervised by the Board of Trustees, which is a consultative body. The Board of Trustees elects Directors and Auditors and advises the Board of Directors on such important issues as the adoption of an annual budget and an annual work program. Chairman, Vice Chairmen, President and Executive Director, are elected for a term of two years by the Board of Directors and are eligible for reelection.

## [Activities]

The Japan Forum on International Relations conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations. The most significant of such activities of the Forum is carried out by the Policy Council, which is engaged in policy research and helps its members to produce Policy Recommendations. A list of the 29 sets of Policy Recommendations which have so far been adopted by the Policy Council, presented to the Prime Minister of Japan and published is as follows;

- (1) *“The Structural Adjustment of Economies of Japan, U.S. and Asian NICs”* drafted by the Task Force headed by Prof. WATANABE Toshio (March 3, 1988)
- (2) *“Long-term Political Vision for Stabilization and Cooperation in Northeast Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KAMIYA Fuji (March 15, 1989)
- (3) *“How to Best Utilize Economic Resources of Japan for Development of World Economy”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. KANAMORI Hisao (July 25, 1989)
- (4) *“Japan, the United States and Global Responsibilities”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. INOBUCHI Takashi (April 5, 1990)
- (5) *“Stabilization of the International Monetary and Trade Systems”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. MANO Teruhiko (August 14, 1990)
- (6) *“Japan’s Response to the Changing Soviet Union”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. TAKUBO Tadae (April 10, 1991)
- (7) *“For a More Open Market in Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. TAKENAKA Ichio (failing to be adopted by the Policy Council on February 27, 1992)
- (8) *“The Strengthening of the U.N. Peace Function and Japan’s Role”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SATO Seizaburo (October 7, 1992)
- (9) *“Japan’s Response to the Transformation of Socialist Economies in Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SATO Tsuneaki (June 8, 1993)
- (10) *“Political Cooperation with Europe: Japan’s Agenda for 21<sup>st</sup> Century”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. NAKANISHI Terumasa (November 16, 1993)
- (11) *“The Future of Regionalism and Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. KOBAYASHI Minoru (June 17, 1994)
- (12) *“The Future of China in the Context of Asian Security”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KOJIMA Tomoyuki (January 25, 1995)
- (13) *“The Essence of U.S.-Japan Economic Conflicts and Japan’s Response”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SHIMADA Haruo (August 3, 1995)

- (14) *“The Perspective of Security Regimes in Asia-Pacific Region”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. WATANABE Akio (June 5, 1996)
- (15) *“The WTO System and Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SAKAMOTO Masahiro (November 27, 1997)
- (16) *“Japan’s ODA in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KUSANO Atsushi (March 5, 1998)
- (17) *“Japan and International Society in the Age of Information Revolution”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KUMON Shunpei (August 24, 1998)
- (18) *“Japan’s Initiatives towards US, China and Russia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. ITO Kenichi (April 19, 1999)
- (19) *“Economic Globalization and Options for Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. TRAN Van Tho (May 27, 2000)
- (20) *“Towards Collective Human Security: A New Internationalism and Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. INOBUCHI Kuniko (July 6, 2001)
- (21) *“Japan’s New Initiative for Global Environment”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. YAMAMOTO Ryoichi (October 24, 2001)
- (22) *“Building a System of Security and Cooperation in East Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. TANAKA Akihiko (December 18, 2002)
- (23) *“Japan’s Initiative for Economic Community in East Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. YOSHIDA Haruki (June 20, 2003)
- (24) *“New World Order of No-War Community and Future of Japan-U.S. Alliance”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. ITO Kenichi (April 28, 2004)
- (25) *“Japan’s Place in the World: The Strategic Value of Culture and Education”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. HAKAMADA Shigeki (December 13, 2004)
- (26) *“Emerging New Threats and Japan’s National Security”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SASE Masamori (August 10, 2005)
- (27) *“The Establishment of an International Energy Security System”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. NAITO Masahisa (May 18, 2006)
- (28) *“Japan and China in the Changing Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KOJIMA Tomoyuki (October 30, 2006)
- (29) *“India’s Leap Forward and Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SAKAKIBARA Eisuke (September 5, 2007)

Currently under study in the Policy Council are the proposed recommendations on *“Japan’s Strategy for Agriculture in the Globalized World”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. HONMA Masayoshi.

**The 30<sup>th</sup> Policy Recommendations  
on  
“Nature of Russian State and Japan’s Strategy towards Russia”**

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