



## THE 26<sup>TH</sup> POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

# Emerging New Threats and Japan's National Security

### — Recommendations —

1. Be aware of the two faces of "new threats" - "renewed threats" and "threats of newcomer-type".
2. Adjust the Japan-U.S. alliance and the new "dual-track" approach of Japan's national security policy.
3. Do not forget the need for a multi-faceted response and Japan-U.S. cooperation in regard to the "renewed" threat from North Korea and China.
4. New ideas are necessary on security strategy toward the "newcomer-type threats", such as international terrorism, WMD and failed states.
5. Set up a posture for both homeland defense and overseas operations in regard to the "dual-tracking" of Self Defense Force missions.
6. Establish a General Statute (a Basic Law) for the overseas missions of the Self Defense Forces.
7. Encourage active discussion of the interpretation of the right of collective self-defense.
8. Formulate a national anti-terrorism strategy.
9. Strengthen the functions of collecting, analyzing, and evaluating defense and security-related information, and enact a "confidentiality protection law".
10. Foster a firm understanding of national security.

**August 2005**

**THE POLICY COUNCIL  
THE JAPAN FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

# Introduction

Japan's national security policy is experiencing what could be termed a tectonic shift, brought about by the two new types of threat that Japan now has to face. The first one is a "renewal" of conventional threats. While we have long been aware of the existence of the source of these threats and their nature, it is now seen in an effectively "renewed" form due to recent upheaval in the international environment, changes in the political and economic circumstances of the source of the threat, and new developments in military technology. For the purposes of these policy recommendations, these will be referred to as "renewed threats." The second type of threat was previously neither recognized at all, nor only vaguely recognized as a threat, and has appeared on the scene as a "newcomer" in recent years, particularly since the end of the Cold War. In contrast to the first category of "renewed threat," these represent threats of "newcomer-type".

The terrorist attacks that occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001, proved that non-government actors are now capable of causing massive destruction by striking at the very heart of the information-based advanced democracies. National and international security policies have long been formulated on the premise that one state could respond to the actions of another in a relatively rational face-to-face manner. However, this premise has collapsed. We have now entered an age in which we need to restructure security policy to meet the threat of non-state actors who carry out erratic and large scale destruction (possibly involving weapons of mass destruction) outside of the established rational framework.

One thing that is often overlooked when discussing national security in the post-9/11 world is the fact that actually "renewed" conventional threats, through their connection with threats "newcomer-type", could eventually have a serious impact on Japan's national security. One such example is North Korean missiles and nuclear weapons. It is possible to believe that there is a potential risk of these weapons being transferred into the hands of "newcomer-type" providers. If this happens, it would cease to merely pose a threat to North East Asia, but would also need to be viewed as a global threat. Also, the possibility that asymmetrical attack could cause serious instability among the advanced nations, including the United States, may affect the credibility of US military involvement in regional areas. When establishing the foundation for Japanese national security policy, it is essential that we understand the relationship between these two types of new threats.

Since 9/11, views on Japanese national security policy are also being "renewed" in response to discussions concerning its reaction to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It is

because these new threats cannot be handled within the previous legal framework, and extend beyond the spatial parameters envisaged in Japan's national security policy. That is why Japan enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law during the war in Afghanistan to dispatch Maritime Self Defense Force vessels to the Indian Ocean to assist with refueling activities for the United States and British navies. Also following the war in Iraq, Japan dispatched Ground Self Defense Force personnel to Samawah in the southern Iraq to carry out humanitarian and reconstruction activities based upon the Special Measures Law on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. Furthermore, the new National Defense Program Outline adopted by the government in December 2004 prescribes "multifunctional and flexible defense capability" as its core concept, instead of the previous "basic defense capabilities," calling for the creation of a defense policy structure that is a combination of Japan's own defense efforts, bilateral alliances and multilateral security arrangements.

Based on the recognition of the spatially and dimensionally complex interrelationship between the above two kinds of new threats, these policy recommendations propose a flexible restructuring of Japanese security policy to effectively deal with this period of tectonic shift.

Based on our perspectives described above, we present our "Analysis" in Part I of this paper, and in Part II, organize and draw our "Recommendations".

The "Introduction" and the "Recommendations" parts of the Policy Recommendations are translated in English and, together with the full text of the Policy Recommendations in Japanese, are distributed to various circles of people and made accessible at the website of the Japan Forum on International Relations, <http://www.jfir.or.jp/>.

The Policy Council of the Japan Forum on International Relations first met to consider the draft of the Policy Recommendations on July 20, 2004, and adopted them in the final form at its fourth meeting on May 31, 2005. During this time the Task Force headed by **Prof. SASE Masamori**, Professor of Takushoku University, and staffed by **Mr. MIYOSHI Norihide**, Deputy International Editor of the Yomiuri Shimbun, **Prof. MIYASAKA Naofumi**, Associate Professor of the National Defense Academy, and **Mr. TAKAHASHI Sugio**, Research Associate of the National Institute for Defense Studies, assisted the Policy Council in adopting the final text of the Policy Recommendations.

Once the final text was confirmed, it was sent to all the members of the Policy Council, and the following 81 members of the Council indicated their approval of its contents. Their names appear below as co-signers of the Policy Recommendations.

On this occasion, we would like to thank Mr. YANAGISAWA Kyoji, Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary, for his valuable opinions expressed at the second meeting of the Policy

Council. We would also like to mention the helpful insights we have received from senior officials of our government, who willingly granted us their precious time to attend our meetings as individuals in their advisory capacity of Policy Council Counselors.

Let us also add that the views expressed in the Policy Recommendations do not represent those of Mr. YANAGISAWA Kyoji or the ministries and agencies represented by the Policy Council Counselors and that sole responsibility for the contents of the Policy Recommendations lies with those members of the Policy Council who signed them.

August 2005

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**(In alphabetical order)**

# The Recommendations

We hereby draw our ten-point Recommendations, which are based on the position and the viewpoint that are set forth in “Part I The Analysis”.

## **1. Be Aware of the Two Faces of “New Threats” – “Renewed Threats” and “Threats of Newcomer-Type”**

While the Cold War ended some time ago, causes of tension, whose origin lays in the beginning of the Cold War, still remain today in the areas surrounding Japan, specifically in the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits. These pre-existing threats have been “renewed” in the form of new nuclear weapons, missiles and naval strength. On the other hand, Japan also faces global threats of “newcomer-type” such as international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and failed states. Japan has already entered an age when its national security policy must address these two aspects of new threat and implement a dual-track approach - homeland defense and overseas operations. First of all, we need to understand this new national security environment.

## **2. Adjust the Japan-U.S. Alliance and the New “Dual-Track” Approach of Japan’s National Security Policy**

The Japan-U.S. security arrangement has provided the cornerstone of Japan’s national security policy for more than half a century. We now need to strengthen cooperation within the alliance, positioning it as not only providing defense of the Japanese homeland, but also as a component for increasing Japan’s ability to deal with the two aspects of “renewed” and “newcomer-type” threats. Also, now that American overseas military presence is being restructured, Japan should propose to the United States how it can contribute to the establishment of a network of U.S. bases that can be more effective to the dual-track of “national defense” and “overseas missions,” and to the practical implementation of Japan-U.S. cooperation. While it would be preferable if the new proposal ultimately let local communities reduce the burden of supporting bases, such as those in Okinawa, strategic concerns for national security should be given a higher priority.

### **3. Do Not Forget the Need for a Multi-Faceted Response and Japan-U.S. Cooperation in Regard to the “Renewed” Threat from North Korea and China**

The enhancement of a missile defense system is desirable, but its significance and effectiveness are often overstated, probably from the desire to hasten in that direction. This is dangerous. Also, a new theory is appearing that approves of attacks on enemy strategic bases in certain circumstances, because it is simply not desirable to “Sit Back and Wait to Die”. Although there is some merit to this theory, it does present numerous difficulties in terms of military technology. While both options should be considered carefully, we must also strive to heighten the reliability of the strike power of the U.S. military stationed in Japan. In response to the growing strength of the Chinese Navy, we should continue to pay attention to Japan-U.S. cooperation in the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands, and to maintain military superiority both in the air and at sea.

### **4. New Ideas are Necessary on Security Strategy Toward the ”Newcomer-Type Threats”, such as International Terrorism, WMD and Failed States**

Non-state international terrorist organizations have been hidden and grown in failed states, presenting a global threat that could transcend the traditional concepts of the spatial and regional parameters of conflict. We cannot rule out the possibility that missiles or weapons of mass destruction from countries such as North Korea could reach any of the international terrorist groups via the “black market” and actually be used by them. We need to recognize that security strategy needs to be set up globally, in a new, multidimensional and comprehensive manner, because “newcomer-type threats”, including cyberterrorism, are multi-dimensional and exist beyond the bounds of specific regions.

### **5. Set up a Posture for both Homeland Defense and Overseas Operations in Regard to the “Dual-Tracking” of Self Defense Force Missions**

We need a new vision and setup for defense to replace the current “basic defense capabilities,” to address the “renewed” threat from the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits. At the same time, two things are essential in order to carry out missions in failed states, an important category of the SDF activities. The first is to keep appropriate numbers of personnel for carrying out operations, not just based upon impractical spiritualism, and the second is provision of a rapid long-distance air transport capability and so forth. We cannot facilitate a dual-track mission by merely perpetuating a mindset focused on traditional “homeland defense.”

## **6. Establish a General Statute (a Basic Law) for the Overseas Missions of the Self Defense Forces**

We welcome the move to recognize the overseas missions of the SDF as part of its regular activities, rather than categorizing them under “Miscellaneous Provisions” of the Self Defense Forces Law, or under a special measures law. Taking this opportunity, a general statute (a Basic Law) should be enacted. The enactment should free us from our current, hopeless mire, and permit timely and orderly responses to situations. Still, while overseas missions are recognized as regular activity, homeland defense naturally has to take priority, and obviously this will continue to be the case unless there are dramatic changes in Japan’s security environment.

## **7. Encourage Active Discussion of the Interpretation of the Right of Collective Self-Defense**

With the sole exception of the “Laws Regarding Response to Armed Attacks,” all SDF mission-related legislation introduced in recent years has been influenced by the interpretation that the Japanese constitution prohibits the use of the right of collective self-defense. However, there is increasing skepticism within Japan whether this interpretation is adequate in international and military context. While the United States does qualify its comments, pointing out that this is a matter for Japan alone to decide, it has also given numerous signals that it would prefer to see an interpretation that permits collective self-defense. When viewed objectively, we must recognize that the current interpretation of the constitution has restricted the development of closer Japan-U.S. security arrangements. This is why we should encourage active discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of changing how we interpret Article 9, rather than amending the entire constitution. At the same time, we have to encourage this discussion independently as Japanese. It is essential that this discussion not hint at, or present the impression of, pressure from outside countries like the U.S. Such an impression would only undermine public support for the Japan-U.S. alliance.

## **8. Formulate a National Anti-Terrorism Strategy**

Taking measures to combat international terrorism is a medium to long-term issue and not just a temporary one. As terrorist acts and organizations become increasingly diverse, there will be an increase in international commitments and agreements concerning anti-terrorism measures. The Japanese government should also centralize its domestic anti-terrorism preparations and compile a comprehensive strategy document that covers both medium and long-term anti-terrorism measures and the various means to achieve them; principles governing measures to terrorism; different types of measures responding to different types of terrorism; measures (sanctions, support) to be taken against countries that support or harbor terrorists; intelligence analysis of the latest data on the acts of terrorism; and involvement in international cooperation, thereby showing the world the active steps that Japan is taking to counter terrorism.

## **9. Strengthen the Functions of Collecting, Analyzing and Evaluating Defense and Security-Related Information, and Enact a “Confidentiality Protection Law”**

Japan does not possess the kind of full-blown intelligence organization that generally exists within a state. Data related to homeland defense and security is collected and analyzed by numerous different governmental organizations, and there is no central system to evaluate and apply these results. The increasingly complex security environment requires a change in this area. With regard to data collection, even if the task is shared, the facility of “human intelligence” is particularly weak. The reason for this can be found in the somewhat naïve perception that “spying is bad.” The government needs to get the understanding of the people of Japan that strategy cannot be formulated without information, by explaining that comprehensive intelligence activity is of crucial importance to the state. On the other hand, protection of confidentiality should go hand in hand with the strengthening of the intelligence function. Therefore, it is equally important to strengthen confidentiality protection. There have actually been problems in Japan regarding maintaining confidentiality. Just continuing the current approach would rule out effective information sharing, as other countries will exclude Japan from intelligence exchange and sharing arrangements. To avoid this, Japan must establish a confidentiality protection law.

## **10. Foster a Firm Understanding of National Security**

In order to take effective measures to counter “newcomer-type threats,” it is essential that the people of Japan firmly possess a broad and realistic understanding of national security. We must accept that the expansion of opportunities for overseas missions means that those dispatched overseas, including Self Defense Force personnel, will be exposed to potentially life-threatening situations. Greater public tolerance of the risks involved in such overseas operations is needed so that the Japanese do not falter when faced with these critical situations. It is true that the public perception of the SDF has greatly improved now, but it is still insufficient in terms of tolerance to the risks involved. Ideally the process to improve this should start with moves to revise the constitution. Within that process, the government must carry out its responsibility to properly explain security issues to the public, and show the courage to lead the public toward a new and deeper understanding of these issues.

# Appendix

## Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations

### [Purpose]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. Okita Saburo, Mr. Hattori Ichiro and 61 other independent citizens from business, academic, political and mass media circles of Japan. They agreed that a policy oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently looked for in Japan because the world now wanted to know not only what the Japanese government spoke about but also what the Japanese people thought about. They were also convinced that Japan was now expected not only to think about its own role in the international community but also to contribute to breaking new ground in the search for a new world order.

The Forum is a nonprofit and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations.

The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

### [Organization]

The Japan Forum on International Relations is a membership organization. There are four categories of membership in the Forum; corporate membership, associate corporate membership, individual membership and associate individual membership. The Forum as a whole is governed by the Board of Directors, which is in charge of the management, and is supervised by the Board of Trustees, which is a consultative body. The Board of Trustees elects Directors and Auditors and advises the Board of Directors on such important issues as the adoption of an annual budget and an annual work program. The work program of the Forum is coordinated and directed by the Steering Committee, while the fund raising and other financial matters of the Forum is taken care of by the Finance Committee. Advisers can attend the Board of Directors meeting and give advice on important issues of the management of the Forum, though they do not have a voting right. The Officers of the Forum, Chairman, President and Vice President, are elected for a term of two years by the Board of Directors and are eligible for reelection.

### [Activities]

The Japan Forum on International Relations conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations. The most significant of such activities of the Forum is carried out by the *Policy Council*, which is engaged in policy research and helps its members to produce the Policy Recommendations.

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**Drafted by**

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