

Policy Recommendations
on

New World Order of No-War Community and Future of Japan-US Alliance



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Introduction

The survival and prosperity of Japan, a major economic power, is dependent upon Japan's security and world peace. Postwar Japanese foreign policy pursued these goals during the Cold War years by maintaining the Japan-U.S. Alliance as its lifeline. However, now the world order of the early twenty-first century has come to a historic turning point. What is commonly referred to as the international system is one in which multiple powers (or their prototypes) engage in relationships of cooperation and conflict. But this international system is currently undergoing an unprecedented transformation. One reason may be that globalization has divided the international system into three distinct spheres. These are the "advanced sphere", consisting of advanced democratic nations – in North America, West Europe, and Japan, which are trying to spread post-modern values; the "modern sphere", consisting of Russia, China, and other Asian, African, and Latin American nations, which clings to the "richer and stronger nation" type of modern values; and the "chaos sphere", consisting of Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, and a host of Asian and African nations, which currently lack even the ability to govern themselves. The "advanced sphere" nations have lowered their mutual sovereignty barriers in recognition of their growing interdependence in political and economic realms. They are in the process of moving toward what might be termed a "No-War Community", in which members mutually abandon war as a means of solving international disputes; a distinct, new system that differs from the traditional sovereign-nation system, which was termed the Westphalian.

Existing "world peace" theories in general have tended to discuss world peace according to either of the two major models – Kantian-Republican "World Government" or Hobbesian-Hegemonic "World Empire." The former seeks "world peace" based on consent and the latter by force. However, the prospect of a "world peace" that is led by the Grotian-Mutualistic "No-War Community" has recently come into being, at least for the inter-relationships among "modern sphere" nations. One can observe a competition between the "U.N.-led order" and the "U.S.-led order" after the September 11 incident, and especially after the U.S. attack on Iraq. The former may trace its genealogy back to the "world government" theory, whereas the latter may find its origin in the "world empire" theory. Each of these faces difficult issues; that is, there is a lack of the power and the will to maintain world peace in the "U.N.-led order", and in the "U.S.-led order", unilateral decisions and solo actions that derive from unilateralism are inevitable.

When one looks at trends in the world, one sees that the "advanced sphere" nations have already formed a "No-War Community", a relationship in which waging war to solve conflicts has become obsolete. Most "modern sphere" nations are approaching, and are

being incorporated into, the “No-War Community” by the strengthening of interdependent relationships. Of the “modern sphere” nations, however, there is a group of countries, which are called “rogue nations” by the United States. These nations are trying to challenge the “No-War Community” by acquiring weapons of mass destruction. The “chaos sphere” nations, meanwhile, are drifting outside the “No-War Community”, being a hotbed of “international terrorism” and thereby destabilizing the overall international system. The largest threat which the “No-War Community” faces is the possibility of “international terrorists” acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, which are developed by “rogue nations”. The “advanced sphere” nations are attempting to incorporate “modern sphere” nations through engagement policies, and confronting themselves against attempts to acquire and proliferate weapons of mass destruction by “rogue nations”. Furthermore, the international community is trying to level up the “chaos sphere” nations with conflict prevention, peace building, development aid and other means, while maintaining a unified front against “international terrorism”. What we are witnessing today is a world in which the maintenance and the expansion of the “No-War Community” themselves are being seriously challenged by the interactions among these three spheres.

Given this analysis of the world situation, it becomes evident that widening and deepening of the “No-War Community” is the only viable option for Japan in terms of national interest and strategy. Seen from this perspective, it is imperative that the possibilities and the limits of both the “U.N.- and U.S.-led orders” should be cool-headedly pointed out, and it is also necessary to clarify Japan’s independent decisions in terms of how best to contribute to the building of the “New World Order”. We are of the opinion that we can depict the future shape of the Japan-U.S. Alliance only if Japan can make such independent decisions as mentioned above.

Based on our perspectives described above, we present our “Analyses” in Part I of this paper, and in Part II, organize and draw our “Recommendations”.

An English version of our Policy Recommendations is hereby published concurrently. Both the Japanese and English versions of our Policy Recommendations may be viewed at the Japan Forum on International Relations home page, <http://www.jfir.or.jp/>.

The Policy Council of the Japan Forum on International Relations first met to consider the draft of the Policy Recommendations on May 7, 2003, and adopted them in the final form at its fourth meeting on February 6, 2004. During this time the Task Force headed by Prof. Ito Kenichi, President of the Japan Forum on International Relations, and staffed by Mr. Iiyama Masashi, Deputy International Editor of the Yomiuri Shimbun, Prof. Kawakami Takashi, Professor of the Hokuriku University, and Mr. Jimbo Ken, Director of Research of the Japan Forum on International Relations, assisted the Policy Council in

adopting the final text of the Policy Recommendations.

Once the final text was confirmed, it was sent to all the members of the Policy Council, and the following 77 members of the Council indicated their approval of its contents. Their names appear below as co-signers of the Policy Recommendations.

On this occasion, we would like to thank Prof. Tanaka Akihiko, Professor of the University of Tokyo, for his valuable opinions expressed at the second meeting of the Policy Council. We would also like to mention the helpful insights we have received from senior officials of our government, who willingly granted us their precious time to attend our meetings as individuals in their advisory capacity of Policy Council Counselors.

Let us also add that the views expressed in the Policy Recommendations do not represent those of Prof. Tanaka Akihiko or the ministries and agencies represented by the Policy Council Counselors and that sole responsibility for the contents of the Policy Recommendations lies with those members of the Policy Council who signed them.

April 2004

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(In alphabetical order)

I. The Analyses

1. Contribution to the “New World Order”

(1) The Emerging “New World Order”

1. [The Formation of a “No-War Community” Order]

Changes have become inevitable for the Westphalian System. An unprecedented transformation is occurring in the international system at present. The post-Cold War world, in which the U.S.-Soviet conflict has ended, is developing into three distinct spheres, the “advanced sphere”, the “modern sphere”, and the “chaos sphere”. Among the “advanced sphere” nations, i.e. Japan, the United States, and West European countries, a common understanding has evolved – that war is not only legally “forbidden” (illegalization of war), but also economically “unbearable” (commercial peace), and also politically “unexecutable” (democratic peace). It is safe to say that among the “advanced sphere” nations, resolving international conflict by force is excluded from their realistic policy alternatives. In other words, we can say that a “No-War Community” has been formed among these nations. Meanwhile, the “modern sphere” nations, which include not only such major powers as Russia and China, but also most Asian, African, and Latin American nations, still use the “richer and stronger nation” value as their national goal, and have not abandoned the use of force as a means of international conflict resolution. On the other hand, it is also a fact that these nations are gradually being incorporated into the “No-War Community” as they expand and strengthen their economic interdependence with their external world. The “advanced sphere” nations, led by the United States, are implementing an “engagement policy” toward Russia, China, and other “modern sphere” nations. This represents nothing else but their effort to widen the “No-War Community” through deepening of interdependence and in having the leaders of those nations realize that it would be in their national interest to choose peace over war, and democracy over dictatorship. On the other hand, outside of this “No-War Community” there are outsiders who threaten the “Community”. Among the “modern sphere” countries there are some “rogue nations” that attempt to challenge the “No-War Community” through acquisition of weapons of mass destruction. Also, there are “failed states” that have lost the ability to govern themselves, and that are massacring their own people, as well as allowing terrorist actors to use their territories. In addition, there are “international terrorist” networks, such as al-Qaida, which are not nation-states but which penetrate into various parts of the world by transcending national boundaries. Therefore, the “New World Order” for which we should aim is a system that widens and deepens the “No-War Community” first by protecting it from the threats of “rogue nations” and “international

terrorism’, second by strengthening its interdependence with the “modern sphere” nations, and third by elevating the “chaos sphere” nations into a higher level of governance. In short, the essence of what is called for now is how to generate the power and the will that are required to achieve this goal.

(2) Limits and Possibilities of the “U.N. -led Order”

2. [Limits of the United Nations]

The modern sovereign nation-state system, after experiencing the twin catastrophes of World Wars, changed its course to illegalization of war by forming the League of Nations and the United Nations. Furthermore, these organizations have attempted to build a “collective security system” to enforce the illegalization of war. However, it cannot be said that those efforts achieved their goals. A “collective security system” becomes a reality only when two critical conditions are fulfilled: (1) when a no-war promise is made among member nations, and (2) when sanctions are imposed upon violators by all other member nations. However, the League of Nations adopted the principle of unanimity, which had to include the parties who were in conflict, and further, its decisions remained mere recommendations. Therefore, the ‘collective security system’ of the League of Nations could not fully address itself to the Manchurian Incident and the Abyssinian Crisis, and eventually self-destructed. The United Nations, on the other hand, is to be commended for empowering itself with binding authority for its Security Council decisions. At the same time, since the five permanent members of the Council were granted veto power, the United Nations was seldom able to contribute to settling international crises during the Cold War period. After the end of the Cold War, expectations for the arrival of the “U.N.-led order” arose, as the international body granted approval for the use of force by multinational forces in the 1991 Gulf War, and in the next year U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali put forth the new concept of “peace enforcement”. However, it became evident that the power and the will that are required for conflict resolution were lacking in the “U.N.-led order”, when in 1995 the U.N. peace enforcement units (UNOSOM II), which included U.S. Marines, were forced to fully withdraw from Somalia, and when in 1999 NATO-led bombing of Yugoslavia was carried out without a U.N. Security Council resolution; and when in 2003 the U.S.- and U.K.-led attack on Iraq was executed. In view of the failure of the “peace enforcement” concept resulting from these realities, it would be dangerous to idealize the United Nations and to raise excessive expectations for the role it can play.

3. [Possibilities of the United Nations]

On the other hand, there is a role for the United Nations to play in the widening and deepening of the “No-War Community”. First, the United Nations can play a major role in the “collective legitimization” of an international action as it offers an international forum for the discussions among the 191 member nations, thus identifying trends in world opinion. This may not always be possible, but the United Nations can still contribute to a certain extent to the forming and strengthening of a unified will of the international community. In this sense, it is necessary to strengthen the role of the U.N. General Assembly for cases in which the Security Council function is set back by permanent member veto. The 1950 “Uniting for Peace Resolution” should be revisited, and used as a basis to strengthen the power of the General Assembly. Second, the international community is integrated by a number of invisible regimes (guidance for action by field), and the United Nations has a unique potential to collectively represent and embody those. The role which the United Nations as an instrument of global governance can play for the promotion of the “No-War Community” is large, if the “No-War Community” itself is construed as an embodied form of global governance. Currently, about three-quarters of the U.N. budget is used for development and human rights, but the involvement of the Economic and Social Council is not necessarily adequate. The role of the ECOSOC should be re-evaluated. Third, in order to widen the “No-War Community”, it is important to prevent the “failed states” from becoming hotbeds of “international terrorism”; in this regard, we would like to recommend that the currently defunct Trusteeship Council be renamed the “Peace Building Council”, and assigned the new duty of rescuing the “failed states”. The Trusteeship Council was established so that the United Nations would be responsible for the territories whose peoples have not attained a full measure of self-government until they become able to be independent. Thus, it is not only entirely possible for the Trusteeship Council to assume the assignment of temporary governance and reconstruction of the “failed states,” but also appropriate. Fourth, the Security Council should stand in the forefront of the defense and the expansion of the “No-War Community”, and for the Council to be able to fulfill its duty, it should reflect the actual distribution of power in the international community in its membership. The reform of the Security Council is an urgent task, but the fact is that the proposed expansion of permanent members is stalemated, as Italy opposes permanent membership for Germany, and likewise Pakistan for India, and Argentina for Brazil. If the proposal had to be enacted as a package deal, we apprehend that the result would be to wait for another hundred years before we reach a conclusion. Fortunately, an almost worldwide consensus is being formed for Japan’s joining the Council as a permanent

member. The Japanese government should make its position clear that Japan wishes to become a permanent member of the Security Council as early as possible. In doing so, Japan will have to convince the world that it has a will and an ability to serve the world as a permanent member of the Security Council. Our Recommendations in this paper are intended to clarify what are such will and such ability of Japan.

(3) Possibilities and Limits of the “U.S.-led Order”

4. [The Emergence of Gulliver the U.S.]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unipolarity of the United States in the international system progressed as if Washington had monopolized the peace dividend. Accelerated globalization diffused the American standard as the *de facto* global standard. The United States attracted monies from around the world with the power of the U.S. dollar as the key currency. The United States also oligopolistically dominated and operated the global money market. In fact, two-thirds of the GDP increase in the world since 1995 came from the United States. The military superiority of the United States is even more apparent. There is no nuclear power in the world, which can rival the U.S. in nuclear arsenal after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In terms of both quality and quantity, the United States is without peer in conventional weaponry as well, from its maintenance of a large number of precision-guided weapons to its ability to project forces with a fleet of twelve aircraft carriers. The U.S. budget for military technology R&D equals three-quarters of the combined military technology R&D budget of the NATO nations, and in the area of RMA (revolution in military affairs), too, the success of the United States is matchless. Politically, U.S. leadership and influence cannot be ignored as many nations get on the bandwagon of U.S. power and as U.S. has provided a variety of international public goods. In addition, the United States has cultural weapons (the so-called soft power) of democracy, the English language, the Internet, Hollywood, and the acceptance of a large number of foreign students. Indeed the United States has emerged as a Gulliver.

In human history there are many examples of regional hegemonic powers, which established overwhelming hegemony in specific regions, but there simply has not been any power which secured this much hegemony on a global scale. According to British political scientist Adam Watson, the world prior to the Era of Exploration was divided into seven regional international systems, such as “European” and “Chinese”, which existed independently of each other. Within these systems, there was repeated an alternation between an equilibrium of power dominated by a hegemonic power and a chaos of power pursued by a number of competitors. After the Era of Exploration, however, a global

international system emerged and a similar process of chaos moving toward equilibrium started to appear on a global scale. In other words, the multipolar rivalry at the end of the nineteenth century, which emerged after the division of Africa by European imperial powers, was nothing but a state of chaos in terms of the global-scale international system. But at the same time it is possible to say that the current international system originated in and developed out of this chaotic multipolarity – that the multipolar rivalry was reduced and reorganized into the U.S.-Soviet bipolarity after the two World Wars, and then into the present unipolar dominance of the United States in the post-Cold war period. In this sense, the fact that the structure of the international system progressed from multipolarity to unipolarity via bipolarity was the process of equilibrium, which emerged out of chaos, and thus was a historical trend. It is also noted that the dominant United States represents universally shared values, such as liberty, human rights, and democracy, and has not shown ambitions for territorial expansion, and this points to the fact that the essence of the U.S. “empire” differs from other historical “empires”.

5. [Acceptance and Checking of U.S. Unilateralism]

The September 11 incident occurred during the emergence of a new world structure in which the United States possessed overwhelming power, while the world split into three spheres, and a different kind of threat originated outside the “No-War Community”. After this incident, the United States appears to have decided to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by using “all necessary means” (especially the proliferation from “rogue nations” to “international terrorists”). The adoption of the “National Security Strategy” (NSS) or the Bush Doctrine, which seeks to legitimize preemptive actions, is only one expression of this national determination. On one hand, the Bush Administration took military action as in the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq, and on the other, organized the application of international pressures such as the “Proliferation Security Initiative” (PSI), the Six-party Talk on North Korea, and the nine-month secret negotiations with Libya. Indeed, one can say that the United States is using “all necessary means”. The fact that the United States employs both war and peace approaches, and also combines unilateral and cooperative actions, points to the United States’ embrace of “all necessary means”. Indeed the Gulliver has displayed its will and its power. The question here is just what that will and that power ultimately entail. However, as long as the exercise of “all necessary means” leads to the defense of the “No-War Community” aspect of international society, U.S. actions and leadership in the international community should be supported. To criticize U.S. actions as lacking U.N. approval and, therefore, to label its war “unjust war”, is tantamount to reducing the issue

to a mere legal technicality and failing to see things in proper perspective, because it is evident that the United Nations lacks the will and the power to meet the threat.

On the other hand, unilateral actions of the United States are not to be accepted in all cases. Some kind of mechanism should be built into the international system to check, limit, or halt U.S. unilateral actions if such actions lead to immediate gains solely for the United States. As the occupation of Iraq became a long-term quagmire, the Bush Administration changed its occupation policy to seek cooperation with the United Nations. The effectiveness of U.S. unilateralism has been demonstrated in its preemptive actions, but the United States has revealed its limits in the postwar governance of Iraq. Seen from the perspective of the growth of national liberation movements after World War II, we might better attribute the present situation not so much to the limits of U.S. power itself as to those of the ‘world empire’. The fact that the United States has sought cooperation with the United Nations points to the possibility that the role of the United Nations may be to check U.S. unilateralism.

6. [Solidarity of the “No-War Community” Called For]

In any case, anti-American sentiments are prominent worldwide at the moment. The spread of such feelings in the Middle Eastern and Islamic worlds goes without saying. But owing to a series of unilateral actions taken by the Bush Administration since 2001, alienation has even spread to some West European nations. These actions include the withdrawal from the ABM (Anti-Ballistic Missile) Limitation Treaty and the Kyoto Protocol of the Treaty on Global Climate Change, and the refusal to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Biological Weapons Convention, as well as efforts to undermine the International Criminal Court. It cannot be denied that the recent “rebellion of France and Germany” against the United States’ attack on Iraq has some of its origins in the above-mentioned alienation. If there are limits to the “U.S.-led order”, they manifest themselves in such alienation from the United States. And it is the self-righteousness of U.S. unilateralism which has caused such alienation. A leader assumes a special responsibility, and unilateral actions, which are resulting from the exercise of such responsibility, should not necessarily be condemned. However, leadership will not endure if an isolated leader relies only on coercion. On the other hand, if the intention of France and Germany was simply to deny unipolarity and to seek a return to multipolarity, that would constitute an anachronism, a turning back of the clock. Humankind presently faces an unprecedented threat, in that weapons of mass destruction may proliferate and fall into the hands of “international terrorists” who would actually use those weapons. It is said that the background of this threat originated in the “Clash of

Civilizations” (as posited by Samuel P. Huntington). The member nations of the “No-War Community,” instead of opposing each other inside the “Community”, should write against the external threat, and work for this unprecedented, universal task. We call for a sense of responsibility and mature leadership from the United States as a superpower. Meanwhile, Japan, on one hand should support the United States, but on the other hand should make independent decisions and display its own style of leadership. For example, there may be a role for Japan, a polytheist civilization, to most appropriately mediate between two monotheist worlds, namely the Christian and the Islamic civilizations.

(4) Japan’s Contribution to Building of the “No-War Community Order”

7. [What Would Be the *Will of Japan to Show to the World?*]

It is necessary for Japan in the twenty-first century to clearly display its will to the rest of the world. The nation must clarify what it considers to be an ideal world order, and what it is prepared to do in order to bring that ideal about. Japan’s options should not be simply dichotomous, choosing the United States over the United Nations or vice versa. From the perspective of human history, Japan’s ideal should be the widening and deepening of the “No-War Community”. Thus, Japan should leave its previous passive pacifism and progress to active pacifism. By passive pacifism, we mean the pacifism which emerged in Japan in the period immediately after the end of World War II. It is a pacifism whose ultimate purpose is atonement, in which the pacifism is finished by the nation’s pledge not to repeat its mistakes. However, Japan’s pacifism in the early twenty-first century should be an active pacifism in which the nation faces the injustices and miseries of the world, comprehends the apprehensions and fears of others, and does its best to eliminate those negatives. And that active pacifism will give Japan its mission to widen and deepen the “No-War Community”.

For Japan to pursue its mission, and to play a larger role in the quest for world peace, it needs to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. That, in turn, will mean that Japan must lead humankind’s noble efforts for peace. Any such endeavor will involve risk-taking and cost. It is indeed necessary to compare risk and cost with their benefits. However, we can never accede to the view that a great work must be shied away because it involves risk and cost. The Japanese government currently takes the position that the Self-Defense Force is dispatched to Iraq to support its postwar reconstruction in a “non-combat zone”. However, a “non-combat zone” is not something to be “given”, but something to be “built”. Without this change in perspective, Japan cannot become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. Japan must make a new start by switching its assumptions from passive to active pacifism.

8. [The Constitution and Active Pacifism]

Here, we would like to pose a question, “Is active pacifism consistent with the present Japanese Constitution?” and answer that question ourselves. Paragraph 1, Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes”. This conforms to the 1928 General Treaty for Renunciation of War as an Instrument of National Policy and provisions of the U.N. Charter. It is therefore an article in accord with international common sense. Paragraph 2, Article 9 of the Constitution states that “In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized”. This paragraph only stipulates what was deemed necessary to “accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph”, and nowhere in the Paragraph is it stated that self-defense measures and cooperative measures for world peace are prohibited. Therefore, we cannot help taking the position that the Japanese government’s interpretations of the Constitution to the effect that “Exercise of the right to collective self-defense shall not be allowed”, and “Joint exercise of force with another nation is prohibited” are simply mistaken. Our view is supported in the Preamble of the Constitution of Japan, which clearly takes the stance of active pacifism and states “We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth”. It is therefore possible to maintain consistency between the Constitution and active pacifism, by confirming a correct interpretation of the Constitution.

Therefore, on the legal level it is entirely possible to switch to active pacifism by changing our interpretation of the Constitution. However, we must also face the fact that aftereffects of the passive pacifism of the past have become a large obstacle to forming such a consensus in Japanese public opinion. Politically, therefore, it might be wiser to confirm the will of the people with a referendum for a constitutional amendment, and in that process try to change the hearts of the Japanese people. The proposed constitutional amendment should at least delete or rewrite Paragraph 2, Article 9. It should be confirmed by the government that the Constitution and active pacifism are not mutually inconsistent. With that confirmed, the government should change its interpretation of the supreme law, and proceed to take an initiative in proposing constitutional amendment.

9. [Japan's Independent National Strategy]

The nations that make up the “No-War Community” should share the effort to turn the world into a more peaceful and safer place by avoiding quarrels within the “Community” and displaying solidarity outward. Any theory, which says that the emerging “No-War Community” can be sustained without the U.S. power, is empty. At the same time, however, we would like to call for a sense of responsibility as well as a mature leadership from the United States. Japan, on one hand, should support the United States, and on the other, secure the independence of its own decision-making. Japan should maintain its independent position by taking a case-by-case approach to the U.S. unilateralism that defiantly declares that “its freedom of action would not be bound by international agreements”. Japan should not only discuss questions of right or wrong with the United States as a friend, but should also check the United States’ running out of control in the international community, or introduce a system to balance U.S. power. That is the role of the United Nations, but Japan should put forth its proposals on what kinds of role can be assigned to that international organization. In our Analysis 3, we already discussed strengthening the role to be played by the United Nations. The United States might dislike having the United Nations assume some of those roles, but Japan should persuade the United States on this matter. Japan, both in its relationship with the United States and the United Nations, should have its own independent national strategy, and concentrate its efforts on polishing that strategy. Then Japan should cooperate with the United States or utilize the United Nations. The essence of Japan’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century should not be to bring U.S. policies and/or U.N. decisions at home but to bring the will of Japan, backed up by its own national strategy, to the United States and to the United Nations.

2. The “Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance”

(1) Implications of the Bush Doctrine

10. [Changes in the U.S. Perception of Threats]

The “National Security Strategy” (the Bush Doctrine), announced by the United States in 2002, was a doctrine under which the United States would not hesitate to attack preemptively in order to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles in response to the asymmetrical threats of “international terrorism” and “rogue nations”. There has been criticism that the Bush Doctrine violates the illegalization of war in international law. However, it should be noted that the “National Security Strategy”

attempts to reorganize the concept of self-defense and limits U.S. preemptive actions primarily to three situations; namely, taking “preemptive actions against terrorists”, “preemptive actions against proliferation”, and “preemptive actions against connections between terrorist supporting nations and weapons of mass destruction”. In this sense, we believe that what is most important is to focus debates of international law on the question of whether the previous terms for exercise of the right of self-defense should be maintained in the new international environment of the post-September 11 period.

A more direct impact of the Bush Doctrine on the Japan-U.S. Alliance is the change in the U.S. perception of threats. It is now the case that the regional challengers and “rogue nations”, which had previously been recognized only as threats to U.S. allies and forward-deployed U.S. forces, are now defined as direct threats to the U.S. homeland. For example, the North Korean threat in the 1994 crisis was only a local threat, but today’s North Korea is a direct threat to the U.S. homeland, as a result of the Taepodong missile, whose range extends to the U.S. mainland, and Korea’s suspected provision of weapons of mass destruction and missiles to “international terrorists”. Currently, the United States is restructuring the logic of its alliances and reevaluating existing relationships. It is noteworthy that, as a result of threats to the U.S. homeland, the strategic concern of the United States is shifting from “expanded deterrence for defense of allies” to “the front line for defense of the U.S. homeland” and “the formation and maintenance of regional orders for defense of the U.S. homeland”. The fact that deployments of U.S. forces overseas are being reevaluated, including those in South Korea and Japan, should be understood in this context.

11. [Changing Logic of Alliance]

The attack on Iraq helped accelerate the transformation of U.S. alliance policy. The fact that France and Germany, openly displaying their grievances against U.S. hegemony, refused to provide even minimum moral support for the U.S. stance against the life-or-death threat it faced, prevented NATO recognition of “common threats” to the military alliance. It is not entirely out of the question that NATO could be transformed as a result of a U.S. shift of the focus of its NATO policy from the “Old Europe” (West Europe) to the “New Europe” (East Europe). At the same time, it should be noted that there have been changes in the Russo-U.S. and the Sino-U.S. relationships, which became evident after the September 11 incident. Russia supported the U.S. attack on Afghanistan, but did not cooperate with the United States in the attack against Iraq. Thus, the Russo-U.S. relationship is extremely fluid. On the other hand, China has distanced itself by one step from the French, German and Russian criticisms of the United

States over the Iraq issue, and has further arranged the Six-party Talk in order to help solve the North Korean issue. As the previous boundary between the Western and the Eastern alliances becomes more uncertain, alliances in general are being transformed into ad hoc relationships of cooperation, which change their combinations and forms depending on issues. Thus, the role of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ is expected to expand, replacing the existing alliances. For these reasons, future trends in the ‘Proliferation Security Initiative’ (PSI) should be closely monitored. Japan should seriously review how to incorporate the transformation of the ‘logic of alliance’ into its own security policy. Furthermore, Japan must decide the extent to which it can share the Bush Doctrine, if the United States continues its adherence to that doctrine. That question is the other side of the same coin; to what extent the ‘world order’ sought by the United States is consistent with the ‘No-War Community’ order to be pursued by Japan.

(2) The Japan-U.S. Alliance after September 11

12. [The Japan-U.S. Alliance in Transformation after September 11]

Adherence to the Japan-U.S. Alliance has been the pillar of the postwar Japanese foreign policy. But the era is over in which it was in the mutual interest of Japan and the United States for Japan to implement only an exclusively defensive security policy, and to depend on the United States for deterrence. This is largely because the international situations surrounding the two nations changed as their common enemy, the Soviet Union, collapsed. This change is the background for the 1996 Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security, which sought the ideal of ‘peace and stabilization of the Asia-Pacific region’, and the 1997 review of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, which emphasized the ‘situation in areas surrounding Japan’. However, the ‘situation in areas surrounding Japan’ is still defined as a part of scenarios which ‘could result in direct military attack against Japan if not responded to immediately.’ As such, it is an interpretation of Article 5 of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty (contingencies in Japan).

However, the September 11 incident and the consequent attack on Afghanistan brought about a situation which far exceeded the assumptions of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, which had just been revised by incorporating the concepts of ‘contingencies in Japan’ and the ‘situation in areas surrounding Japan’. The situation in which the United States, whose homeland was attacked, exercised its right of individual self-defense had not been dealt with in the fifty-year history of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. For Japan to cooperate with the United States for the purpose of U.S. homeland defense is technically an exercise of the right to collective defense, but in Japan there was no security concept or legal framework for ‘protection of the United States’. Therefore, Japan took advantage of the

post-September 11 adoption of the U.N. Security Council resolution 1368, and immediately enacted its Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Furthermore, the Japanese government interpreted its cooperation with the U.S. forces in the attack against Afghanistan as cooperation in a war against “threats to international peace and security”. In this way, Japan as a partner in the Japan-U.S. Alliance managed to avoid falling into a fatal trap. Also, when the United States launched its attack on Iraq, Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq was enacted in order to send the Self Defense Forces to Iraq to support Iraqi postwar reconstruction. Therefore we can safely state that the Japan-U.S. Alliance has changed, becoming a relationship in which the two nations meet global threats and issues by transcending the previous framework.

13. [Enactment of a Basic Law on Security and International Peace Cooperation]

The United States, which forged a preemptive action doctrine, is formulating a security policy which strongly focuses on protection of the U.S. homeland. Especially, the nation is expected to take a variety of preemptive actions in regard to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among ‘rogue nations’, including preemptive military attacks. The time has arrived for Japan to sort out its position in the Japan-U.S. Alliance based on “new potential situations” in which the nation must respond to this kind of asymmetrical threat, along with “contingencies in Japan” and the “situation in areas surrounding Japan”. This indicates the possibility that the Japan-U.S. Alliance will no longer be defined by geographical concepts alone, but also by the characteristics of situations. This does not mean that Japan should send its Self Defense Forces anywhere in the world to support the United States. However, as the range of potentially critical situations rapidly widens, the likelihood increases that Japan will be forced to deal with this dispatch issue as a passive partner in an alliance with the United States, unless Japan secures its independent position by introducing its own perspective on the widening and deepening of the “No-War Community”.

When one considers the possibility of strengthening Japan’s international contributions, the present Japanese government interpretation of the Constitution inevitably becomes an issue, in particular with respect to the right of collective defense. The use of weapons by the Self Defense Forces in U.N. peace-keeping operations as well as in other international peace cooperation operations is severely restricted under the current Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations and Other Operations and the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq. Therefore, SDF soldiers cannot protect their counterparts from other nations in

joint actions. Furthermore, the current constitutional interpretation severely constricts the range of joint operations between the Self Defense Force and the forces of other nations, when the SDF is considered for participation in the activities of multi-national forces under a U.N. resolution. In the defense cooperation between Japan and the United States, too, the interpretation, which prohibits “joint exercise of force with another nation”, restricts the SDF to covering only safe “logistics support in rear areas”, and thus prevents the SDF from providing smooth support for the United States when a “situation in areas surrounding Japan” arises.

The Japanese government should immediately rectify its present interpretation of the Constitution that makes exercising the right to collective self-defense unconstitutional. At the same time, Japan should shift to a system in which it utilizes the Self Defense Force under a comprehensive and general legal system – such as the “Basic Law on Security and International Peace Cooperation” – from the cumulative patchwork security system in which a series of stopgap special-measure laws are enacted to meet the situation of the moment. As that happens, it will be important to bear the building of the “No-War Community” in mind, and to further strengthen and develop Japan’s policy to contribute to the building of an international order, as embodied in the 1992 “Law Concerning Cooperation for U.N. Peace-Keeping Operations and Other Operations.”

(3) The Need for an Independent Japanese Foreign Policy

14. [Japan Should Have Independent Alliance Management Policy]

Until today Japan has made it its policy to limit its defense capability, thereby depending on U.S. forward deployed deterrence for its security. That has forced Japan to leave its ultimate security decisions in the hands of another country, and has accordingly reduced Japan’s foreign policy to what is called by many to be a “policy to follow the footsteps of the United States”. Thus Japan had no independent alliance management policy. However, Japan should from this moment onward have its own security policy as an independent nation. This in turn means transforming the basic character of the Japan-U.S. Alliance to a more equitable one. In order to bring this about, Japan needs to have its own intelligence system to permit the nation to make independent decisions about the world situation. The basis of the Japan-U.S. Alliance ought to be a relationship in which Japan discusses the issues of the world with the United States as a part of Japanese “global engagement”.

Such division of responsibility as “Self Defense Forces as a Shield, U.S. Forces as a Sword” should be gradually rectified in order to assign a minimum independent self-defense capability to the Self Defense Forces in the strategic necessities of the time.

The concept of a “Basic Defense Force”, based on the rationale of “possessing only minimum basic defense power as an independent nation” to avoid Japan becoming a ‘power vacuum’, a destabilizing factor in areas surrounding Japan, is no longer appropriate as a concept to meet the threats, which are arising from today’s complex international picture. It is necessary to switch to the concept of a “Capability-based Defense Force”, that can flexibly assess and respond to “contingencies in Japan” and any “situation in areas surrounding Japan”, as well as “new kinds of situations”. The North Korean deployment of ballistic missiles and its development of weapons of mass destruction exposed the fact that Japan’s security cannot be adequately guaranteed by U.S. deterrence alone. If Japan is to base its security on a “Capability-based Defense Force”, it needs to hasten deployment of the existing multi-layer missile defense (MD) system, and at the same time upgrade the Japan-U.S. joint research program on missile technology from “research” to “development and deployment”.

15. [The Japan-U.S. Alliance Must Be the Most Important Factor in the “No-War Community”]

Both Japan and the United States are maritime nations, and also democracies. As such, the two nations share fundamental national interests and values. The Japan-U.S. Alliance is the world’s strongest bilateral alliance, and it can play a major role in maintaining world peace and security as the most important factor in the “No-War Community”. We have already mentioned the U.S. attempt to restructure its ‘logic of alliance’. Under such circumstances, Japan’s pursuit of an independent alliance management policy would not mean weakening of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. Rather, for Japan to have such an independent policy means a strengthening of Japan’s independent sense of responsibility for the Alliance. That in turn may mean a continuous process of redefinition of the Japan-U.S. Alliance. This process would be consistent with the present attempts to make multi-layered security orders – such as “web-style security” and “cooperative security” – take root in East Asia. Japan should also work for the building of the “No-War Community” not only in the global but in the East Asian scene as well. As we have seen, the Japan-U.S. Alliance has developed into a relationship in which the two nations meet global threats and issues by transcending the previous framework (Analysis 12). This Alliance should be the most important factor in the “No-War Community”, both globally and regionally.

We should say, for the present moment, that developments in the North Korean situation hold the key to the building of the “No-War Community” in the region. The United States and the United Kingdom have, through their diplomacy, succeeded in

making Libya pledge to abandon its weapons of mass destruction, but needless to say this could not have been done without the will and the power of the United States and the United Kingdom behind the scene. Would the five members of the Six-party Talk – namely, Japan, the United States, South Korea, China, and Russia, be able to persuade North Korea to enter a similar kind of agreement to abandon its weapons of mass destruction? In order for diplomacy to succeed, there must be power and will that support the diplomacy. Would the five nations be able to consolidate such power and such will? Here again, the power and the will of the United States come to play a crucial role. Japan should never behave like a bystander. In this way, the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance will continue to be unchanged. If the North Korean issue can finally be resolved, the Six-party Talk system could evolve into the basis of a ‘No-War Community’ order in East Asia.

16. [The “East Asian Community” and the Japan-U.S. Alliance]

Another foundation required to underpin the independence of Japanese foreign policy is the promoting and strengthening of regional cooperative relationships with China and other East Asian nations. Among the “ASEAN-plus-Three” nations, strengthening of East Asian regional cooperation and further, forming of an “East Asian Community” in the future have become a common agenda. Meanwhile, sufficient consensus has not yet been formed in Japan regarding those issues, and not a few hesitate to endorse the “East Asian Community” concept, on one hand due to their consideration for the alliance with the United States, and on the other due to their apprehension of “the threat of China”. However, Japan cannot afford to be left out of the great trend towards regional integration that is beginning in East Asia, and dare not be left outside this community of nations. Japan has no other option but to join the “East Asian Community” and to actively pursue further possibilities for East Asian peace and prosperity. Without this, Japan’s neighbors in East Asia would accept neither the further development of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, nor the strengthening of Japan’s independent self-defense system.

In addition, securing such a presence of Japan in East Asia would be a good basis for Japan’s securing its diplomatic independence in its relationship with the United States. From the U.S. perspective, a Japan rooted in East Asia would be valuable as an ally. In contrast, an isolated Japan that distances itself from East Asia would not be attractive for the United States. In this way Japan can bridge between the U.S. global strategy and the regional integration of East Asian nations. In order to achieve this, Japan should build security talks and cooperation with its East Asian neighbors and take the initiative in building a region-wide cooperative security framework in East Asia. With regard to

South Korea, Japan should arrange its policy through the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), and further try to strengthen the Japan-South Korea security cooperation by widening the talks to include the North Korean issue, and the regional order after the reunification of the Korean peninsula. As for China, Japan should take note of the “hard” side of the nation, such as its nuclear missile development and building of an ocean-going navy, but at the same time pay attention to the “soft” side, such as the China’s adoption of a “New Security Concept”, which originated in the nation’s orientation for international cooperation. Japan and China must work together to strengthen development of regional cooperation in both political and economic arenas. As for ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), Japan should strengthen its cooperation in the areas of maritime safety, counter-terrorism, and energy, and also widen the scope of security cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN nations. That in turn would formalize the role of Japan in East Asia, and from this role the prospects for formation of the “No-War Community” would emerge.

In terms of specific proposals for regional cooperation in East Asia, concerned members of the Policy Council of the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) presented the 22nd Policy Recommendations, “Building a System of Security and Cooperation in East Asia” in December 2002, and the 23rd Policy Recommendations, “Japan’s Initiative for Economic Community in East Asia” in June 2003. In concluding this paper, we would like to point out that a substantial number of the co-signers of the 24th Policy Recommendations are also co-signers of those two previous Policy Recommendations.

II. The Recommendations

For Japan to have a firm policy and perspective for the “New World Order”, and upon that foundation to conceptualize the “Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance”, is an important and urgent task not only for Japan and the world, but for the United States. We hereby draw our ten-point Recommendations, which are based on the position and the viewpoint that are set forth in “Part I, The New World Order and the Future of Japan-U.S. Alliance (Analyses)”.

1. Let “No-War Community” Be the “New World Order”

The “advanced sphere” nations, which consist of countries in North America, West Europe and Japan have formed a “No-War Community” in which nations abandon war against each other. The “modern sphere” nations, which cling to their pursuit of the “richer and stronger nation” type of modern values outside the “No-War Community”, will gradually be incorporated into the “Community” through their increasing mutual dependence. The “New World Order” is none other than the “No-War Community”. The issue for humankind in the twenty-first century is to remove threats against the ‘No-War Community’ and to widen and deepen the “Community” (refer to the Introduction and Analysis 1).

2. Let Japan’s Goal Be the Widening and Deepening of the “No-War Community”

If the “No-War Community” alone is the emerging, genuine “New World Order”, to remove threats against the “Community” and to contribute to the widening and deepening of the ‘No-War Community’ should be major goals in the twenty-first century for the Japanese people and the Japanese nation. This kind of national goal gives substance to Japan’s active pacifism, and independence to Japan’s foreign policy. Therefore, Japan’s involvement in the United Nations, and the ideal of the Japan-U.S. Alliance, should derive from such a national goal, and not vice versa (refer to Introduction and Analyses 1 and 9).

3. Reorganize the U.N. Trusteeship Council as a Peace Building Council

Unfortunately, the present United Nations lacks the power and the will that are required for conflict resolution. It would be dangerous to idealize the United Nations and to burden it with placing unrealistically high expectations on it. However, we can reform the United Nations and have it play a certain role in the widening and deepening

of the “No-War Community”. Specifically, we recommend that (1) the role of the General Assembly be strengthened; (2) the role of the Economic and Social Council be reevaluated; (3) the Trusteeship Council be renamed the “Peace Building Council”, and assigned the new duty of rescuing “failed states”, and (4) Japan be appointed a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council as soon as possible (refer to Analyses 2 and 3).

4. Let the Members of the “No-War Community” Unite and Support the United States

The establishment of global hegemony by the United States, often termed a unipolar dominance, is a historical reality, but we urge the United States to exercise its hegemony cautiously and in a restrained manner. The United Nations can be expected to act as a mechanism to check U.S. unilateralism. However, the U.S. determination and actions in the post-September 11 world to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by all necessary means is directly linked to the defense of the “No-War Community”. The member nations of the “Community” should unite and support the United States (refer to Analyses 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9).

5. Amend Article 9 of the Constitution in Order to Turn Japan to Active Pacifism

Japan should shed the confinement of its post-World War II passive pacifism, and switch to an active pacifism that can contribute to the widening and deepening of the “No-War Community”. This change should occur before Japan can join the U.N. Security Council as a permanent member. There can be no doubt that the Preamble of the present Japanese Constitution takes an active pacifism stance, and in terms of strict legality the current constitutional interpretation can be changed. However, politically, it would be desirable to delete or amend Paragraph 2, Article 9 in a constitutional amendment referendum to sweepingly change the minds of the Japanese people (refer to Analyses 7 and 8).

6. Let Japan Develop an Independent National Strategy

Japan should have an independent national strategy in its relationships with the United States and the United Nations. Japan should cooperate with the United States or utilize the United Nations in order to implement its independent national strategy. The shape of Japan’s foreign policy should not be to follow the wills of the United States and/or the United Nations, but rather to present Japan’s will to the United States

and/or the United Nations. In order to bring this about, Japan must have an independent national goal (contributions to the widening and deepening of the “No-War Community”), and at the same time have its own intelligence system (refer to Analyses 3, 7, 9, and 14).

7. Allow the Exercise of the Right of Collective Self-Defense, and Enact a “Basic Law on Security and International Peace Cooperation”

In terms of increasing the likelihood of a Japanese contribution to the widening and deepening of the “No-War Community”, the current Japanese government interpretation that views the exercise of the right of collective defense unconstitutional poses a serious problem. Also, the existing method of stopgap enactment of a series of special-measure laws to meet issues of the time has reached its limit. It is necessary, on one hand, to immediately correct the existing government interpretation which sees the exercise of the right of collective defense as unconstitutional, and, on the other, to quickly build a system in which the Self Defense Force can be utilized under a comprehensive, general legal system, as in the enactment of a “Basic Law on Security and International Peace Cooperation” (refer to Analyses 10, 11, 12, and 13).

8. Rectify the “Self Defense Force as a Shield, U.S. Forces as a Sword” Division of Responsibility

In order for Japan to have an independent alliance management policy, it should gradually rectify the “Self Defense Force as a Shield, U.S. Forces as a Sword” division of responsibility, and assign the SDF a minimum defense capability with which it can meet the strategic needs of the time. The concept of a “Basic Defense Force” is no longer appropriate. It is necessary to switch to the concept of having a capability-based Defense Force, which can flexibly assess and respond to “contingencies in Japan and any situation in areas surrounding Japan”, as well as “new kinds of situations”. It is also necessary to upgrade the Japan-U.S. joint research program on missile technology from “research” to “development and deployment” (refer to Analysis 14).

9. The Japan-U.S. Alliance Must Be the Most Important Factor in “No-War Community”

Both Japan and the United States are at the same time maritime nations, and democracies. As such, the two nations share fundamental national interests and values. The Japan-U.S. Alliance can play a major role in maintaining world peace and security, as it constitutes the most important factor in the “No-War Community”. Whether the Six-party Talk, in which North Korea is asked to abandon weapons of mass destruction, succeed or not ultimately depends on the power and the will in the background. There is no such power and no such will other than those of the United States. In this way, the importance of the Japan-U.S. Alliance will remain unchanged for ever (refer to Analysis 15).

10. Let the “East Asian Community” and the Japan-U.S. Alliance Be Mutually Compatible

In East Asia, which consists of the “ASEAN-plus-Three” nations, there is a rising momentum for the strengthening of a regional integration that is aimed at an “East Asian Community”. Japan should take its root in East Asia by joining this movement. Such a Japan would be valuable as an ally for the United States. Japan can bridge between the U.S. global strategy and the regional integration of East Asian nations. That is precisely the role we recommend for Japan in East Asia, and in that role Japan can improve the prospects for the formation of a “No-War Community” in East Asia (refer to Analysis 16).

Appendixes

I. Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations

[Purpose]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. Okita Saburo, Mr. Hattori Ichiro and 61 other independent citizens from business, academic, political and mass media circles of Japan. They agreed that a policy oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently looked for in Japan because the world now wanted to know not only what the Japanese government spoke about but also what the Japanese people thought about. They were also convinced that Japan was now expected not only to think about its own role in the international community but also to contribute to breaking new ground in the search for a new world order.

The Forum is a nonprofit and nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations.

The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

[Organization]

The Japan Forum on International Relations is a membership organization. There are four categories of membership in the Forum; corporate membership, associate corporate membership, individual membership and associate individual membership. The Forum as a whole is governed by the Board of Directors, which is in charge of the management, and is supervised by the Board of Trustees, which is a consultative body. The Board of Trustees elects Directors and Auditors and advises the Board of Directors on such important issues as the adoption of an annual budget and an annual work program. The work program of the Forum is coordinated and directed by the Steering Committee, while the fund raising and other financial matters of the Forum is taken care of by the Finance Committee. Advisers can attend the Board of Directors meeting and give advice on important issues of the management of the Forum, though they do not have a voting right. The Officers of the Forum, Chairman, President and Vice President, are elected for a term of two years by the Board of Directors and are eligible for reelection.

[Activities]

The Japan Forum on International Relations conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations. The most significant of such activities of the Forum is carried out by the *Policy Council*, which is engaged in policy research and helps its members to produce Policy Recommendations. A list of the 23 sets of Policy Recommendations which have so far been adopted by the Policy Council, presented to the Prime Minister of Japan and published is as follows;

- (1) *“The Structural Adjustment of Economies of Japan, U.S. and Asian NICs”* drafted by the Task Force headed by Prof. Watanabe Toshio (March 3, 1988)
- (2) *“Long-term Political Vision for Stabilization and Cooperation in Northeast Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. Kamiya Fuji (March 15, 1989)
- (3) *“How to Best Utilize Economic Resources of Japan for Development of World Economy”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. Kanamori Hisao (July 25, 1989)
- (4) *“Japan, the United States and Global Responsibilities”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. Inoguchi Takashi (April 5, 1990)

- (5) “*Stabilization of the International Monetary and Trade Systems*” by the Task Force headed by Mr. Mano Teruhiko (August 14, 1990)
- (6) “*Japan’s Response to the Changing Soviet Union*” by the Task Force headed by Prof. Takubo Tadae (April 10, 1991)
- (7) “*For a More Open Market in Japan*” by the Task Force headed by Mr. Takenaka Ichio (failing to be adopted by the Policy Council on February 27, 1992)
- (8) “*The Strengthening of the U.N. Peace Function and Japan’s Role*” by the Task Force headed by Prof. Sato Seizaburo (October 7, 1992)
- (9) “*Japan’s Response to the Transformation of Socialist Economies in Asia*” by the Task Force headed by Prof. Sato Tsuneaki (June 8, 1993)
- (10) “*Political Cooperation with Europe: Japan’s Agenda for 21st Century*” by the Task Force headed by Prof. Nakanishi Terumasa (November 16, 1993)
- (11) “*The Future of Regionalism and Japan*” by the Task Force headed by Mr. Kobayashi Minoru (June 17, 1994)
- (12) “*The Future of China in the Context of Asian Security*” by the Task Force headed by Prof. Kojima Tomoyuki (January 25, 1995)
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