Building a System of Security and Cooperation in East Asia

December 2002

The 22nd Policy Recommendations of the JFIR Policy Council
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Introduction

Strategic relations in East Asia continue to present a feature of the balance of power, where two divided areas — the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait — remain the focus of international politics as vestiges of the Cold War. Efforts to introduce regional security mechanisms have been extremely difficult under the circumstances in which China, where economic development has brought the wake of a variety of domestic concerns; the Taiwan Strait, where the military option has not yet been renounced; North Korea, which considers the development of its armed forces as high priority in spite of the economic crisis; and Indonesia, where political crisis put the country at risk of disintegration. Ideas and concept for regional security mechanisms must be formed to effectively forestall these causes for conflict and to ease tensions. Time has come to synthesize the various attempts made so far in this direction and to take a further step ahead.

The threats and risks in East Asia are not limited to inter-state relations within the traditional balance of power. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 represented the symbolic fact that the threat posed by the non-state entities has become one of the top-priority issues for international security. New approaches to regional security cooperation are required for issues that cannot be adequately addressed within traditional frameworks, including the stability of state governance, the safety of sea-lanes of communication, energy issues, and international organized crime.

More than a decade since the end of the Cold War, the security mechanism in East Asia has been in major transition. The US-led bilateral alliance networks, especially the Japan-US alliance, have evolved their concept, roles and missions from threat-driven alignment to a framework emphasizing the enhancement of the regional stability. Cooperative security, the ASEAN Regional Forum as a major framework, served almost a decade to build confidence among nations through continued dialogue among the member-states, and is now seeking for the next stage to introduce measures for preventive diplomacy. Defense officials' exchange has also
increased in recent years including exchange among Defense Ministers.

There are also emerging features of security cooperation in East Asia that are not necessary based on its geographical groupings but on its security concerns and capability, which leads to the formation of a “coalition of the willing.” These multi-dimensional developments indicate that security cooperation in East Asia is far more complex today than the traditional bi-multi nexus model, and is on the verge of new developments.

The Policy Council of the Japan Forum of International Relations (JFIR) presents 15 policy recommendations to the Japanese government on the future security cooperation in East Asia. The recommendations aim to present the principle and focus of security cooperation, and concrete proposals to the government for immediate action and for their long-term implementation.

A long-term prospect of security order that the Japanese government should pursue is the “pluralistic security community,” a community that “shares dependable expectation of peaceful change” and does not presuppose the use of military force to resolve disagreements. Until such point can be reached, however, the Japanese government must enhance security cooperation in East Asia that addresses both traditional and non-traditional security threats.

The key ideas at the heart of these recommendations are to develop “multi-layered network” of the East Asian security and to enhance a “coalition of the willing.” Multi-layered network is based on the strategic convergence of existing bilateral alliance relations, cooperative security, and various security arrangements. A “coalition of the willing” should develop on issue areas where members share common security concerns, and constitute the security cooperation based on each member's political will and capability.

Security cooperation often tends to assume a potential enemy that leads to trigger “security dilemma” in which mutual suspicion creates arms race. Given the shared security interest among nations in East Asia, however, designing frameworks for security cooperation and developing specific measures could generate a positive sum for parties in the region. It is significant, therefore, to ensure that existing security frameworks and newly developed frameworks could coexist by maintaining organic coordination among them.
In view of these imperatives, the recommendations aim to broadly present a new framework for the East Asian security to the Japanese public, policymakers, and academia, thereby contributing to the formulation of the Japanese regional security strategy. Accordingly, these recommendations are intended to stress the importance of “multi-layered network mode” not only to the Japanese government but also to the governments of East Asia and beyond. The 15 recommendations presented here are classified into the following four categories:

- [Designing the Model for Security Cooperation in East Asia] 1, 2, 3
- [“Strategic Convergence” of Alliances, Cooperative Security, and Other Security Arrangements] 4, 5, 6, 7, 8
- [Security Cooperation and a “Coalition of the Willing”] 9, 10, 11, 12, 13
- [Security Cooperation in East Asia and the Role of Japan] 14, 15

Let us also add that this English version of the 22nd Policy Recommendations of the Policy Council is a reproduction of Recommendations in Japanese. The full text of the Policy Recommendations in Japanese, which includes not only the Introduction and the Summary but the Body as well, is printed and published separately, and both versions can be viewed on the web site of The Japan Forum on International Relations at http://www.jfir.or.jp/.

The Policy Council of The Japan Forum on International Relations first met to consider these proposals on 28 November 2001, and adopted them in the final form at its fourth meeting on 24 September 2002. During this period the Task Force headed by Prof. Tanaka Akihiko, Professor of the University of Tokyo, Mr. Hayashida Hiroaki, Deputy Editor, International News Department, The Yomiuri Shimbun, Prof. Hiraiwa Shunji, Professor of University of Shizuoka, Mr. Jimbo Ken, Research Fellow, The Japan Institute of International Affairs, assisted the Policy Council in preparing the final draft of the recommendations.

Once this final draft was completed, it was sent to all the members of the Policy Council, and the following 97 members of the Council indicated their approval of its contents. Their names appear below as signers of these recommendations.

On this occasion, we would like to thank Mr. Yachi Shotaro, Deputy
Vice-Minister for Foreign Policy (at the time) Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for his valuable opinions expressed at the second meeting of the Policy Council. We would also like to mention the helpful insights we have received from senior officials of our government, who willingly granted us their precious time to attend our meetings as individuals in their advisory capacity of the Policy Council Counselors.

Let us also add that the views expressed in these recommendations do not represent those of Mr. Yachi Shotaro or the ministries and agencies represented by the Policy Council Counselors and that sole responsibility for the contents of the recommendations lies with those members of the Policy Council who signed them.

December 2002

Signed by

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[In alphabetical order]
The Policy Recommendations

[Designing the Model for Security Cooperation in East Asia]

1. Taking the lead to create a “pluralistic security community” as a long-term goal for security in East Asia through developing mechanisms of security cooperation

   Japan should take the lead to create a “pluralistic security community” in East Asia as a long-term objective. A pluralistic security community is a group of states whose members share dependable expectation of peaceful change in their mutual relations. In other words, the community creates an environment in which states do not presume that they will engage in wars to ensure their security and in which the citizens of these states do not presume that conflicts and disagreements among them will be resolved through the use of military force. While East Asia is at the moment still quite distant from constituting a pluralistic security community, Japan must at least reflect in its foreign policy a move towards such a community by promoting security cooperation in East Asia.

2. Establishing “strategic convergence” of alliance relations, cooperative security, and other security arrangements to co-exist as multi-layered networks

   Multi-layered security network is a model which seeks for the linkage between deterrence and prevention to complement each other. The countries of East Asia need to establish organic ties by ensuring that (1) alliances (Japan-US, US-South Korea, etc) (2) cooperative security (ASEAN Regional Forum, Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and (3) other security arrangements (cooperation among military
officials, etc.) continue to coexist. It is highly important that the countries of the region bolster their security cooperation as they push towards a “strategic convergence” in which they can pursue common security interests.

3. Promoting security cooperation through a “coalition of the willing” in addressing non-traditional security threats

Non-traditional security threats have come to pose a clear threat to states in recent years. To address these threats, new frameworks beyond existing security mechanisms, which is described in Recommendation 2, must be established and reinforced. It is vital that such frameworks become an international network—a regional security complex—whose members are bound together with mutual security concerns, while open to the participation of all. A “coalition of the willing” must be formed to deal with these specific issue areas so that a flexible and effective security system can be constructed. There is no need to limit involvement in this security cooperation to those countries geographically located in East Asia, but flexible and open groupings should be adopted.

[“Strategic Convergence” of Alliances, Cooperative Security, and Other Security Arrangements]

4. Promoting the Japan-US alliance, and the US-led bilateral arrangements as linchpins of security in East Asia as “public goods”

Post-Cold War alliances have become far more multi-functional than the traditional alliances in which shared threat perception produced the original association. Most notable among multi-functional features are: (1) alliances provide the basis for strategic calculations in the region, thus reducing unpredictable feature of security circumstances; (2) alliances consequently provide a basis for regional cooperation by providing stable deterrence. In this regard, the Japan-US alliance not only maintains the function of the deterrence to promote peace and
stability in East Asia, but also provides a foundation for regional cooperation.

The Japanese government should work with the US to create organic networks between the Japan-US alliance, the US-South Korea alliance, and the security cooperation the US enjoys with Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia, and should consider these relationships as “regional public goods.”

5. Expanding the roles and functions of the ASEAN Regional Forum and working to improve its mechanism for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution

To make the ASEAN Regional Forum “ARF” a highly effective security framework, the Japanese government should make all efforts to implement the following measures: (1) hosting the Defense Ministers' Forum during the ARF session and expanding the involvement of defense officials among the ARF member states; (2) organizing the Northeast Asia sub-committee, formed by Japan, the US, China, Russia, South Korea, and North Korea as members within the ARF framework; (3) establishing a regional training center for peacekeeping operations “PKOs” that is open to the participation of the ARF member states; (4) transforming the ARF chairmanship to a joint chair of ASEAN and non-ASEAN, thereby enhancing the “shared ownership” among the participating countries; (5) establishing an ARF Secretariat to provide administrative support to the ARF Chairman, experts and member states; (6) establishing a Risk Reduction Center “RRC” within the ARF to provide early warning information to the ARF Chairman, experts and member states; (7) introducing a “consensus minus one” formula for the decision making in the ARF; and (8) deepening the coordination between the ARF and the Track II organizations such as CSCAP, and working to ensure that the ideas from the private sector are reflected in the official process.
6. Promoting “security webs,” encouraging exchanges among defense/military officials, and actively participating in multinational military exercises conducted for the purpose of maintaining peace in East Asia

There has been a growing trend in recent years among the countries in East Asia to promote exchanges and security cooperation among defense/military officials, thereby generating networks referred to as “security webs” by the US Pacific Command (USCINC).

Japan should participate actively in these multinational security cooperation efforts among defense/military officials. There are growing opportunities for the Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces to actively contribute to the “military operations other than war” (MOOTW) including humanitarian assistance, disaster rescue/relief, conflict deterrence and crisis prevention, and peacekeeping activities.

7. Taking the initiative towards the strategic convergence of existing and proposed multilateral frameworks for resolving the problems of North Korea

Multilateral frameworks in dealing with North Korea can be categorized into those such as the Japan-US-South Korea Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) that exclude North Korea, and those such as the ARF, the KEDO, and the Four-Party Talks (North/South Korea, plus the US and China) that premise the participation of North Korea. The former are the frameworks of “deterrence” which aim at preventing North Korea from taking provocative military actions, while the latter are the frameworks of “cooperation” through engagement, urging North Korea to take responsible behavior as a member of the international community.

TCOG, the linchpin of “deterrence,” should continue to be the primary framework of policy coordination, and a greater participation of security policy makers from three states is essential. Japan, China, and South Korea in the ASEAN+3 process, must also cooperate further in addressing the issues of North
Korea. Efforts should also be made to establish Japan-US-China-Russia, while Japan-US-China-Russia-South Korea frameworks, and the effectiveness of frameworks of the Japan-US-China, Japan-US-China-Russia, etc. must not be ignored. At the same time, the existing frameworks of “cooperation” such as the ARF and the Four-Party Talks should be supplemented by the potential framework of North/South Korea+Japan-China as well as North/South Korea+Japan-US-China-Russia. The frameworks to promote confidence building and the Japan-North Korea security dialogue, that were proposed in the Pyongyang Declaration of September 17, 2002 should also be pursued promptly. It should also be recognized that KEDO has a potential significance to constitute the future Japan-US-South Korea+North Korea framework that would work beyond its mission to provide light water reactors.

8. Increasing and effectively using the multilateral frameworks in which Taiwan and China participate together, thus frankly discussing the Taiwan Strait issue as a matter of international interest

In light of the greater instability that would fall on this region in case of the crisis, the Taiwan Strait could not be localized as a domestic issue but as the interest of the international community. Constructive discussion among regional members on the Taiwan Strait, however, has been difficult since China maintains to regard the region as interference in internal matters and thus rejects the international involvement. Multilateral frameworks in which both China and Taiwan can participate in a frank manner on the Taiwan Strait issue must be increased and empowered. It is essential to create the international consensus (including China and Taiwan) that the frameworks in which China and Taiwan both participate are no longer any “special” The Japanese government should therefore endeavor to urge China to acknowledge that the Taiwan Strait issue is a matter of international interest.

With the termination of the ABM regime, the Bush administration called for a “new framework” of international security based on the concept of deterrence that relies both on the offensive and defensive forces (Speech by President Bush on May 1, 2001). A fundamental re-examination of “strategic stability” in the post-ABM regime world is now needed.

Incorporating China into this new dialogue process will be of decisive importance. From the standpoint of Japanese strategic interests, it would be critically important to have regional dialogue on military doctrines and missile deployment, given China’s rapid development and deployment of intermediate/medium-range ballistic missiles (IRBM/MRBM) that cover mainland Japan and the US military bases in range. The four countries of Japan, the US, China, and Russia should conduct intensive dialogue on the offense-defense balance.

The Japanese government should bolster compliance and verification measures that would improve the effectiveness of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) all the while making maximum efforts to have North Korea and China join the MTCR, and should play an active role in supporting the drafting of principles for the “International Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)”

10. Defining international terrorism as a common threat to East Asia and establishing a comprehensive cooperation system for counter-terrorism

As part of its anti-terrorism policy, the Japanese government should set up a standing organization in East Asia to augment monitoring of terrorist activities, develop and execute measures to implement the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, and strengthen cooperation with the police and intelligence agencies of other countries in East Asia. The Japanese government
should create an “East Asia Cyber Forum” to counter cyber terrorism and attacks on information infrastructure. Police and intelligence sectors and agencies in East Asia should coordinate together under this forum to flexibly deal with the new threat.

11. Establishing a new “coalition of the willing” to deal with the serious crisis of state governance in East Asia

In East Asia, crises of state governance fall into two categories. The first involves the dismantlement of state governance by independence movements directed by sub-groups within a sovereign state that leads to economic and social disorder, while the second derives from the collapse of an authoritarian regime, signaling the possible onset of a high degree of disorder — including civil wars, large numbers of refugees, and economic and social disorder — until another stable regime is established.

The Japanese government should seriously examine ways of having existing organizations (ARF, ASEAN, and KEDO) deal with these contingencies, and should begin to prepare for forming a “coalition of the willing” to ensure flexible approaches.

12. Strengthening regimes for maritime security cooperation with the US and the East Asian countries

To ensure the security of sea-lanes of communication running from the Middle East to Japan, the Japanese government should actively enhance communication between maritime security and police agencies in this region, and by doing so, take the initiative in devising means of assisting countries that lack adequate financial resources for maritime security. The Japanese government should therefore: (1) encourage cooperation among countries in the region through such forums as the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) (2) strengthen regional anti-piracy measures through the Asian Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships and, most importantly, improve cooperative relations between the navies and the maritime security organizations in East Asia; (3) strengthen the intelligence gathering and communication functions of the
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) currently based in Kuala Lumpur; and (4) reflect these efforts in the ARF and ASEAN+3.

A new forum to promote energy dialogue among the countries of East Asia should be established, and the strategies for regional storage of oil reserves should be developed. Cooperation regimes for nuclear energy -covering nuclear technology, monitoring, and nuclear waste disposal- should be reinforced to improve security with regards to nuclear power.

Japan should play a major role, together with the countries of Southeast Asia and China, in drafting a code of conduct to prevent conflicts in the South China Sea.

13. Strengthening inter-organizational intelligence cooperation among the countries of East Asia to combat international organized crime

In combating international organized crime, which continues to grow in East Asia, the countries in this region must strengthen their domestic criminal law and law enforcement systems, while conducting stricter monitoring and cracking down harder on criminal activities by improving regional legal and police capabilities. Among the most important issues that must be addressed in this regard are: (1) the need for joint government-industry frameworks in the countries of East Asia to tackle hi-tech crime; (2) improved collection and analysis capabilities for intelligence on money laundering, and tougher measures against uncooperative countries; (3) more robust regional efforts to combat drug crime on both the supply and demand fronts; and (4) better immigration control and trans-border security in connection with undocumented foreign workers, illegal immigrants, and the smuggling of women and children.
14. Strengthening cooperation among the Prime Minister's Office and relevant ministries/agencies in developing strategies for security cooperation in East Asia

Security cooperation in East Asia as discussed in the recommendations above goes beyond the authority of diplomacy and defense but includes measures that cut across a diverse range of activities, such as police activities, legal affairs, intelligence sharing, and economic cooperation. The increasing complexity of multi-national security efforts makes more essential cooperation and coordination in areas in which the countries in East Asia share interest. A Policy Coordination Committee centered on the Foreign Policy Bureau and comprising the Deputy Directors from key divisions should be established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to enable them to better coordinate multi-national diplomatic efforts. The Japanese government should also set up an “East Asia Security Contact Group” by traversing ministries and agencies that bring together the most talented personnel from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Defense Agency, the Cabinet Information Research Office, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the National Police Agency, the Maritime Safety Agency, and other relevant ministries/agencies.

15. Carrying out institutional and legal reforms for enabling the Japanese government to actively participate in East Asian security cooperation

Japan needs to carry out at least two institutional and legal reforms to enhance its security cooperation with other countries. The first is to review the PKO Five Principles and to establish the PKO training center in Japan to provide assistance. The second is to change the government’s interpretation banning the exercise of the right of collective defense. The present interpretation imposes unnatural legal restrictions on the cooperative security measures in East Asia, which is considered
in the aforementioned recommendations. The Japanese government should reaffirm its commitment to peace and stability in East Asia and amend its interpretation on the right of collective defense.
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