Japan-India-Korea Trilateral Strategic Dialogue

Conference Papers

November 28, 2019
Tokyo, Japan

Co-Sponsored by
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1. Program

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<td>Opening Session</td>
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<td>(1) Introduction of the Participants</td>
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<td>(2) Opening Remarks (7 min. each)</td>
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<td>WATANABE Mayu, President of JFIR</td>
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<td>KIM Joon Hyung, Chancellor of KNDA</td>
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<td>Samir SARAN, President of ORF</td>
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<td>10:30 – 12:10</td>
<td>Session 1: Changing Strategic Landscape in Indo Pacific</td>
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<td>Chair: AKIYAMA Masahiro, President, Akiyama Associates</td>
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<td>Speakers: (10 min. each)</td>
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<td>HORIMOTO Takenori, Visiting Prof (Dr) Gifu Women’s University</td>
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<td>PARK Jae-jeok, Professor, Hankuk University</td>
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<td>Abhijit SINGH, Senior Fellow, and Head, Maritime Initiative, ORF</td>
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<td>Free Discussion (70 min.): All Participants</td>
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<td>13:30 – 15:10</td>
<td>Session 2: Exploring New Economy of Trilateral Cooperation in Indo Pacific</td>
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<td>Chair: Samir SARAN, President, ORF</td>
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<td>Bonghoon Kim, Head, Global R&amp;D Center, Hanyang University</td>
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<td>Mihir Swarup SHARMA Senior Fellow and Head, Economy and Growth Programme, ORF</td>
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<td>SHINTANI Daisuke, General Manager, Mitsui &amp;Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute of Japan</td>
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<td>Free Discussion (70 min.): All Participants</td>
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<td>Session 3: Prospects for Trilateral Cooperation</td>
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<td>Chair: KIM Joon Hyung, Chancellor, KNDA</td>
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<td>Speakers: (10 min. each)</td>
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<td>Samir SARAN, President, ORF</td>
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<td>SANO Shutaro, Senior Researcher, Institute for National Strategic Studies</td>
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<td>CHO Won Deuk, Research Professor, KNDA</td>
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<td>Free Discussion (70 min.): All Participants</td>
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<td>17:00 – 17:30</td>
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<td>Closing Remark: AKIYAMA Masahiro, President, Akiyama Associates</td>
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2. Biographies of the Panelists

【India Side】

Samir SARAN  
President Observer Research Foundation

Dr Samir Saran is the President of Observer Research Foundation, one of Asia’s most influential think tanks. He writes frequently on India's foreign policy, and issues of global governance, climate change, energy policy, global development architecture, artificial intelligence, cyber security and internet governance. Samir is the author of four books, numerous academic papers, and is featured regularly in Indian and international print and broadcast media. Samir curates the Raisina Dialogue, India’s flagship platform on geopolitics and geo-economics, and chairs CyFy, India’s annual conference on technology, security and society. He is a Commissioner of The Global Commission on the Stability of Cyberspace, member of the World Economic Forum’s South Asia advisory board and Global Future Council on Cybersecurity. Samir is also the Director of the Centre for Peace and Security at the Sardar Patel Police University, Jodhpur, India. He completed his doctoral studies at the Global Sustainability Institute, UK. He holds a Masters in media studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science, UK, and a Bachelors in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from Manipal Institute of Technology, India.

Abhijit SINGH  
Senior Fellow, and Head, Maritime Initiative, ORF

A former naval officer, Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow, heads the Maritime Policy Initiative at ORF. A maritime professional with specialist and command experience in front-line Indian naval ships, he has been involved the writing of India's maritime strategy (2007). He is a keen commentator on maritime matters and has written extensively on security and governance issues in the Indian Ocean and Pacific littorals. His articles and commentaries have been published in the Asian Bureau for Asian Research (NBR), the Lowy Interpreter, the World Politics Review, the Diplomat and CSIS Pacific Forum. Editor of two books on maritime security — Indian Ocean Challenges: A Quest for Cooperative Solutions (2013) and Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific (2014), Abhijit has published papers on India’s growing maritime reach, security of sea-lines of communication in the Indo-Pacific region, Indian Ocean governance issues and maritime infrastructure in the Asian littorals. In 2010, he assisted the late Vice Admiral G. M. Hiranandani (Retd) in the authorship of the third volume of Indian Naval History, Transition to Guardianship.

Mihir Swarup SHARMA  
Senior Fellow and Head, Economy and Growth Programme, ORF

Mihir Swarup Sharma was born in Delhi, and grew up mainly in Bombay and Calcutta. He was trained as an economist and political scientist in Delhi and in Boston. From 2008, he edited and wrote a column for the opinion pages of The Indian Express and Business Standard, both based in New Delhi, and has won a Sriram Sanlam award for financial journalism. His book Restart: The Last Chance for the Indian Economy was published in 2015, to considerable critical acclaim; it won the Tata LitLive best Business Book of the Year and was longlisted for the Financial Times–McKinsey Business Book of the Year. He is also the India columnist for Bloomberg View.
【Korea Side】

Kim Joon-hyung  
Chancellor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA)

Dr. Kim Joon-hyung was inaugurated as the Chancellor of the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea, on 12 August 2019. Prior to this responsibility, he had served as a professor in the Department of International Studies at Handong Global University (1999 to 2019). He also served as Planning Director & Director of Foreign Policy Research Center at Korea Peace Forum (2013 to 2019); a member of the Subcommittee for Foreign Affairs and Security at the State Affairs Planning Advisory Committee (2017); a member of the National Security Council Advisory Committee (2017 to 2019); Advisory Committee Chair for Reforming the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017 to 2019); and a member of the Presidential Commission on Policy Planning (2017 to 2019). Chancellor Kim holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from George Washington University, U.S. (1996), a Master’s degree in Political Science from George Washington University, U.S. (1990) and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science and Diplomacy from Yonsei University, Republic of Korea (1986).

KIM Ki-Jung  
Professor, Yonsei University

Ki-Jung Kim, Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Studies, Yonsei University, has been teaching and conducting researches in the field of International Relations, East Asian International History, and Korea’s Foreign Policy. He received Ph.D. from the University of Connecticut in 1989. He served as policy advisor for the Korean government: for Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Unification, and National Defense during 2004~2008. He served as Dean of the Graduate School of Public Administration at Yonsei University. He worked as Second Deputy of the Office of National Security in 2017. He has written many books and articles on Northeast Asian regional politics, American foreign policy, Korean-American relations, and peace governance on the Korean peninsula.

CHOE Wongi  
Professor, KNDA

CHOE Wongi is a Professor and Head of Center for ASEAN–India Studies at the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA). He holds a B.A. and M.A. from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington. He has been involved in policy research at KNDA on various issues such as Korea’s FTA policy, regional integration and cooperation in East Asia, G20 and global governance, and Korea’s approach toward UN climate change negotiation, etc. Currently, as head of Center for ASEAN-India Studies at KNDA, he leads policy research on Korea’s New Southern Policy, which is Moon Jae-in government’s new initiative toward the ASEAN and South Asian countries. His recent publications in Korean include “Recent Developments in Indian Foreign Policy”, IFANS FOCUS, (August 2019); Korea’s New Southern Policy: Achievements and Ways Forward, IFANS Report 2019-12 (May 2019); “US Indo-Pacific Strategy: Recent Developments and Implications for Korea,” Diplomacy, No. 128, (January 2019); “Korea’s New Southern Policy: Strategic Environment and Policy Directions”, IFANS FOCUS, (June 2018), etc.
CHO Won Deuk  
Research Professor, KNDA

Dr. CHO, Wondeuk is a research professor of the Center of ASEAN-Indian Studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA). He is also a visiting professor at Graduate School of International Studies of Yonsei University. He was a lecturer at Carroll University and the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He holds a Ph.D in political science from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee. He also holds MA degree from Texas A&M University. His main research topics consist of (US) foreign policy analysis, international relations of Indo-Pacific region, and foreign troops deployment. His recent publications include “Making Dictators’ Pockets Empty: How Do US Sanctions Influence Social Policies in Autocratic Countries?” Defence and Peace Economics (2019), 30(6); “US-China Competition and the Trump Administration’s South Asia Strategy: Focusing on India and Pakistan,” (in Korean) National Strategy (2009), 25:3. His articles were also published in Pacific Focus (2012), and Korean Political Science Review (2004).

PARK Jae-jeok  
Professor, Hankuk University

Jae Jeok Park is currently Associate Professor at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Previously, he worked as a visiting professor at Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) and a research fellow at Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU). His research interests include alliance politics, US security policy in Indo-Pacific, the US-ROK alliance, and the US-Australia alliance. He received his B.A and M.I.S. from Yonsei University, M.A. and M.S. from Northwestern University in the US, and Ph.D. from Australian National University (December 2009).

KIM Bonghoon  
Head, Global R&D Center, Hanyang University

Economics, PhD. University of Florida. He served as Senior researcher, POSCO Research Institute in New Delhi. He is currently Director, Global R&D center at Hanyang University (Since 2016), CEO, MAXtin Global Book : India Code 22, 2007, Haeneim Publish.

CHOI Eunsong  
Researcher, KNDA

CHOI Eunsong is a researcher of the Center for ASEAN-Indian Studies at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA). She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Tsinghua University, and a Bachelor’s degree in International Studies from Hanyang University.
【Japanese Side】

WATANABE Mayu  
President, JFIR / President, GFJ
Graduated from Chiba University. Received M.A. in Education from the Graduate School of the University of Tokyo in 1997. Joined the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) in 2000 and appointed Senior research fellow in 2007, during which period she specialized in global human resource development and public diplomacy. Appointed Executive Director in 2011 and assumed Senior Executive Director in 2017. She has served as President since 2018. Concurrently serving as President of the Council on East Asian Community (CEAC) and President of the Global Forum of Japan.

AKIYAMA Masahiro  
President, Akiyama Associates
Mr. Masahiro Akiyama graduated from the Faculty of Law of the University of Tokyo in 1964 and entered the Ministry of Finance. His professional career in government includes budget examiner of Budget Bureau and head of Banking Investigation Division of Banking Bureau in MOF, chief of the Nara Prefectural Police Headquarters, director general of Tokyo Customs House and councilor in MOF’s Secretariat. He moved to the Defense Agency in 1991, serving as director general of the Defense Policy Bureau and the Finance Bureau, and administrative vice-minister of defense before resigning from the agency in 1998. He was a visiting scholar at the Kennedy School of Government of Harvard University in 1999, and was chairman of the Ocean Policy Research Foundation from 2001 to 2012 and Tokyo Foundation. He has also served as a professor at Rikkyo University and a visiting professor at CISS, Peking University.

HORIMOTO Takenori  
Visiting Prof (Dr) Gifu Women’s University
Currently Visiting Professor of Gifu Women’s University and Senior Fellow of Center for Contemporary Indian Studies of JIA after serving as Professor of Shobi Univ Graduate School, Project Professor of Kyoto University Graduate School, Visiting Professor of Open University of Japan and Takushoku University Graduate School. Study committees, groups, and projects on contemporary India and South Asia organized by ministries such as Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and Economy, Trade and Industry, think tanks and universities in the past and presently. Deli Univ MA (Pol. Sc). Specializing in Contemporary Asian Politics with special emphasis on India-US/ India-China relations. Single authored & co-edited 14 books: India-Japan Relations in Emerging Asia, Manohar, 2013, Japanese books of Toward the World’s Third Major Power: India’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy, Iwanami Shoten, 2015, Deepening Democracy, University of Tokyo Press (UTP), 2015 and Introduction to Contemporary Japan-India Relations, UTP, 2017. Commentator of NHK (Japan’s BBC) TV programs on Asian issues more than 40 times. The number of lectures delivered has been 280 times. At the moment, preparing two books. Edited Contemporary India and its Future to be published by Univ of Tokyo Press (like OUP) and a single authored book Logic of India to be published by one of major publishers in Japan.
SHINTANI Daisuke  General Manager, Asia China and Oceania Department, Global Economic and Political Studies Division, Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute of Japan

Joined MGSSI in 1999, He has researched mainly on ASEAN and India’s political economy, to make business strategies and analyze country-risks for Mitsui & Co Ltd. From April 2010 to June 2014, He had stationed in Singapore that is the regional HQ of Mitsui & Co Ltd, and worked as ASEAN representative for MGSSI. One of his recent concern is ASEAN’s integration. He is also an expert of CSR related issues. Lecturer of Graduate School of Social Design Studies at Rikkyo University (2006-2013). Major Publications are “Asian CSR and Japanese CSR” (JUSE2008), etc.

SANO Shutaro  Senior Researcher, Institute for National Strategic Studies

Dr. Shutaro Sano is Senior Researcher at the Institute for National Strategic Studies (Colonel, Ground Self Defense Force, retired), and former professor at the National Defense Academy of Japan (NDA). He assumed his current position in October 2019. He specializes in international security notably in the Indo-Pacific region, and has recently focused on Japan-India and Japan-ROK-China relationships. His recent academic works include “Japan’s Inclusive Indo-Pacific Vision – Seeking Multi-layered Security Cooperation,” in “Europe in the Indo-Pacific: Moving from Periphery to Centre?” South Asia Discussion Papers (September 2019); “The United States’ Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy: Challenges for India and Japan,” (coauthored) ISAS Insights, No. 524 (December 4, 2018); “Japan’s Engagement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” Australian Outlook (February 23, 2018); “Trust and Trust-Building in Northeast Asia: The Need for Empathy for Japan-ROK-China Security Cooperation – A Japanese Security Perspective” (coauthored) in Kevin Clements (ed.), Identity, Trust, and Reconciliation in East Asia: Dealing with Painful History to Create a Peaceful Present (Palgrave Macmillan, 2018); “Japan-India Security Cooperation: Building a Solid Foundation amid Uncertainty” (CSIS, 2017); “Japan-India Bilateral Security Cooperation: In Pursuit of a Sound and Pragmatic Partnership” (coauthored) in Rohan Mukherjee and Anthony Yazaki (eds.), Poised for Partnership: Deepening India-Japan Relations in the Asian Century (Oxford University Press, 2016). He is the winner of the Inoki Masamichi Honorable Award (Japan Society for Defense Studies) for his publication on private military and security companies in 2015. He graduated from NDA in 1989, and received his MA in public policy from John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1995), and Ph.D. in international security from NDA (2013).

IIDA Keisuke  Professor, the University of Tokyo

Received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University. He has formerly taught at Princeton University and Aoyama Gakuin University. He has been a fellow at Brookings Institution and a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley. His research interests include the politics of trade, the political economy of financial crises, the politics of regional integration, and the interactions between security and economics. He is a member on the Board of Directors at the Japan Association of International Relations (JAIR). He is also a member of the Policy Council at JFIR. He is an editor of the journal Leviathan and the editor-in-chief of International Relations of the Asia-Pacific.
KIKUCHI Yona  
*Director and Senior Research Fellow, JFIR*

Graduated from Faculty of International Studies at Meiji Gakuin University in 2002. Received M.A. from International Cooperation Research Course (ICRC) of Kyorin University in 2004. Completed Ph.D program without a Ph.D. degree, in ICRC of Kyorin University in 2007. He served as an Special Analyst of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and as a Researcher at Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). Joined JFIR in 2008 and became Senior Research Fellow in 2012. He has served as Director since 2018. Concurrently he serves as Executive Vice President and Executive Secretary of The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC).

NISHINO Junya  
*Professor, Keio University*

He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Yonsei University. His research focuses on contemporary Korean politics, international relations of East Asia and Japan-Korea relations. Previously he served as a Visiting Professor of Dongseo University (2005-2006), as a Special Analyst on Korean Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2006-2007), and was a Special Assistant on Korean Politics at the Japanese Embassy in Seoul (2002-2004).

SAKATA Yasuyo  
*Professor, Kanda University of International Studies*


TAKEDA Yuki  
*Research Fellow, JFIR*

Graduated from Aoyama Gakuin University in 2008 (B.A., Politics, Economics and Business), and from its graduate school (M.A., Political Science) in 2010. He then joined the Embassy of Afghanistan in Japan (non-resident mission to Philippines, Singapore and Thailand) and served in the positions of Consular & Administrative Assistant, Public Relations Officer, and Secretary to the Ambassador in the following 8 years. Currently a Research Fellow at the Japan Forum on International Relations since 2018.
YANO Takuya  
*Director and Research Coordinator, JFIR*

Graduated from Faculty of Letters of Keio University. Completed the doctoral course in political Science at the Graduate School of Law of Keio University. Joined the Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) in 2007. In JFIR, held such positions as Associate Research Fellow and Research Fellow, before becoming Senior Research Fellow in 2009. Assumed the current position in 2015. Became Member of the Board of Directors of JFIR in 2018. His publications include *Intersection of the History of Political Thought and Intellectual History in Europe* (co-authored, Keio University Press, 2008) and *East Asian Community White Paper 2010* (co-authored, Tachibana Publishing, 2010) among others.

*(In order of appearance in the “Program”)*
3. Participants List

【India Side】
Samir SARAN  President, Observer Research Foundation (ORF)
Abhijit SINGH  Senior Fellow, and Head, Maritime Initiative, ORF
Mihrir Swarup SHARMA  Senior Fellow and Head, Economy and Growth Programme, ORF

【Korea side】
KIM Joon Hyung,  Chancellor, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA)
KIM Ki-Jung  Professor, Yonsei University
CHOE Wongi  Professor, KNDA
PARK Jae-jeok  Professor, Hankuk University
KIM Bonghoon  Head, Global R&D Center, Hanyang University
CHO Won Deuk  Research Professor, KNDA
CHOI Eunsong  Researcher, KNDA

【Japan side】
WATANABE Mayu  President, The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
AKIYAMA Masahiro  President, Akiyama Associates
HORIMOTO Takenori  Visiting Prof (Dr) Gifu Women’s University
SHINTANI Daisuke  General Manager, Asia China and Oceania Department, Global Economic and Political Studies Division, Mitsui & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute of Japan
SANO Shutaro  Senior Researcher, Institute for National Strategic Studies
IIIDA Keisuke  Professor, the University of Tokyo
KIKUCHI Yona  Director and Senior Research Fellow, JFIR
NISHINO Junya  Professor, Keio University
SAKATA Yasuyo  Professor, Kanda University of International Studies
TAKEBA Yuki  Research Fellow, JFIR
YANO Takuya  Director and Research Coordinator, JFIR

(In order of appearance in the “Program”)

【Observer】
OKAWA Shinsuke  Deputy Director, Second Division, Intelligence and Analysis Service, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
US-led minilateral cooperation in the Indo-Pacific beyond security cooperation: Instrument for China containment or Regional order-building?

2019.11.29

1. Introduction

At the center of the US Indo-Pacific strategy is the construction of a US-led security network. The Obama administration sought to develop this network through multilayered arrangements of minilateral linkages among US alliance partners. The Trump administration has also been expanding existing minilateral security cooperation with like-minded states in the region. The minilaterals highlighted in this context include: (1) the TSD (the US-Japan-Australia), (2) the US-Japan-India and (3) the Quad (the US-Japan-Australia-India).

The US claims that the US’s linking among itself and its allies and security partners in the Indo-Pacific using ‘multilayered bilateral processes’ has become a key strategy for its regional multilateral security order-building. However, China perceives that the US-led alliance network exists to contain China itself and uselessly perpetuates Cold War tensions. Especially, China has been condemning the regionalization of individual US-led alliances and the linkage among them as creating a ‘mini-NATO’ that is designed to contain it. For example, from a Chinese perspective, the US, Japan, Australia and India re-initiated the Quad with an intention to assigning a role of encircling China under the name of the FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) against China’s behavior in the Indo-Pacific.

Then, what can the US and/or its allies do in order to mitigate such Chinese concerns while activating minilateral security cooperation? To address this question, this paper first introduce various US-led minilaterals that have been shaping in the Indo-Pacific. Second, it pays attention to new roles to be assigned to US-led minilaterals beyond security. It claims that the coordination of member states’ infrastructure investment has emerged as a new role. Also, it maintains that the coordination of member states’ contributions to regional maritime capacity building and maritime domain awareness has the potential to become a new role. Third, despite the new role(s), the paper points out that China can still perceive such roles in relation to China containment. Fourth, the paper examines how some members of the US-led security network have been working [and should work] in order to make US-led minilaterals function as an order-building mechanism rather than one for institutional balancing.

2. US-led minilaterals as a component of the US-led Indo-Pacific security network

Security minilaterals are defined as “meetings between small subsets of nations, typically three or four, designed to address common security interests in a more focused setting”.¹ They are different from ad-hoc meetings in that they do not meet only once, though the meetings do not have to be convened regularly and do not require a high level of institutionalization. On the other hand, compared to institutionalized meetings,

minilaterals are relatively free from the fear of entrapment and abandonment, as they are informal ‘strategic partnerships’ with the characteristic of flexibility.

Existing bilateral alliances or Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCA) can serve as a solid basis for forming the minilaterals in the first place. While signing an alliance or a DCA and observing its commitments, signatories can reveal their trustworthiness and ‘preference for institutional design’ to third parties.\(^2\) Therefore, Kinne points out that the more a state has actively signed alliances or DCAs, the easier it becomes to form another one, as its potential partner can have a reasonably good idea of its expected level of commitment to and the scope of the alliance or the DCA.\(^3\) In addition, when a state has separate alliances or DCAs with the other two countries, the state can serve as a mediator for information exchange between the other two, increasing the likelihood that they sign an alliance or a DCA.\(^4\) In this context, the US has a firm base for leading minilateral security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, as the US has alliances with South Korea, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines and Australia, and numerous bilateral DCAs with regional states.

The TSD (the US-Japan-Australia trilateral), which was launched in 2001, is a good example of US-led security minilaterals in the Asia-Pacific. The TSD, having been developed through conducting joint military exercises and holding four trilateral summit meetings up to today, has extensively enhanced the security cooperation between Japan and Australia.

In the case of the US-Japan-India trilateral, the Malabar military exercise between the US and India since 1992 has become highlighted in the context of constructing the US-led Indo-Pacific security network. Following its first inclusion in 2007, Japan had participated in the Malabar exercises intermittently; but it has joined the exercises annually since 2015, thereby making the Malabar a trilateral military exercise. Unlike Japan, Australia, which participated in it in 2007, has been absent from the Malabar exercises out of concern for China’s negative perception on the expansion of Malabar. That being said, though, Australia expressed its intention to join the Malabar in 2017 and 2018 in the midst of the intensified perception of the China threat in Australia; but the requests were rejected by India. Yet, bilateral maritime exercises, the AUSINDEX, have been conducted between India and Australia biannually since 2015, and it compensates for Australia’s absence at the Malabar exercises.\(^5\) The two trilaterals mentioned above contributed to the re-emergence of the Quad since 2017 (Quad version 2) among the US, Japan, Australia, and India after its short-lived appearance in 2007 (Quad version 1). Since President Trump announced US Indo-Pacific policies during his tour to Asian countries in November 2017, there have been five meetings among high officials of the four countries with the last one held in September 2019 at the foreign minister’s level.

The Quad version 2 is the expansion of the TSD and the US-Japan-India trilaterals. The fact that not only the TSD but also the US-Japan-India trilaterals are a part of the Quad version 2 helped India and Australia join the Quad, as they each can defend themselves against China’s accusation that their decision to join it was to expand the existing trilaterals to contain China. It cannot credibly be claimed that India joined the TSD to expand it to the Quad. Nor can it be claimed that Australia joined the US-India-Japan trilateral to expand it to the Quad. If the Quad would be (mis)perceived as an expansion of only the TSD, India would have greater reservations to join the Quad due to its concern for unnecessarily provoking China. India could claim that it is not India, but Australia, that expanded the US-Japan-India trilateral to a Quad, as was the case of aforementioned Australia’s request to join the Malabar military exercise along with the US, India and Japan in 2017 and 2018.


\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid.

Moreover, the media has been raising the possibility of ‘Quad+’ as several non-Quad states, including the United Kingdom and France, are conducting military exercises with various Quad states in the Indo-Pacific. For example, French President Macron suggested during his visit to Australia in May 2018 that France, India and Australia set up a strategic axis against China in Indo-Pacific. In sum, the US has been constructing a US-led security network and in doing so, it facilitates minilateral security cooperation and its expansion.

3. Assigning a new role to US-led minilaterals beyond security cooperation: Coordinating infrastructure investment

Though the US-led security network in the Indo-Pacific is still in the making, the US-led bilateral alliances, trilaterals, the Quad and the Quad+ have shaped the skeleton of the US-led security network in the Indo-Pacific. Then, the trilaterals and the Quad version 2 have already become minilaterals embedded within the US-led security network rather than ones that are comprising the network. That being the case, the trilaterals and the Quad version 2 are to find new roles that can facilitate the working of the network or fixing the problems/concerns of the network.

One of the concerns/problems with the US-led network in the Indo-Pacific is that it lacks a mechanism to respond to China’s BRI, especially as the US stepped out of the TPP. China has been expanding its investment in infrastructure construction and its provision of governmental and non-governmental aid in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Central Asia. The Quad states have been confronting the necessity of preventing China from spreading its political and economic influence in the region more widely through the BRI.

Indeed, each of the four Quad states has been increasing its infrastructure investment in the Indo-Pacific. Since the announcement on July 30, 2018 by the US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, that the US would invest seed money of USD130 million, the US has been putting forth efforts to cultivate public-private partnerships (PPP) for infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific. Japan provided a public fund of about USD35 billion in 2017 for quality infrastructure development. Likewise, Australia announced the Southeast Asia Economic Governance and Infrastructure Initiative in November 2018 and South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity Initiative in January 2019 and made the Australian Infrastructure Financing Facility for the Pacific operational in 2019. India is also actively engaging with South Asian and Indian Ocean states to respond to China’s BRI in the sub-region.

Also, bilateral coordination has been enhanced. To name a few cases, in November 2017, after the summit meeting, the US and Japan launched the Japan-U.S. Strategic Energy Partnership (JUSEP) and signed a Memorandum of Cooperation on energy infrastructure in third countries. Indeed, private companies of the two states contributed to the start of the Jawa 1 Project in Indonesia on December 19, 2018. In the case of the Japan-India bilaterals, in order to develop the most underdeveloped area in India, the Northeast region, the two states set up the India-Japan Act East Forum in November 2017. Outside of India, the two states formed the ‘Asian African Growth Corridor’ (AAGC) in order to cooperate with each other for development projects across Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Africa.

Then, it would be much more efficient if they could coordinate their respective policies trilaterally and quadrilaterally. In that sense, a new role has been assigned (or is being assigned) to US-led minilaterals in the Indo-Pacific: Coordinating member states’ infrastructure investment to provide regional states with alternative sources to China’s BRI investment. At the trilateral level, the US, Japan, Australia and India have been increasing their trilateral infrastructure investments to respond to China’s expansion of influence in the region via its BRI. Examples are as follows.

The US-Japan-Australia trilaterals
- The MOU of the trilateral partnership signed on November 12, 2018 among the U.S.’s Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) and Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Announcement in November 2018 of a project for jointly building an electrical grid
- Agreement among the OPIC, JBIC, and Australia’s Export Finance and Insurance Corp. in April 2019 to build an LNG facility in Papua New Guinea
- OPIC, JBIC and DFAT established a Blue Dot Network in November 2019 for infrastructure development by promoting PPP.

The US-Japan-India trilaterals
- Forming the Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group (TIWG) in February 2018
- Launching the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral Forum among private institutions in May 2018

At the Quad level, their intention to coordinate their infrastructure policies has been expressed whenever they have officially met and at various conference venues in which officials from the four countries have participated.

4. Additional role(s) to be assigned to the US-led minilaterals?

The US and its allies and security partners have been interested in coordinating their policies on non-traditional security issues. In the case of the US, in addition to USD32.5 million under the Foreign Military Financing, the Maritime Security Initiative (MSI) enables the US to provide USD425 million to Southeast Asian states from 2016 to 2021.

Along with the US, Japan and Australia are also interested in contributing to regional states' maritime capacity building and maritime domain awareness. They have been providing (used) surveillance aircraft, patrol vessels and radar to targeted Southeast Asian states, including Vietnam, the Philippines and Indonesia in the form of official development aid (ODA). Also, they have been training officials of armed forces, coastal guards and coastal police from the above-mentioned Southeast Asian states.

On the front of maritime domain awareness, with such resources as the MSI, the US, Japan and Australia ultimately aim to produce a Common Operational Picture of the Indo-Pacific and to construct a Vessel Traffic System in the region. As an example of enhancing maritime domain awareness, there have been media reports that the US and Australia have been considering operating drones jointly with Indonesia in the Cocos Islands to monitor maritime activities in the Indian Ocean. It is in this sense that the Australia-India-Indonesia trilateral has been noted, as India and Indonesia agreed that the former develop the latter’s port, Sabang, located at the approaches to the Strait of Malacca. Its first meeting was held in Bogor, Indonesia in November 2017 at the senior official’s level and the second one held in Canberra, Australia in September 2018.

In most cases of the trilateral and quadrilateral meetings involving the US, Japan, Australia and India since 2017, maritime capacity building and maritime domain awareness (along with infrastructure investment) were one of the meetings’ main agendas. For example, at the Quad meeting held on May 31, 2019, the Quad states “underscored their intent to continue close coordination and collaboration in support of sustainable, private sector-led development, maritime security, and good governance.” In this sense, it is likely that selective US-led minilaterals will be given another role of coordinating maritime capacity building and maritime domain awareness among their members. Indeed, the four countries have already been
strengthening their defense cooperation at bilateral levels and via the US-Japan-Australia and the US-Japan-India trilaterals. Thus, it is unnecessary to direct the Quad toward the military aspect. Rather, the Quad may well examine the possibility of the four states utilizing the Quad as a mechanism to coordinate their respective contributions toward maritime capacity building and maritime domain awareness.

5. Regional allies’ efforts to mitigate competition between the US and China over non-security issues in Indo-Pacific

In order to assuage China’s criticism/concerns and consequently to undermine China’s attempt to build a counter-balancing bloc, US allies and security partners have been attempting not to provoke China unnecessarily. For example, Australia has been inviting China to the joint military training exercises with the US, the Kowari, since 2014, including about ten Chinese soldiers in those exercises annually. Also, in Southeast Asia, Thailand invites China to their major military exercises with the US, Cobra Gold. In the midst of an intensifying military confrontation between the US and China in the South China Sea, China and ASEAN conducted a joint naval military exercise in 2018.

India joined the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) on June 9th, 2017 led by Russia and China. Though the border dispute in 2017 between China and India that lasted for 73 days soured their relationship, they restored their relationship through four summit meetings in 2018 and resumed their military exercise, *Hand in Hand*, in December 2018, which had been halted in 2017. Also, as mentioned before, though Australia expressed its intention to join the Malabar in 2017 and 2018 in the midst of the intensified perception of the China threat in Australia, India rejected Australia’s requests. India has been promoting the ‘inclusive’ nature of Indo-Pacific, which was well expressed Prime Minister Modi’s speech in June 2018 at the Shangri La Dialogue.

Japan announced its conditional participation in the BRI for ‘plus-sum BRI’ in 2017.\(^8\) Asei Ito contrasts ‘plus-sum BRI’ and ‘zero-sum BRI’ using the competition for high-speed rail construction in Indonesia and Thailand between Japan and China as an example. In bidding for the contracts, China seeks to expand its infrastructure exports; and Japan sees this as a zero-sum game, since only one country can win either contract. However, were Chinese state-owned enterprises and Japanese trading companies to work jointly together with a third country to develop and operate industrial parks and electric power infrastructure, for example, such projects could produce a “plus-sum” outcome for all concerned.

To pursue the ‘plus-sum BRI’, Japan worked with China to organize the Japan-China Third Country Market Cooperation Forum on October 26, 2018 to promote “exchange between private companies in Japan and China, with a focus on Japan-China economic cooperation projects by the private sector in third countries”.\(^9\) During that time Tokyo and Beijing agreed to work on the possibility of building a high-speed railway system in Thailand as a joint venture. Were that to succeed, it would help lessen the tension that competition might otherwise engender between the two nations over the BRI.\(^10\) During Prime Minister Abe’s participation in the Forum, Tokyo and Beijing signed a total of 52 memorandums of cooperation on

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infrastructure investment initiatives in third countries, with details of the various public-private partnerships involving Japan, China and third-countries to be worked out as they are developed.  

In this context, it should be noted that South Korea has been pursuing the New Southern Policy and striving to find a nexus with the US Indo-Pacific strategy. Since both the US and South Korea are interested in increasing their investment for infrastructure construction in Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Pacific, assigning a role of coordinating the three states’ infrastructure investment to the US-Japan-South Korea or the US-India-South Korea trilaterals could be a starting point. Since the US, Japan, India and South Korea are all technologically developed states, the US-Japan-South Korea or the US-India-South Korea trilaterals could specialize in coordinating bidding and funding for projects which involve high tech and entail security safety issues such as digital city, smart city, telecommunications, and so on and so forth. The creation of a trilateral forum or fund would give greater room (or an excuse) for South Korea to participate in China’s BRI without making the US misperceive that South Korea tilts toward China.

On the other hand, US allies and security partners may not join minilaterals for marine capacity building and maritime domain awareness out of concern for China’s position. That is because China suspects that, as long as contributing states are the US and its allies and receiving states are Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, all of which have (potential) territorial disputes with China, such minilaterals are intended to constrain China’s marine activities in the Indo-Pacific. With assistance from the US, Japan and Australia, receiving states can improve their marine capacity to confront non-traditional security issues at hand. For example, they can be equipped to respond to the IUU (Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated) fishing practices of the Chinese more effectively.

It is in this context that Australia and Indonesia have some reservations in fully engaging in maritime cooperation. For example, there have been media reports that Australia and Indonesia were considering joint maritime patrols in the South China Sea, but both governments have not officially confirmed the possibility. Also, it may be a reason why minilateral security cooperation has not been officially launched among Australia, Indonesia and Japan, as it may be perceived to be formed for trilateral cooperation for maritime security.

In the context of mitigating Chinese concerns over US-led minilaterals, US allies and security partners have been developing and operating minilaterals in which they are involved apart from the US as mechanisms to avoid unnecessarily seeming to exclude China in favor of US-led groupings only. For example, the Japan-Australia-India trilateral was set up in June 2015 at the Secretary level. It was the first time that US allies and security partners established a minilateral without the US. The trilaterals mainly discussed maritime security issues, counterterrorism and regional connectivity. There have been four official meetings with the most recent one held on December 13, 2017, though there have been trilateral meetings at various academic and think-tank conferences, including the one held on August 13, 2019 organized by Griffith University. Also, it should be noted that the Australia-India-Indonesia triangle, which had its first meeting in November 2017 in Bogor, Indonesia and the second meeting in September 2018 in Canberra, Australia at a high official level, defines the Indo-Australia as “a strategic triangle within the Indo-Pacific, comprising Australia, Indian and Indonesia”.  

In sum, it should wait and see how various minilaterals would develop and what roles they would assume, not to make the US-led network serve as part of an outright China containment. It will be sure, though, that US allies and security partners will make a significant impact on whether the minilaterals would evolve as an instrument for order-building or China containment.

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11 Ibid.
Contents

- The *Fourth Industrial Revolution* and New Economy
- Trilateral Cooperation of The *Fourth Industrial Revolution*
The Fourth Industrial Revolution and New Economy

New Economy for Indo Pacific

Position + Data

AI, IoT, Big Data, 3D Printing, Intelligent Robot etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disaster Prevention</th>
<th>Weather Monitoring</th>
<th>Environmental Monitoring</th>
<th>Utilization of Marine Water Resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Utilization of Agriculture and Forests</td>
<td>Security and surveillance and mapping</td>
<td>Telecommunication</td>
<td>Navigation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

17

Sustainable Development Goals

1. No Poverty
2. Zero Hunger
3. Good Health and Well-being
4. Quality Education
5. Gender Equality
6. Clean Water and Sanitation
7. Affordable and Clean Energy
8. Decent Work and Economic Growth
9. Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure
10. Reduced Inequalities
11. Sustainable Cities and Communities
12. Responsible Consumption and Production
13. Climate Action
14. Life Below Water
15. Life on Land
16. Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions
17. Partnerships for the Goals
Trilateral Cooperation of The *Fourth Industrial Revolution*

- Korea, India & Japan need to cooperate for providing more accuracy position and sharing data.

- More accuracy position and sharing data can solve many social problems.

- India: Software and basic science, Korea: Advanced Manufacturing, Japan: Science Infrastructure

- Trilateral Cooperation based the Fourth industrial revolution can lead better life and welfare.

---

**Thanks**

Bonghoon Kim  
Director, Global R&D Center([www.global-rnd.org](http://www.global-rnd.org))  
CEO, MAXtin Global Co.Ltd([www.maxtin.co.kr](http://www.maxtin.co.kr))
Importance to Integrate India to East Asia manufacturing network and Strengthen IORA’s function

28th November 2019

Mitsui & Co Global Strategic Studies Institute

SHINTANI Daisuke
General Manager,
Mitsui &Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute of Japan

Japanese company : Challenges in the next 1-2 years

(Source) 2018 JETRO Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese Companies in Asia and Oceania
**India is Domestic sales-oriented market at the moment**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country/Region</th>
<th>Proportion of Export Sales to Total Sales (% of respondents)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>63.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>59.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>49.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>46.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>43.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>42.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source) 2018 JETRO Survey on Business Conditions of Japanese Companies in Asia and Oceania

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**“Make in India” for Middle East & Africa**

**NEWs**

Suzuki Motor Corporation (SMC) has today started export of the all-new Swift produced at Suzuki Motor Gujarat Private Limited (SMG), SMC’s 100% subsidiary to produce automobiles in India.

Production of the all-new Swift started at SMG in January 2018. It was shipped from Mumbai Port to South Africa, with Maruti Suzuki as its merchant exporter.

Export of vehicles from India is expanding to over 100 countries and regions including Europe, Japan, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In FY2017, total number of exports of Maruti Suzuki reached to 126,000 units (102% year-on-year).

This is the first time an SMG model is being exported. The number of destinations will be expanded. Through this SMC will support “Make in India” initiatives by the Government of India.

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RHQ and Export Hub for “ISAMEA” region

Panasonic aims to make India a global manufacturing hub

Panasonic wants India to be a global manufacturing hub to help it achieve a sales target of $4.8bn in the country by 2018. The Japanese electronics manufacturer wants its Indian operations to focus on business-to-business and business-to-government segments to help reach this multi-billion dollar revenue target. (Source) Manufacturer, 1 Oct 2015

“India has been recognised as the only ‘strategic country’ for the ISAMEA region (India, South Asia, Middle East and Africa) and we are taking initiatives to maximise localisation.”

Approach to Emerging WEST from India

1. RCEP makes India to integrate manufacturing supply-chain network of East Asia
2. Japanese company can use India more for export hub to the WEST

![Diagram showing RCEP for strengthening connectivity]

(Source) Metru & Co. Global Strategic Studies Institute

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India’s Trade negotiation with Africa is still early stage

India’s FTA etc.

Bi-lateral
- Sri Lanka (FTA)
- Afghanistan (PTA)
- Thailand (FTA)
- Chile (PTA)
- Singapore (CECA)
- Nepal (FTA)
- Korea (CEPA)
- Bhutan (TA)
- Bangladesh (TA)
- Malaysia (CECA)
- Japan (CEPA)
- Argentina (FTA)
- Africa 19 countries (TA)

-Multi-lateral
- Peru (FTA)
- New Zealand (CECA/FTA)
- Indonesia (CECA)
- Canada (CEPA)
- Pakistan (FTA)
- Serbia and Montenegro (TECA)
- Mauritius (CECA) – Finalize

-Mauritius (as gateway from India)
- COMESA (FTA)
  *Common Market for Southern and Eastern Africa
- SADC (FTA)
  *Southern African Development Community
- AECFTA
- EU (iEPA)
  *Interim Economic Partnership Agreement
- Turkey (FTA)
- Pakistan (PTA)
- China (CEPA) – Concluded Oct 2019
- USA (TIFA)
  *Trade and Investment Framework Agreement
- UK (FTA) - Negotiating

Conception Stage
- Africa
- IORA

Frameworks are still not practical from economic perspectives

* AAGC: Asia-Africa Growth Corridor  IORA: Indian Ocean Rim Association  FOIP: Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy
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BIMSTEC: Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation

23
IORA’s secretariat is very small, budget is not enough.

IORA’s Priorities & Focus Area

- Maritime Safety & Security
- Trade & Investment Facilitation
- Fisheries Management
- Disaster Risk Management
- Tourism & Cultural Exchanges
- Academic, Science & Technology
- Blue Economy
- Women’s Economic Empowerment

Prior agenda is like Disaster Risk Management, Maritime Security. “IORA is too political” (Foreign Minister of Mauritius, 15 Nov), economic agenda is not so important. No concept of FTA like as FTAAP of APEC.
Just started to strengthen IORA’s economic function

Key Takeaways for Session 1:
1. Establish a business-to-government dialogue on Non-Tariff Barriers including via the implementation of online feedback systems and greater information sharing by governments on how such barriers are being addressed.
2. Build networks of information exchange among IORA trade officials (particularly young officials) via an ‘IORA Trade Academy’ on best practices and developments across the region.
3. Study how existing maritime infrastructure (e.g. ports, shipping capacity and containers and routes) in the region can be harnessed better to not just serve regional SMEs but also enable landlocked countries to bring goods to ports in IORA Member States.
4. Foster a system of innovation and growth in IORA, such as PIICC’s partnership with Lockheed Martin.
5. Develop an integrated IORA Maritime Industry Strategy to unleash the potential of the ocean economy.
6. Need to be cognizant of complementarities between Member States, and the more limited flow of freight between Member States.
7. IORA Member States to facilitate regional economic cooperation and boost attractiveness to investors.

Key Takeaways for Session 2:
1. Consider mechanisms to address impediments to trade in goods, trade in services, and investment.
2. Accelerate implementation of the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement, leveraging the Trade Facilitation Agreement Facility and bilateral Aid for Trade with the support of developed IORA Member States and Dialogue Partners.
3. Partner with business in policymaking and implementation through new or existing public-private mechanisms (e.g. National Trade Facilitation Committees).
4. Establish an Annual Trade Dialogue to review trade developments and potential new initiatives within IORA, which can be fed into the IORBF.
5. IORA Member States to examine the potential of cooperation with the Global Alliance on Trade Facilitation, preparing the full spectrum of its potential assistance and existing projects (such as adopting risk management strategies, reducing customs clearance times, examining pre-customs clearance systems, and establishing paperless trading).


How can member states proceed these “takeaways”?

IORA’s member states

Almost members need development support from developed countries, but IORA couldn’t have enough member to play such roles.

(Source) IORA’s website

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Importance of IORA’s Dialogue Partners

Dialogue partners’ roles are quite important for IORA.

{Source}: IORA’s website

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Importance of IORA’s Dialogue Partners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conference and Associated Meetings</th>
<th>Table of Participation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IORERF</td>
<td>WOTI</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
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<td>Bangladash</td>
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<td>China</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Japan didn’t attend any sessions at this conference...

{Source}: IORA’s website

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Exploring New Economy of Trilateral Cooperation in Indo Pacific

1. To clarify each roles of regional cooperation mechanism around Indian Ocean; AAGC, FOIP, IORA, IOC, BIMSTEC etc...

2. To strengthen IORA’s institutional function; secretariat, budget...

3. To support IORA by Dialogue Partners including Japan and Korea

4. To involve private sectors more at these mechanism for promoting economic cooperation; e.g.) Participating private sectors from Dialogue Partners more to IORBF

Thank you.
In Pursuit of a Substantive Japan-India-ROK Trilateral Cooperation
- From a Japanese Strategic Perspective –

Presented at the 2019 Japan-India-Korea Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Draft Program

1 Significance of Japan-India-ROK Trilateral Cooperation
✓ Ensuring US presence in the Indo-Pacific region by strengthening strategic ties with the US respectively.
✓ Increasing the influence in the Indo-Pacific region as a “middle” power to:
  - Prevent a potential threat to turn into an active threat.
  - Enhance Japan’s FOIP vision as well as India’s FOIIP and ROK’s New Southern Policy.
    (Strengthening development initiatives backed up by security measures)
✓ Strengthening bilateral/trilateral/multilateral cooperation with other Indo-Pacific countries (notably emphasizing the importance of the ASEAN countries in the Indo-Pacific region).

2 Areas of Potential Trilateral Cooperation
✓ Global issues: international values and norms, arctic, space, climate change, UN PKO and HADR, UNSC membership etc.
✓ Regional issues: maritime security (SLOC, marine safety, economic development, human security), international terrorism, water security etc.
✓ National Defense: Missile defense, border security (importance of mutual recognition).

3 Confronting Challenges
✓ Different focus on the Indo-Pacific initiatives.
  - Japan’s emphasis on economics and connectivity.
  - India’s pursuit of establishing strategic identity.
  - ROK’s approach to evade over-dependence on the Chinese market.
✓ Different areas/levels of concerns over China’s recent assertiveness.
  - East China Sea, THAAD, land borders & the Indian Ocean, BRI.
✓ Different views on WMD (i.e. NPT, CTBT, PSL, post-INF).
✓ Lack of power projection capabilities due to different geographic priorities.
✓ Different levels of existing bilateral cooperation.
  - Ongoing efforts in strengthening the Japan-India & India-ROK relationships.
  - Deadlocked Japan-ROK relationship.
✓ Views of other countries on the trilateral cooperation (US, China, ASEAN etc.).

4 Conclusion
Importance of seeking a step-by-step approach in expanding the existing bilateral relationship into a substantive trilateral relationship (i.e. importance of pursuing an issue-based development).
Prospect for ROK-India-Japan Trilateral Cooperation: A Korean Perspective

I. Regional strategic contexts surrounding South Korea: Emerging New Southern Policy

- Implementing New Southern Policy: South Korea’s strategic needs to go beyond Northeast Asia (diplomatic diversification)
  - Economic overdependence on China: China’s THAAD retaliation on South Korea
  - Strengthening ties with ASEAN member states and states in South Asia
  - Trump administration is steering foreign policy based on the ‘American First’ doctrine->relative decline in American regional hegemony
  - A trade disputes between US and China is resulting in the rise of uncertainty in the regional order
  - Responding to the newly emerging regional architecture of Indo-Pacific and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)

⇒ India can be an ideal partner both in strategic and economic perspective for South Korea in navigating through challenges posed by the US-China competition.

- New Southern Policy
  - It is the first time in South Korean diplomatic and strategic history, singling out India as one of the major regions to be dealt along with the four big countries.
  - Improving its cooperation with its Southern countries-Southeast Asia and South Asia-up to those with the four big countries (US, China, Japan, Russia)
  - Key domains of New Southern Policy
    - Prosperity: for economic co-prosperity along with ASEAN and India
    - People: to build a people-centered, people-oriented community
      - Have more friendly relationship with ASEAN and India
      - To increase exchange between heads of state, governments, enterprises and students
    - Peace: to establish a peaceful Asia community for all citizens
      - To further strengthen cooperation in security and defense in bilateral and multilateral ways (EAS, ARF, IORA)
  - South Korea’s Expanding horizon to India and South Asia
    - ROK President Moon (visit to India in 2018): “We (Korea and India) recognized the value of this bilateral partnership and its contribution to peace, stability and security in our region. We resolved to work together to address new substance and impetus to bilateral cooperation in all areas of engagement so as to contribute to regional and global peace and prosperity. In this context, we agreed to explore tripartite partnership for development in third countries, beginning with capacity building program in Afghanistan.”
II. ROK-India relations

- Strategic Partnership (2010); Special Strategic Partnership (2015)
- 2018’s ROK-India Summit
  - **First**, during their summit meeting, President Moon and PM Modi built on the core values of the New Southern Policy, by elaborating a shared vision for 3+, which is aimed at fostering a “future oriented partnership for People, Prosperity and Peace.” Moreover, the two sides reaffirmed their determination to provide a framework for future-oriented cooperation with India viewing Korea as an indispensable partner in pursuing its ‘Act East’ policy, and Korea seeing India as a central pillar of the Moon Administration’s New Southern Policy.
  - **Second**, the two heads of state agreed to expand their interactions in various areas of mutual interests by working together towards forging diplomatic, security, trade, and cultural cooperation. They also agreed to intensify leadership-level contact to give impetus to Moon’s New Southern Policy and the development of Korea-India relations by regularizing state visits between the two countries. The two sides reaffirmed their resolution to coordinate efforts at creating synergy between Korea’s New Southern Policy and India’s Act East Policy so as to contribute to promoting regional peace and prosperity. Additionally, they agreed to partner with each other in exploring areas of mutual interests to secure mutual economic growth.
  - **Third**, it is also worth noting that the two countries shared their understanding that the New Southern Policy and Act East Policy are aimed at promoting peace and mutual prosperity, and reaffirmed their resolution to work towards creating synergy that contributes to regional economic growth, peace, and stability. Moon’s New Southern Policy underscores building a people-oriented community for peace. And Modi’s Act East Policy envisions to foster mutual prosperity with regional partners for peace and stability. As it is quite evident that the two heads of state are looking at the same direction in nurturing regional cooperation, they agreed to discuss details needed to shore up efforts at cooperation at the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).
  - **Fourth**, in a joint statement released after the summit, Prime Minister Modi pledged to contribute to diplomatic efforts at addressing the situations unfolding on the Korean Peninsula, working toward complete denuclearization, and promotion of lasting peace and stability.

III. India-Japan Relations

- Japan-India: Strategic and Global Partnership (2006)-global partner
  
  Modi’s visit to Japan has resulted in Japan’s commitment to invest $35 billion in India over the next five years, including some major projects such as the Smart City, Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor, and the Shinkansen train between Mumbai and Ahmedabad. This initiative was markedly confirmed by Abe’s mutual visit to India in December 2015. Abe’s visit to India in 2015 was a big success: his decision to sign a civilian nuclear deal with India. The relationship between India and Japan has gained momentum through the efforts of the two countries to interact at various levels, including economics, politics and strategy.

- Motivations to strengthen India’s relationship with Japan.
  
  o First, as the awareness of the importance of the Indo-Pacific grew, the US renamed Pacific Command to Indo-Pacific Command.
Second, due to China’s rise, neighboring countries, including India and Japan, are paying close attention, and both India and Japan have territorial conflicts with China.

Third, the US is pushing ahead with the “American First strategy,” which has a huge impact on Asia. Prime Minister Modi is pursuing Act East policy and aims to promote relations with East Asian countries such as Southeast Asia and Japan. Japan’s financial and technical support for India is an opportunity to solve India’s infrastructure deficit, and Japan’s role is also important in relations with its neighbors.

In India, Japan meets the elements necessary to make a strong India. First, there is little conflict between the interests of India and Japan, and there are no significant problems hindering bilateral relations. They are collaborating and fighting jointly on UN reform. It also shares common values of free and peaceful Indo-Pacific construction in the security arena and collaborates on common interests in various fields. Secondly, Japan is somewhat attractive in terms of economic strength, although it has been weakened as it used to be. In particular, Japan is a country that combines economic development with a modern worldview while still maintaining Asian values such as family-centered, respectful, and polite. The views of the Indian people on Japan are also very favorable (42%) and the third highest after the US (49%) and Russia (47%).

IV. Agenda for Trilateral Cooperation

- Trilateral cooperation on development in the Mekong region (?)
  - Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC)
  - Mekong-Japan Cooperation (MJC)
  - Mekong-ROK Cooperation

=> Trilateral cooperation projects?

- Trilateral Cooperation in India Ocean Rim Association (IORA)
  - South Korea relies on Indian Ocean for natural resources and markets
    - IOR: great potential for economic growth & home to critical sea lanes used for transportation of energy and goods
    - About 99.7% of ROK’s energy resources and cargoes brought into and carried out of the country travel by vessels.
    - South Korea became the 8th dialogue partner in the IORA following the US, China, Japan, etc. => consultative relationship down the road in agreed areas of common interest including maritime safety and (non-traditional) security, economic cooperation and disaster risk management.

- Track-II dialogue
  - Exchange views on regional issues: backchannel diplomacy
  - Providing a venue for critical bilateral and trilateral discussions on important agendas in the region
4. Introductions to Co-sponsoring Organizations

(1) The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

The Forum was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, and (3) individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

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The Forum’s activities are composed of such pillars as “Policy Recommendations,” “e-Forum”, “Research Programs,” “International Dialogues & Exchanges,” “Participation in International Frameworks,” “Information Gathering,” and “PR and Enlightenment.” Of these pillars of activities, one important pillar is the “e-Forum: Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/). The “e-Forum,” which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Foramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

Contact
Address: 2-17-12-1301, Akasaka, Minato-ku, Tokyo, 107-0052, Japan
TEL: +81-3-3584-2190  FAX: +81-3-3589-5120  E-mail: jfir@jfir.or.jp  URL: http://www.jfir.or.jp/j/
(2) Observer Research Foundation (ORF)

Set up in 1990, the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) seeks to lead and aid policy thinking towards building a strong and prosperous India in a fair and equitable world. It helps discover and inform India’s choices, and carries Indian voices and ideas to forums shaping global debates. ORF provides non-partisan, independent analyses and inputs on matters of security, strategy, economy, development, technology, energy and sustainability, and global governance to diverse decision makers (governments, business communities, academia, civil society). ORF’s mandate is to conduct in-depth research, provide inclusive platforms and invest in tomorrow’s thought leaders today.

(3) Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA)

About KNDA

Greetings From Chancellor Kim Joon Hyung

From its origins as the Educational Institute of Foreign Service Officers (EIFSO) which was established in 1963, the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA) has grown to be an institute dedicated to training diplomats and conducting research on Korea’s foreign policy, and is now forming the backbone of the Korean government’s efforts to enhance the country’s diplomatic capacity. South Korean diplomacy currently faces a challenge of bringing permanent peace to the Korean peninsula against the backdrop of an increasingly complex global political landscape. The KNDA will vigorously support all efforts and initiatives aimed at achieving the grand vision of a peaceful Korean peninsula.

First of all, the KNDA will strive to train talented, well-rounded diplomats strongly committed to serving the public, and help them cultivate skills to respond and adapt proactively and flexibly to a fast-changing diplomatic landscape.

Also, as Korea’s top foreign policy and security think-tank conducting research on and analysis of the Korean government’s mid to long-term foreign policy and diplomatic strategy, the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) promises to work harder with greater dedication to support the government’s diplomatic efforts.

Lastly, with various programs designed to share diplomatic know-how and better communicate with the public, the KNDA will make utmost efforts to collect diplomatic insights of individual Koreans to maximize the country’s diplomatic capacity.

About IFANS

The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) is Korea’s top foreign policy and security think tank. IFANS is primarily responsible for:

1. Conducting research on and analysis of the government’s mid to long-term foreign policy and diplomatic strategy, and
2. Developing policy recommendations on pending diplomatic issues.

In addition, IFANS continues to build a wide-ranging policy research network with the academia and research institutions in Korea and abroad, share Korea’s diplomatic agenda with domestic and foreign audience, and promote public understanding on foreign policy through “open diplomacy together with people.