III. The Vision of the Maritime Nation of Japan - The Vision of The maritime Nation of Japan: The World Order and the Regional Order - The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)

III. The Vision of the Maritime Nation of Japan
- The World Order and the Regional Order -

by
Ota Hiroshi
Executive Vice President
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.

I would like here to consider what Japan should do as a maritime nation not only as a wrap-up to this year’s (FY2000) topic “The vision of the Maritime Nation of Japan: The World Order and the Regional Order” but also as a summary of the discussions conducted on the overall theme of this three-session, three-year seminar “The Maritime Nation of Japan: Its Culture and Strategy.”
Before tackling the issue of what Japan should do, though, I would like to briefly return to the issue of identity. Japan’s identity is often defined in terms of “harmony” or “an emphasis on nature” or “an egalitarian society” or “diligence;” in other words, it is described from a cultural perspective or from a Nihonjinron standpoint. In line with the aims of this project, however, identity here should be discussed from the viewpoints of international politics and world history.

A. A Maritime Nation Located in Northeast Asia and Surrounded on All Sides by the Sea

The first of Japan’s identity from this perspective is that it is a maritime nation located in Northeast Asia and surrounded on all sides by the sea. Our discussions thus far have featured, broadly speaking, two comments on the fact that Japan is a maritime nation. The first is that Japan is not actually a maritime nation but rather an insular nation. Japan at one time secluded itself from the rest of the world and as a whole its people have an introverted mentality and are unwilling to take risks. This argument has been advanced especially in comparison with Great Britain. The second comment is that the very idea of ‘maritime’ is outdated. We now have air travel and transport, and also ‘seas’ of information.
On the first point that Japan is not so much a maritime nation as an insular nation, it is an unmistakable fact in geographical terms that Japan is surrounded on all sides by ocean. Economically, Japan is absolutely dependent on open trade via the seas for every one of its resources, and from this perspective, Japan is undoubtedly a maritime nation. Whether the mentality and stance of the Japanese reflect this, however, is certainly a question, it is a challenging question especially with regard to Japan’s status as a Northeast Asian maritime nation in contrast to that of China, traditionally a continental nation.
With regard to the second point that maritime nations as such are no longer desirable models, the concept of a maritime nation should be defined in terms of posture and not necessarily in terms of physical oceans. Being a maritime nation should be understood as believing that contributing to the formation of a new world order will serve Japan’s national interests, i.e., that Japan should pursue open national interests with an open mentality.

B. First Non-Western Country to Modernize through Its Own Efforts

The second of Japan’s identity is that it was the first non-Western country to modernize through its own efforts. This has three meanings.
The first is that Japan is a modernized country just like the countries of the West. In other words, Japan as a modern state has many points in common with its Western counterparts. Japan and the US are said, for example, to share values. It means that both countries have in common such fundamental characteristics as democratic governments and market economies.
The second is that, although Japan did modernize, it is not a Western country. This means that modernization is not identical with Westernization or Europeanization. The Japanese public as a whole tends to believe that the true spirit of the Japanese volk has been lost as their country has become thoroughly Westernized and, since World War?, Americanized, but foreign countries take a different view on modern Japan. Developing countries such as Thailand and Saudi Arabia do not consider Japan to have completely Westernized; in fact, they hold that Japan has successfully modernized without losing its sense of self. This is not a perspective limited to developing countries, either. For a time, the revisionist views of such people as Karel von Wolferen or Clyde Prestowitz were popular, and these observers argued that Japan, although a modern nation, is still unique and very different from a Western nation.
This calls to mind the recollections of Watanabe Koji, once the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Japanese representative at the Japan-US Structural Impediments Initiative. He noted that, though both Japan and the US may have market economies and capitalist frameworks, their respective systems are quite different.
The third meaning touches on the fact that Japan was the first non-Western country to modernize. Many of the non-Western countries working to modernize see Japan as a role model or guide. Modernization centered on industrialization is the aspiration of many developing countries, and Japan has shown that neither Europe nor the West holds a patent on modernization. Japan is in a position to use its own experience of modernization to contribute to the world.

2. What Should Japan Do at the Global Level?

I would now like to examine what Japan should do at the global level based on these aspects of Japan’s Identity.

A. Contributing to the Resolution of the North-South Issue

The first thing Japan should do at the global level is to contribute to the resolution of the North-South issue. While some may question the good of bringing up the North-South issue again, I believe that the dramatic changes occurring with regard to this issue at the beginning of the 21st century require that it be addressed. The first major change is that the Cold War has come to an end. Not all of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) supplied by the West during the Cold War was provided as a part of Cold War strategy, and strategic considerations played a particularly small role in Japan’s ODA. There is no doubt, however, that the Cold War was a key factor in ODA, and annual ODA worldwide has dropped from Cold War levels of around US$50 billion to approximately US$40 billion, a decline of about 20%. While the end of the Cold War was not the only reason for this decrease, it was unquestionably a major cause.
The second major change surrounding the North-South issue is the onward march of globalization. Of course, these has always been a disparity between those countries that have succeeded in development and those that have been left behind, but it appears that globalization may have spurred a widening of this gap. A growing number of countries have been, or are being, marginalized. Globalization has had an enormous impact, as evidenced by the fact that Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, all considered outstanding examples of development, were tripped up in the Asian crisis by financial globalization.
One would expect that globalization would create a single world market but, from the standpoint of the North-South issue, it has in fact exacerbated the disparity between rich and poor. The world tends to be more divided with globalization. Although such phenomena as regional conflicts, fundamentalism, and terrorism cannot be attributed solely to poverty, these problems are becoming more serious as a result of the growing disparity between rich and poor driven by globalization, and are threatening the construction of a stable world order.
As mentioned earlier, modernization is the aspiration of the countries of the South. Even such countries as Iran, which temporarily turned its back on modernization in favor of Islamic fundamentalism, are returning to the path of modernization. These non-Western countries are seeking modernization but not Westernization. Being the first non-Western country to modernize through its own efforts, Japan is in the best position to respond to the aspirations of these countries in the South.
I recall from the discussions we have held thus far on “maritime nations” a comment made by Kitaoka Shinichi (Professor, The University of Tokyo): “The South must achieve development through its own efforts if the North-South disparity between rich and poor is to be peaceful resolved, and Japan has become a valuable model for countries developing on their own under pressure from developed countries.”
Zibgniew Brzezinski has stated that Japan should seek to become not a regional power but rather an “international power” that tackles global problems, and the North-South issue is certainly one of these. Because interest in ODA among developed countries has fallen off since the Cold War, Japan has a particularly large role to play. Japan should undertake the mission, as a national objective, of supporting the development of the many countries in the South that see Japan as a leader in nation building. This is also the path by which Japan can contribute to the stability of the world order.

B. Contributing to the Formation of a Post-Modern Civilization

Another thing that Japan could do at the global level is to contribute to the formation of a post-modern civilization. In his book The Impact of Post-Modern Civilization (Toyo Keizai Inc., 1995), Kenichi Ito, President of the Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc., uses the term “post-modern civilization” to refer to a “civilization that transcends modernity.” Modern civilization has reached an impasse, manufacturing nuclear weapons, destroying the environment, and wasting resources. The structure of modern civilization does not allow us to overcome the walls that divide us into ethnic groups and states, nor does it give us the ability to transcend logical thought and specialization. Consequently, it is essential for the future of humanity that we develop a civilization that transcends our modern one, and the world may well be nearing the time for this, a view that is gradually gaining support.
Characteristic of this new post-modern civilization will be the coexistence of civilizations that are tolerant of unorthodoxy and diversity, and this coexistence will produce a world civilization in the truest sense of the term. From another standpoint, this civilization will replace the traditional domination of military power and wealth with intellectual influence, which as a means of influencing other people and other countries, has been lacking. In the new civilization, intellectual influence will become an important tool in what will become an “intellectual civilization.”
Japan’s culture and civilization contain several elements that can assist in the formation of a new civilization transcending modern civilization. One example is a spirit of tolerance that emphasizes harmony, best exemplified by the liberal view of the Japanese on religion. This view is distinguished by a spirit of tolerance not found in monotheistic religions like Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. Another example is a desire to coexist with nature, connected to which are a sense of humility and a careful use of resources; Kawakatsu Heita (Professor, International Research Center for Japanese Studies) has proposed that Japan become “a resource-saving garden island state.” Japanese culture also gives great importance to networks. This characteristic, not often found in a modern civilization that insists on logic and individualism, has heretofore been regarded as heretical in today's Western-dominated culture, but it would be seen as something universal and potentially mainstream in a post-modern civilization. In light of this, Japan will certainly be able to make an intellectual contribution to the world. The Japanese are not very good at making intellectual contributions, though, and are handicapped by their weak presentation and English abilities. Though this would be quite a difficult challenge for Japan, if it were able to contribute in this regard, I do believe that Japan would earn itself a special place in the history of civilization.

3. What Should Japan Do at the Regional Level?

I recommend that, at the regional level, Japan work to strengthen the frameworks for cooperation in East Asia. The Asian economic crisis has made it apparent just how economically dependent East Asia is on Japan, and just how high expectations of Japan are. Japan has responded to these expectations by supplying standby credit in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and by offering the New Miyazawa Initiative. Something else that the Asian crisis highlighted was the absence in East Asia of any framework for regional cooperation to deal with such a contingency. There is, of course, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), but this organization is not equipped to deal with this type of crisis. Japan once proposed the establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund, but this idea was quickly opposed by the US. Momentum is building, however, behind ASEAN+3 (the ASEAN nations plus Japan, China, and South Korea), which is essentially the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) suggested by Dr. Mahathir Mohamed of Malaysia several years ago. The US opposed the idea when it was first suggested because the proposal had come from Mahathir, but before long prime ministerial meetings were being held by ASEAN+3, and this framework has come to enjoy increasing support.
My recommendation here is that Japan take the initiative and work through ASEAN+3 to reinforce the system for cooperation in East Asia. Japan should start with what can practically be done at the moment, and the first measures are being implemented to improve cooperation in the financial arena, as a follow-up of the currency/economic crisis. In May 2000, the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meeting reached an agreement on the Chaing Mai Initiative for creating a decision-making network for bilateral financial cooperation among the countries involved.
Japan should strive in future to expand such cooperation into a free trade zone. In other words, Japan should lead the way in constructing an open and multifaceted system for financial, trade, and economic cooperation in East Asia.
Several points merit particular attention when promoting this concept. One is relations with the US. The US was against the EAEC at first, and it has opposed the idea of an Asian Monetary Fund. Though it offered a variety of pretexts to justify this position, it was clear in the end that the US finds any system for regional cooperation beyond its own influence unacceptable.
It should be clearly explained, therefore, that these efforts are not aimed at distancing Japan from the US. The US generally grows concerned whenever Japan holds to differing ideas, but the US really should adopt a more broad-minded attitude. After all, Japan and the US are bound closely together through the Japan-US Security Treaty, and the Japan-US security arrangements have now even become a public good that enhances Asia-Pacific security. Reinforcing these ties would give Japan the leeway to express independent views backed by regional cooperation. This would, I believe, be a very sound approach for Japan-US relations. By taking this kind of initiative, any sense of subordination that the Japanese currently may feel towards the US would likely be lessened.
Another point to which attention should be paid is relations with China. China holds the key to developments in East Asia in the 21st century. One of the greatest concerns of the region is that China might choose to seek a dominant position, and the countries of East Asia are watching to see how hegemonic it will become. Japan should encourage China to take an open and cooperative posture towards its neighbors, and Japan has indeed been doing so. It is on the basis of such an approach that Japan provides China with as much as \200 billion in ODA annually, despite various difficulties.
One aim of a regional system for cooperation in East Asia would be to integrate and engage China. Be it an Asian Monetary Fund or a free trade zone, though, bringing China into the fold will not be an easy task. On the other hand, any system for cooperation in East Asia that excludes China would be unworkable. For China, maintaining friendly relations with stable and prosperous neighbors in Asia and deepening its own interdependence with them would also be to its benefit.
Another aim would be to make ASEAN the linchpin of these efforts. In the confusion of the economic crisis and the situation in Indonesia, it may seem that ASEAN has lost some of its glow, but the organization even now remains a hope of countries in the South. ASEAN can be expected again to serve as a driving force in the world economy. Furthermore, ASEAN is a forum for cooperation that encompasses considerable diversity; the organization loosely joins together Buddhist, Christian, and Islamic countries for the sake of greater collaboration. ASEAN is an important region for Japan economically, and last year nearly 40% of Japan’s bilateral ODA was directed to the ASEAN countries. As Okazaki Hisahiko (Director, The Okazaki Institute) has noted, “ASEAN is a bastion in Japan’s prosperity.”
ASEAN is also a region of great importance strategically for Japan, containing as it does the Malacca and Lombok Straits. The keystone to ASEAN’s foreign policy is to seek balance among the major powers outside the region and to avoid falling under the sway of the US, Japan, Europe, or China. One possibility for this balance to be lost in the future is if China emerges dominant. The possibility that ASEAN might then be incorporated into the sphere of a Greater China cannot be excluded.
In The Grand Chessboard (basic Books, 1997), Zbigniew Brzezinski included two diagrams, one showing spheres of influence should China become a dominant regional power, and the other showing the scope of Chinese influence should Japan and the US pursue a deliberate policy of containment towards China. Comparing these two diagrams, one sees that the difference lies in the disposition of Taiwan and ASEAN, illustrating just how important the region is in relation to the future posture of China.
To prevent ASEAN from becoming a “tributary” of China and being subsumed into its sphere of influence, Japan should implement a two-front strategy, engaging China on the one hand while strengthening the resolve of ASEAN on the other. The concept proposed here aims to achieve both objectives and to realize the attendant benefits without transforming the Japan-US alliance into a partnership directed China.

4. Japan from the Perspective of a Maritime Nation

Finally, let us take one more look at what Japan should do from the perspective of a maritime nation. I mentioned earlier that the concept of a maritime nation need not be defined in terms of physical seas, and that it would be in the national interest of Japan to offer up universal values in contributing to the international community. This should be interpreted to mean that Japan should maintain an open mind towards pursuing open national interests leading to peace and prosperity for Japan; resolving the North-South issue at the global level and helping in the formation of a post-modern civilization would be perfectly in line with this idea.
When presenting the issues to be discussed in 1999, Iokibe Makoto (Professor, Kobe University) said of the regional order: “East Asia is seeking out a new historical context in the 21st century that transcends the traditional pattern of the Chinese Empire. In doing so, the presence of the maritime nation of Japan a country that sees the existence of numerous smaller countries on the continent [note: this might be better read as East Asia] as being in its own interest, that dislikes the idea of East Asia coming under the exclusive domination of any one country, and that is working to construct an open and multi-dimensional international system is good news for many countries and many people in the region.”
If it can take the initiative in establishing an open and multi-dimensional system for cooperation in East Asia with the maritime alliance of the Japan-US partnership at the core, all the while engaging China and strengthening the resolve of ASEAN, Japan will be able to fulfill a historical mission worthy of a maritime nation.