Summary of the Keynote Speeches
Session
I : "Self-Portrait of Japan" by SOEYA Yoshihide
As seen in
its classification alongside the US, China, and Russia as one of the four
major countries in East Asia, Japan is frequently accorded the status
of "major power." However, Japan's diplomatic efforts are only
seen through the lens of "major power diplomacy" by the other
countries of Asia when the potential of these efforts is viewed with concern.
When Japanese themselves speak of "major power diplomacy," they
often do so as a critique of current circumstances or as an expression
of determination, and post-war Japanese foreign policy cannot rightly
be termed "major power diplomacy."
A foreign policy suited to Japan's stature would in no way resemble the
strategic game played by such major powers as the US and China but would
instead be an approach in which Japan would put its shoulder to the wheel
to build a "middle power network" with the countries of Asia.
Such a foreign policy would enhance relations with the countries of Asia
as equals, especially in civil society.
The major premise for such a foreign policy would not be rejecting the
strategic game between major powers but rather pursuing major power relations
through the Japan-US security relationship. The strategic weight of US-China
relations has a considerable impact on Asia's political system, and Japan
and the other countries of East Asia do not have the capability to develop
independent strategies in this regard. Though situated between the US
and China, Japan should resist the temptation to view Japan-US-China relations
from an equidistant stance. Japan and the rest of East Asia should adopt
a similar perspective in addressing the US-China strategic relationship,
establishing multilateral cooperation as a basic principle. Upon this
will rest the basis on which the countries of Asia will welcome Japan-US
security relations as an element of stability.
Creating a self-image for Japan is a major precondition for formulating
a basic stance on Japan-US relations, but even more important is that
this will provide a basis for Japan to engage in "dialogues among
equals" with its East Asian neighbors.
The first and most important partner for such dialogue is Japan's next-door
neighbor, South Korea. It has become almost second nature for the vast
majority of South Koreans to view Japan through the "major power"
lens. It is highly probable that the Korean peninsula will see an acceleration
of changes in the circumstances surrounding North Korea. Should that occur,
it is also likely that Japan's response will not be taken for what it
actually is by South Koreans looking at it through the lens of "major
power diplomacy." Cooperation with South Korea is the very foundation
on which Japan constructs its policy towards the Korean peninsula, and
the South Korean people must be convinced through dialogue and exchange
via all possible channels that Japan's actions are not simply diplomatic
tactics but substantial responses arising out of Japan's self-image.
The conventional stereotypes of Japan in the area of political security
have for the most part disappeared in Southeast Asia. Japan is exceedingly
indifferent, however, to the tendency of Southeast Asian countries to
regard Japan as basically an "extra-regional major power." If
close attention is paid to this inclination, the relationship between
Japan and Southeast Asia has great potential as a means of implementing
multilateral approaches in Asia. In that sense, Japan's conduct in principally
Southeast Asian forums such as ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and ASEAN
+ 3 is very important. Similarly, one can expect future implementation
of the proposals in Prime Minister Koizumi's policy speech (January 2002,
Singapore), which emphasized building momentum towards the creation of
an "East Asia Community" with Japan-ASEAN relations at the core.
SessionII: "Rising China" by TAKAHARA Akio
The 21st century
was once optimistically termed the Asian Century and in particular the
Chinese Century, but a more cautious view has become prevalent of late.
Even so, later historians most likely will acknowledge the rise of China
from the late 20th century to the early 21st century as an important event
in world history. China is undoubtedly a key element to be examined when
considering Japan as an integral part of Asia.
China already boasts the sixth-largest economy in the world. The inflow
of foreign capital and systemic reform that the country's accession to
the World Trade Organization (WTO) will promote are expected to further
invigorate China's economy. China perceives itself as a regional power
in the process of developing into a global one and, as certainly the only
regional candidate for superpower status, its presence in the region and
around the world appears to be growing day by day.
Nevertheless, Chinese society is facing many serious problems. Public
funds have had to be used to cover an accumulation of bad debts, leading
to an increasing dependence on the issue of government bonds that, together
with the difficulty of structural adjustments and the aging of the society,
will likely pose increasingly serious challenges as we move deeper into
the century, as will environmental problems stemming from economic growth
and widening income disparities between regions and social strata. Rising
pluralism and a diversification of views in Chinese society are also putting
pressure on the authorities to carry out political reforms. The authorities
have made a point of utilizing nationalism as a centripetal force for
national unity, but skillfully controlling such a force without error
is by no means an easy matter.
The reality of China is complex and many-sided, and its presence has a
double meaning for East Asia. As economic competitors, the countries of
ASEAN see the emergence of China as the "sole winner" as a threat,
though at the same time they also have high expectations of attracting
Chinese capital and of exporting some of their goods to China. There are
some in Japan, too, who perceive China as an economic threat, but Japanese
companies have expanded their business as China has grown. All of the
countries of East Asia can benefit by utilizing the rise of China, and
the worst-case scenario would in fact be a disruption in the Chinese economy
leading to political instability. Unproductively warning China's imminent
collapse or portraying China as a clear and present danger should be avoided;
instead the realities of China need to be grasped.
Despite its efforts to ensure a peaceful international environment for
the sake of economic development and to maintain and develop cooperative
relations with other countries, China faces the dilemma that achieving
growth to the degree that it appears to be the "sole winner"
will provoke concern among its neighbors of "a Chinese threat."
To allow everyone to benefit from the "asset" of Chinese growth,
therefore, China has sought to avoid isolation by forming multilateral
frameworks that will bring about a "win-win" situation. Some
Chinese also place a practical emphasis on frameworks of regional cooperation
inclusive of the US in light of the close interdependence between the
countries of East Asia (including China) and the US. It is important that
we endeavor to offer indirect support to those on the side of greater
cooperation with the international community in policy disputes within
China. A key element in pursuing both global international cooperation
and harmony within Asia at the same time will be the incorporation of
China as a trustworthy member into the East Asian community.
Session III: "Japan
in Asia" by SHIRAISHI Takashi
The process
of regional formation in East Asia has been one of "regionalization."
What forces are at work in this regionalization process?
Both the security and trade foundations of the East Asian regional system
were built by the US. Hence American guarantees of security in East Asia
and access to US markets have become preconditions for the continuation
of the East Asia regional system. Americanization projects have been carried
out on that basis, with their principal aim being to groom people sharing
the same language and thinking about matters in the same way as Americans
to manage systems (states) that are fundamentally the same as the American
system.
Japanization, on the other hand, was premised on the success of Japan's
"politics of productivity," its economic growth and its advanced
industrialization. Japanization attempted to bring to East Asia economic
growth, greater industrial sophistication, and political stability by
way of extension through foreign policy approaches such as direct investment
and comprehensive economic cooperation, and it entailed the expansion
and further development of informal production and distribution networks
by companies receiving policy-based assistance to expand into East Asia.
"Sinofication," grounded on the presence of communities of Chinese
descendants throughout Southeast Asia, involved companies run by these
"locals of Chinese ancestry", who had gradually become a powerful
force in East Asia's economic development from the 1970s, transcending
national boundaries to become "transnational" companies and
expanding and deepening informal networks of personal trust based on shared
territorial bonds and blood relations.
Even today these forces still play a significant part in the formation
of a regional order in East Asia. With the onset of the Asian economic
crisis, Japan put forward the idea of an Asian Currency Fund and carried
out the Miyazawa Initiative, and in 1999 it even began negotiations with
Singapore on economic cooperation. Prime Minister Koizumi further proposed
Japan-ASEAN economic cooperation during his 2002 visit to Southeast Asia.
Why? Economic recovery in the ASEAN countries would be a big plus for
Japan, and assisting these countries in overcoming the crisis and enabling
them to return to the path of sustained growth was extremely important
for Japanese companies expanding into Southeast Asia.
The same can be said with regard to China and "Sinofication."
Unlike Japanization, however, Sinofication does not imply an extension
of the Chinese model and Chinese economic power beyond the country's borders.
"Sinofication" refers to the process whereby people who had
long been settled in Southeast Asia and transformed from "overseas
Chinese" to "locals of Chinese ancestry" expanded their
economic activities across national boundaries from the 1970s, at the
same time extending their informal networks among other "locals of
Chinese ancestry" internationally. The China-ASEAN Free Trade Zone
being proposed by China can be seen as a means of allowing "locals
of Chinese ancestry" linked by these networks to engage freely in
trans-national trade without being hindered by formal systems.
From this perspective, it appears that, despite a number of recent regionalistic
initiatives, regionalization will continue to be the basic approach to
regional formation.
Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR)
|