

The **37**th Policy Recommendations

Positive Pacifism and Japan's Course of Action



August 2014

**The Policy Council
The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc.**

Greeting

The Japan Forum on International Relations (JFIR) organized the Policy Council within itself immediately after it was founded in 1987, and has since publicly announced a series of policy recommendations on a regular basis (see Appendix at the end of this booklet). The Policy Recommendations on “Positive Pacifism and Japan's Course of Action,” which we hereby present, is the 37th in such a series. The Cold War era, after plenty of twists and turns, eventually resulted in a victory for the advanced democracies of the West. The post-Cold War world has since evolved through multiple stages of power distribution – uni-polarity, multi-polarity and non-polarity – and has fallen into disarray without reaching a point where a new balance of power could be secured. With international affairs in deep transformation as described above, what course of action should Japan take?

With this awareness in mind, the Policy Council of JFIR has held five meetings since November 11, 2013 and on July 11, 2014 drafted the policy recommendations on the theme of “Positive Pacifism and Japan's Course of Action.” The draft of the policy recommendations was sent to all the members of the Policy Council, of which 72 members agreed to its contents and signed.

Thereafter, in line with the tradition, the full text of this set of Policy Recommendations, both in Japanese and in English, was submitted to the Prime Minister of Japan, released to the press, distributed to opinion leaders both at home and abroad, and made accessible at the website of JFIR, <http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/>. In addition, in view of the importance of the issues raised by this set of Policy Recommendations, we decided to appeal directly to the public at large by running a full-page advertisement of the Policy Recommendations in the August 6 issue of the national edition of ; The Sankei Shimbun, The Asahi Shimbun and The Mainichi Shimbun.

The objective of JFIR is to encourage its members to discuss, study and propose ideas on matters of foreign policy, thereby enlightening the public in and out of Japan. In doing so,

however, JFIR as an institution neither takes nor rejects any specific positions on matters of foreign policy. The responsibility for the contents of these Policy Recommendations lies solely with those Members of the Policy Council who signed them. JFIR as an institution, trustees, officers and members of JFIR as well as other parties to JFIR who did not sign them are exempted from any responsibility for the contents.

August 2014



ITO Kenichi

President of JFIR
Chairman of JFIR Policy Council

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Introduction

1. The Post-Cold War International Order Falling into Disarray

The Cold War era, after plenty of twists and turns, eventually resulted in a victory for the advanced democracies of the West. The post-Cold War world has since evolved through multiple stages of power distribution – uni-polarity, multi-polarity and non-polarity – and has fallen into disarray without reaching a point where a new balance of power could be secured. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990 and the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001 are among the incidents that heralded the beginning of the current state of affairs.

The subsequent "War on Terror," which has been waged mainly in Afghanistan and Iraq, has now seen the battlefield extended into Syria and shows no signs of winding down. Asserting that America is not the world's policeman, the United States has withdrawn from the battlefields in the Middle East and announced a "pivot" to Asia. In the meantime, China is unilaterally extending its control over the South China Sea and the East China Sea, while defiantly proposing "a new model of major-country relations" with the United States.

As if to pre-empt such changes in the "rules of the game" of the international order, Russia on March 18, 2014 forcibly took over Crimea from Ukraine and annexed it. This was a gauntlet thrown down by Russia challenging the fundamental norm of the post-WWII international community "not to tolerate changes to the status quo by force."

Shortly thereafter, on March 27, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution refusing to recognize the change in Crimea's status unilaterally imposed by Russia. The vote was 100 in favor and 11 against, with 58 abstentions. The G7 Summit meeting held on June 4-5 in Brussels also declared its support for this UN General Assembly resolution. This means that a majority of the international community, including all of the advanced democracies of the West, did not approve of Russia's action and decided to impose economic sanctions on Russia. In the background to this response, needless to say, is the historical memory of the United Kingdom and France abandoning Czechoslovakia in the face of Nazi Germany's

demand that Czechoslovakia cede the Sudetenland to Germany, thereby giving a green light to Germany's expansionism.

2. Never Be Complacent About Exercising the Right to Collective Self-Defense

With the international order falling into disarray as described above, what course of action should Japan take? The Japan Forum on International Relations announced the 32nd Policy Recommendations on "Positive Pacifism and the Future of the Japan-U.S. Alliance" in October 2009, in which it was proposed that "Pacifism of Japan in the past was the one naively content with a mere fact of not being involved in an act of war as a perpetrator. However, the world in the 21st century asks Japan what a role she can play in positive propositions for the peace and stability of the region and the world, let alone not becoming an aggressor or a perpetrator in an act of war. In other words, the world asks Japan to fulfill her duties as a responsible member of the global civil society. Pacifism of Japan must now evolve from 'negative pacifism' or 'passive pacifism' to 'positive pacifism' or 'active pacifism'."

As it happened, a Cabinet decision was made on July 1 by the Abe administration to change its interpretation of the constitution to allow Japan to exercise the long-banned right to collective self-defense. Since every state has the inherent right to self-defense, be it individual or collective, we welcome this decision. To the extent that this decision pertains to the right of self-defense, it enhances deterrence, thereby helping "to maintain international peace and security" (Charter of the United Nations, Chapter 1, Article 1), but genealogically it can be categorized as maintaining peace through "a balance of power." Conceptually this differs from participation in or contribution to the collective security measures or PKO activities conducted by the United Nations. Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations as a general rule prohibits the use of force other than participation in collective security measures taken by the United Nations, with the exception of the exercise of the right to self-defense, and not the other way around. In light of the principle of international cooperation as advocated in the preamble of the Constitution of Japan, Japan should never stay complacent with constitutional approval of the exercise of the right to collective self-defense, but instead should further enhance its participation in, and contribution to, establishing a global collective security system that embodies the spirit of "world pacifism."

3. Switch Japan's National Credo from "One-Country Pacifism" to "World Pacifism"

The world now stands at a crossroads: will it degenerate into an international order characterized by a law-of the-jungle struggle for power, tolerating changes to the status quo by force under changed rules of the game, or evolve into an international order characterized by "an international peace based on justice and order" (The Constitution of Japan, Article 9, Section 1). The question of which of these two scenarios will become the mainstream in forming the international order is of no small interest for the security and peace of Japan. Japan should never tolerate a reversion of the world order to a primitive power struggle, but instead should commit itself fully to realizing a "no-war" order. In so doing, Japan should switch its national credo from the "one-country pacifism" of the past to "world pacifism."

Theoretically speaking, the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact (General Treaty for the Renunciation of War) in 1928 should be considered as a turning point in world history. In the face of the horrible calamities of WWI, humankind set out to outlaw "war," which had been justified as a sovereign state's right under international law, by concluding this General Treaty for the Renunciation of War and concurrently prohibiting the "unilateral expansion of territory by force." With the year 1928 as a turning point, human history did make a leap from "the age of freedom to wage war" dominated by the non-discriminatory concept of war to "the age of *jus contra bellum*" in which war was made unlawful. Both the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the Cairo Declaration of 1943 affirmed the "principle of non territorial aggrandizement," on the grounds of which Japan has been demanding the return of the Northern Territories from Russia. As a proponent of "positive pacifism," Japan should switch from "one-country pacifism" to "world pacifism."

4. The Way Japan Deals with the Crimean Crisis is a Touchstone of Its Positive Pacifism

Notwithstanding this trend, Russia has forcibly taken over the Crimean peninsula from neighboring Ukraine and annexed it. Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a public address to the Russian parliament on March 18, 2014, justified his annexation of the Crimean peninsula on the basis of the request made by Russian-speaking residents in Crimea. This justification is in square defiance of the spirit of renouncing war commonly shared by the international community and is virtually a revival of the

notorious "Brezhnev Doctrine." This decision represents the idiosyncrasy of Putin, who dared to declare that the collapse of the Soviet Union was "the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century." There is no denying that the current actions of Russia are an extension of the two Chechen Wars as well as the War with Georgia.

While it was a considerable relief to observe that the international community, or at least the advanced democracies of the West, has criticized Russia's current actions and decided to impose economic sanctions on it, this inadequate response needs to be supplemented by a host of follow-up measures.

Under such circumstances, it is quite regrettable that there are voices in Japan which declare that the geographical remoteness of Ukraine makes it no direct concern to the security and peace of Japan, that Japan should take a different stance from other countries and refrain from provoking Russia improvidently in view of the sensitivity of the Northern Territories issue, or that it must not be forgotten that Japan and Russia are tied by such common interests as the development of natural gas in Eastern Siberia, all of which are typical manifestations of "one-country pacifism." Japan would simply fall into self-contradiction if it should give tacit approval to Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea on the one hand and demand the return of the Northern Territories on the other.

5. The International Community Should Not Send the Wrong Signal to China

If the international community turns a blind eye to Russia's illegal actions at this stage, it is feared that China might receive the wrong signal and venture on unilateral actions in East Asia similar to those taken by Russia in Ukraine.

While China has yet not crossed the line at this point, if the international community should become reluctant to bear costs and risks of any kind and hesitant to resort to economic sanctions, let alone military sanctions, such connivance would eventually prompt China to play a "second Russia."

On the other hand, the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a means of sanction should not be underestimated. In the face of nuclear proliferation and its growing deterrent effect, the international community should be more cautious than ever about

invoking military sanctions, and should therefore note the effectiveness of non-military sanctions, especially economic sanctions. The Cold War, which in some regards was a competition between the Eastern and Western blocs over the relative merits of regimes, resulted in a victory of the West in the last analysis. Amid advances in globalization, economic sanctions cost ever more but also yield more effect. Therefore, the international community is hereafter expected to undertake the task of developing a strategy to implement and maintain economic sanctions more tactfully and wisely.

Japan, along with other advanced democracies, should stand firm in disapproval of Russia's annexation of Crimea and should never waver in its position. In March 1933, Japan seceded from the League of Nations, thereby breaking off with the entire international community. We must remember just how much Japan lost from this. China has vacillated between disapproval and support of Russia's actions but, if Japan were to respond similarly, it would not only lose its credibility in the international community but would also become unqualified to criticize whatever similar actions which China might unilaterally take in the South and East China Seas in the future.

6. Positive Pacifism and Japan's Course of Action

While the primary aim of the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War has been taken over by the Charter of the United Nations, the current UN-led collective security system that serves as the "global no-war regime" is still fairly flawed (e.g., the five permanent members of the Security Council are granted the veto powers). Therefore, realistically speaking, Japan's peace and security cannot be completely entrusted to it at this stage. It should be noted that solidarity and unity among advanced democracies (the G7 for economic affairs, NATO and/or the Japan-US alliance for politico-military affairs) work as supplements or surrogates for such elements as balance of power and/or deterrence that are lacking in the "global no-war regime." It is also imperative that these countries share such common values as fundamental human rights and democracy.

There are criticisms in some quarters in Japan that participation in or contribution to the "global no-war regime" or the regime of advanced democracies as a supplement or a surrogate is tantamount to "becoming an accomplice to war." However, this is an accusation based upon ignorance. Since the conclusion of the General Treaty for the

Renunciation of War, there is no such thing as a "war" in the legal sense of the word. There are only "acts of aggression" and "sanctions" against them. Participation in sanctions is the duty of a responsible member of the international community, and is far from "becoming an accomplice to war."

Having been defeated in WWII, Japan has made it a basic national strategy to follow "the Yoshida Doctrine," under which Japan entrusted its own national security to a foreign country and became intensely oriented toward economic development. Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato was once derided by President de Gaulle of France as "a salesman of transistor radios." The Yoshida Doctrine as such is no longer valid in the interdependent international community of the 21st century. Japan should break away from the "one-country pacifism" of the past holding that "peace in Japan alone is possible and we may be content with that," and hoist a new flag of "world pacifism" demonstrating that, without peace in the world, peace in Japan is not possible. Positive pacifism is a system of ideas consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, upholding the principle of international cooperation. Japan's positive pacifism should start with honest recognition of the mistakes Japan made before and during WWII, and with a vow never to repeat such mistakes. Positive pacifism is Japan's strategic vision for realizing co-prosperity and co-existence with the rest of the world.

Based upon the ideas elaborated thus far, we the 72 undersigned members of the Policy Council of the Japan Forum on International Relations present the following set of six policy recommendations.

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<i>KAWAKAMI Takashi</i>	<i>Director, Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University</i>
<i>KAWAMURA Mikio</i>	<i>Professor Emeritus, Tama University</i>
<i>KAWATO Akio</i>	<i>General Manager, Japan-and-World Trends</i>
<i>KIMURA Takayuki</i>	<i>former Ambassador to the European Union</i>
<i>KOIKE Yuriko</i>	<i>Member of the House of Representatives</i>
<i>KUSAKA Kazumasa</i>	<i>Chairman and CEO, The Japan Economic Foundation</i>
<i>MANO Teruhiko</i>	<i>Financial Commentator</i>
<i>MORII Toshiharu</i>	<i>Councilor, JFIR</i>
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<i>OGASAWARA Takayuki</i>	<i>Professor, Yamanashi Gakuin University</i>
<i>OGAWA Hajime</i>	<i>former Member of the House of Representatives</i>
<i>OHKI Hiroshi</i>	<i>former Member of the House of Representatives / Councillors</i>
<i>OHKURA Yunosuke</i>	<i>President, Cross Cultural Laboratory</i>
<i>OHTA Masatoshi</i>	<i>former Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa</i>
<i>OHYA Eiko</i>	<i>Columnist</i>
<i>OTANI Tatsumi</i>	<i>Professor, Soka Women's University</i>
<i>SAITO Naoki</i>	<i>Professor, Yamanashi Prefectural University</i>
<i>SAITO Shoji</i>	<i>former Advisor, Mitsubishi Chemical Corp.</i>
<i>SAJIMA Naoko</i>	<i>Professor, Senshu University</i>

<i>SAKAMOTO Masahiro</i>	<i>Superior Research Fellow, JFIR</i>
<i>SAWAI Hiroyasu</i>	<i>Visiting Professor, Kobe University</i>
<i>SHIDORI Gakushu</i>	<i>Commentator</i>
<i>SUGIUCHI Naotoshi</i>	<i>former Ambassador to Romania</i>
<i>SUZUKI Keisuke</i>	<i>Member of the House of Representatives</i>
<i>SUZUKI Touichi</i>	<i>Political Columnist</i>
<i>TAIDA Hideya</i>	<i>Member of the Board of Trustees, Akita International University</i>
<i>TAJIMA Takashi</i>	<i>former Ambassador to Canada</i>
<i>TAKAHASHI Kazuo</i>	<i>former Professor, International Christian University</i>
<i>TAKEUCHI Yukio</i>	<i>Auditor, JFIR / former Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs</i>
<i>TAKUBO Tadae</i>	<i>Chairman, Emergency Policy Council, JFIR</i>
<i>TRAN Van Tho</i>	<i>Professor, Waseda University</i>
<i>UCHIDA Tadao</i>	<i>Journalist</i>
<i>URANO Tatsuo</i>	<i>Professor Emeritus, Nihon University</i>
<i>WATANABE Hirotaka</i>	<i>Professor, Tokyo University of Foreign Studies</i>
<i>WATANABE Mayu</i>	<i>Executive Director, JFIR</i>
<i>WATANABE Toshio</i>	<i>Chancellor, Takushoku University</i>
<i>YAYAMA Taro</i>	<i>Political Commentator</i>
<i>YUSHITA Hiroyuki</i>	<i>former Ambassador to the Philippines</i>

(In alphabetical order)

Conclusions

1. Japan Should Participate in the United Nations Collective Security Actions, including Those Involving Military Actions

Participation in UN collective security actions, including even military actions, does not qualify as the "use of force" prohibited by the Japanese Constitution. Japan should participate in such UN collective security actions, as multinational forces organized under UN Security Council resolutions, from the perspective of "positive pacifism" based on the principle of international cooperation.

2. Japan Should Contribute to Establishing a Global Collective Security Structure by Promptly Revising the Act on Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations and Formulating a Basic Law on International Peace Cooperation

There are many cases of blatant breaches of peace and security by rogue nations and international terrorists all around the world. Currently, there are 46 armed conflicts across the globe that killed more than 110,000 people last year alone. Japan achieved a certain degree of results in global peacekeeping operations in Cambodia and elsewhere as well as in a refueling mission in the Indian Ocean. To contribute to world peace in more timely and suitable ways, Japan should both revise the Act on Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations and formulate a Basic Law on International Peace Cooperation as soon as possible.

3. We Welcome the Abe Administration's Decision on the Use of the Right to Collective Self-Defense and Call for the Government's Immediate Establishment of the Necessary Legal Institutions

The post-Cold War world has suddenly become tumultuous, and East Asia is no longer an exception. North Korea hints at the use of nuclear weapons and missiles and China shows no hesitation about making maritime forays. Japan cannot confront these threats singlehandedly. Therefore, Japan needs to handle these threats in collaboration with the United States or other friendly nations in the Asian region. We welcome the Abe administration's decision to reinterpret the Japanese Constitution to allow the exercise of the right to collective self-defense and we call for the government to establish the necessary legal institutions as quickly as possible.

4. Japan Should Strengthen Its Collaboration with Southeast Asia, Australia and India on the Basis of Japan-US Strategic Cooperation vis-à-vis China

While the United States declares that Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty covers all territories under Japan's administration, including the Senkaku Islands, it also continues to pay heed to the concept of "a new model of great-power relations" put forward by China. Based on its strategic cooperation with the United States vis-à-vis China, Japan should make efforts to engage as well as deter China. At the same time, Japan also needs to enhance its collaboration with Southeast Asian nations, Australia and India.

5. Japan Should Reject Russia's "Unilateral Territorial Expansion by Force" and Adopt a Consistent Non-Recognition Policy Together with the Group of Seven Nations

Russia has taken Crimea from Ukraine and annexed it. This action has undermined the basic post-World War II international relations principle of prohibiting "changes to the status quo by force." We will never accept Russia's action. Advanced democracies led by the Group of Seven nations are imposing restrictive economic sanctions against Russia. Japan should support these moves and act in concert with the Group of Seven nations.

6. Japan Should Exercise Leadership in Resolving "Global-Scale Issues"

Without limiting security concerns to issues of territorial integrity alone, Japan should pay keen attention to "global-scale issues" or "issues related to human security" (failed states, international terrorism, poverty, human rights, development, piracy, cyber-security, energy, space, climate change, infectious diseases and so forth) and should exercise leadership in resolving these issues from the perspective of positive pacifism.

Appendix

Introduction to The Japan Forum on International Relations

The Forum conducts a variety of activities hosting conferences, organizing research programs, and publishing research reports and policy recommendations, etc.

[History]

The Japan Forum on International Relations, Inc. (JFIR or The Forum) was founded on March 12, 1987 in Tokyo on the private initiative of Dr. OKITA Saburo, Mr. HATTORI Ichiro, Prof. ITO Kenichi, and 60 other independent citizens from business, academic, political, and media circles of Japan, recognizing that a policy-oriented research institution in the field of international affairs independent from the government was most urgently needed in Japan. On April 1, 2011, JFIR was reincorporated as a “public interest foundation” with the authorization granted by the Prime Minister in recognition of its achievements.

[Purpose]

The Forum is a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization dedicated to improved understanding of Japanese foreign policy and international relations. The Forum takes no institutional position on issues of foreign policy, though its members are encouraged not only to analyze but also to propose alternatives on matters of foreign policy. Though the Forum helps its members to formulate policy recommendations on matters of public policy, the views expressed in such recommendations represent in no way those of the Forum as an institution and the responsibility for the contents of the recommendations is that of those members of the Forum who sign them alone.

[Organization]

JFIR is a membership organization with four categories of membership, namely, (1) corporate, (2) associate corporate, (3) individual and (4) associate individual. As for the organizational structure of JFIR, the “Board of Trustees” is the highest decision making body, which is in charge of electing the “Directors” and of supervising overall activities of JFIR, while the “Board of Directors” is an executive body, which is in charge of the management of day-to-day operations of JFIR.

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TAKEUCHI Yukio

[Activities]

In tandem with the core activities of the “Policy Council” in making policy recommendations, another important pillar of JFIR’s activities is the e-Forum “Hyakka-Seiho” which means “Hundred Flowers in Full Bloom” (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/cgi/m-bbs/>). The e-Forum, which started on April 12, 2006, is open to the public, functioning as an interactive forum for discussions on foreign policy and international affairs. All articles posted on the e-Forum are sent through the bimonthly e-mail magazine “Meru-maga Nihon Kokusai Fōramu” in Japanese to about 10,000 readers in Japan. Furthermore, articles worth attention for foreigners are translated into English and posted on the English website of JFIR (<http://www.jfir.or.jp/e/index.htm>) as “JFIR Commentary.” They are also introduced in the e-mail magazine “JFIR E-Letter” in English. “JFIR E-Letter” is delivered bimonthly to about 10,000 readers worldwide.

The screenshot displays the homepage of THE JAPAN FORUM ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, INC. (公益財団法人 日本国際フォーラム). The header includes the organization's name in English and Japanese, a search bar, and a language selector set to 'Japanese'. Navigation links for 'JFIR E-Letter', 'Contact us', and 'SiteMap' are provided. A central text block describes the forum's mission as a private, non-profit, independent, and non-partisan organization established to encourage members and the public to study, discuss, exchange, and propose ideas on foreign policies and international affairs. A photograph of a meeting is captioned 'The Japan- U.S. Dialogue'. Below the header is a navigation menu with 'HOME', 'About us', 'Organization', and 'Activities'. The main content area features a 'JFIR Commentary' section with a list of articles, including 'The Decline of Deterrence Power behind the Ukraine Crisis' by NABESHIMA Keizo (May 19, 2014) and 'Revisiting the Kono Statement Carries Japan-South Korea Relations into Unknown Waters' by SUGIURA Masaaki (March 31, 2014). To the right, a 'What's New' section highlights the latest 'JFIR E-Letter' (June 20, 2014) and a 'Greetings' section from Chairman IMAI Takashi, who notes the forum's establishment in 1987 and its role in international relations during the Cold War.

The JFIR’s sister organizations, The Global Forum of Japan (GFJ) and The Council on East Asian Community (CEAC), have their own e-Forum of “Giron-Hyakushutsu” and “Hyakka-Somei.” Each of the troika e-Forums is visited by about 10,000 visitors daily. It means that the troika system of e-Forums is visited by about 10 million visitors annually even though many of them are repeaters.

The List of Policy Recommendations

The most significant activity of JFIR is carried out by its Policy Council, which is engaged in policy research and helps its members to produce policy recommendations. The 37 sets of “Policy Recommendations,” which have so far been deliberated by the Policy Council, are shown below. Out of these 37 sets of “Policy Recommendations,” the 7th and the 34th failed to be adopted by the Policy Council due to lack of consensus in the Council.

1. *“The Structural Adjustment of Economies of Japan, U.S. and Asian NICs”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. WATANABE Toshio (March 3, 1988)
2. *“Long-term Political Vision for Stabilization and Cooperation in Northeast Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KAMIYA Fuji (March 15, 1989)
3. *“How to Best Utilize Economic Resources of Japan for Development of World Economy”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. KANAMORI Hisao (July 25, 1989)
4. *“Japan, the United States and Global Responsibilities”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. INOUCHI Takashi (April 5, 1990)
5. *“Stabilization of the International Monetary and Trade Systems”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. MANO Teruhiko (August 14, 1990)
6. *“Japan’s Response to the Changing Soviet Union”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. TAKUBO Tadae (April 10, 1991)
7. *“For a More Open Market in Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. TAKENAKA Kazuo (failing to be adopted by the Policy Council on February 27, 1992)
8. *“The Strengthening of the U.N. Peace Function and Japan’s Role”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SATO Seizaburo (October 7, 1992)
9. *“Japan’s Response to the Transformation of Socialist Economies in Asia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SATO Tsuneaki (June 8, 1993)
10. *“Political Cooperation with Europe: Japan’s Agenda for 21st Century”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. NAKANISHI Terumasa (November 16, 1993)
11. *“The Future of Regionalism and Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Mr. KOBAYASHI Minoru (June 17, 1994)
12. *“The Future of China in the Context of Asian Security”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KOJIMA Tomoyuki (January 25, 1995)
13. *“The Essence of U.S.-Japan Economic Conflicts and Japan’s Response”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SHIMADA Haruo (August 3, 1995)
14. *“The Perspective of Security Regimes in Asia-Pacific Region”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. WATANABE Akio (June 5, 1996)
15. *“The WTO System and Japan”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. SAKAMOTO Masahiro (November 27, 1996)
16. *“Japan’s ODA in the 21st Century”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KUSANO Atsushi (March 5, 1998)
17. *“Japan and International Society in the Age of Information Revolution”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. KUMON Shunpei (August 24, 1998)
18. *“Japan’s Initiatives towards US, China and Russia”* by the Task Force headed by Prof. ITO Kenichi

(April 19, 1999)

19. “*Economic Globalization and Options for Asia*” by the Task Force headed by Prof. TRAN Van Tho (May 27, 2000)
20. “*Towards Collective Human Security: A New Internationalism and Japan*” by the Task Force headed by Prof. INOBUCHI Kuniko (July 6, 2001)
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