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The Security Questions in the Post-War Era
-- Keynote Speech Delivered at the International Forum on the History of War --

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1. Definition of War and Its Origin

It is said that everything has a beginning and an end. War as a social institution has a beginning and therefore must have an end. This is the starting point of my argument today. War is an institution that emerges only after certain socioeconomic conditions are met. It, therefore, follows that when such conditions disappear, war has to come to an end. In my view, the social institution called “war” first appeared in the history of mankind about 10,000 years ago in the Mesolithic Age, and it has finally started to disappear in the era when we live today. When viewed from the standpoint of the history of war, the history of mankind may be divided into the three eras, namely, the “Pre-War Era”, the “War Era”, and the “Post-War Era”. Almost all of the past 10,000 years of human existence were a War Era. This has imbued man with the idea that war was unavoidable as something implanted in our DNA. Today, however, war is gradually disappearing from our sight, and it is of crucial importance for us to chew over the revolutionary significance of this development to understand the essence of security questions with which we are confronted today. This is the theme I would like to discuss today.

To avoid confusion or misunderstanding, let me first clarify the definition of the concept of “war”. *The New Encyclopedia Britannica* defines the term as follows; “Military writers usually confine the term of war to hostilities in which the contending groups are sufficiently equal in power to render the outcome uncertain for a time. Armed conflicts of powerful states with primitive peoples are usually called pacifications; with small states, interventions; and with internal groups, rebellions.”¹⁾ I think this defines the term “war” in its narrowest sense. Another definition includes not just pacifications, interventions and rebellions but all other forms of acts of organized violence that range from banditry and piracy to scuffles between private groups. In the latter case, the term “war” is used almost as a synonym of the term “conflict”. Depending on the sense in which it is used, answers to such questions as “what is the essence of war?” or “does war have an origin?” would vary. Arguments about the definition and the origin of war are so intertwined that conclusions as to the existence of the origin of war have necessarily to vary depending on the definition of war adopted by the argument concerned.

Some people argue that offensive instincts of human beings have their roots in animal instincts, that they existed before the human race emerged on the earth, and that, therefore, there is no origin of war. Lions form a battle formation, plan a strategy and hunt down their prey. Male monkeys fight one another for access to a female monkey or for control of their territory. In his essay on “*The Predatory Transition from*

Ape to Man,” Raymond Dart argues, “the small brain of the Australopithecine was demonstrably more than adequate for the crude, omnivorous cannibalistic human emergence. The loathsome cruelty of man is explicable only in terms of his carnivorous and cannibalistic origin.”²⁾ If there is no beginning of war as argued by Dart, there can be no end to it, and this leads us to the conclusion that man has to learn to live with war as a fate ingrained in his DNA.

On the other hand, Margaret Mead contends that “Warfare is only an invention, not a biological necessity”.³⁾ H. H. Turney-High argues that “Those people who do not avail themselves of these two sociological devices (the column and the line) are below the military horizon without argument. Their fighting can be nothing but a scuffle, regardless of the amount of bloodshed, and cannot be called a war. . . . The line is the simplest tactical formation, and a sociologic trait without which there can be no true war.”⁴⁾ Turney-High acknowledges that there is a beginning of war, and in this sense he shares the same conclusion with Mead. Arthur Ferrill concludes, “In the Mesolithic Age, 12,000 to 8,000 B.C., there was a revolution in weapons technology. Four staggeringly powerful new weapons made their first appearance, the bow, the sling, the dagger and the mace. This new, revolutionary weapons technology was combined with the invention of military tactics and, by historical standards, produced true warfare.” He also states, “Neolithic paintings clearly reveal the use of the bow and arrow against men as well as animals. This is not the case with Paleolithic cave paintings.”⁵⁾ Thus, he argues that the institution of war was not seen in the Paleolithic Age, and that it occurred and spread in the Neolithic Age.

2. War as an Attribute of the International Systems

That said, I would like to hazard a comment on the theories of the origin of war which I have introduced in the foregoing. Before so doing, however, I must clarify my definition of “war”, particularly, the definition of “war” as an institution distinguished from that of “conflict” or the line separating “war” from “conflict”, and the significance of drawing such a line between the two. “Conflict” and “war” are all alike in the sense that they are driven by the same offensive instincts inherent in human beings. Therefore, if we focus on this aspect of “conflict” and “war” alone, there is no gainsaying the conclusion that they are both a fact of our life and mankind is doomed to live with them to the end. However, if we turn our eyes to the other aspect of the fact of our life, we can see a different story. War being a social institution that emerged only when certain socioeconomic conditions were met, war may be eradicated when such conditions are removed. Here lies the difference between “war” and all other forms of “conflict”.

If this is the case, defining the scope of “war as a kind of conflict that could be eradicated” would serve an intellectually meaningful purpose. When a human being lets loose his offensive instincts against another human being, a conflict arises. Conflicts as such have existed since the days when human beings were apes. However, as Turney-High and Arthur Ferrill pointed out, human beings alone later started to avail themselves of, first, the powerful weapons such as the bow, the sling, the dagger and the mace and, second, the formation of the column and the line. And it was concluded that at this stage of history an institution of war was invented by man. But I would like to add a third condition as a requirement to the birth of war as an institution in the history of mankind. What is that condition?

War is a kind of conflict, but a peculiar kind of conflict. Conflicts are waged by a variety of human groups, but, when they are waged by a body or bodies that have a substance of “state”, those conflicts come to be called wars. Then, what is a state? In my view, a state consists of the three elements of territory, people and sovereignty. I would call a clash of arms between two bodies that have these three elements a war. Put another way, any body, if not called a state, that has territory, people and a political will independent from other bodies, could become a party to a war. I call such a body “an independent political unit.”⁶⁾ The introduction of this new concept is necessary to verify whether a war took place in the early period of the history of mankind when political organizations mature enough to be called a state did not exist, or to determine in later stages of history whether a conflict is a war or not when waged by a party that is not called a state even if the body has its territory, people and an independent political will (such as “warring parties” as defined in international law). In the study of international relations, an international system is understood to have been born when a plural number of “politically independent units” had come to contact with each other in a way to have regular relationships of action and reaction among them. Under the international system, an act of violence committed by a body which is not “an independent political unit” is dealt with as an internal problem of “the independent political unit” that has jurisdiction over the place where such an act of violence occurred. It is treated as a law-and-order problem subject to the exercise of police power. By contrast, when “an independent political unit” commits an act of violence against “another independent political unit”, it is considered to be an act of war, and the parties concerned try to deal with the problem by exercising military power against one another.

It is essential to understand accurately that the inseparability of war and the international system is the starting point of our arguments. When viewed in this

perspective, one can clearly see why the social institution called war did not make its appearance in the Paleolithic Age, and why it was in the Neolithic Age that war began to emerge. It is thought that “independent political units” in the Paleolithic Age were small hunter groups tied by blood that roamed through hills and plains in search of their prey. In those days, in the presence of a vast expanse of land sparsely populated by human beings, there were absolutely no man-made conditions that limited their movement. Therefore, no groups had the incentive to cling to a piece of land or to put down roots in any specific locations. In reality, the establishment of a permanent settlement at a location meant starvation. This is why they continued to migrate from one place to another. Even if a group came into contact with another in the course of such migration, the two groups simply passed each other, and there were no socioeconomic reasons why they should cause a conflict, let alone a war. This is why there are no traces of war in Paleolithic remains. In other words, an international system was not formed in the Paleolithic Age. In this sense, Joseph Frankel was absolutely right in saying, “The international system can exist only as a middle point between the two ends of a political unity and a complete lack of such a unity.”⁷⁾ To say that an international system does not exist, or that a relationship of action and reaction among the members of such a system is void is tantamount to saying that the institution called war has not occurred yet. It is important to bear in mind that the institution called war is an attribute of the international system, and that war was institutionalized as soon as such a system emerged.

Upon the arrival of the Neolithic Age, people started to settle at locations of their choice that had fertile soil and till the land. Those groups were formed by people who settled in the territory and continued to attract more people to come and join. Thus, the population of settlers grew larger and they began to accumulate wealth. In the course of such developments, the concept of land ownership emerged. Contacts and exchanges with neighboring groups have presumably begun. An international system has thus emerged, and various types of relationship of action and reaction have inevitably developed between such “independent political units”. While a cooperative relationship – namely, trade – might have developed, a rivalry relationship in which a contending group might try to take over the wealth or the land from another group by force of arms – namely, war – could also develop. In such cases, socioeconomic conditions that inevitably lead to the institutionalization of a war have become ripe. Herein lies the origin of the international system, and the origin of war.

3. Nuclear Weapons and their Deterrence Effects

A study of changes in historical perspectives of the socioeconomic conditions which brought about the emergence of war reveals an interesting fact. A historical review of the War Era of the past 10,000 years shed light on the nature of security questions we face in the Post-War Era of 21st century. It is important to view the changes in the socioeconomic conditions relating to war from four angles: 1) the technological aspect (revolutions in weapons technology), 2) the national interest aspect (war purposes), 3) the value aspect (one's view of war), and 4) the methodological aspects (theory of strategy).

Weapons revolution has taken place three times in the course of the history of the human race. As introduced earlier, Arthur Ferrill pointed out that the first revolution in weapons technology occurred in the Mesolithic Age, 12,000 to 8,000 B.C. New weapons such as the bow and the mace made their appearance in this period. People used horses as a means of transportation, and slings to attack castles. However, they failed to develop explosives as weapons. It was not until the second revolution in weapons technology early in the Modern Age that firearms and cannons made their appearance as principal weapons. In the battle of Marathon of 490 B.C., massed troops of heavily-equipped infantrymen of the ancient Greek army led by Miltiades defeated an ancient Persian army of archers and cavalrymen led by Darius the Great. On the other hand, taking full advantage of the mobility of the cavalry, the Mongolian army built by Genghis Khan trifled with, and destroyed, the armies of Japan and Europe that waged a hand-to-hand battle under the motto of *bushido* or chivalry.

However, when firearms and cannons made their appearance, and proved their worth, the whole pattern of the world history was changed. The descendants of Genghis Kan, who had lorded it over the rolling plains of Siberia, were crushed by a handful of Cossacks, and the Inca Empire and the Aztec Empire that had reveled in splendor for centuries in the New World were conquered all too quickly by a handful of Spanish soldiers – all by the overwhelmingly strong destructive power of explosives. Not just the inhabitants of Siberia and the New World but the Mogul Empire of India and the Ching Dynasty of China knuckled under to invading British soldiers who came aboard steam-driven ironclad warships. The world map of the Modern Age was thus redrawn completely.⁸⁾

In this context, the advent of nuclear weapons is characterized as the third weapons revolution. Nuclear weapons have drastically changed the character of, and the role played by, the power that defines the relationship of action and reaction among “independent political units” in the international system. If the incapacitation, by the advent of firearms and cannons, of the nomadic tribes who had lorded it over the vast

territory of Siberia by using a combination of the trajectory of arrows and the mobility of horses, changed the pattern of modern history, it may well be said that nuclear weapons has choreographed contemporary history.

After all, the distinctive quality of nuclear weapons is the tremendous destructive power they produce. Indeed, a hydrogen bomb the Soviet Union tested in 1961 produced an explosive power of 58 megatons (equivalent to the combined explosive power of 4,462 atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima). At the height of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union, the former had 25,000 strategic, theater and tactical nuclear warheads, and the latter, 45,000 – and they created a situation of overkill. It was plain to anyone that, once a nuclear exchange would take place, no room would be left for either side to emerge as a winner. A so-called MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) system was thus established. The United States set a goal of gaining “a clear and unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable degree of damage upon any aggressor even after absorbing a surprise first strike.” In such cases, 200 cities of the Soviet Union, one-third of its population, and two-thirds of its industry were expected to suffer an unacceptable degree of damage. Subsequently, the U.S.-Soviet confrontation became a thing of the past, and under the Offensive Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (“the Moscow Treaty”) signed this year, the United States and Russia promised each other to reduce the number of readily deployable strategic nuclear warheads to about 2,000 each. Theoretically, the MAD system is not to be affected by this reduction. In reality, however, as the treaty allows both signatories to stockpile the removed warheads, Russia, which does not have the financial resources to stockpile the removed warheads, is presumed to have given up the idea of maintaining a nuclear balance with the United States. The MAD system seems to have gone, and in its place we now see what we might call a UAD(Unilateral Assured Destruction) system, under which the United States acts as a single-handed policeman. In any event, it must be said that nuclear weapons, once called “the final weapon” and/or “the absolute weapon”, still serve as a factor deterring all major countries in the world from starting war.

4. The irrelevance of Territorial Expansion as a Vehicle for the Promotion of National Interests

Acts done by man are composed of a purpose and its means. Referring to the purpose and its means of war, Karl von Clausewitz aptly said, “War is nothing but an extension of politics, conducted through the means different from those used in politics.” Let me pause briefly to consider what was the political objective that nations wanted to achieve through war. Abstractly speaking, many would argue that it was their

security and prosperity. But speaking more concretely, most would agree that it was the expansion of their territory. That is to say, there were socioeconomic conditions that led nations to the conclusion that the expansion of their territory was in their national interests. It, therefore, follows that if such socioeconomic conditions disappear, territorial expansion – and war as a means of achieving such political objectives – loses its ground. Here I wish to divide the past 10,000 years of the “War Era” into three Periods, namely, the “Regional Hegemonic War Period”, the “World Partitioning War Period” and the “World Hegemonic War Period”.

In the world before Christopher Columbus and other Europeans set sail for non-European worlds, there had been no worldwide international system. In that world, several regional international systems co-existed in separation from each other as so effected by the limited availability of means of transportation and communication of the time. To cite a few of them, they were the medieval Latin Christendom, Arab-Islamic system, Indian subcontinental system, and the sphere of Chinese dynasties. The geographical scope of these regional international systems varied widely from very limited ones seen in the Neolithic Age to vast domains conquered by ancient empires. Moreover, the geographical expanses underwent frequent changes as they were subdivided or enlarged in the course of war and peace. Anyhow, these regional international systems formed a small cosmos and went through the process of chaotic disturbances and orderly equilibriums. It was “Regional Hegemonic Wars” that brought the chaotic disturbance(or rivalry) of plural local forces into the orderly equilibrium(or harmony) of unified forces. And when such equilibriums collapsed in time, the process for the reconstruction of order was started again. Such processes had continued for thousands of years. This notwithstanding, given the purposes of most of the wars fought across the world in this Age, they may be collectively characterized as “Regional Hegemonic Wars”.

During the four centuries of 16th through 19th, Europeans forayed into non-European worlds, and by taking monopolistic advantage of the overwhelming firepower as produced by the second weapons revolution, they conquered and colonized the non-European part of the earth among themselves. I would call the wars waged in this Era “World-Partitioning Wars.” We can of course call them “Colonial Wars,” but I think it is more apt to call them “World-Partitioning Wars” for the purpose of observations I want to make. The partition of the rest of the world was completed by the end of the 19th century.

In the 20th century that followed, imperialistic wars erupted between what were then called the haves and the have-nots. In this sense, we may be able to call those

wars “World-Repatriation Wars.” A case in point is World War I. However, I would prefer to call all the world-scale wars in the 20th century, including World War II and the Cold War, “World Hegemonic Wars” collectively. In my view, following the birth of a worldwide international system brought about as a result of the “World-Partitioning Wars”, “World Hegemonic Wars” were fought for the same purpose and logic as those for which “Regional Hegemonic Wars” were fought in the regional context. There is no gainsaying the fact that those three wars in the 20th century have one thing in common, i.e. they were all fought by two worldwide camps in quest of the global hegemony.

The third “World Hegemonic War” ended as a Cold War with no shot exchanged. This was effected by the nuclear deterrence which prevailed as a corollary to the third weapons revolution. Noteworthy is the formation of an international system that has a new attribute that might be called “a no-war system” among industrialized democracies. Through the “Regional Hegemonic War Period”, the “World Partitioning War Period”, and the “World Hegemonic War Period” – or all through what I call the “War Era” – territorial expansion was indeed the ultimate national interest. Now, however, nations have come around to the view that territorial expansion is not logically in the national interest, and that the exercise of the force of arms does not pay. It means that such socioeconomic conditions have emerged as to make governments think that war does not pay. Indeed, it must be said that a major change has occurred, a change comparable to that which occurred to mankind about 10,000 year ago, when people stopped hunting animals and started tilling the land. Thus, people began to claim the right to own and use land exclusively.

Most fundamental of the changes that took place was a drastic decline in weight of the value of land as one of the four factors of production, the other three being capital, technology and labor. In other words, incentives for expanding territory to increase wealth (namely, production) have become minimal while the cost of war waged to expand territory has increased maximally. In addition to this basic change of conditions, there is a secondary change called “democratic peace.” Democratic governments cannot go to war without an agreement of their people, and their top priority is to promote the welfare of their citizens. Further, there is a third change. Thanks to the Bretton Woods regime which helped the post-World War economies to develop in the direction towards a free, multilateral, and non-discriminatory trade system, economic interdependence among countries in the free world has been instituted so solidly that a recession and/or insolvency in one country is sure to deliver an immediate blow at another within the system. I liken such economic interdependence among Western industrialized democracies to the “Mutual Assured

Destruction” that existed in the military relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, and call it the “Economic MAD” or the “Eco-MAD.” Under the Eco-MAD, it is no more possible for any nation to resort to war to settle an international dispute “because it will not solve problems but lead to military as well as economic suicide.”⁹⁾ Therefore, if the age-old maxim of international politics that “war is an inherent attribute of the international system” is still valid, today’s world system must be said to be no longer an international system or to be a system different from what is understood as an international system. Indeed, it must be said that a revolutionary state of affairs is emerging. There are no military installations along the borders shared by Germany and France, as well as by the United States and Canada. Following the end of the Cold War, such “No-War Regime” as developed among the industrialized democracies of the West is now rapidly expanding into a worldwide system. It is true that there are still a few countries such as Iraq and North Korea that doggedly cling to expansionistic and belligerent values, but they are isolated exceptions. There is no denying the fact that, as a general trend in the international system as a whole, the governments of an overwhelming majority of countries are losing interest in territorial expansion as a political goal.

5. Outlawing War and Farewell to War

Next, I would like to review man’s outlook on war and changes it has gone through. A survey of changes through which man’s outlook on war has gone – or how man viewed and dealt with war – found that while he recognized the usefulness of, and justified, war, he wanted to avoid it, if possible, because of the bloodshed it caused. In other words, it was an outlook on war that weighed its usefulness against its cost.

The view that glorifies war or at least recognizes that war has a certain role to play in human society and contributes to the development of human civilization has existed from of old. Particularly, as military casualties of wars fought before the second weapons revolution were relatively limited, the idea was accepted that if a war brought about sufficient reward in the way of justice and public order even at a certain cost of bloodshed, such war was justified. It was Heracleitos of ancient Greece who declared without scruple that “war is the father and the king of all things.” More recently, Herbert Spencer, who had developed the Darwinian theory of evolution, asserted in support of war that “Rivalry and conflicts between individuals and between groups of people contribute to the progress and development of mankind.”

For all that, however, there were people from of old who, aware of the loathsome cost of war that had to be paid in bloodshed, sought to minimize such cost.

It is worthy of note that wise men of ancient China advocated such an outlook on war. Among the books on war and strategy, they say: "The Sacred King calls his army a lethal weapon and uses it only when forced to do so" (Rikuto); "The army is an ominous instrument and Heaven hates it. To use it only without any other choice is the way Heaven chooses" (Sanryaku); and "War is a matter of critical importance to a country. It spells the difference between life and death. It determines the fate of a nation. It should never be made light of" (Sun-tzu). These leading thinkers called for consideration of the negative aspects inherent in war. Also in the pre-Christian Europe, Lucius Seneca, a Stoic, opposed war by saying that "To say that murder by an individual is a crime but that murder by a state is a glory is not reasonable. Victors bring disasters to mankind."

The point I would like to touch upon in this context is the outlook on war that emerged in Christian Europe. It is the "holy war" theory that characterizes war as a sword to right the wrong according to the will of God. As demonstrated by the Crusades, it was one of the most positive pro-war theories. The "holy war" theory was not an outlook on war that was limited to the Christian Europe of the Middle Ages. As it was demonstrated by the Saracens of the 7th and 8th centuries who conquered neighboring nations by brandishing a sword in one hand and the Koran in the other, and by the post-Revolution French army that had advanced into the neighboring countries of Europe under the flag of republicanism, it was an outlook on war to which many countries subscribed to propagate their fanatic religious beliefs or to export their revolutionary political ideologies.

In contrast, there were people who, while sharing awareness of negative aspects of war with the anti-war theory, did not negate all wars by differentiating "just war" from "unjust war", characterized wars that were inevitable and tolerable as a necessary evil, and asserted that wars should be restrained within a certain limit. This was the "just war" theory. Aurelius Augustinus of the 4th century and Thomas Aquinas of the 13th century built the theological foundations of the theory, while Hugo Grotius of the 17th century and Emmerich de Vattel of the 18th century established its legitimacy based on international law.

However, as it entered the 19th century, emphasis moved to the equality of sovereignty from the standpoint of strengthening national sovereignty, and an outlook on war that considered war a matter of discretion of sovereign states and made no distinction between just and unjust wars has prevailed. This is the "Non-Discriminatory Outlook on War". In the belief that there is an international law that applies even in wartime, a wartime international law that prescribes rules for

neutrality and hostilities has been framed rapidly. The “Convention regarding the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare” adopted at the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 formed the core of such wartime international law. The Convention took it for granted that each of the warring countries were entitled to an equal legal position because that was the logical consequence of the nature of war. War was a game, and the rules that were necessary for the game of war were the wartime international law.

The years rolled on into the 20th century, and the international community that had witnessed the ravages of the two World Wars had to change its outlook on war for the third time, and the conclusion it reached was the outlawing of war. The new outlook on war that owed its birth to the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaty of the Renunciation of War, and became a full-fledged one under the Charter of the United Nations divides wars into an aggressive war and military sanctions. It recognizes no neutrality and does not even classify an aggressive war as a war on the ground that is an unlawful act. This means an end not just of the “Non-Discriminatory Outlook on War” but of the legal base of war. As war is no longer a lawful act and merely is a criminal act, the wartime international law is not applied to it as the rules of the game. There are only new rules that govern crime and punishment. In reality, however, a war-like situation could develop and in such cases, measures for a legal solution of humanitarian problems should be readied. With this in mind, a new legal system such as an international humanitarian law, not a wartime international law, is being formulated, and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional protocols of 1977 provide for the protection of the sick and wounded, and for the treatment of prisoners of war. Worthy of note in this connection is the fate of the 384 al-Qaeda men in custody in the “bird cages” of Guantanamo base in Cuba. The Bush Administration takes the position that al-Qaeda is not a state, that it merely is a terrorist group, that its men are unlawful combatants, and that they are not prisoners of war as defined by the Geneva Convention. The Bush Administration plans to try them at a military tribunal composed of prosecutors, judges and even counsels who are drawn exclusively from the U.S. armed forces.¹⁰ Aside from the question whether it is right or wrong, this reminds us that the Sept. 11 attacks and the military campaign against Afghanistan are not “a new war” but “a new event” that has occurred in a world where the institution of war is disappearing.

6. A Copernican Change in the Theory of War

Lastly, I would like to review, from the standpoint of the theory of war, how war has been treated. In Japan, the word *senjutsu* means the tactics of war and *seiryaku*, the

wisdom of politics. And the word *senryaku* (strategy) that combines the word *sen* (war) and *ryaku* (wisdom) denotes the wisdom of war. The English word “strategy,” the German word “strategie,” the French word “strategie” and the Russian word “

” are all derived from an ancient Greek word “strategia” (στρατηγία), while it is a derivative from the ancient Greek word “strategos,” (στρατηγός) which means “the art of generalship.” Thus, the theory of strategy has been developed, East and West, as a theory of how to win a war. Central to, or at the core of, the theory was the quest of an assured victory. As he sought an elixir of life, man has been chasing his unattainable dream of an assured victory in war. There were men who firmly believed in the existence of such a theory valid at all times in all places. Antoine H. Jomini, for one, believed in *Prinzip der inneren Linien* that sought an assured victory through the use of the inner line. Napoleon Bonaparte believed in the MV^2 formula (M stands for military force and V the velocity of movement) that stressed the decisive importance of speed. It may be said that these theories are the manifestations of their quest of an assured victory. In the Orient, also, as the word *hiden* (hereditary secret) or *ougi* (ultimate secret) suggest, thinkers of strategic and tactical affairs had long sought to develop a recipe for an assured victory in a war.

However, believers in these theories of strategy – viewing war as a game, in which they were to manipulate divisions and armies just as they moved pieces on a chessboard – had to rethink their point of view in the face of the experience they had had either in the battlefields or at the headquarters of World War I and World War II. They were made aware of the existence – or the imperative – of a strategy which was something more than a simple military strategy; namely, state strategy, higher strategy or grand strategy. That which prompted them to rethink their strategy was the superb leadership provided by Winston Churchill during World War II. As head of his wartime Cabinet, Prime Minister Churchill played a central role in the management of his country’s war efforts covering politics, diplomacy, military and economic affairs. In addition, in close coordination with President Franklin Roosevelt, Churchill fought a prolonged and devastating war in the global scale by organizing the efforts of the allied forces. It was this maneuvering of his that historians called “grand strategy.”

One of the first military thinkers who recognized the necessity of rethinking the conventional wisdom of strategy was Basil Liddell Hart. Liddell Hart, a student at Cambridge University, who had entered the army as a volunteer, happened to be involved in the Battle of the Somme of July 1916 and was traumatized by the sight of tragic human sufferings. And his experience in that battle had a profound impact on the subsequent formation of his thought.¹¹⁾ It is said that his celebrated theory of

strategy – which argues that a victory in a modern war has outlived its relevance as an objective of war, and leadership devoid of an idea for postwar peace has become senseless – owed its origin to the experience he had had in the Battle of the Somme.¹²⁾ It was Liddell Hart who challenged the wisdom of the conventional theory which used to say, “All that is necessary is to win in the battlefield.” It was he who raised the basic question “what does a victory mean?” He theorized that the ultimate aim of war was to secure peace after the war, and that postwar peace had to be a sustainable one. It was at this juncture that the history of thoughts on war and the history of theories of strategy underwent a Copernican change from one of “how to win war” to one of “how to win peace”. It may not be an accident that Liddell Hart divined ahead of his contemporaries the implications of nuclear weapons that had made their appearance toward the end of World War II. In the post-World War world armed with nuclear weapons, the idea of nuclear deterrence became the main current of strategic thinking, and it was only natural that the strategic thinking changed its aim from one aimed at “winning a war” to one aimed at “preventing a war”. Today after the end of the Cold War, the concern of strategic thinkers is rapidly shifting to the concepts of “human security” and “conflict prevention”. One cannot escape the conclusion that such a Copernican change in the way of strategic thinking is a reflection of changes taking place in today’s world conditions – the end of the “War Era” .

7. The State of Equilibrium to Which Today’s International System Has Attained

Following the birth of a worldwide international system that had resulted from the “World-Partitioning Wars” by the end of the 19th century, three major “World Hegemonic Wars” were fought for the same purpose and logic as those for which “Regional Hegemonic Wars” were fought in each of the regional international systems. It is through the changes caused by the results of those three major “World Hegemonic Wars” that the worldwide international system as we see today has emerged. At the beginning of the 20th century, the nascent worldwide international system was in a state of chaotic disturbances caused by the rivalry among contending imperialistic nations. The human race had to undergo three major “World Hegemonic Wars” to see such a state of chaotic disturbances evolving into the state of orderly equilibrium which today’s international system has attained. What distinguished “World Hegemonic Wars” from “Regional Hegemonic Wars” was the means used to prosecute a war. World War I was a classic war in the sense that it was fought mainly with military strength. Yet, it took on a strong tinge of an all-out war. As for World War II, it was plain to anybody

that the war was fought not just by military strength but with all of the resources available political, economic, social and cultural. Indeed, the Cold War took on the characteristics of a war that was fought with all but military resources – to such an extent that it did not fit the description of an orthodox war as we know it.

Be that as it may, today's worldwide international system has finally attained a state of equilibrium(or harmony) among nations as a result of the three "World Hegemonic Wars". As Francis Fukuyama pointed out in his book *The End of History and the Last Man*,¹³⁾ democracy and market economy are being widely accepted as man's common values. After the end of the Cold War, not only are the communist-bloc countries shifting their systems rapidly to democracy and market economies but the process of globalization allowing freedom of cross-border movement of factors of production is becoming a fact of life. Joseph Frankel observed, "an international system exists only as a mid-point between political unity and a complete lack of unity."⁷⁾ If an international system did not exist in the Paleolithic Age because of "a complete lack of unity", it may be said that today's international system is infinitely closing in upon a point where the international system would fade away because "a political unity" has been achieved. States, a building block of the international system, are rapidly losing their "independence" as "an independent political unit". At least, it is obvious that countries that enjoy sufficient independence for launching a war single-handedly have almost disappeared. It must be said that an international system in the classic sense is becoming extinct, and that the world is entering an entirely new stage.¹⁴⁾ Given the definition that "war is a clash of forces between political bodies that are mutually independent", one cannot escape the conclusion that today's worldwide international system is in a situation where war of such a definition has lost the base for its existence.

Opinions are divided as to how the order or regime of today's international system is maintained. Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindleburger represent a school, which advocates the theory of hegemonic stability. They argue that a world order is maintained by the presence of a hegemonic power and that, as the hegemonic power starts declining, so the world order begins to disintegrate. On the other hand, Robert Keohane and others advance the theory of international regime. They maintain that there are principles, norms, rules and procedures in each of the issue areas that guide the behaviors of principal actors in those areas, and that such an international regime do not immediately disintegrate even when the world hegemonic power starts declining. I am of the opinion that these two theories, while emphasizing different aspects of the same international system, complement each other. In any event, the classic

institution of war is losing its base for existence on account of such developments that have occurred recently in the international system.

8. The Security Questions in the Post-War Era

This is to say, however, neither that all the security questions facing us have been answered, nor that the Garden of Eden has finally emerged before us. Even if the social institution called “war” fades away, a broader concept of “conflict” remains to be implanted in man’s DNA, and it will reappear in various non-war forms. This is because the worldwide international system (the world order, or the international regime) has not been perfected yet. Centering around the Western industrialized democracies, what might be called the “Non-War Community” of nations is being formed, and is expanding by absorbing countries outside the “Non-War Community”. Not only the eastward widening policy of the European Union but also the engagement policy of Japan and the United States towards China is intended to make the “Non-War Community” genuinely universal. However, there are a few states and non-states, that are aggressively opposed to the international system which I here call the “Non-War Community”. The security questions we face in the “Post-War Era” lie in how the “Non-War Community” should – or can – deal with these aggressive outside actors. Before doing this job, however, we need to clear our mind of the obsession of memories of the “War Era” and its accompanying outlook on security. Instead, we need to face up to the reality of the “Post-War Era” and form a new outlook on future security. When Japan debated a United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill in the Diet in October 1990, then-President of the Japan Socialist Party, Doi Takako, succeeded in killing the bill by asking her fellow Diet members whether they are “for war or for peace” and by exhorting them “not to repeat the same mistake as in the last war,” and “not to send our young men to battlefields.”¹⁵⁾ This is a demonstrable example of a person, blindfolded by an outlook on security in the “War Era”, failing to see the true nature of today’s and tomorrow’s security realities. I must say that it is incumbent on Japan to join the nascent “Non-War Community” and actively contribute to achieving the common objective.

I said that there were a few states and non-states, that were aggressively opposed to the “Non-War Community”. Who are they? They can be divided into the following three groups. The first group is composed of states called “rogue nations” that consider territorial expansion in their national interests and the use of force an effective means to attain such an objective. A case in point is the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on Aug. 2, 1990. The second group consists of non-state actors that commit

atrocities such as genocide and ethnic cleansing in so-called failed states. Cases in point are the massacre of the Tutsi minority by the Hutu majority in Rwanda and the ethnic cleansing of the Muslim minority by the Serbian majority in Yugoslavia. Both took place in the first half of 1990s. The last group is global terrorists. Terrorist groups who have built worldwide networks by taking advantage of the globalization mount attacks on arbitrarily chosen targets anywhere in the world in pursuit of a certain ideology. The most shocking case was the terrorist attacks of the World Trade Center of New York on Sept. 11, 2001. A point that must be noted in this connection is the fact that rogue nations and failed states may provide the global terrorists with a hideout or a launching base.¹⁶⁾ We must bear in mind that these three kinds of actor groups that constitute basic threats to the peace and stability in the “Post-War Era” are not isolated from one another.

Where the first question of rogue nations is concerned, the most orthodox response of ours should be to strengthen the collective security system under the United Nations Charter that outlaws aggression and provides sanctions against it. However, given the possibility of its Security Council failing to act because of a veto, it is important to redefine and strengthen the role of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty so that they may serve more effectively as a guarantor of peace in the region concerned. The immediate problem facing the world is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and that facing Japan is to establish an interpretation of its Constitution to recognize Japan’s collective defense right.

With respect to the second question of atrocities by non-state actors in failed states, it is necessary to support the “peacekeeping operations” of the United Nations and to emphasize the standpoint of “human security”. At the same time, we must recognize that this problem is concomitant with the collapse or failure of a state. For this reason, international organizations, governments and non-government organizations(NGOs) are asked to work together in their long-term and comprehensive efforts from the standpoint of “conflict prevention”. While the concepts of “human security” and “conflict prevention” played peripheral roles in the “War Era”, they will have to come into the limelight in the “Post-War Era”.

Where the third question of global terrorists is concerned, it is essential for the international security cooperation to take necessary measures to smoke them out of their operation bases and to eradicate them. But it is also indispensable for the world community to do its best to eliminate social and economic discrimination and political oppression that produce a hotbed for them. For the illegality of terrorist activities to

be established, there must be provided an option of “peaceful change of the status quo”. For this reason, the international community is urged to make its all-out efforts to work out a peaceful solution to the Palestinian and the Chechen problems.

As for Japan, it is imperative to realize that we have reached a point where we can no longer remain indifferent to these problems.

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